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International migration and modern means of transportation and communi-
cation make it easier for people to meet and form relationships across borders
and national origins. The growth of academic interest in marriage migration
and family migration has led to greater attention being paid to (im)migrant
families and couples and the formation of mixed unions between migrants and
natives. While migrant women were long overlooked in migration studies, they
are now established subjects of research. However, the (re)production of gen-
der inequalities through migration remains neglected, especially in quantitative
research.
This PhD research seeks to address this gap through a comparative study of
migrants’ couple formation and gendered dynamics in France and the United
Kingdom. Starting with a critical, historical and political examination of survey
data on mixedness and migration in both countries, it investigates the difficulty
and the necessity of considering migration as a gendered experience of mobility.
That is, not simply who migrates or how many migrate, but how they migrate,
with whom and at what point in their life. Using Understanding Society and
Trajectoires et Origines data, this PhD models and weighs the complex interlock-
ing of migration in the life course through sequences of migration and family
formation, which it ultimately connects to patterns of paid and unpaid labour
division between partnered women and men.
Through sequence analysis, it constructs a typology of union-migration
trajectories which reveals the gendered paths of migration and mixedness. These
trajectories, in turn, help make sense of why, for migrant women, both migration
and mixing can be associated with heightened gender-specialisation of house-
work and care work on the one hand, and paid work on the other. By presenting
an analysis which emphasizes trajectories and intermarriage (rather than profiles
and endogamous unions), this PhD offers a complex analysis of how gender
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Introduction
In a world increasingly interconnected and globalised, the rise of interna-
tional migrations and modern means of transportation and communication have
made it gradually easier for people to meet, and to form and maintain relation-
ships across borders and national origins. In this context, there has also been a
rise in unions and families made up of individuals born in different countries
(Breger & Hill, 1998; Heikkilä & Yeoh, 2010; Waldis & Byron, 2006). Meanwhile,
the growing attention towards family migration and reunification as the main
entryway into Europe has been associated with greater interest in how migrants
form families and find and recruit partners. The propensity of migrants to in-
termarry with the native majority group - those born in the country, as part
of the majority group (generally defined in ethnic terms and perceived to be
the historical and indigenous occupants of the land1) - is a long-standing topic
of sociological interest (e.g. Gordon (1964), Kalmijn (1998), and Varro (2003)).
Intermarriage rates are commonly interpreted as an indicator of social cohesion
or, symmetrically, social fragmentation between groups; at the level of migrant
individuals, intermarriage is generally held to denote a high degree of integration
and acculturation.
It would not be unfair to state that the question of gender relations – and not
simply gendered differences – has been little focused on in quantitative research
on intermarriage and migration. While there is no shortage of discussion on the
roles that migration and migrants may play in re-shaping societies in immigration
countries, the gender consequences and the gendered mechanisms at play have
seldom been empirically investigated. This is puzzling when considering that
media and political discourse alike seem to routinely associate migrant families
with patriarchal gender norms and practices towards women; immigrants, the
story goes, bring with them backward and oppressive gender cultures (ranging
from somewhat stricter gender roles all the way down to female genital mutila-
tion) from which women – native women especially – must be protected. This
understanding of migration as a medium through which patriarchal remnants
1This differs in cases such as the US, Canada or Australia, where the historical populations
(native Americans and Aboriginals) are not the majority and certainly not the dominant groups.
However, the reasoning applies for more recent immigration waves.)
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are imported in (and therefore are alien to) Western societies has been denounced
by – some – feminists, who have pointed out the role that this narrative plays
into justifying a self-satisfied status quo on gender equality in the majority group,
whilst simultaneously patronizing and disempowering migrant and minority
women (Delphy, 2008; Hark & Villa, 2020). Despite this prevailing narrative, the
fact remains that we have little quantitative empirical scholarship to bring to this
discussion. On one hand, the intermarriage scholarship is almost single-mindedly
focused on integration, either implied in intermarriage or, more rarely, measured
through economic and, more rarely educational performance (e.g. Kalmijn (2010)
and Meng and Gregory (2005)) or identity construction (P. J. Aspinall, 2003;
Breger & Hill, 1998; Unterreiner, 2012b). On the other hand, migration stud-
ies concentrate most of their attention on migrants’ economic contribution and
performance. Though migrant women, long overlooked in migration studies,
have become a subject of research in their own right, largely thanks to the ef-
forts of feminist scholarship since the 1980s (e.g. (Morokvasic, 1983; Pedraza,
1991; Truong, 1996), the (re)production of gender hierarchies and inequalities
throughout and as a result of migration and mixing remains very much in the
background of quantitative research on intermarriage and on migration.
Part of this is linked to the fact that the scholarship on intermarriage and
mixed unions revolve much more often about rates of intermarriage across var-
ious migrant groups, that is, on what intermarriages represent, rather than on
what it produces socially (a point also made by e.g. Kalmijn (2010)). To put it
differently, mixed unions are more likely to be treated as a dependent variable,
rather than as a independent variable. In the main, the scholarship refers to
gender relations only to explain gender differences in the propensity to inter-
marry, that is, to form exogamous relationships, outside the group, in contrast
to endogamous relationships, when the partner is recruited within the group. It
is widely acknowledged that, with some exceptions (such as e.g. Chinese or
Vietnamese women in the US), minority and migrant men are on the whole
more likely to form exogamous relationships than women (Hwang, Saenz, &
Aguirre, 1997; Jacobs & Labov, 2002; Qian, 1997), a social fact often explained
by patriarchal order within ethnic and migrant communities whereby women’s
mating and partnerships are more tightly monitored than men’s, and women
have less independence and power to leverage to impose a mixed union. Yet
how this patriarchal order exactly operates, and how this works with regards to
migrant-native mixing is much more often assumed than empirically researched.
When it comes to gender relations, research has found that most migrants
hold somewhat more patriarchal beliefs than those held in the destination country,
although differences between groups and between generations are large (Roeder
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& Mühlau, 2014). While migrant women worldwide are more likely to be in paid
employment than women who do not migrate (UN statistics - 2019), migrant
women to the UK and France have lower rates of labour market engagement
than their native counterparts (ONS (2016) and INSEE (2017) reports). The rates,
however, vary widely by country of origins, partner characteristics (native or
migrant, co-ethnic or not), and by migration category – i.e. mainly articulated as
the differences between ’family migrants’, ’economic migrants’ and (sometimes)
’refugees’. A more complex appreciation of migration trajectories in a perspective
informed by life-course theory is much needed. Furthermore, although the
growing research stream around global care chains has articulated notions of the
gender division of labour (including housework and care work) with regards
to international migration and migrant families, it has been mainly through
analyses of a global and intersectional gender division of labour (Hochschild,
2000; Kofman, 2014; Mies, 2014; Parreñas, 2005, 2015). Consequently, the gender
division of labour at the micro-level of the couple, while a core concept and culprit
for gender inequalities in feminist theory (Delphy, 1977; Hartsock, 1983; Kergoat,
1982), has been very rarely analysed empirically with reference to migration
and/or intermarriage, and the little scholarship that there is mostly addresses
variations in gender relations in couples through the prism of migrants’ origins
(migrant or ethnic group) and gender-acculturation. To different migrant groups
are associated more or less patriarchal gender cultures, which may be more or less
diluted by acculturation processes (e.g. Kan and Laurie (2018) and Roeder and
Mühlau (2014). The acculturation process is indexed on the time spent in the
country of immigration, an early age at migration, and presumably also a mixed
relationship with a native partner.
Yet we know from qualitative scholarship that the migration paths and
modes of recruitment leading to unions between majority natives and migrants
are deeply varied, from mail-order brides and marriage migrants (Chiu, 2017;
Suksomboon, 2011) to couples who met and fell in love in the country of immi-
gration where the migrant partner had already settled (e.g. Fleischer (2011)) or
subsequently decided to stay (e.g. Varro (1984)). Some of these paths overlap
with those more commonly analysed in connection to so-called ’transnational’
marriages - unions formed between a first-generation migrant and a native-born
descendant of migrants from the same country (Beck-Gernsheim, 2007; Charsley,
Bolognani, & Spencer, 2017).
I argue that much more attention needs to be paid to the process of migration
and couple formation itself. Drawing on feminist theorists of migration, I suggest
that the paths that lead to migrants intermarrying (or not) need to be understand
in the context of migration experiences which are both gendered and gendering
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(Pedraza, 1991). Gendered because men and women do not tread the same jour-
ney: there are great gender discrepancies in calendars of migration and family
formation, as well as in legal pathways of migration. Gendering (in the sense
of entrenching or changing gender roles) because these geographical, temporal
and legal sequences of migration impact how migrants enter a country, how
dependent they are on their partner, how likely they are to get paid and secure
employment, and ultimately how couples will distribute housework, childcare
and elderly care. In the different ways that migration and couple formation inter-
lock over the life course, gender roles can be further entrenched or renegotiated,
and not only as a result of exposure to other gender norms. ’Gendered geogra-
phies of power’ (Mahler & Pessar, 2009) need to be considered, because they
help understand two seemingly contradictory observations: that - firstly - unions
with a native Westerner may appear, to women especially, like an option worth
uprooting for, even though - secondly - these unions and the migration they entail
also lead to acute gender inequalities between partners. Indeed, migration and
family formation trajectories influence the balance of power and the distribution
of resources between partners - often, though not always, at the disadvantage of
women (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1992, 1994).
Greater scrutiny of the varied paths of migration and couple formation
reveals unsurprisingly a more complex landscape. Certain trajectories such as
marriage migration, have been qualitatively associated with acute dependency
(legal, economic, social) of the marriage migrant on the sponsoring partner
(Charsley, Storer-Church, Benson, & Van Hear, 2012). In terms of the context
in which the couple form and start cohabitation, this can be contrasted with
situations where, for example, the migrant partner migrated independently,
and only met their native partner when they were already well-established in
the country of immigration. These interlocked paths of migration and couple
formation can be expected to be deeply gendered: women are much more likely
to be already partnered when they migrate; men are much more likely to migrate
as single adults. Gender relations both in the country of origin and in the country
of destination shape the migration and family formation paths in which men and
women are channeled. But legal categories of admission alone can not capture
the complexity of these processes (González-Ferrer, 2011), although it is no doubt
an important factor. Two of the issues with focusing on the legal mode of entry
(beyond its obvious reductionism) are that, firstly, such data is rarely collected,
and indeed almost never available in surveys that also include an interest in
household and gender dynamics. Secondly, using the legal category of admission
as proxy for the interlocking of family formation and migration (as e.g. González-
Ferrer (2006, 2011) does) means that one must exclude from the analysis migrants
Introduction 5
who are exempt from visa requirements - typically EU migrants. In contrast,
using the sequencing of family formation stages and migration applies to all
migrants’ families. We are here compelled to move beyond making space simply
for legal or ethnicised profiles of migrants - even gendered profiles - to consider
biographies and trajectories of couples.
Considering the UK and France as case studies
As longstanding countries of immigration, the UK and France (like e.g. the
USA or Canada) have long produced research on intermarriage (see notably
Berrington (1994), Caballero (2012), Coleman (1994), Edwards (2012), Muttarak
and Heath (2010), Rodríguez-García (2006), and Song and Aspinall (2012) for
the UK, Barbara (1993), Collet (1993), Girard (1964), Lévi-Strauss (1949), Noiriel
(1996), Safi (2008), Santelli and Collet (2003), Todd (1994), and Varro (1995) for
France). Yet the definition of what constitutes a mixed couple diverge between
the two countries. Where family formation within and between ethnic groups
has been more researched in the UK, French demographers and sociologists have
produced some of the richest European scholarship on migrant-native mixing
(Collet, 2015; Collet & Régnard, 2011; Hamel, Lhommeau, Pailhé, & Santelli,
2015), benefiting from a well-established tradition of research on family-related
migration and migrant families more broadly (Kofman, 2004). France and the UK
have often been contrasted with one another, as opposite models of integration
and nationhood (see e.g. Brubaker (2001) and Favell (1998) and on mixedness
specifically: Unterreiner (2012a, 2012b). They are also considered to represent
different models of welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990), different ’varieties of
capitalism’ (Soskice & Hall, 2001). Yet their immigration histories have much
in common, as do their immigration regime and immigration debates in both
countries around migrants, migrant families, and gender. In terms of gender
relations and gender inequalities, they can be considered broadly comparable;
and importantly, the survey data is there in both countries, with enough overlap
to allow for a meaningful comparison and co-analysis.
These two cases serve the research interest in two key ways; in a classic
comparative approach, I outline similarities and divergences between and across
migrant groups in the two countries. Literature to date has found similarities
between Pakistani, Bangladeshi and (some) Indian migrant groups in the UK, and
Northern Africans and Turks in France, groups which have been associated with
higher rates of endogamy, more patriarchal gender attitudes (Roeder & Mühlau,
2014) and less engagement of women in paid work (Boyle, Cooke, Halfacree, &
Smith, 2001; Boyle, Feng, & Gayle, 2009). These groups are contrasted (although
not necessarily empirically) with ‘Western migrants’ (primarily migrants from
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the EU, Australia, the U.S., Canada and New Zealand), associated with high
rates of female employment and gender views not dissimilar to those of British
and French majority natives. By comparing these groups in the British and
French context we can also look out how the distinct welfare and integration
regimes manifest. I also use the two cases in a complementary rather than strictly
comparative fashion. Some key information for the research is only available in
the French data (e.g. on visa types), while other information is only available in
the British data (e.g. on self-reported ethnic identity). On top of a core analytical
framework that can makes use of information available in both data sets, I thus
add a patchwork-like analytical layer which takes advantage of the relevant
country-specific data.
Feminist reflexivity: contextualising and using data critically
The fact that the available data on migration, family formation and gender
differs between France and the UK is a product of particular French and British
historic practices of quantification of migration and population diversity. The
political focus on measuring and managing population diversity (whether it
is defined in explicitly racial terms or not) directly impacts the production of
survey data on migrants. Moreover, as I argue, this political focus is particularly
relevant in framing migration mainly as producing the category of immigrant -
that is, in constructing ideal-typical profiles of migrants - rather than as a dynamic
experience of mobility - that is, as part of a trajectory. This is admittedly a bias
of the statistical lens in general, which lends itself more readily to classifying
static profiles of people, rather than biographic trajectories. But it also should
be understood in the context of survey design and a - sometimes controversial
- political obsession with classifying population diversity to the exclusion of a
broader, more comprehensive understanding of migration. Furthermore, through
this process, not only is migration quantified as a marker of otherness rather
than as an experience of mobility, but the quantification of gender relations
also suffers. Indeed, the gender gaps that I have identified in the empirical
literature on intermarriage and migration can be attributed in no insignificant
part to the lack of data across numerous variables relevant to gender relations
and to migration and partnership history. The production of survey data and
classifications with regards to migrants is highly complex and technical, but it is
by no means politically neutral, nor inconsequential. In a data feminism approach
to quantitative feminist scholarship (D’Ignazio & Klein, 2020), it is necessary to
address the context of survey design, and the powers at play (Data for whom?
Data by whom? Data for what purpose?) to better understand and posit the data
that we use, and the analysis that we can offer.
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Contribution
This PhD contributes to the existing sociological scholarship in several ways.
It empirically analyses intermarriage and migration through the lens of gender, a
connection rarely made in quantitative research. While the feminist scholarship
on migration is flourishing, thus far it has developed overwhelmingly on qualita-
tive and theoretical grounds, and indeed its proponents have often challenged
quantitative researchers for engaging only superficially with feminist theories
and concerns (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2012). In this research, I draw on feminist
epistemology at three stages: 1) I posit gender relations, as manifested through
the gender division of domestic labour in couples, as the focus; 2) I approach
migration as a fundamentally intersectional experience, where both trajectories
and outcomes of migration are expected to reflect asymmetrical social relations
around gender, but also ethnicity and class; 3) building on feminist (and socio-
historical) approaches to situated knowledge, I associate the quantitative analysis
of the data with a critical analysis of the process of data production itself, and
notably how the production of survey data on migration constrains and orients
the quantification of migration and migrant families, and segregates it from the
quantification of gender. Methodologically, the research takes advantage of ad-
vanced quantitative methodologies to propose a model template that enables an
interrogation of the trajectories of migration and family formation, specifically
with regards to how these trajectories intersect and interlock. The data-driven
typology of union-migration trajectories, based on sequences of different stages
of couple formation around migration, allows us to locate the migration mo-
ment in the narrative of couple formation and in the life-course. This research,
therefore, contributes to the literature on gender, migration and intermarriage
by incorporating a more process-oriented life course perspective, and by con-
ceptualising union-migration trajectories as interlocked processes. This proves
enlightening in enabling us to differentiate between gendered paths of migration
and intermarriage, and to understand gender relations in couples, post-migration.
Theoretically, this research makes a strong case for considering migrants’ trajec-
tories as well as national, cultural and ethnic background. It thus injects into a
conversation on migrants and gender relations which has been dominated by
considerations of gender cultures and integration, a discussion about trajectories
and power - in that migration can also reshuffle or further polarise resources and
dependence within couple partnership. This brings broad-brushed but important
empirical elements for critical scholarship that tries to go beyond essentialising




While heavily relying on quantitative methods and data, this thesis therefore
also includes a more qualitative dimension, which uses qualitative methods
(interview and archival research) to investigate and contextualise the survey
design for the survey data later used in the quantitative chapters. This aspect of
the research is constructed not as another methodological approach to the same
question, but rather as a meta-analysis of the framing of the question itself and
a critical assessment of the quantitative data it uses. Although still unusual in
quantitative scholarship, such an approach has long been advocated by feminist
scholars and, indeed, the absence of data reflexivity has been a key part of the
feminist resistance to quantitative methods (e.g. Stanley (1983)).
Quantitative data
In order to establish the typology of migration-union trajectory, to uncover gen-
dered patterns, and to connect them to the gender division of labour in mixed and
non-mixed couples post-migration, this research relies on large-scale, complex
survey data. Specifically, the quantitative data sources are the French survey
Trajectoires et Origines (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009) and the British survey Under-
standing Society: the UK Longitudinal Household Survey (ISER-University of Essex,
running since 2009). The data is used cross-sectionally; in the British case, it is
extracted primarily from the first two waves of the British survey (2009-2011),
meaning that the French and British data are almost perfectly contemporaneous
to each other.
Analytical strategy and life-course approach
The construction of sequences of migration and couple formation relies on ret-
rospective information on partnership history and migration history provided
by survey respondents. I use sequence analysis with optimal matching to build
a typology of migration-union sequences (for a similar modelling strategy, see
e.g. Castro Torres (2020)). The sequences are limited to a 10 year period, rang-
ing from five-years before to five-years after migration; the sequences do not
therefore provide a fully-fledged life-course perspective, but nevertheless allow
us to interrogate the moment of migration in relation to other key transitions
such as the entry into adulthood and couple formation. These sequences can
be interpreted as different life course trajectories in which migration and family
formation interlock in various ways. These sequences bring fruitful complexity
to classifications of ’family migration’ or ’independent migration’, and they help
refine the gendered patterns of migration trajectories, and ultimately the different
mode of partner selection associated with mixed (and non-mixed) unions. These
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sequences are then incorporated as covariates into survey-weighted regression
models in order to estimate the relative effect of migrant origins, of acculturation
and of migration-union sequences in the gender division of labour at the micro-level
of couples. I use indices of gender-specialisation of labour to analyse gender roles
and relations between men and women at the micro-level of couples.
Definitions and terminology
Couples
This research revolves around partnered migrants and the couples they form.
As will be discussed in more detail in the literature review, this is not a neutral
decision: many of those who migrate - men especially - are and remain single, and,
in addition, those migrants who form cohabiting relationships in the host country
generally tend to be those who are perhaps most ’settled’, most established,
likely most ’acculturated’, also with regards to gender norms and practices. The
research also focuses on couples formed by cohabiting men and women. The
exclusion of same-sex relationships is dictated by their lack of representation
in the quantitative data. The couples under study are flatly identified as ’man-
woman couples’, rather than e.g. heterosexual couples, since a not insignificant
proportion of people who live in a cohabiting man-woman relationship do not
actually identify as heterosexual, but as e.g. bisexual or other (see for instance
the results of the VIRAGE surveys conducted in France (Debauche et al., 2017)).
Therefore heterosexuality cannot be deduced from the fact that a man and a
woman cohabit and identify themselves as a couple.
Mixed couples and intermarriages
Intermarriage does not necessarily conceptually involve migrants (e.g. interracial,
inter-ethnic or inter-religious marriages). Indeed, the notion of intermarriage
and, concomitantly, of ’mixed couples’, ’mixing’ and ’mixedness’ are profoundly
context-dependent (Rodríguez-García, 2012; Varro, 2003; Waldis & Byron, 2006).
In the context of migration it is generally defined as either unions between a
foreigner and a citizen of the country of residence, or increasingly as unions
between a primary migrant and a native with native parents. The latter espe-
cially are often positively analysed as markers of fast-tracked integration and
even ’extreme assimilation’.(J. W. Scott, 2010). I will discuss the definitions of
intermarriage and mixed couples more at length in later chapters, but it should
be clear that, in this thesis, the term ’mixed couples’ will be mostly used to refer
to couples that fit the last definition, that is, those that involve a first-generation
migrant (born abroad) and a native born to native parents.
Migrants
Migrants will be the term used to identify somebody who was born in a different
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country from the country they identified as their residence. It does not imply that
the person either intended to settle when they moved in (as per the International
Passenger Survey for instance), or has lived in the country for at least a year (as
per the UN definition). I choose to use the term migrant rather than immigrant
because the latter carries significant negative connotations, and implies to a
certain degree that the only type of migration that merits interest and scrutiny
(and certainly the only migration targeted by survey quantification) flows in
one direction, into Western countries. The term ’migrant’ seems to me more
process-oriented, still somewhat more open in its meanings, and less pejorative.2
Majority and minority
I will refer to the group formed by the native descendants of two native-born
parents (native over two generations) as the majority group, which is meant to em-
phasize the fact that they are a numerical majority, rather than an un-problematic,
neutral or hierarchical baseline or category of reference. Accordingly, I use the
term ’minority’ and ’minorities’ to refer to migrant groups (and in the British
case, ethnic groups) which are numerically (much) smaller than the majority
group. This ’minority’ classification only partially overlaps with ethnicity-based
or nationality-based groupings: many ’minority’ individuals have British/French
citizenship, and many also identify as e.g. white British or French.
Thesis outline
PART 1: The political borders of the statistical ’Others’ This part refers
to the more qualitative, historical and ’meta’ part of the thesis. It critically
interrogates and assesses the survey data that forms the empirical material for the
latter parts of the PhD analysis, and the context in which this data was designed.
The surveys in question are Understanding Society (UKLHS) (ISER, 2009) and
Trajectoires et Origines (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).
Chapter 1: Mobile or racialised ’Others’? Quantifying mixing and migra-
tion trajectories in French and British data
In the first chapter, I dissect how statistical categories and sample design worked
together to shape migration less as an experience of mobility, and more as a
marker of ’otherness’, which in the French case in then used for categories of
mixedness. Trajectories and biographies are a complicated object for quantitative
data, which handles and creates profiles of people more readily than life trajectories.
Concurrently, the problematisation of migration is constructed politically and
2Although it has also become stigmatising and has been rejected as such, for this reason - see
discussions by e.g. Schrover and Moloney (2013) and Akoka (2020), who analyses how and why it
seems necessary to turn ’migrants’ into e.g. ’refugees’ in order to legitimise their existence and
migration.
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statistically as a matter of integration and ’race relations’, and that is what is
prioritised in the quantification process. It should be noted that official narratives
of integration differ between France and the UK, and so too do official statisti-
cal classifications of ’otherness’ and, subsequently, of mixedness. Furthermore,
these two surveys were developed in strikingly different contexts in terms of
the political scrutiny and the pressure facing the respective survey designers.
Nevertheless, in both cases, the survey design is focused on the slippery question
of framing and classifying population diversity, and the dynamic part of migra-
tion - migration as a trajectory - is overshadowed. Moreover, the conflation of
migration with racialised and ethnicized ’otherness’ mean that ’migrants’ that are
over-sampled are simultaneously foreign-born, ’ethnic’ and non-white. Survey
design thus makes it difficult to avoid conflating inequalities that derive from
migration trajectories, experience and immigration regimes (uprooting, immigra-
tion status, etc...) and inequalities linked to ethnic and cultural differences and
discrimination.
Chapter 2: The other ’Others’: gender and the family in survey data on
migrants
In this chapter, I highlight the relevance and consequence of survey design choices
for gender analyses of migration. Migratory flows, like ’immigration problems’,
are almost always painted with a gendered face: the male economic migrant or
guestworker; the over-fertile female family migrant; more recently - the male
terrorist. But beyond (racialised) gender prejudice, and beyond statements of
intention, what is the actual centrality and the perimeter of gender in migration
survey design? The place given to gender relations has increased slightly in
surveys on migration and population diversity, primarily as a result of gender-
mainstreaming at the level of European statistics. Subsequently, in and with
the surveys under study, an ’intersectional window’ has opened, making it
possible to study migration as a gendered and racialised process - a process
which is both embedded in and can (re)produce inequalities best understood as
intersectional. All survey designers and statistical institutions involved would
agree that migration is gendered and that therefore gender matters. But through
interviews with the survey designers and archival work, as well as analysis of
the final questionnaires, I reconstitute the survey design process and show how
it reflects, at every step, a sustained segregation between questions of gender
and questions of migration, which ultimately may help explain why survey data
remains a complicated, often inhospitable source of data for feminist scholarship
on migration.
PART 2: Couples, mixedness, and gendered migration-union sequences
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Part 2, and part 3 of the thesis form the quantitative analysis per se. Each
part is divided into two mirror chapters: one on the French case, one on the
British case. Part 2 describes the construction of the typology of union-migration
sequences and examines the characteristics of mixed couples, of their patterns of
migration and union-formation. The first chapter in this part (chapter 3) covers
the French case, while the second (chapter 4) addresses the British case.
These chapters address the timing, ordering and sequencing of migration
and couple formation: they reconstruct how migratory and partnership journeys
interlock. While the literature, both qualitative and quantitative, has established
that women are more likely to be ’trailing spouses’ and men are more likely to
be ’lead’ or ’pioneer’ single migrants, the timing and sequencing (and not just
the order) of these events and stages of migration and family formation have
been more rarely addressed. This is a shortcoming insofar as we know from
the sociology of family that the circumstances of partner recruitment are key
events and determinants, in women’s lives and social trajectories especially. A
static focus on an single decision in time - such as ’who followed who?’ - cannot
adequately capture this sequencing. Using data from the two surveys whose
genesis and framing of migration is examined in part 1, these chapters employ
sequence analysis and optimal matching in combination with several clustering
methods to posit migration in the broader context of family formation. In so
doing, I propose a data-driven typology of union-migration sequences which
transcends the reductive binary of ’independent’ and ’family migrants’. These
chapters highlight that for both UK- and France-bound migrants, the timing of
migration and the formation of a first relationship are essentially simultaneous
for many migrant women, but very few migrant men. Men’s migration is largely
disjointed from couple formation, which happens either long before or long
after. Being in a couple acts as an enabler or an incentive for women’s migration,
even when controlling for age, country of origin, educational level and children.
Moreover, exogamy appear as not simply reflective of migrant groups’ varying
degrees of ’openness’ and integration: I also find that mixed couples are associ-
ated with different union-migration sequences, and not simply in the sense that
former child migrants are over-represented. These patterns are clearly gendered:
depending on who (between the woman and the man) is the migrant and who
the native partner, mixed couples’ union-migration trajectories can also involve a
high proportion of couple-forming migration.
PART 3: Chapter 5 6: Couples, from migration-union trajectories to the
’labour of love’
In the final part of the thesis, I connect sequences of migration to the gender
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division of paid and unpaid labour (e.g. unpaid housework and care) in couples.
Chapter 5 uses the French data, and chapter 6 uses the British data.
I start by constructing indexes of gender-distribution of employment and
housework and care tasks, which are then aggregated into an index of gender-
specialisation of labour. With the British data, I also devise a second index of
gender-specialisation based on the distribution of hours spent in unpaid and
paid labour, between partnered men and women. I show that the degree of
gender-specialisation of labour in couples appears to differ depending on the
exogamous/endogamous make-up of the couple (partnering ’in’ or ’out’ of one’s
group. Here, exogamy refers to cases where migrants partner with majority na-
tives. Migrant couples are assumed endogamous. Couples formed of a primary
migrant and a direct descendant of migrant are considered to be a specific form
of mixedness, often ethnically endogamous but nevertheless involving partners
socialised in different national contexts. (Collet & Santelli, 2012)). Indeed, it
depends more specifically on the gendered make-up of the couples. In other
words, a couple formed of a migrant woman and a native majority man and
couples formed of a migrant man and a native majority woman do not express the
same gender dynamics: the first case tends to be much more gender-specialised
than the second. I then build more complex models to combine migrants’ ex-
ogamy/endogamy, migrants’ country of origin, religiosity, how long they had
been in the country, but also the particular migration-union sequence they had
followed. I find that, when accounting for other factors, trajectories of migration
and couple formation clearly matter for migrant women, but not so much for
migrant men. In fact, for migrants (especially migrant women), partnering with
a majority native partner appears less relevant for gender-specialisation than
union-migration trajectories and group effects. This is however less true for
migrant men, whose union-migration trajectories matter comparatively less for
gender dynamics of labour division in the home, but whose migratory origins
(area of birth) and choice of partner are more important. I deduce that though the
culturalist argument has some merit to explain variations in gender relations and
gender-specialisation in the household between different categories of migrants,
attention to trajectories of migration and especially how migration fits into mi-
grants’ life-course is necessary to understand (also quantitatively) the relevance
of migration for both gendered experiences of mixedness, and the (re)production
of gender relations overall.
Chapter 7: Conclusion and comparison The final chapter focuses on bring-
ing out the key findings in a comparative perspective. In the main, the analyses
are very consistent in France and in the UK, which makes sense considering
that the similarities greatly outnumber the differences with respect to French
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and British immigration and gender regimes. This consistency across datasets
and national contexts is taken as corroborating evidence of the robustness of the
analyses. The comparison further highlights similarities between certain migrant
groups (notably Turks in France and Pakistani/Bangladeshi in the UK) in enforc-
ing strict gender division of labour within couples. Union-migration sequences
are found to be associated with significant variations in gender-specialisation
for migrant women’s relationships. In both national contexts, couple-forming
migration is associated with increased gender-specialisation for migrant women,
but the analyses suggest reduced gender-specialisation for migrant men, which
supports the hypothesis that certain paths of migration can affect the bargaining
power of the migrant in question - and most of the time, these paths are treaded
by women. For migrant women, exogamy is not found to have a significant
impact once accounting for other factors. The fact that it is associated with a
reduced gender-specialisation of labour in the French case only is interpreted as
a reflection of the fact that in certain migrant groups in France, mostly Northern
Africans, migrant men have intermarried with majority native French women at
a higher rate than e.g. South Asians in the UK (the first generation intermarries
very little, whether men or women). These groups are otherwise associated with
gender-polarisation of labour (much like South Asians in the UK), something
which is not as present when the men intermarry. The effects associated with
living with children are larger in the UK, which is consistent with greater welfare
support and notably affordable childcare services in France. However, in most
key aspects, it appears that the gender dynamics at play for migrants in the UK
and France are very similar. The chapter also underlines the key limitations of
the research design, and suggest trails for further research.
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Literature Review
This literature review is structured into three themes, which overlap in the
thesis: the gender division of labour; the intersection of gender and migration;
and intermarriage and couple formation. Following the presentation of the
relevant literature on these three themes, I introduce the theoretical framework
and give a brief account of recent migratory flows into the UK and France.
0.1 Gender equality and the gender division of labour
0.1.1 Recent changes in the gender division of labour
There have been key changes in the gender division of labour since the mid-
20th century. In Europe, this has been most notably marked by the massive entry
of women into the labour market, and the growth of the service sector; France
and the UK alike have undergone vast socio-demographic changes since the end
of the 1950s, which have been referred to as the Second Demographic Transition
(Lesthaeghe, 2010; Lesthaeghe & van de Kaa, 1986). This refers to the dramatic
rise of women’s employment (Tilly and Scott, 1989; OECD 2017; Rindfuss, Choe,
and Brauner-Otto 2016); the steady increase in the proportion of dual-earner
couples (Bonney, 1988); the drop in fertility which saw more and more couples
choose not to have children; and the increase in single-parenthood. At the same
time, the time that women spend in unpaid labour has reduced across all Western
countries, and across all types of unpaid labour, e.g. routine housework (laundry,
tidying, cleaning, cooking), non-routine housework (gardening, diy) and care
(for children or adults) (Kan, Sullivan, & Gershuny, 2011). This drop has been
particularly strong for women who do paid work; there has also been a slight
but steady increase of men’s participation to unpaid labour, although it tends
to be concentrated on non-routine housework (e.g DIY jobs, gardening, Sunday
cooking) (Bittman & Wajcman, 2000; Kan & Gershuny, 2010; Kan & Laurie, 2016).
Though gender convergence in the division of labour, including housework and
care work, is empirically undeniable (Altintas & Sullivan, 2016; Gershuny &
Sullivan, 2003; Sullivan, 2000), the research also finds signs of it stalling or - at
least - slowing down. Men still spend about half the time that women spend
on physical housework, every week — a gap that has not really shrunk since
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the mid-1990s (Bianchi, Sayer, Milkie, & Robinson, 2012). The question as to
why women’s engagement and performance on the labour market has not been
matched by an equivalent increase in men’s involvement in housework and care
work has produced scores of scholarship.
0.1.2 Theories for the gender division of labour
Economic theories of gendered labour
Among the theories offered to explain why paid labour and unpaid labour
tend to be distributed along gendered lines, two theories have emphasized
the role of economic resources. The first one, rooted in human capital theory,
suggests that it is economically sensible for a couple to divide the labour, and for
the partner with the strongest advantages on the labour market and the highest
expected earnings to specialise in paid labour (G. S. Becker, 1981, 1985). Typically,
it was expected that it would be the man, in most man-woman relationships.
Subsequently, the other partner (the woman, in the example), will specialise in
unpaid labour and take over most of the housework and care work. Consistent
with the theory of specialisation is the idea that part of men’s advantage on the
labour market is because women may be discriminated against (and therefore
paid less). The gender specialisation of labour is therefore a sound economic
strategy to maximize the couple’s potential, but theoretically only in a context
where they have less earning potential. Thus ’specialisation’ is often presented
as conceptually gender-blind - although Becker also considered that women
have a ’biological advantage’ in unpaid labour, making them better suited for
reproductive and care labour.
In the second theory, economic interests are also the determinant factors, but
partners are not one harmonious unit jointly maximising their collective interests:
they compete and bargain with each other, using their respective resources to
negotiate - or impose - their preferred outcome. It is generally presumed that the
preferred outcome for each is to spend less time on unpaid labour. The partner
with less resources and less bargaining power is therefore left with more of the
undesirable tasks; this perspective is referred to as intra-household bargaining or
relative resource theory, which in its original formulation considers only economic
resources, namely economic assets and earnings (Blood & Wolfe, 1960). It also
removes the blanket assumption of equity inherent in the Becker’s specialisation
(Bittman & Wajcman, 2000), by suggesting that partners do not necessarily choose
their specialisation, that in the main, nobody enjoys housework and that those
who do it are essentially forced or pressured into it. Accordingly, taking on most
of the housework reveals that one is at a disadvantage in the balance of resources
or power.
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Even in situations where labour is little-specialised, equity is not at all a
given. For instance, if one partner does 70% of the paid labour and the other does
70% of the unpaid labour, this may seem ’fair’ in terms of share, but not ’equitable’
if paid labour represents 40h a week and unpaid labour 20h a week. Conversely,
a highly-specialised gender division of labour (the woman does almost all of the
unpaid labour, the man does all or almost all of the paid labour) can be considered
’equitable’ in the sense that both partners spend the same total amount of time
in work, either paid or unpaid, but inequitable if we consider that the woman is
mostly doing work she does not enjoy, is little valued and not associated with
direct economic retributions and independence. Non-specialised divisions of
paid labour - for instance in dual-earner couples, when both partners work full-
time - can also be associated with high inequity if the woman then takes on most
of the unpaid work: the women’s ’second-shift’ (Hochschild, 2012). There is
a wide range of variations in how different degrees of gender-specialisation of
labour can match different degrees of ’equity’ in the distribution of total hours
of work (Kalmijn & Monden, 2012) - not to mention the fact that an hour of
housework may weigh heavier (i.e. feel like a greater sacrifice and a bigger
contribution) than an hour of paid work in the eyes of both partners. Couples,
including dual-earner couples, in which the woman is responsible for most of
the housework and care are often labelled traditional (S. S. Hall & Macdermid,
2009) - more so, in a way, than when women have a smaller share of the paid
labour, but men contribute more to unpaid labour. The more even sharing of
household labour in particular is considered in bargaining approaches to reflect
stronger bargaining power on the side of women. It is also a terrain where gender
ideology and norms are key.
Gender norms and gender performativity
Indeed, while these first two theoretical streams focused on economic de-
terminants and explanations, the next emphasises gender socialisation, ideology
and norms. Often referred to as ’doing gender’, it theorises that men and women
try to abide by gender roles which they have been socialised into, even when it
goes against the rational maximisation of time or economic interests of the couple.
Thus man-woman couples that function on a female main or sole breadwinner
model may still perform expected gender roles in unpaid labour distribution,
and an unemployed man may still leave the housework and childcare to his
wife. The relative earnings and bargaining power of each partner are considered
less relevant than the capacity of gender norms to label certain tasks as ’mas-
culine’ and others as ’feminine’, to make it difficult for partners to cross over
(S. F. Berk, 1985; Robinson & Milkie, 1998; West & Zimmerman, 1987) Notably,
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representations of parenthood imply different gender roles for fathers and moth-
ers, rewarding different traits and tasks. Schematically: a good husband and
father is one who can provide for his family; a good wife and mother is one
who can care for them on an emotional and daily-logistic level, and professional
achievements and careers are secondary to the needs of children (Garey 1999;
Hays 1996; Mercer 2004). This also means that both the institution of the couple
and of parenthood imply a different attitude and cost towards paid work for
men and women: while it would encourage men to advance their career, it may
deter or sanction women for doing so. The doing gender approach is useful in
understanding why, even when men contribute more to unpaid labour, they tend
to concentrate their contribution in specific types of housework, deemed more
’masculine’ (like fixing things around the house, gardening or shopping), and
appear much more resistant to take on more archetypal ’feminine’ tasks such as
childcare and - most of all - the routine housework of cleaning, tidying and doing
the laundry (Kan et al., 2011).
’Doing gender’ and gender socialisation perspectives are thus heavily re-
liant on the notion of pre-existing gender expectations, gender ’assessments’,
which men and women have already integrated and reproduce in their intimate
arrangements. It derives that, if the gender norms were to change, so would the
gender division of labour. Examples of social norms changing towards more
gender equality and less gender-specialisation are taken from changes in fertility
behaviour. Gender-specialised divisions of labour were considered conducive
to parenthood in Becker’s approach; conversely, the rise of dual-earner couples
and of women’s autonomy and career interests were considered a key factor in
the drop in fertility levels in Western countries (G. S. Becker, 1976, 1981); yet in
recent years, dual-earner couples and couples with egalitarian distribution of
labour more generally have been found to have similar levels of fertility to more
gender-specialised couples (Muzhi Zhou & Kan, 2019). However, in cases where
women face a ’double burden’, when they work full-time and take on most/all
of the housework, fertility is in fact reduced (Raybould & Sear, 2020). This is part
of the ’uneven and stalled’ state of the ’Gender revolution’ (England, 2010).
All three approaches (specialisation, relative resource and gender) consider
and generally find that doing less of the unpaid labour also means doing a greater
share of the paid labour and vice-versa (see e.g. Gershuny and Sullivan (2003)
and Sullivan and Gershuny (2016), as per time-availability constraints, which posits
that the distribution of time spent on housework and care is a function of how
much time each partner has available (i.e. freed from paid work) for it. Time
availability typically explains part of the division of housework - but not all. In
practice, most social scientists use some combination of time availability, relative
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resource and doing gender (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000; Bianchi
et al., 2012; Coltrane, 2000, 2010; Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010).
The question of power: why the gender division of labour matter
The key reason to study housework as well as paid work is that it reflects
power relations in the intimate sphere, which is a key place to understand the
production and re-production of gender relations as power relations (S. N. Davis
& Greenstein, 2013). The individualised construction of the couple is in Western
societies generally assumed to be companionate. But second-wave feminism em-
phasized that this companionate appearance of ’Love’ could be used to convince
women to accept their unfair deal (De Beauvoir, 1949). Many sociologists compre-
hend gender as a social structure, institution, or system inscribed in individual,
interactional, and institutional dynamics (e.g. Risman (2004)). Accordingly, gen-
der is part of the power struggle: not only can it give men an stronger footing,
it can frame the assessment of capitals and resources. In the case of migration,
it can imply for instance that women’s professional resources are valued less
highly, in the decision of when or where to migrate, than her ability to look
after the children. The gender division of labour cannot therefore be considered
through a neutral lens of specialisation and efficiency. When women and men
’specialise’ in housework and paid work respectively, the roles they undertake
are not simply separated but hierarchised (Kergoat, 2004),3 and part of a system
that undermines women’s autonomy, devalues women’s time and exploits their
labour (Kergoat, 2004, 2017). Accordingly, the gender division of labour a central
concept in mechanism in feminist intellectual traditions, especially those with
Marxist roots (e.g. Bhattacharya (2017), A. Y. Davis (1981), Delphy (1998), and
Federici (1975))
Gender relations and gender (in)equality have many dimensions and play
out on many different stages. The gender division of labour is arguably one
of the most important ways to address and capture how couples (re)produce
gender roles and inequalities, both in the intimate sphere of unpaid domestic and
care labour, and in the more formal, outward distribution of paid employment.
In particular, the couple-level gendered division of labour between men and
women in man-woman couples is a key terrain to understand and represent
gender relations and inequalities in practice (Muzhi Zhou & Kan, 2019). Indeed,
micro-level empirical studies often refer to the division of labour, or sometimes
3It is disputable whether there can be a separation of tasks and roles without a hierarchy
between said tasks and roles, whether the distribution is organised by gender, class, race or
other. The feminism that advocates against the gender division of labour is thus at odds with
notions of ’separate but equal’ and complementarity between men and women which anchored
e.g. Durkheim’s defence of gender specialisation and indeed those of many 19th century feminists
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specifically housework, to represent the level of gender equality within couples.
In this thesis, I will refer more specifically to gender-specialisation. For women,
gender-specialisation in the couple implies the combination of economic depen-
dence or subordination with the provision of most or all of the unpaid housework
and childcare.
0.1.3 Variations across countries and groups
As approvingly noted in both of Coltrane (2000, 2010)’s reviews on empirical
scholarship on household labour, there has been an increase in cross-national
comparative work on the gender division of labour. Empirical research has
found that in spite of the convergence trend overall, patterns of gender division
of labour are still very much in place, but there are also non-trivial differences
between countries and between clusters of countries (Rosmary Crompton &
Feuvre, 2000; Geist & Cohen, 2011; Kan et al., 2011). This applies to the gender
division of unpaid labour as well as paid labour.
As Cunha and Atalaia (2019) note, there are four points that the literature
widely agrees on. Firstly, that the welfare states, in the post-war period especially,
promoted gender roles in labour division by entrenching the male breadwin-
ner/female homemaker model; secondly, that the relative decline of this model
was linked to the empowerment of women through increased labour market
participation - hence notably financial independence and equality of rights, all
parts of the ’female revolution’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990); thirdly, the dual-earner
couple model has also been associated to a point with a dual-carer model, mean-
ing that the division of labour in these couples has become less gendered - even
when they have young children (Gornick and Meyers, 2003). There are however
country-specific variations, especially on the matter of childcare. Finally, and
fourthly, all points to the fact that the time that men and women spend on paid
and unpaid labour continues to reflect considerable (if relatively smaller) differ-
ences: the gender-specialisation of labour, with women taking on more of the
unpaid labour, and men more of the paid labour, remains very much a reality of
the present (Vagni, 2020)
Most of the existing comparative studies focus however on one of the two di-
mensions, either paid or unpaid labour distribution (Mandel, Lazarus, & Shaby,
2020), which presents something of a limitation (Coltrane, 2010). State poli-
cies and welfare provisions appear to affect paid work distribution in couples
more than the distribution of housework and childcare, which tends to remain
staunchly gendered (Cunha & Atalaia, 2019; Gershuny & Sullivan, 2003; Vagni
& Cornwell, 2018). Paternal leave policies have been associated with a positive
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effect for gender equality in the sharing of housework, along with other insti-
tutional frameworks like a large public sector and changes like the abolition of
discriminatory regulations (Fuwa and Cohen, 2007). However, long maternity
leave and public childcare provisions were not found to foster more equal divi-
sions of unpaid labour, with even in some cases a negative effect (Jan Windebank,
2001). In general, the division of unpaid labour appears more strongly associ-
ated with individual traits - such as education and gender attitude - than with
state policies and institutional context (Gershuny & Sullivan, 2003). However,
the scheduling of work is an area where policies can make a difference (Vagni,
2020). An example is provided by the research undertaken by Pailhé, Solaz, and
Souletie (2019), who studied the change in housework allocation following the
partial implementation of the 35-hour workweek reform in France in the early
2000s. They showed that the way couples used the time freed from paid work
was both gendered and dependent on the day of the week. Men contributed
more to housework (albeit non-routine housework) during the week but did
less at the weekend, while women spent more time on childcare overall, both
during the week and at the weekend. Thus the reforms was associated with an
increased specialisation of unpaid labour tasks (though not of unpaid labour
overall), and the weekend appeared like a moment where both partners, being in
the presence of one another, were more likely to ’do gender’. Pailhé et al. (2019)
also interpreted this change as a case in point demonstrating that time allocation
(to housework or different types of housework) is not simply a matter of time
availability.
Building on comparative frameworks in the tradition of Soskice and Hall
(2001), and more specifically on Esping-Andersen (1990)’s work and clustering,
the literature often classifies Western countries into policy clusters that reflect
different public and social policy contexts based on levels of redistribution and
social equity, the range and involvement of the welfare state, and gender attitudes
(e.g. Esping-Andersen,1990, 1999; Gauthier, 1996; Goodin et al., 1999; Lewis, 1993;
O’Connoret al., 1999; Sainsbury, 1999), more recently, Kan et al. (2011) ). The
linking of these clusters with the gender division of labour is derived from the
assumption that the distribution of both paid and unpaid labour is affected by,
firstly, the structure of employment and the labour market; and secondly by the
welfare provision or subsidisation of services that allow couples and families
to combine paid employment with notably childcare (as well as elderly care,
although this is less often tackled) (e.g. Fraser,1994; Gershuny and Sullivan, 2003;
Gornick et al., 1997; Hobson, 1990; Lewis, 1992; O’Brien et al., 2007; O’Connor et
al., 1999; Pfau-Effinger, 2004; Sullivan et al., 2009)). Policy clusters are typically
divided into four categories: (1) a non-interventionist liberal cluster (e.g. the UK
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as well as the USA and Australia); (2) a corporatist or social capitalist clustern
(e.g. France and Germany); (3) a southern/Mediterranean cluster (e.g. Italy,
Spain, Portugal, Greece); and (4) a social-democratic ’egalitarian’ nordic cluster
(e.g. Sweden and Denmark).4
I concentrate here on the first two clusters, because they encompass the
British and French cases. These clusters can be roughly characterised as follows:
non-interventionist/liberal countries are generally associated with a low level of
welfare support. Specific measures are put in place to support those most in need,
but the underlying state approach to welfare is that the market is better suited to
and more efficient at promoting social progress than the welfare state. Therefore,
social services (e.g. childcare, elderly care, medical care) are largely privatised,
the level of total welfare expenditure and redistribution is low and societies tend
to be deeply and widely stratified. For instance, in the UK, parental leave is
much more limited than in most other European countries (Daly Ferragina, 2018,
Gauthier, 2002, Thévenon 2011), and the cost of childcare (and, more broadly,
of having children) is significantly higher for British families. Hence, the rate
of children in formal childcare is lower, as is the rate of full-time employment
among mothers (Boeckmann, Misra, Budig, 2014). In contrast, in the second
cluster, the corporatist/social capitalist or ’managed’ capitalism cluster to which
France is assigned, the welfare state is less anemic and state-organised social
services are much more extensive (Schmidt, 2002, 2003). They function primarily
through the medium of social insurance programs, themselves often linked
to occupational groups, with therefore wide social variations between groups.
Maternity and parental leave policies are more generous, the labour market is
much more regulated and facilitates parental leave and (some) flexibility for
parents. There is also a high level of employment protection and a high level of
welfare expenditure overall.
With respect to gender ideology, however, the assumption in both clusters
is that women will take time off work to look after children (and other unpaid
labour). While the state takes on a more actively subsidiary role in supporting
women/parents during this time, or in making it easier to combine paid work
and childcare. In practice, time-use research has found little difference in the
gender division of housework and leisure time between the UK and France
(Vagni & Cornwell, 2018). The main differences seem to be with regards to the
4Although the premises on which Esping-Andersen (1990) had built his clustering were criti-
cized for not making enough room for considerations of gender and family, subsequent alternative
cluster calculations which were more mindful of gender (and focused more on welfare provisions
of e.g. childcare and maternity leave) ended up with clusters that largely overlapped with Esping-
Andersen (1990)’s (e.g. Gauthier, 1996). As Kan et al. (2011) point out, this is likely because even
though welfare state provisions do not exactly mirror gender ideologies, they may be expected to
be at least related to and thus broadly consistent with them.
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gender division of paid labour, especially once couples become parents. Cunha
and Atalaia (2019) thus noted that the French model of childcare allows women
to return to full-time employment shortly after the birth of children (see however
Jan Windebank (2001), but with qualitative data). In contrast, in the UK, the
prohibitive costs of childcare likely play a part in the fact that the dominant
model of gender division of paid labour is not two partners working full-time,
but a man working full-time and a woman working part-time. Thus while more
couples involve two partners in paid employment in the UK, compared to France,
the importance of women’s part time employment is such that the proportion of
equal-employment couples is much lower than in France.
0.2 Migration and gender: acculturation and/or trajecto-
ries
There has been very little empirical work on time-use and the gender di-
vision of labour among migrants and migrant families. Part of this is linked
to the lack of data, as I discuss in chapter 2. Time-use surveys almost never
over-sample migrants and, symmetrically, surveys that over-sample migrants
are not necessarily interested in time-use, or in gender relations for that matter.
This means that in most cases, migrants are not present in the sample in num-
bers large enough to be analysed separately. The same observation applies to
a large extent to ethnic minorities, and the empirical evidence on the gender
division of labour (especially unpaid labour) among ethnic minority couples is
extremely scarce. Kan and Laurie (2018) provide a noteworthy exception and
show variations in the gender division of domestic labour by ethnicity in the UK,
even while controlling for employment and education of both partners. Much
more commonly addressed are rates of employment among migrants (and ethnic
minorities), and to a certain extent migrant women, but these rarely consider
micro-level distributions of labour in couples. Overall, there has seldom been
quantitative investigations of the links between gender relations and migration.
The literature that has tackled this empirically has mostly done so - whether
implicitly or explicitly - through the lens of gender ideologies and acculturation.
0.2.1 Migrants, gender egalitarianism and acculturation
The literature on migrants’ gender attitudes, and especially gender roles,
is mostly qualitative, and mostly focused on one specific migrant group at a
time, in one country: for instance, Moroccan and Turks in the Netherlands (De
Valk 2006), Turks in Germany (Diehl, Koenig, & Ruckdeschel, 2009). A common
feature is that the migrant groups under study tend to come from countries
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that are less gender-egalitarian both in measures of gender norms and women’s
empowerment. These groups are frequently found to have less egalitarian gender
attitudes compared to the native population, but as Roeder and Mühlau (2014)
note, the effect of country-of-origin cannot be rigorously investigated with such
approaches. In contrast, Roeder and Mühlau (2014) comparison of different
migrant groups’ gender ideologies across Europe using European Social Survey
data allowed them to justify that there were indeed variegated effects associated
with different countries/areas of origin, with less egalitarian countries being
associated with less egalitarian attitudes among migrants. This association,
however, reduced over time and generation, leading the authors to diagnose an
acculturation of migrant to mainstream norms of gender division of labour in
their host country. They also found gendered patterns, with migrant women
appearing to transition quicker to more egalitarian views, closer to those of the
majority native population.
Acculturation is considered a dimension of assimilation (Gordon, 1964),
with the latter involving more broadly and more structurally the decline of ethnic
differences (Alba & Nee, 2003). There is a rich tradition of studies on migrants’
assimilation, ranging back to the early 20th century (Alba & Nee, 1997). The
scholarship has covered many aspects of assimilation processes, from social status
(Hirschmann and Wong 1981; Neidert and Farley 1985) to residential segregation
(Massey and Mullan 1984) and fertility (Ford 1990, more recently Wilson (2019))
and - more importantly for this research, intermarriage (Blau, Blum, and Schwartz
1982; Gordon 1964). In Gordon’s theory, acculturation is automatic, inevitable
and indeed largely unconscious (see also Gans (2007) and while it was generally
understood that acculturation would result from socio-economic integration and
mobility, the more recent scholarship suggests that the two may well be quite
disconnected (e.g. Alba and Nee (2003)). The general understanding is that
culture, including values and norms around gender roles, is mostly stable in
adults but much more prone to change, influence and ’hybridisation’ in children.
Thus if we consider the gender division of labour to be mainly affected by gender
ideologies or habitus (Bourdieu, 1984), it would derive that children who are
socialised and, importantly, educated in a different country from their parents are
likely to develop cultural traits and practices different from them, influenced at
least in part by the culture of the immigration country. Acculturation applies also
to migrants who arrived as children and spend (at least some of) their formative
school years in the host society - the so-called ’1.5 generation’ as labelled by
Rumbaut (1994). Indeed, Roeder and Mühlau (2014) find that compared to
their migrant parents, both child migrants and direct descendants of migrants
identify with gender norms that are closer to those of majority natives (i.e. with
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native parents) in their country of residence. Thus their more gender-egalitarian
attitudes cannot be simply attributable to cohort-replacement effect, which is
also a driving mechanism in changes in gender ideologies (and practices) in the
majority population (see e.g. Bolzendahl and Myers (2004)).
Kan and Laurie (2018) reach interesting conclusions using not gender atti-
tudes but the gender division of household labour as dependent variable. Al-
though focused on ethnic differences, they also note variations within and across
ethnic groups between first-generation migrants who migrated as children, those
who migrated after the age of 12, and their UK-born co-ethnics. These variations
are mainly between women: thus adult migrant women contribute significantly
more housework hours compared to co-ethnic 1.5 generation women, co-ethnic
native women and to the majority white British native population. In France,
the work of Collet and Santelli (2012) on descendants of migrants also suggested
this convergence, although their enquiry did not bear specifically on questions of
gender or domestic labour.
There is also evidence of a within-generation effect, post-migration: con-
sistent with the acculturation hypothesis, Roeder and Mühlau (2014) find that
migrants’ gender norms tend to shift towards those of the host society over
time also over the course of individuals’ lifetime, following migration. They
find a significant effect of the length of time spent in the country of migration,
not limited to those who migrated as children. This within-generation change
(as distinguished from the inter-generation change) is similarly interpreted as a
function of the exposure to the different beliefs and gender norms in the country
of immigration (in line with e.g Cunningham 2008)
0.2.2 Segmented and gendered assimilation
This literature also finds consistent evidence of variations in patterns of
gender ideologies and practices, and gender acculturation by migrant/ethnic
group. The first are usually explained by reference to differences in the gender
culture of the country of origin, while the second is interpreted via processes
of ’segmented assimilation’ (Portes & Zhou, 1993). The concept refers to the
different paths and pace of assimilation followed by different groups, which
are a product of several factors: the ’modes of incorporation’ are a function,
notably, of the immigration regime and the attitude of the state towards the
migrant group at hand; the degree of prejudice that the majority population holds
towards them; the presence and size of a co-ethnic community in the country of
immigration. Different migrant groups, thus faced with different ecologies in the
immigration country, may resort to different strategies. Importantly, acculturation
is to a certain extent dissociated from economic integration and social mobility:
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some groups may find their access to - and success in - the mainstream society
mostly obstructed by prejudice and discrimination, in spite of a high degree of
acculturation. For other migrants with well-established and cohesive co-ethnic
communities, a better strategy for socio-economic integration may be a ’paced,
selective assimilation’ (Portes & Zhou, 1993, p. 96). In this case, socio-economic
integration can co-exist with a comparatively high degree of ethnic and cultural
distinction on other grounds - for instance fertility behaviours and gender norms.
Work inspired by segmented assimilation emphasises the interplay between the
societal context of the immigration country and the migrant/ethnic groups and
its own characteristics - which may include gender beliefs and practices distinct
from the majority native population. However, in the case of the UK and - to
a point - France, weaker rather than stronger segmented assimilation models
may be best suited. For instance, working on the propensity to intermarry in
Britain, Muttarak and Heath (2010, p. 298) judges that though different ethnic
groups have ‘different starting points’ and differ upon arrival in the UK in their
propensity to intermarry, they all follow the same process and convergence
afterwards. A. Heath and Demireva (2014) reach the same conclusion, as does
Safi (2008) for the French case.
Importantly, patterns of acculturation to the gender norms of the majority
native group are not only segmented by migrant group (based on country of
origin), but can also be segmented by gender (Curran, Shafer, Donato, & Garip,
2006). The literature include assumptions that migrant and ethnic communities
may be more protective and less forgiving of violations to deviations from as-
cribed gender roles when it comes to women and daughters compared to men
and sons. Indeed it has been documented that girls may be more strictly moni-
tored (e.g. Idema and Phalet (2007)) and that their exposure to the mainstream
gender norms in the country of immigration may thus be comparatively more
constrained. This is likely culturally specific: for instance, it is conceivable that
in certain patrilineal cultures where sons represent and bear most of the family
aspirations, their behaviours and whereabouts may be more tightly controlled
than those of daughters, whose potential straying is of less consequence. Re-
gardless of whether families and communities attach greater effort and concern
to shelter migrant and minority women, Roeder and Mühlau (2014) found that
the gender attitudes of migrant women and native-born women with migrant
parents shifted more towards egalitarian beliefs than those of their male coun-
terparts, post-migration (also: Güngör and Bornstein (2009), Dasgupta (1998)).
This suggests that changes in gender norms are not simply a function of passive
exposure to more different gender norms. Instead, agency, interests and power
are (also) involved. Namely, migrant women may have a stronger interest in
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embracing gender egalitarian values and practices than migrant men (Bolzendahl
& Myers, 2004). But the main mechanism - especially for the first generation -
seems to be that migration can instigate or coincide with changes in the gender
distribution of resources and power, and thus also a change in the family power
structure and organisation (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Pedraza, 1991; Pessar, 1984).
This change can lead to women having a greater degree of financial independence
and control over economic and social resources, without that being necessarily
associated with a change in professed gender attitudes or endorsement of gender
roles of male-main-breadwinner and women-caregiver (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2000).
The role of migration experience per se and of gendered migration trajectories in
reorganising gender relations, also at the level of couples, is the topic of the next
section.
0.2.3 Trajectories, partnering and the role of the migration experience
It has become commonplace to state that migration studies were long deeply
androcentric (e.g. kofman_gender_2005-1; Nawyn (2010)). Dominant theories
of migration (whether based on classical economists or neo-Marxist political
economy), overtly gender-neutral, mostly did not acknowledge gender relations
- at best assuming that the framework they set up with migrant men in mind
would apply to migrant women (Truong, 1996).5 Subsequently, large sections of
migration studies have ignored migrant women. If the specificity of women’s
migration trajectories was acknowledged, it was to assign them a strictly passive
or stabilising role as trailing family migrants (see for instance Noiriel (1988,
1991)). Yet Morokvasic (1984) were already showing that women were part of
the ranks of temporary, economically-driven migrants - the so-called ’birds of
passage’(Piore, 1979).
From the 1980s and 1990s onward, the emerging feminist sociological schol-
arship on migration noted that women also migrated, in ways that could not
be stereo-typically reduced to family migration. Ever-growing since, feminist
research has emphasized how gender relations inform and differently constrain
men’s and women’s migration at all stages of migration experiences: from the
motivation to migrate, the resources and organisation provided by the family
and the community to enable migration, the legal channels, and the outcomes.
Migration experience, feminist scholarship argued, follows different paths
for men and women, but it also holds different rewards for men and women (Kats,
1982). Research focused on specific groups such as the Irish migrant women in the
5This is not entirely fair towards some of the Marxist-inspired account who did discuss the
gender division of labour (e.g. Castles and Kosack (1973)), even if the research stream they are
associated with typically did not.
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USA (Jackson, 1984), or Jamaican migrants in London (Foner, 1979), found that
’[...]difficult as the experience of immigration was, it was often far more positive
for women than for men, as it allowed women to break with traditional roles and
patterns of dependence and assert a new-found (if meager) freedom.’ (Pedraza,
1991, p. 314). Through migration, gender roles and power relations in couples
could be suspended, and potentially renegotiated (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1992) or
alternatively, entrenched. This paved the way for a theorization of migration that
saw migration processes and trajectories as both gendered and gendering (Pedraza,
1991). The particularity of this literature is that it does not simply treat gender
as an extra co-variate (the ’add women and stir’ approach); it handles gender
relations as a key dependent variable as well as a theoretical lens that needs
to inform all aspects of model specification - since it informs all aspects of the
migration experience.
Seminal studies, such as those of Pessar (1984) and Hondagneu-Sotelo (1992)
emphasised migrant women’s experiences of paid employment following mi-
gration as an important change, which linked migration with women’s empow-
erment. It was found that women’s financial contribution to the household
increased with migration, as did their involvement in decision-making and their
self-esteem. For some migrant women, the post-migration period is the first
time that they enter the labour market (Fernández-Kelly and Garcia 1990). While
men often undergo downward mobility, the experience of migrant women post-
migration can be economically and socially empowering, especially if it means
that women get more distance from patriarchal family and community controls.
Indeed, this can be a motivation for their migration in the first place (Morokvasic
1983). The important thing here, noted in much of the theoretical and qualitative
literature of gender and migration, is that not only do gender relations in the
country of origin shape migration opportunities (and potentially motivations),
the experience and process of migration itself may open up possibilities for a
practical and pragmatic reorganisation of gender roles.
The economic constraints post-migration may make a dual-earner system
necessary and in some cases women may even take on the role of sole or main-
breadwinner while their partner looks for work or sets up their business (Ferree,
1979). Gender roles in the household can be transformed to some extent, although
as Pessar noted, that does not necessarily imply that gender roles (women as
primarily mothers and wives) were contested, but rather that women found
more agency through and post- migration to redefine them in a way that suited
them better (Pessar, 1984, 1999). Approaches that focus on changes in gender
ideologies may miss this reconfiguration of resources and roles: material changes
in the gender division of labour are not necessarily associated with changes in
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gender ideologies - (Ferree (1979, p. 48) spoke of ’employment without liberation’
to refer to Cuban women in the USA), at least not in the short term. Conversely,
in other cases, migration to Western countries may be invested with hopes
of independence and empowerment by migrant women, hopes which can be
bitterly disappointed. This is the case, for instance, of the Thai marriage migrants
who appear in Suksomboon (2011)’s research, and who, having followed their
Dutch partner to Europe, find themselves locked in (gendered and racialised)
expectations that they will be submissive, domestic wives.
Theoretically, the experience of migration can improve women’s social posi-
tions and thereby enhance gender equality if it leads to greater balance in migrant
women’s and men’s relative status and power in the country of immigration.
In Pessar’s theorisation (1984), this occurs mainly when migration results in a
greater participation of women in paid employment, which has a domino effect
on their autonomy and bargaining power relative to that of their husband’s.
Alternatively, migration may modify certain aspects of gender roles, but leave
women and men’s relative power and status mostly untouched (Curtis 1986).
With respect to migration’s impact on gender relations and inequalities, the jury
is still out. The existing literature has found contradictory outcomes, depending
both on the particular migration flows, and on the social consequences the studies
considered. Often the conclusion is that while migration may improve the social
standing of migrant women in certain ways, it simultaneouly undermines it in
others (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Morokvasic, 1984)
0.2.4 Male lead and female trail: migration trajectories as a gendering
process
Empirical evidence shows that on the whole migration appears negative
for migrant women’s paid labour performance and engagement (be it from
the point of view of paid work time, earnings and attitudes (Boyle et al., 1999,
2001; Lee and Roseman, 1999; Lichter, 1980, 1983; Maxwell, 1988; Morrison
and Lichter, 1988). This is true for partnered women especially, with migrating
married women being associated with lower odds of employment than any other
migrant sub-group (Boyle et al., 1999, 2002). The opposite applies to migrant
men, for whom empirical research finds a net positive impact of migration on
paid labour participation (Bartel, 1979; Yankow, 2003; Böheim and Taylor, 2007).
The understanding is that these gender discrepancies have to do with gender
norms, which dictate that migration be organised in a way that is driven by and
maximises men’s and husbands’ career prospects over those of women, pushed
into supportive and ’trailing spouse’ migration and family journeys.
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Indeed, the ’gendering’ potential of migration trajectories has been raised
mostly with regards to the specific kind of migration trajectories represented by
’tied migrations’, namely migrants who follow or join a partner (or a relative) in
the country of immigration. ’Family-stage migration’ is one configuration which
forms the focus of Hondagneu-Sotelo (1992, 1994)’s case studies. It refers to
migrant couples, who were already formed before migration, but who migrated
in stages, so that one partner (the ’lead migrant’) went first, and was later joined
by the second partner (the ’trailing’ or ’reunified’ migrant). ’Marriage migration’
is another category of ’tied migration’, which refer to union-migration trajectory
where one partner was already long established in the country (or a native of that
country), and the other partner migrated to join them shortly after marriage, as
their dependent.
For marriage migrant women, this may involve a confinement into a very
domestic and care-taker role, driven by gender expectations that can in fact
be more gender-conservative than the ones they were accustomed to in their
country of origin (see for instance Charsley, Storer-Church, Benson, and Van Hear
(2012) on Indian marriage migrant women, or Suksomboon (2011) as mentioned
above). For marriage migrant men also, marriage migration can be associated
with economic and legal dependency on their sponsor partner, creating situations
of female-main/sole breadwinner which reverse the gender division of paid
labour. This gender reversal can be experienced very painfully by men, who may
perceive it as a loss of status and as undermining their capacity to fulfil their
gender expectation of male-breadwinner, as in the case documented by Charsley
(2005) of Pakistani marriage migrant men in the UK. In a ’doing gender’ or even
potentially compensation perspective, they may refuse to contribute to any form
of domestic or care labour, which would further entrench the role reversal. We can
draw from this qualitative literature that tied migrants, and perhaps especially
marriage migrants (when the formation of the couple comes at the same time or
shortly before migration) are associated with a relative loss of agency and power
on the side of the marriage migrants. Importantly, this literature has posited how
marriage migration means being uprooted and distanced from kin and family.
The case of family-stage migration is more complex: while the Mexican
women analysed by Hondagneu-Sotelo (1992) were initially left-behind to look
after the children while their husbands went abroad for work, this period could
also promote their independence and autonomy. In addition, when they them-
selves emigrated to join their partner, the greater distance from the family and its
patriarchal demands, as well as the economic needs of the moment, could push
them into paid employment. This had long-reaching consequences, as it gave
them access to autonomous income but also to their own, new social networks in
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the country of immigration. This could thus result in a more egalitarian division
of labour - at least relative to the context of the area of origin -, with some men
also contributing more to domestic tasks and childcare. But this change could be
nullified if the family moved back, which is also what led some migrant women
to develop strategies to delay or prevent return migration.
The quantitative literature on this is scarce. The data lend itself poorly to
account for a gendering effect of various migration trajectories, for a rigorous
approach would require data for the same individuals and families collected both
before and after migration. Such data is largely non-existent for international
migration, and the best one can do is rely on migrants’ retrospective accounts of
employment - when they are collected. One can also draw from the literature on
family relocation within national borders, for which there is better data.
This literature on intra-national relocation informs us that partnered women
appear disadvantaged by migration on many accounts: family relocations have
positive consequences for partnered men and negative consequences for part-
nered women in regard to employment rates, paid work hours, wages, and
occupational status (Cooke, 2003; Boyle, Cooke, Halfacree, and Smith, 1999;
Boyle, Cullis, Flowerdew, and Gayle, 2003; Pailhé Solaz, 2008). They explain
this effect in large part through the gender allocation of migration roles within
couples, with a male lead mover and a female tied mover, roles which have
remained surprisingly stable in Western countries (Tenn, 2010; T. J. Cooke, 2011).
Building on Becker’s theory, these gender roles in family migration theory used
to be explained gender-blindly through household specialisation, and the max-
imisation of the employment and career prospects of the partner specialised
in paid work - the male partner (Mincer, 1978). But there again, gender-blind
explanations perform poorly when we consider the substantial achievements in
educational attainment and career shifts by women (England, 2010). People may
be ’doing gender’ mostly and most consequentially when they decide how to
migrate (Bielby Bielby, 1992; Halfacree, 1995; Shihadeh, 1991): Will they agree
to follow their partner, or to go with them? Will they go alone, unchaperoned?
Are those even available options? The research done by Vidal and Lersch (2019)
and Vidal, Perales, and Baxter (2016) on couple relocations and the division of
domestic labour concluded that couple relocation was indeed associated with
a widening in the gender gap in housework hours; however, this was chiefly
driven by the gendered hierarchy inherent in the migration decision, and to other
changes happening at the same time as relocation, namely the arrival of children.
Because the migration itself was gendered and focused on maximising men’s
careers, it therefore had the effect of gendering the division of paid work (women
often stopped working), and this in turn heightened the division of unpaid work.
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Thus gendered organisation of couples’ relocation had gendering consequences on
both paid and unpaid levels.
Subsequently, it becomes crucial to understand why migration would almost
systematically be organised in a way that prioritises men’s projects and employ-
ment prospects. One of the explanations is that economic potential is evaluated
in biased, gendered ways in the migration decision, with men’s resources being
attributed more value than women’s: it derives that economic resources will not
have linear but rather gender-asymmetrical effects on the propensity for male
and female spouses to lead moves. The employment outcomes resulting from
such moves is therefore gender-asymmetrical, and so is the impact on unpaid
labour (T. J. Cooke, 2008; Perales Vidal, 2013). Ultimately, this leads to greater
gender-specialisation. To transpose this at the international or transnational scale,
the notion of ’gendered geographies of power’ (Mahler & Pessar, 2009) is useful:
gender relations and hierarchies in the society of emigration and in the society of
immigration frame the mode of migration and of partner selection. The merits
and opportunity (the ’push’ and ’pull’) of international migration, both for the
individual and the household, are likely to be evaluated and gauged in gendered
ways. For instance, women may be tempted to emigrate if they feel like the
society they live in is too gender-conservative and constrains them (Suksomboon,
2011); but the family or the couple may also find it more difficult to send a woman
abroad alone, compared to a man - even if they have the same prospects - unless
they are perhaps already married, in which case they can be trusted to take their
place in the care chains (Hochschild, 2000; Palenga-Möllenbeck, 2013; Parreñas,
2015).
The literature on tied migration - including international migrants - is un-
equivocal on the fact that men are much more likely to be lead migrants (first
of the couple to migrate) or pioneer migrants (migrating before couple forma-
tion, and later bringing a partner from the country of origin), whereas women
are more likely to be tied (second-movers) or joint migrants (González-Ferrer,
2011; Taylor, 2007). Lead and pioneer migrants are associated with higher labour
performance, which does not apply to tied migrants. This is also found to be
true for international family-stage migration (González-Ferrer, 2011). In addition,
González-Ferrer (2011) found that in family-stage migration, the length of time
that separates the migration of the lead partner and family unification also mat-
ters for the employment of both. Amongst tied migrants, women are much more
likely to join after a year or more, and men much more likely to go at the same
time. However, as precious as it is, this scholarship has three limits: it has been
entirely focused on paid labour, understood as individual labour performance
(especially women’s employment rates), which leaves mostly unaddressed the
0.3. The partner matters: intermarriage and the interlocking of migration and
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question of gender dynamics in the couple; it has considered almost exclusively
migrant couples (not mixed unions); it relies either on very basic dichotomies
(who migrated first?) or on legal category of admission (family reunification /
labour migration etc), which only very imperfectly posit migration in the life
course.
0.3 The partner matters: intermarriage and the interlock-
ing of migration and couple formation
Whether we consider connections between couples’ gender division of
labour and migration to be linked to different gender norms (the gender culture
argument) and/or to the agency gained (or the economic and social power
lost) during the migration process, a common feature of the literature is that
in all scenarios, the choice and status of the partner matters. Accordingly, the
literature on migrants’ acculturation to gender egalitarianism, like the literature
that engages with the gender consequences of specific migration trajectories (’tied
migrants’, marriage migrants etc), identifies different scenarios depending on
whether migrants are partnered with another migrant, a co-ethnic descendant
of a migrant, or a majority native individual (with no migrant parent). The last
scenario is generally considered ’mixed’ and treated as ’intermarriage. Other
mixed scenarios involve mixed minority-minority partnering, but these are much
rarer, and almost never researched.
If the recruitment of the partner can be considered a key element to un-
derstand how we may go from migration to gender relations, it is because it is
understood to (1) set the ground in terms of gender norms and culture, and (2)
inform and heavily influence the migration journey as well as the power relation.
0.3.1 Intermarriage and assimilation
The view that intermarriage can be considered both a marker and a bench-
mark of migrant or ethnic assimilation is largely represented in sociological
scholarship (Birrell and Healy, 2000: 38; Schinkel, 2011: 101). In classic assimila-
tion theory, intermarriage is considered a key indicator and vector of structural
assimilation (Gordon, 1964). In part, this is because intimate partner choice pre-
supposes the absence of prejudice between groups (Alba & Nee, 2003; Gordon,
1964); At an individual level, intermarrying with the majority group can reward
a high degree of integration (which allows exposure, encounter, attraction and
social acceptability) but it also gives access to resources and social networks that
may otherwise be out of reach. It has been found in some countries that migrants
who marry other migrants tend to ’lag behind’ in terms of social and human
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capital, as does their labour performance - compared to migrants who marry
natives (Meng & Gregory, 2005; Nielsen, Smith, & Çelikaksoy, 2009)
Indeed, there is a wealth of research on intermarriage rates and what influ-
ences them, from residential segregation, migrant/ethnic group sizes and other
opportunity structures (Kalmijn, 1998) to minority groups’ different degrees of
acceptability in the eyes of the majority group, and varied degrees of preference
for intra-group unions. Subsequently, this scholarship finds that there are many
obstacles for migrants to intermarry (see reviews by Rodríguez-García (2012) and
Waters and Gerstein Pineau (2016), as well as Choi and Tienda (2018)), and that
certain group boundaries are harder to cross - for men more than women and
vice-versa. There have been important descriptive studies of intermarriage in
Britain (Berrington, 1994, 1996; Coleman, 1985; Collet, 1993; Muttarak & Heath,
2010), and in France (Collet & Santelli, 2013; Munoz-Perez & Tribalat, 1984; Safi,
2008; Tribalat, 2009; Tribalat & Munoz-Pérez, 1996). Yet as Kalmijn (2010, p. 272)
argues, there is comparatively much more research on what intermarriage repre-
sents than on its social consequences and what it produces. This absence is almost
complete when it comes to gender relations.
From the perspective of gender acculturation, for a migrant to intermarry
with a majority native should be associated with particularly intense and sus-
tained exposure to mainstream gender norms, and thus much convergence over
time towards the ’mainstream’ gender attitudes in the country of immigration;
indeed, not only are the children of mixed couples more socially integrated over-
all (Kalmijn, 2010), they may also be more egalitarian than those of two migrant
parents (see Goldscheider, Goldscheider, and Bernhardt(2011) on Turks and Poles
in Sweden). Children of migrants who partnered with majority native couples
appear to hold even more egalitarian views, in fact, than the children of two
majority native parents (Roeder & Mühlau, 2014). This suggests that on top of
acculturation and integrative processes, those engaged in such relationships may
be self-selected among those with more gender-egalitarian views and, and/or
that the formation of inter-relationships may foster reflexive disengagement from
mainstream gender beliefs on both sides - including the majority native’s. Con-
versely, the acculturation approach would imply that migrants in relationship
with a native descendant of migrant (even if co-ethnic) are likely to see their
gender ideology and gender arrangements edge over time closer to those of the
descendants of migrants, which are themselves quite close to those of the native
majority group (Roeder & Mühlau, 2014). Intermarriage could be expected to
promote noticeably more gender-egalitarian roles when the migrant partner’s
country-of-origin context is particularly gender-conservative. Nottmeyer (2014)
thus found that migrant-native couples involving a majority native are less likely
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to specialise in Becker’s term. This is connected to the fact that these couples are
both highly educated and educationally homogamous, but it is relative: for cou-
ples formed by native women and migrant men, these unions are less specialised.
But for couples formed between a native man and a migrant woman, they are
more specialised compared to other native men’s couples - though still less spe-
cialised compared to other migrant women’s couples. This gender asymmetry is
also noted by Basu (2017).
0.3.2 Intermarriage, migration and power: exchanges and bargains
In fact the qualitative scholarship suggests that these couples can also be
very un-egalitarian, specicically when they involve a native man and a migrant
woman from a third-world country. Rather than European native men’s (presum-
ably more gender-equal) norms permeating the relationship, the situation these
studies describe are better characterised as very asymmetrical power relations,
which allow the native men to impose highly gendered divisions of labour. The
asymmetry of the power relation is particularly acute when the migrant partner’s
rights to reside in the country of immigration are legally tied to the continuation
of their relationship with the native partner, as is the case with partner and spouse
visas. Such situations of legal dependencies have been associated with higher
risks of other expressions of patriarchal power - such as intimate partner violence
(Chiu, 2017; Masson & Roux, 2011). The unions formed by migrants and their
outcomes in term of gender relations and the division of labour, cannot be only
tackled through the lens of integration or acculturation. It also involves thinking
about power and the bargaining capacity of the migrant relative to that of their
native partner.
This also make it possible to conceptualise situations of gender-reversal of
the roles in migration - when men follow - and their possible consequences for
gender relations; for instance, marriage migrant Pakistani men who migrated to
the UK to join their UK-born or resident wife are in a position of ’ghar-damad’
(house son-in-law), dependent on their wives and wives’ relatives, which is
perceived as shameful. But as pointed out by Lievens (1999), this has the positive
consequence for their wives that through this transnational union, they escape the
tradition of patrilocality which would have otherwise required them to move to
their husbands’ family. The ’Lievens hypothesis’ thus posits that a transnational
union is not necessarily a ’traditional’ or oppressed choice of partner: through
the combination of migration and couple formation, it can have emancipating
consequences for women.
However, this gender-reversal of migration trajectories and gender roles
is often socially and emotionally costly for the men involved, and challenging
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for the couple. These conjugal scenarios have been associated therefore with
intense discomfort which can lead to marital conflict (Beck-Gernsheim, 2007;
Qureshi, Charsley, & Shaw, 2014). In parallel, marriage migrant wives may find
themselves acutely isolated and vulnerable towards their husband and in-laws
(Charsley, 2008), especially during the probationary two years (five since 2012)
before they can apply for independent leave to remain. And as Wray (2015) noted,
it is not the case that such migration only concern transnational unions - indeed
they also involve majority native British individuals.
Intermarriage and the marriage market, cross-border unions, gender
asymmetries and bargaining power
In Merton (1941)’s exchange theory, intermarriage is understood as a bargain
struck between a minority partner and a majority partner. It presupposes a
majority ’premium’, which forced minority partners to ’bargain’ their way into an
interrelationship with the majority group (see also Kingsley Davis (1941)). Thus
educational hypogamy (marrying ’down’ in terms of educational attainment)
could be the cost for intermarriage - that is, marrying ’up’ from the point of view
of group hierarchies. When applied to cross-border and international unions,
this reasoning often relies on an assumption of gender asymmetry (Weiss, Yi,
& Zhang, 2013): that men and women’s capitals are not assessed in the same
way, but through the lens of gender (hence age and beauty may matter more for
women to be seen as attractive partner, whereas men’s income or wealth may be
more important). Thus the capitals that women can bargain with on the marriage
market are not the same as men’s.
Variants of exchange theory have been used to explain some of the gender
arrangements and migration patterns. Suksomboon (2011) thus coined the term
of ’geographical hypergamy’ to describe the process by which educated and
autonomous Thai women chose to marry European men with little education
and to follow them to Europe. On the international marriage market, access to
wealthier and more in-demand parts of the world may constitute a significant
bargaining ticket. Similar observations have been made on unions formed by
migrants and descendants of migrants, for instance among Indian families living
in the UK, who can negotiate advantageous unions with India-born higher-class
partners for their UK-born children (Charsley, Bolognani, Ersanilli, & Spencer,
2020).
Such bargaining can thus take place at the level of partner recruitment, but
as we have seen in the section on the gender division of labour, there is evidence
that the distribution of resources and power between partners also influences
the terms of their bargaining and ultimately how they share paid and unpaid
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labour. The equation and the bargaining does not simply dissipate once the
union is tied. In addition, the native ’premium’ which may grant natives of the
country of immigration an extra card on the marriage market, also comes with
real advantages, notably in the form of social networks. The asymmetry between
migrant and native (or more established migrant) partner is not merely symbolic.
For the migrant partner, it can mean that their right to remain in the country,
as well as their social network and their economic survival are mediated to no
insignificant extent by their relationship. Even if the most asymmetrical terms
may be temporary - for instance when migrants move from a partner visa to
their independent right to remain (or citizenship), they may set the tone (Nicollet,
1992; Zehraoui, 2003).
This also reflects, on the side of men, an aspiration and propensity for
’traditional’ and polarised gender roles, in societies sometimes perceived as
(too) emancipatory for women. These gender expectations and ideologies of
gender complementarity and specialisation have been found to be more present
among certain migrant groups in Europe (Roeder & Mühlau, 2014), notably
Turks (Diehl et al., 2009) and Moroccans (Arends-Tóth & Vijver, 2009). But
such representations of gender roles and hierarchies also remain widespread
in Western societies of immigration, where women’s engagement in paid work
(mothers, especially) is seen as a couple’s decision much more than men’s paid
labour activity (Kellerhals, Perrin, & Steinauer-Cresson, 1982). In contrast, men
and masculinity continue to be legimitised by the role of male breadwinner
(Henchoz, 2008). Transformations of the traditional family and gender model
are underway, as denoted by the surge of cohabitating couples and civil unions
(PACS) (de Singly, 2007; Lesthaeghe, 2010; Lesthaeghe & van de Kaa, 1986) -
although these are still limited to populations selected among those with higher
cultural and economic capitals and with more egalitarian views on gender roles
(Rault & Letrait, 2010).
0.3.3 The interlocking of partnering and migration trajectories
Migration trajectories play a key role here in setting the terms of these power
relations, at least initially. In the cases just described, it is not simply that migrants,
or even migrant women are at a social disadvantage on the marriage market com-
pared to natives. It is also the mode and timing of their migration and couple
formation that contributes to creating an asymmetrical power relation. I have
already discussed the gendering capacity of tied migration and marriage migra-
tion especially. It may well be that it is this mode of migration-union interlocking,
more than partner recruitment or indeed the gender cultures associated with
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different migrant groups, which sets the stage for gender relations in the couple,
post-migration.
For example, Baker and Benjamin (1997), and more recently Meng and
Gregory (2005) noted that being partnered with a native significantly improves
migrant women’s labour participation and/or earnings, although the effect is
not as clear for migrant men. But when González-Ferrer (2011) introduced a
typology of union-migration trajectories in her modelling, thus controlling for
different migration-union sequences, she found no effect anymore of having a
native partner for migrant women’s employment. This contributes to making the
case that to understand the gender relations post-migration, we need to consider
the different interlocking and implications of union formation and migration in
the life-course as well as what Choi and Tienda (2018) call the lifecycle timing of
migration.
The timing of migration is key for integration and acculturation: people who
migrate young and who migrated long ago are more likely to be integrated, more
likely to intermarry (Choi & Tienda, 2018), more likely to have gender beliefs that
are closer to those of the host society (Roeder & Mühlau, 2014). But the timing of
migration matters also in relation to the timing of couple formation. For women,
the moment of couple formation is strongly associated with an increase in time
on domestic work,6 an effect which could be amplified or sustained if couple
formation also coincides with migration and joining a more established partner.
The social consequences of the interlocking of migration and family formation
processes are little addressed and poorly understood, but they can be expected to
be highly relevant to the shaping of gender relations and gender roles.
From the literature we can safely expect that patterns of migration-union
trajectories are both heavily gendered, and vary by migrant group. Although
there has been a diversification of women’s migration and a certain degree of
gender convergence over the past decades (see e.g. Beauchemin, Borrel, Régnard,
and Santelli (2015)), it remains true that women form the majority of marriage
migrants and family migrants more broadly, while men numerically dominate
among labour migrants in France (Algava & Bèque, 2008; Ministère de l’Intérieur,
2021), as in the UK (Home Office, 2019). In addition, EU migrants in Europe are
much more likely to be independent, labour migrants than non-EU migrants -
something easily explained by the fact that the ever-stricter immigration regula-
tions do not apply to them. Therefore and in contrast, non-EU migrants are much
more likely to enter the country as family migrants. This applies especially to
those arrived since the clamping down on labour migration in the 1960s (for the
6For men it is relationship dissolution that is associated with increases in time spent on domestic
tasks (Gupta, 1999; Hewitt et al., 2013)
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UK) and the 1970s-1980s for the rest of Europe. Within the category of non-EU
migrants, however, there is still a large degree of variation in migration-union tra-
jectories between groups. Thus ’marriage migration’ appears to be more common
among certain migrant groups, e.g. Turks and Pakistani, and marriage migra-
tion is more likely to be co-ethnic than other kinds of migration. While the two
dimensions (co-ethnic partnering and marriage migration) are thus connected,
they should not be conflated in the reasoning. Nielsen et al. (2009) for instance,
analyse the causal effect of a legislation on marriage migrants, but suggests that
the interpretation of the effect apply to all situations in which migrants marry
other migrants rather than natives; in short, as an effect of the choice of partner,
rather than the migration trajectory itself.
0.4 Theoretical framework
Building on this discussion of the literature and the theoretical contribu-
tions it offers, this research will follow a broad feminist perspective, linking an
understanding that migration trajectories are gendered and gendering (Pedraza,
1991). This means that trajectories not only differ by gender, but are also shaped
by gender relations, both in the country and context of origin, and in the coun-
try of immigration. In turn, these paths of migration, some of which are more
likely to be walked by men and some by women, can also have gendering effects,
either in further locking people and notably women into rigid gender roles; or
on the contrary in giving them opportunities to re-negotiate gender roles and
specialisation.
The first theoretical strand, drawn from the theory of assimilation and
acculturation, suggests that the more exposure the migrant gets to the majority
group in the society of immigration, the more likely they are to shift both practices
and views of gender roles towards those of the majority group. It derives that,
compared to migrants who partner with other migrants, migrants who intermarry
with a native, and especially a majority native, should see their couple adopting
modes of labour division that are closer to those of the majority native group.
The process is not expected to be uniform across migrant groups, because the
starting points (in Kalmijn (2010)’s terms) may differ. Some migrants may arrive
with gender views and expectations that are very similar to those of the majority
British or French native groups. This would be the expectation for most European
migrants, for instance (as per e.g. Roeder and Mühlau (2014)’s findings). Other
groups, in contrast, may arrive with more distinctive gender cultures, for instance
when they come from countries with much lower levels of gender equality
and women’s empowerment. In addition, and in accordance with theories of
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segmented assimilation, acculturation may work at a slower pace for certain
groups, especially those who more frequently deploy strategies of endogamy -
for instance through transnational marriages between children of migrants and
primary migrants. The central explanatory factor here remains the idea of more
or less different gender cultures and of processes of acculturation. Across migrant
groups, one would therefore expect that both intermarriage and the length of
time in the country will be associated with modes of gender division of labour
that are closer to those of the native majority group. The migration trajectory
should only matter insofar as it may condition how early migrants start being
exposed to the gender norms of the country of immigration. Thus one would
expect that individuals who migrated as children will be more likely to divide
labour with their partner in a manner that is more similar to the majority native
group, compared to migrants who arrived as adults. A further possibility is that
migrants who migrate as independent adults, and prior to couple formation, may
experience a form of migration trajectories that grants them much independence
and distance from their community of origin, thus making them more likely to
mingle with the majority group.
The second theoretical mechanism invokes not culture but power, namely
power relations between partners. It builds on theories that consider the gender
division of labour as rooted in the division of power between partners. I posit
that the relative power and resources that migrants bring to the bargaining table
of their relationship is likely to be affected by their migration trajectories, and
notably its interlocking with the life-course and the key life-cycle event of couple
formation. Migrants who migrated prior to couple formation are less likely to be -
economically, socially, legally - dependent on their partner; by contrast, migrants
whose timing of family formation coincide with the timing of migration may be
in the worst position to bargain on the sharing of paid and unpaid labour, at
the key transitional moment when the couple starts their cohabiting life. This
could apply especially to migrants who entered on a partner visa, but the broader
reasoning remains plausible even if the asymmetry plays out solely on social
(and possibly economic) terms without involving legal dependency. It is not
expected that only migration trajectories impact the power relation between
partners. Indeed, the choice of partner also should: in intermarried couples, a
native partner can be expected to be on much firmer ground than their migrant
partner, in the sense that they may remain for a long time more competent with
the language, more familiar with the institutions, and they may benefit from more
extensive networks, especially in the majority group. Subsequently, they may be
in a position to mediate and condition their migrant partner’s access to certain
resources, services and social circles, and they may leverage this ’native’ premium
0.4. Theoretical framework 41
in the division of paid and unpaid labour. This power is likely to diminish over
time, as migrant partners get more settled in the country of immigration, but it
may durably impact the gender division of labour. However, and contrary to
classic bargaining theory, I do not expect these negotiations to work on a gender-
neutral basis. In societies which are still marked by patriarchal relations (and
here I include British and French societies of immigration, as well as countries of
origin), one should not assume that men and women negotiate on a level-playing
field, including in the intimacy of the home and the couple. In her analysis
of ’conjugal mixedness’ - how migrant-native couples experience their cultural
differences and how they find compromises -, Collet (2012) noted that women
seemed less able than men to impose their preferences (on, e.g. the language
spoken at home) - or that men were less conciliatory than women, which amounts
to the same thing. Thus, one could expect that there is also a ’male premium’,
which favours men in the negotiations, and can blunt asymmetries that work
against them, and sharpen those that are to their advantage.
This research’s theoretical framework thus invokes theories of gender norms
and ’doing gender’, and theories of power and relative resources (broadly de-
fined) to investigate connections between migration trajectories and the gender
division of labour in couples. It will combine and test both explanatory threads
of gender cultures and migration-union trajectories. Indeed, feminist theories of
migration insist that gender relations both in the context of emigration and that
of immigration shape migration trajectories as well as its outcomes. Explanations
of gender cultures and migration-union trajectories are not mutually exclusive;
the case I make does not pit ideologies against power relations; in the context
of migration and gender, the two are at any rate undeniably enmeshed: the
gender culture in the context of origin, like the gender assumptions inherent
to both British and French immigration regimes, both play important roles in
channeling men and women into different migration paths. But it is also true
that, as little as connections between migrants and gender have been analysed
quantitatively, differences across groups (and across couple types) have generally
been explained by resorting to arguments of gender cultures and integration. The
actual role of migration trajectories and experiences - their gendering potential,
and not only their gendered profiles - has been very little addressed.
In this thesis, I do not look only at women’s employment, or only at the
gender division of housework/care in couples. I look at both together, through
notion of gender-specialisation. The concept (and the measure) does not allow to
appropriately capture degrees of ’equity’ or ’inequity’ (Kalmijn & Monden, 2012)
and possible cases of compensation. That is because the concept is designed on
the theoretical assumption that the gender-specialisaton of labour is by definition
42 Literature Review
inequitable and that the gender-specialisation of labour, even if it is ’fair’ from
the point of view of time-allocation, is still fundamentally a relation of power
and of domination (Kergoat, 2017). As such, the project is rooted in feminist
critical theory. Furthermore, it is constructed as a fundamentally intersectional
endeavour (I expand on this in chapter 2): it starts from the premise that the
connection between trajectories of migration and social consequences of migra-
tion are intersectional. I follows an intra-categorical approach (McCall, 2005),
segregating models between migrant women and migrant men, to understand
not only gendered dynamics at how they are mediated by other characteristics
and inequalities (e.g. ethnicity and educational level).
0.5 Two histories of migration: France and the UK
Immigration flows
Both former colonial empires and industrial powers, the UK and France
share a history of old and diversified mass immigration. Until the second world
war, most migrants to France came from Europe, either Eastern Europe (notably
Poland) or Southern Europe (especially Portugal, Spain and Italy). The post-war
period of reconstruction which turned to economic prosperity saw a rising need
for manpower. This led to a steep rise in labour migration. Until the late 1970s,
most labour migrants came from Southern European countries, and from North-
ern Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia). From 1974 and the closure of the borders
to (most) labour migration, the migration flows shifted, with growing propor-
tions of family reunification and (though in much smaller numbers) students and
political refugees. Migrants from Southern Europe and North Africa continued
to come, with rising proportions of migrant women among them. Migration
from other parts of the world are on the whole more recent than the groups just
mentioned, and the post-1974 era is associated with a greater diversity - including
gender diversity - of migration origins and profiles of migrants (Beauchemin, Bor-
rel, Régnard, & Santelli, 2015). Migrants from Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa,
Turkey, and European countries other than Spain, Portugal and Italy, mostly
came after 1974, and in smaller numbers. Exile migration, notably from former
Indochina and Central Africa also increased in the same period. Immigration
from Southeast Asia is very concentrated around the times of the political crisis
in the Indochinese peninsula (1975-1983), while Turkish immigration followed
shortly after (one in two Turkish-born migrants arrived after 1989). Sub-Saharan
immigration (like Chinese immigration) is more recent still, with most migrants
arriving after 1984. Part of this migration, notably from the Sahel region, is labour
migration, later followed by family reunification. Most of the migrants born
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South of the Sahel, however, came as refugees and asylum-seekers.
The UK has also been the destination of many migrants. The Irish were
there in large numbers already before the second world war. In contrast, most
migrants came after 1950, initially in response to postwar labour shortages, but in
differentiated waves for each group. Most Caribbean migrants arrived during the
years 1955 to 1965, whereas migrants from SubSaharan Africa (from Nigeria, for
most of them), from India and from Pakistan arrived in the 1970s, and even later
in the case of the Pakistanis. Most of Bangledeshi and Chinese migrants arrived
after 1980 (Owen, 2003; Lessard-Phillips, 2009; Dustmann Theodoropoulos,
2010). In the 1970s British subjects of South Asian origin came from Africa in
response to the Ugandan and Kenyan governments’ Africanization policies - the
’twice migrant’ population described by Bhachu (1985). As in France, since the
1970s, the legal entry of unskilled, non-white (non-EU) people has been restricted
to the family or partners of these earlier immigrants, brought through family
reunification provisions and partner visa. In consequence, Britain’s contemporary
immigrant-origin population mainly consists of these very specific groups of
postwar immigrants and their descendants.
These descriptions are detailed further in the French and British chapters.
Finally, I want to set the legal stage for family reunifications and migrant-native
unions in France and the UK.
Regulations and restrictions: family migration and mixed couples
The British and French immigration regimes have followed very similar
evolutions and are very comparable in effect (although they have differed in
justification and narratives of integration (Favell, 1998). During the recruitment
period they wanted only temporary workers, so family reunification was little
developed but also little regulated. Rules were underdeveloped and often infor-
mally. The UK was one of the first European states to introduce a sophisticated
policy framework on family-related migration. In the 1960-70s, many measures
were specifically designed to prevent and contain marriage and family migration.
This was when the ‘primary purpose’ rule was brought in, which required of all
foreign nationals married to British citizens to be able to prove that the primary
purpose of their marriage was not the acquisition of British citizenship. It pre-
vented thousands of individuals married to British citizens to enter the UK until
it was dropped in 1997.
Although the stated objective in the UK was to curb immigration, this
motive was not present as such in the rest of Europe’s policies until the 1990s.
The European Convention of Human Rights and the European Court of Human
44 Literature Review
Rights were often referred to in family-related migration cases (Lahav 1997).
However, while family reunification policies in France were perhaps not – at least
in the beginning – expressly motivated by immigration restrictions, the definition
of family that it relied on and enforced was certainly restrictive. As in the UK, the
framing of family-related migration drew on heavily gendered tropes and made
no room for family forms and relations outside of spouses and children within a
nuclear model (Kofman, 2004), as marriage (or civil partnership) is mandatory for
a couple’s eligibility to family reunification, of which only spouses and children
can benefit.
The fact is that women constitute the bulk of family-related migration, on
which European states have been clamping down (Boyle, Feng, & Gayle, 2009;
Charsley et al., 2012). Though family reunification and formation is a human right
enshrined in international human rights legislation7, there are many restrictions
in the UK and France on who can enjoy this right. Visas allowing family reunion
and the settlement of spouses are subject to strict economic criteria and potential
migrants are commonly tested for language skills and may be prevented from
migrating to join partners because of their age (Williams, 2010). This has also
justified the introduction of further requirements and tests (Wray, 2011). Under
the current immigration regulations, a partner visa allows migrants to the UK to
stay for two and a half years in the UK, following which partners can apply to
extend their partner/family visa. It is only after five years of continuous residency
in the UK that migrants who first entered the country on a partner visa can apply
for independent leave to remain. If their application is successful, it ends the
period during which their right to live in the UK is dependent on their sponsor
partner and on the continuation of their relationship and cohabitation. As of the
2012 reform to the family migration visa, there is now a English language test, as
well as a requirement for the couple and more specifically the sponsor partner to
prove that they meet an income (or savings) threshold which guarantees that they
will be able to support the couple financially. This income threshold conditions
eligibility for family reunification in the UK. Though introduced in 2012, this
reform was foregrounded in 1999, 2002 and 2010 (Charsley et al., 2012; Turner,
2015). It is disputed whether the introduction of these provisions has had any
impact at all, apart from bringing in further restriction on immigration at large,
and especially women’s immigration (Van Walsum & Spijkerboer, 2007).
From the point of the view of immigration laws, at any point in time, cou-
ples formed between a migrant and a native partner may fall into three main
configurations. The first one is binational couples (Riaño 2011; Unterreiner 2012),
7see Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
0.5. Two histories of migration: France and the UK 45
typically when one partner is a national of the country of residencen and the other
is not. The second case is identified as mixed-immigration status couples (Grif-
fiths and Morgan 2017): when the two partners do not have the same residency
rights. It often overlaps with the first category. The final configuration is when
both members of the migrant-native couples are citizen of the country where they
reside, either because the migrant partner acquired citizenship at some stage,
or got it from birth through one of their parents (jus sanguini provisions). Of
course, these categories move, as couples can shift from on to the next through
citizenship acquisition (or loss, potentially). But it is also self-evident that couples
in these three categories do not fall under the same regulations, and that being in
the first category is likely to come with a lot more trouble.
The British and French immigration regime has long payed close attention
to family and spouse migration. It has justified its interest in connection to the
prevention of ‘non-genuine’ and ‘sham’ marriages to bypass British immigration
restrictions. This political concern was already explicit in the discourse surround-
ing primary purpose (Yuval-Davis, Anthias, & Kofman, 2005), and refreshed by
the 2012 reform. Thus since 2012, applicants for partner visa who are already
residing in the UK at the time when they apply are put into a different cate-
gory than applicants from ’outside’, with stricter eligibility criteria being applied
to the latter category. Certain migration trajectories, in combination with the
mixed-nationality or mixed-immigration status of partner, have been particularly
targeted by immigration restrictions, who cast doubt of the authenticity of all
such mixed couples, suspected of being cynical enterprise to bypass immigration
control. Marriage migration is especially suspect in the eyes of the Home Office
(Home Office, 2013), while French ministers have been known to treat all French-
foreigner unions as potential scams to obtain French citizenship (E. Fassin, Ferran,
& Slama, 2009). The suspicion of sham wedding is linked to the possibility that
marriage migrants would be deceiving both sponsor partner and/or immigration
control in order to be able to migrate and settle in the UK or France. It is because
on this suspicion that immigration control both in France and in the UK justifies
the policing of the intimacy of these couples. Until very recently, EU foreign
citizens were free to move, settle, form attachments and untie them in France
and in the UK as they please. Brexit has changed the game for EU residents in
England, potentially bringing their choice of partner and the ’authenticity’ of









Mobile and racialised ’Others.
Quantifying migration
trajectories and mixed couples in
France and in the UK
It is difficult to think
simultaneously that the objects
being measured do exist, and
that this is only a convention.
Desrosières (1998, p. 1)
Statistical data ought to always be considered in (political, institutional,
historical) context and as part of power relations. D’Ignazio and Klein start their
book Data Feminism (2020) with this: their first chapter calls for examining power
behind and within the structures and institution of statistical production and the
people who produce them. This part is dedicated to presenting the two surveys
that form the focus and provide the material for this chapter and this research:
the French survey Trajectoires et Origines1 and the UK Household Longitudinal
survey, also known as Understanding Society2. In line with what has become a
fundamental of feminist epistemology of situated knowledge (Haraway, 1988),
particular attention will be drawn to the producers of these sources and to the
political, institutional and micro-sociological contexts of their genesis. Notably,
1Institut National d’Etudes Démographiques, & Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes
Economiques. (2008). Trajectoires et origines. enquête sur la diversité des populations. ADISP. Paris.
Retrieved from http://www.progedo-adisp.fr/enquetes/XML/lil.php?lil=lil-0494.
2University of Essex, & Institute for Social and Economic Research. (2019). Understanding society:
Waves 1-8, 2009-2018 and harmonised BHPS: Waves 1-18, 1991-2009. [data collection]. special licence.
UK data service. SN 6614. Retrieved from http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6614-14..
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I will historicize the survey structure, recruitment and categories, mapping out
the statistical continuities and key inflexions which drove the survey design
process, especially on the topic of migration and population diversity. I will
further discuss the process, the resistances and compromises that were found,
which ultimately allowed for data that is innovative and crucial but not neutral
for the research questions I investigate in this thesis.
The two surveys are unique in the French and British statistical landscapes
because of a combination of features: they record information on the mode and
timing of international mobility; they include measures of population diversity;
they over-sample migrants and their questionnaires comprises questions on part-
ner, family formation including timing and mixing, and on gender and relations
in the household. Such co-occurrence of data and themes in large-scale surveys
is rare, recent, and indispensable for studies such as this one. It is important to
contextualise this encounter, because it conditions both the quantitative analysis
and the possibility of a comparison between the two countries. But it is also
important because the context in which this co-occurence of data and research
questions emerged in the surveys still informs the data, the analysis, as well as
what remains unaddressed.
The first chapter focuses on the categories of mixedness and migration and
their representation in both surveys. The second chapter extend this conversation
to the intersectional articulation between gender and migration in survey data.
Chapter introduction
This first chapter has three aims. The first is to introduce and briefly histori-
cise the two surveys used in this research, Trajectoires et Origines and Understanding
Society, and explain why they fit the purpose of the study as well as the context
of their coming about. The second aim is to discuss the extent to which statis-
tics on mixedness, migration and migration-related inequalities differ between
France and the UK, and to situate my specific objects - migrant-native couples
and union-migration trajectories - in British and French statistical landscapes. As
I will discuss, the survey quantification of mixedness and migration are tightly
connected to the quantification of population diversity. The French and British
cases have often been pitted against one another as opposite models when it
comes to understanding and managing diversity, integration (Favell, 1998), social
cohesion, national identity and mixedness (Unterreiner, 2012a). They have also
been constructed as exceptions in the relevant fields of statistical production:
France, because of what is often referred to as a constitutional ban on ethnic
statistics and its regime of Republican colour-blindness; and the UK, for the
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opposite reason that it is the only country in Western Europe to routinely collect
statistics that use an explicitly ethnic (or rather ethno-racial) framework.
The scale of this difference between the two cases bears consequences for the
comparability of the data, both in terms of overlap (is the same data on migrants
and migration collected in both countries? Are the same migrant groups focused
on?) and in terms of meaning and interpretation (does the data and the categories
mean the same thing and weigh the same weight in both countries?). As we
will see, the political response to the two surveys were very different: where
Understanding Society was and remains largely uncontentious, TeO became
the object of intense political scrutiny and a nation-wide polemic known as
the French controversy on ethnic statistics. The final aim of this chapter will
be to assess how migrants and their conjugal and geographic trajectories are
constructed in both surveys. I argue that though the two surveys overtly differ in
structure and aims, they problematise migration along the same lines, through
the prism of discrimination and inequalities (mainly on the academic side) and
integration and diversity management (or race relations) on the government side.
This help explain why the quantification of migration as trajectory (in geographic,
legal and conjugal terms) is a much more secondary dimension. Subsequently, it
helps make sens of the surveys’ focus, in both countries, on specific - racialised -
categories of migrants, hence also on specific categories of mixing.
Why survey data? Why these surveys? Much of the literature on the statis-
tical construction of categories of ’others’ (migrant, racial, ethnic, deviant, etc...)
has focused on census data and politics - for good reasons (P. Aspinall & Song,
2014; Ballard, 1996; Bulmer, 1986; Owen, 2007; Thompson, 2015). The census
holds a particular space and a direct connection to the state, conferring census
classifications a unique potency and a status. As the controversies around the
2020 edition of the British census illustrated again, changes in census classifica-
tions are often heavily debated, because they condition politics of recognition at
the same time as they draw boundaries of national belonging (Thompson, 2016).
More and more, however, states have been turning away from classic census
taking, spacing out or splitting census waves, a process motivated in no small
part by the exorbitant cost of exhaustive censuses. This has gone concomitantly
with the development of large-scale data surveys that are mostly publicly-funded
without necessarily being fully locked in the constraints of public statistics. His-
torically, this has also meant a greater reliance on statistical tools of extrapolation
and significance-testing, rather than on the exhaustive quality of the data which
was allowed by censuses (Desrosières, 1985). Representative surveys , if undercut
in some ways by booming methods of computational methods of data extraction
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(’Big Data’)3, continue to represent a pillar of academic social knowledge, and to
benefit from a legitimacy and an aura of scientific credibility seldom granted to
other data sources for social analysis. Surveys also hold much creative potential
in moulding statistically-inspired representations of society: who is the majority;
how is it defined; who is at the margins; what puts them there. Quantitative sur-
veys, according to Sarah Igo’s Averaged American, played a major role in shaping
the understanding of modern nation states, and notably: who was part of them
(Igo, 2007, p. 283).
Importantly, surveys like the ones under study in this thesis have come to
combine detailed data on migration trajectories with broader data on household
compositions, family life, living conditions, labour distribution, and sometimes
even - gender roles and relations. These aspects of life post-migration could not be
studied with flow data on migration (e.g. the International Passenger survey in
the UK (IPS)4). Indeed, such a combination of data is found in so few large-scale
surveys that the choice imposed itself.5
Sources The chapter analyses the design of the French survey Trajectoires et
Origines (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009), and the British survey Understanding Society
(UKLHS; ISER 2009 and running). Like in the empirical analysis later in the
thesis, the analysis focuses on the first two waves of Understanding Society (2009-
2011). The period of data collection is therefore contemporary with that of TeO
(2008-2009). For the purpose of this discussion on survey design, it is sometimes
also useful to take into consideration survey changes that were brought in later,
notably the introduction of the Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Sample Boost
(IEMB) at Wave 6 of Understanding Society. In the main, this chapter relies on
two sources of data: archives, primarily technical documentation and the various
proposals and working reports that were issued by the survey teams during the
process of the survey design; and semi-structured interviews with the survey
designers themselves (see table 1.1). Not all members of either of the two survey
teams could be interviewed, but the participants included most of the survey
leads. The recruitment also focused on those survey designers who had been
most involved on questions of migration and ethnicity, and those who had been
involved over a long period of time and therefore had a ’long view’ of the project
and the survey design process. Interviews were carried out between 2017 and
3Burrows and Savage (2014) and Savage and Burrows (2007) have problematised the receding
position of large-scale surveys and the rise of ’Big data’ in the production and claim of social knowl-
edge, especially with regards to the commercial and transactional nature of much computational
data sources and agents; and the loss of ground of social scientists in the field of social analysis.
4The IPS is the source of the data for the ONS estimates of long-term international migration
5The Labour Force Survey in the UK could have been a contender, but it does not include
sufficient information on migration trajectories and timing.
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2019, participants were recruited through a mix of direct contact-taking and
snowball-sampling. All interviews lasted between 45 min and 1h30.
TABLE 1.1: Expert interviewees:
UKHLS and TeO survey designers
Interview number Interview year Interview mode Understanding Society TeO
#1 2018 Face-to-face Survey designer, Ethnicity Strand
#2 2019 Video-call Survey lead
#3 2019 Video-call Survey designer, Ethnicity Strand
#4 2019 Video-call Survey designer
#5 2017 Video-call Survey team
#6 2017 Face-to-face Survey lead
#7 2017 Face-to-face Survey lead
Chapter outline The chapter unfolds in three parts. First, it problematises
the ways in which mixed couples and mixednness have been constructed his-
torically and statistically in both countries, and how these definitions connect to
classification of migration. Second, the chapter turns its attention to the two sur-
veys at hand, notably to the political, economic, and institutional context of their
coming into existence, from the initial idea to the final design and data collection.
The third part dives into the more technical matter of the (over)sample design
and of the questions on migration that were ultimately retained in the surveys.
More micro-sociological, this section follows the hesitations and ambiguities, the
influences both internal and external, and the decision-making process within
the survey design team, in an effort to unpack the particular frames within which
migration and indirectly mixedness were constructed in the survey data.
Theoretical lens: sociology of quantification and data feminism
Quantification practices and statistics tend to be analysed as methods, as
useful tools to provide relevant results. The sociology of quantification shifts
the researcher’s gaze, inviting us to look at quantification as its own research
object. The word ’quantification’ is here distinguished from that of ’measure’
(Desrosières & Kott, 2005). Whereas the act of ’measure’ is attached to a real-
ist understanding of the world, in which there would be ’real’ things simply
waiting to be objectively counted, the sociology of ’quantification’ (and related
streams like the economics of conventions (Thévenot, 2016)) underline the extent
to which statistics rely on conventions. It implies, in a broad sense, the process
of actively manufacturing numbers, a process made of negotiations, compro-
mises, translations, encoding, agreements... a process therefore deeply contextual
and political, imbued with power relations as well as technical considerations.
Certainly, in the spaces and the moments where we trade stories in words for
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stories in numbers (quantification), and stories in numbers for stories in words
(interpretation), neither the data nor the ways data is understood and used are
completely predictable. Conventions of equivalence and meanings are not in-
herently nor necessarily the best or the most accurate: they are those that were
invested in, with money and with meaning and sometimes with no small degree
of contingency. Nevertheless, they have the power to produce norms and cate-
gories that hold and that matter (Bloor, 1982; Latour, 1989) and can durably shape
the statistical forms and the debates of the present (Desrosières, 1985; MacKenzie,
1981). Classification and statistics, we expect, describe certain kinds of people
which are identified as having distinct properties, properties that call for being
controlled, helped, altered or (more rarely) emulated. But the process by which
certain groups are identified as warranting counting, and delineated in statistical
categories and constructs, also changes them, how they experience their social
reality, and the social reality itself. This is what Ian Hacking (2006) named the
’looping effect’ (Hacking, 2006, p. 1). This is reflected in the ways in which ’mixed
couples’ and ’migration’ are quantified in survey data.
Adopting a reflexive approach on the ways in which statistical categories
and statistical actors are anchored in the society that they attempt to describe
is therefore important to understand and interpret the statistical material they
produce - especially so when it touches onto topics as sensitive and contested as
migration. Yet this reflexive stance cannot be assimilated to a criticism or an attack
against quantitative methods. Alain Desrosières himself was a public statistician
with no intention of disqualifying his own field or expertise. Behind the study of
the social, historical and political process of quantification, the aim is to inform the
practice and, in this sense, to improve and to rehabilitate quantitative methods,
especially for critical aims.6 The efforts that I have deployed here to contextualise
and scrutinize the survey categories and the survey data are motivated by the
logic of statactivism, aimed at ’reappropriating statistics’ power of denunciation
and emancipation’ (Bruno, Didier, & Vitale, 2014, p. 199). It stems from the
belief that statistics are part of the vocabulary of critic and contention. Though
statactivism often refers to the production of original statistical data, the use of
qualitative and historical data with which to inform and illuminate statistical
praxis is a key part of the toolbox.
6Qualitative methods of sociological enquiries are expressions of social relations to no lesser
degree than quantitative methods, and they require the same reflexivity. Categorisation and the
manufacturing process of conventions are in no way specific to quantitative methods and the
statistical reasoning, but truly a feature of all knowledge production on society, indeed of all
cognitive activity (Berger & Luckman, 1966)
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1.1 Mixed couples, migration and ethnicity in statistics
1.1.1 Categorising and quantifying mixed couples in France
The notions of ’mixed couple’ and mixing are highly polysemous and con-
textual. There are no global definitions of what a ’mixed couple’ is (Edwards,
2012; Filhon & Varro, 2005; Varro, 2003). Which difference matters enough to
identify a couple as ’mixed’ depends on the differences considered structuring
in any given society, and the statistical construction of mixedness reflects these
national, official narratives of difference-that-matter. It is fundamentally bound
to identifications of ’otherness’, which are by definition ’floating’, in Hall’s terms
(S. Hall, 1997), and which statistics ’fix’ into classifications. The particular clas-
sification and statistics used to describe the phenomenon of mixedness reflect
society’s history and construction, but also the power struggles and institutional,
academic, administrative and political rationales that participate in the charac-
terisation and representation - statistical or otherwise - of the national ’Others’.
Accordingly, perhaps especially when talking about mixing, it is necessary to
clearly posit a social, temporal and geographic frame.
For a long time, in France, mixedness - la mixité - is mainly religious; for
inter-religious couples, mixedness can be simply frowned upon, or downright
dangerous, for instance in the case of Jewish-Christian unions, in-between racial
and religious mixing (Bensimon & Lautman, 1977). In the 19th century, and
especially at the beginning of the 20th century, the narrative of mixedness shifts:
mixité then mostly designate gender-mixed spaces, such as ’mixed’ schools that
teach boys and girls together. Ultimately the notion of social mixing (mixité sociale)
prevails, focused on the intermingling between social classes. Class identities
and class struggles together with the influence of Marxist and then Bourdieusian
theories in France have durably structured representations of social cleavages in
French society. Accordingly, there is a long tradition of sociological and statistical
studies of couple formation, which have constructed ’mixed’ couples on the basis
of unions across social classes (heterogamy/homogamy). In this stream, Alain
Girard (1964), François de Singly de Singly (1987), Michel Bozon and François
Héran (2006 are pioneering figures. This focus on social class continues to be
particularly strong in French scholarship, to the point where it has been argued
that it blinds French scholars and society to other social cleavages - notably ethnic
and racial inequalities (Mazouz, 2020; Safi, 2013).
Indeed, the French colonial empire operated with different categories of
’otherness’ and ’mixedness’ than those most commonly studied in mainland
France. There the cleavage and the hierarchies were clearly racial, as reflected in
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colonial classifications (Renard, 2019; Saada, 2002). Mixed couples in the colonies
involved a French or European partner and an indigène (native), but the gendered
layout was almost always the same: the indigène was generally a woman (see
also Stoler (2010), in which case mixedness could be perceived as a civilising
and emancipating opportunity for them (Ruscio, 2002). In contrast, reversed
gender configuration (when the French partner is a woman and the indigène a
man) were never even remotely tolerated (MacMaster, 2011). This emphasizes
the relevance of gender relations for opportunity structures (there were very few
female settlers), and the importance of patriarchy in defining acceptable and
non-acceptable forms of mixing. This last point is also reflected in the history
of European national law used to regulate mixed marriages in colonial empires,
which often stripped European women of their nationality if they married an
indigenous partner (De Hart, 2015).
Colonial history is a crucial element of the construction of figures of mixed-
ness in France, and it is in or with reference to the colonial context that many
of the representations - including gendered representations - of mixed couples
were forged. With the successive waves of immigration, the question of racial
mixedness was transported from the colonies to mainland France. Indeed, the
introduction of family reunification programs for Algerian guest-workers were
linked in part to concerns about their mixing with French women (MacMaster,
1997, 2011). The question of migration, family and mixedness meet here. In the
French context, the emphasis on Republican universalism and the fact that French
colonial and slaver history in which racial hierarchies were rooted mostly took
place outside of mainland France (contrary to, e.g. in the United States) has often
been invoked to justify how and why ’otherness’ in France can be defined and
debated in largely colour-blind terms.7 Yet there is no question that the racial
hierarchies implemented in the colonies permeated mainland France early on,8
and marked representations of mixedness there as well.
Although social mixing and gender-mixing continue to dominate the se-
mantic and statistical field of French mixité, the omnipresence of categories of
’immigrés’ and ’étrangers’ contribute to creating another figure of the ’Other’.
Though fuzzily defined, this ’Other’ is presumed to be ’visibly different’, and
the nonofficial avatar of mixedness that comes with them is that of ’visible’ (un-
derstand: visibly mixed-race) mixedness, the white/black, white/’beur’.9 These
7See e.g.Le Bras (1998) and Le Bras, Blum, and Guérin-Pace (2007). The next subsection engages
with these debates as they informed the controversy of ethnic statistics in France. For further
details see appendix 7.3.3 to chapter 1.
8It is little known, for instance, that interracial (black-white) marriages were discreetly but
effectively banned under Napoleon (Heuer, 2009).
9The term ’beur’ (or the feminine ’beurette’) is sometimes used to refer to populations linked to
North African immigration, notably French children of Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian migrants.
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mixed couples are abundantly staged in French cultural production, and immedi-
ately identified as ’mixed’ in French society, though in statistical terms they only
appear through the (distorted) medium of binational mixing (French-foreigner)
or mixed-migration background. Until the end of the 1980s, the only official
statistical definition of ’mixed couples’ was binational unions. Since then, the
term ’immigré’, initially a layman term, was pushed politically and ultimately
promoted to statistical category. Accordingly, the dominant statistical paradigm
for mixed couples focuses on conjugal situations in which partners are expected
to have been socialised in different national environments to the extent that they
were born in different countries: one partner in France, and one partner abroad,
to non-French parents. These are therefore tied to migration experience, although
in practice also interwoven and invested with ethnic and racial interpretations
and assumptions (Simon, 1998, 2010).
1.1.2 Mixed couples and mixed identities in the UK
In the UK, statistics have been concerned with mixing and mixed couples
since the very early days, due to the discipline’s initial links with eugenics. The
measurement of correlation between personal characteristics, as an example,
was developed in response to the Eugenic Society’s concern about inter-unions
(MacKenzie, 1981). Perceiving social disadvantage to be the reflection of genetic
inferiority, eugenicist projects were anxious to prevent the interbreeding and
dilution of what they saw as superior European stock. As in France, mixed unions
have been characterised in different ways at different times, and in different parts
of the UK. Inter-religious unions were an important figure of mixedness, and
continue to be the main one in Northern Ireland, where unions between Catholic
and Protestant still constitute the greatest border-crossing (Marranci, 2006).
Historically nationality seems not to have been a major criterion in iden-
tifying difference, hence mixing. As in France, categories and perceptions of
mixedness were strongly influenced by the British Empire, but in contrast to
the French Empire, the racial categories used in the British Empire were not
restricted to the colonies, and were imported to the UK (Favell, 1998, p. 119).
The idea of the ‘English race’ and its superiority was developed since the sev-
enteenth century (Banton, 1977), and underpinned this classification. The 1948
British Nationality Act confirmed the status of British subject to colonial subjects
without reference to nationality. ‘In absence of a meaningful concept of citizen-
ship, British immigration policy had to operate on a proxy[:] . . . race’ (Joppke,
1999, p. 101). The evolution of the contours of British nationality since the 1960s
are drawn through reactions to waves of non-white immigration from the New
Commonwealth (Hansen, 1999, 2000). Thus the British national ’Others’ were
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constructed fairly straight-forwardly around race rather than nationality or mi-
gratory background. According to Favell (1998), the emphasis put on race rather
than nationality was the reason why a much stronger distinction and segregation
of concerns was implemented in Britain between issues of immigration control
and population diversity, namely ’race relations’. Where the French model of
integration posited the acquisition of French nationality as the end goal and
culmination of the integration process, the British ’pact’ was to associate active
anti-discrimination policies (fostering good ’race relations’ within) with extreme
stringency in immigration restrictions.
Accordingly, mixed unions have been mainly operationalised as inter-ethnic
(Berrington, 1996; Coleman, 1985; ONS, 2014). In addition, the statistical oper-
ationalisation of mixedness in British statistics in the last 30 years has largely
been aimed at individual mixed identities perhaps more so than mixed couples.
The ’mixed’ ethnic options were introduced in the census in 2001. The use of
‘mixed’ categories was also justified from the multicultural camp as reflecting
new cultural identities and the positive ’hybridisation’ of British society. In effect,
the three specific ’mixed’ categories are interracial (rather than inter-ethnic), re-
flecting the focus on mixing between white and non-white groups.10 Accordingly
there is also a - mainly qualitative - scholarship in the UK that explicitly studies
’mixed-race’ individuals and experiences (e.g. Ali (2003, 2011), Peter J. Aspinall
(2009), and McKenzie (2012)), while the term and the topic of ’mixed-race’ is al-
most entirely absent from French scholarship on mixing in contemporary French
society.11 This genealogy of French and British categories of ’mixedness’ sheds
some light on how distant the question of ’mixing’ and ’migration’ are from
one another in politics and statistics. In the French case, mixed unions have
been tightly connected to questions of immigration control and their conjugal
trajectories have been largely understood to be intertwined with migration ex-
perience. This is not the case in the UK, where migration trajectories, especially
in relation to couple formation, have only relatively recently become the subject
of (qualitative) sociological scholarship, and almost exclusively in the context of
endogamous, ’transnational’ unions among South Asians communities (Charsley,
Bolognani, Ersanilli, & Spencer, 2020; Charsley, Storer-Church, Benson, & Van
Hear, 2012).
10The census ’mixed’ ethnic options are the following since 2001: ’Mixed White and Black
Caribbean’; ’Mixed White and Black African’, ’Mixed White and Asian’, and ’any other mixed
background’.
11Mixed-race children (métis) in the French colonial empire are however the focus of Saada
(2007)’s historical scholarship.
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1.1.3 Measuring diversity or measuring mobility? Categories or tra-
jectories of migrants and couples
Though the connection between mixing and migration is more often made in
France than in the UK, this does not actually imply that the definition of migration
involved is focused on migration trajectories and experience. When it comes
to statistical operationalisations of migration, there are in fact two paradigms:
migration as an experience of mobility, and migration as a marker of otherness
(Renard, 2019). Naturally, in migrants’ lives, the two often overlap, because many
migrants will go through the process of international migration and experience its
consequences, but they will also be identified as ’others’, possibly discriminated
and so on.
In 1998, Alaim Blum had criticised the introduction of ’ethnic belonging’ and
’ethnic origins’ in the survey MGIS12 on the ground of the volatility, heterogeneity
and historical usage of these ethnic criteria. But the main issue Blum saw with
’this postulate of aggregation and especially of the methodological introduction of
a "new concept" to group together and designate immigrant populations, is that
it puts in the background what is supposed to the object of study: immigration.
[...] Nothing is done to estimate what mobility itself brings about’ (Blum, 1998,
p. 577). As Renard (2019, pp. 480–481) pointed, the focus on ethnic categorisation
meant that the study of the processes and dynamics of geographic mobility
were forgotten, even though ’geographic mobility’ was in the very name of the
study. ’It would have been interesting’, had added Blum, ’to hierarchise the fact of
movement, of crossing a border, of staying in one place for a certain length of time,
and finally the fact of migrating from one country or the other. By shifting the
analytical reasoning from the length of immigration to ethnicity, the fundamental
point that makes an immigrant population - the fact of migration - risks being
forgotten.’ (Blum, 1998, p. 578). The risk is that the superimposition of measures
of ’otherness’ on top or instead of measures of mobility leads to shadowing if not
forgetting the relevance of the second for inequalities. Renard (2019) in her socio-
history of the statistical categories of ’migrants’ and ’descendants of migrants’ in
France and Germany, followed the same thread. Is migration problematised in
the surveys as an experience of cross-border mobility or merely as a marker of
otherness? The question extends beyond categorisation and it has expressions
and consequences in sample design.
The British and the French states differentiate explicitly between categories
of migrants (e.g., economic, family, refugee..). They also focus on certain cat-
egories of migrants, which are deemed more problematic and less beneficial
12Institut National d’Etudes Démographiques, & Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes
Economiques. (1992). Mobilités géographiques et insertion sociale. Paris.
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for the host country. Point systems instigate categorisations of migrants best
defined as ordinal - nominal classifications which are associated with judgements
and rankings of essential worth (Fourcade, 2016). Yet the classifications and
quantification of migrants used by the state are not necessarily those that ap-
pear in surveys. Information on immigration status (beyond citizenship) are
almost never requested in survey questionnaire, be they British or French, and
migrants are not explicitly ranked. Yet the ’ranking’ of migrants plays a role in
what migrants and which kind of migration require specific quantification, i.e.
dedicated categories and sampling - usually those at the bottom of the ranking.
This ordinalization of migrants and migration relies on creating more or less
desirable profiles of migrants. It pays very little attention and leaves very little
space for understanding migration as a trajectory, part of a biography and the life
course of migrants - admittedly a tougher statistical endeavour (Bowker, 1999).
1.2 Two surveys in context
1.2.1 British survey: Understanding Society (2009-)
The project for Understanding Society (or UKLHS - UK Longitudinal House-
hold Survey) is developed at the University of Essex by researchers in ISER
(Institute for Social and Economic Research), working jointly with the ESRC
UK Longitudinal Studies Centre (ULSC). The ambition is to develop large-scale,
quality longitudinal survey data for the UK. The only important household panel
survey at that point was the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which had
been running since 1991. The initial proposal behind Understanding Society was
to make a much bigger version of the BHPS.13 The project also incorporated a
strong focus on ethnicity, embodied in the Ethnicity Strand – one of three research
strands around which the survey design was to be organised.
The projected sample size made Understanding Society a very expensive
project, and the team needed to secure grants from various sources to cover the
initial cost of the study. Most of the funding came from the Economic and Social
Research Council (ESRC), for whom it represents the single biggest investment
ever. Several government departments contributed as well.14 The project thus
absorbed much of the available funding for social sciences: this happens at the
detriment of other projects, including the re-edition of the National Survey on
Ethnic Minorities, a series of surveys which had been running since the 1960s.
The next survey in the series was to be a separate longitudinal survey on ethnic
13The survey team jokingly calls Understanding Society the BigHPS
14Substantial funding came in from the department of Business, Innovation and skills. Other
government departments contribute at various stages of the survey, among which the Department
for Work and Pensions, the Department of Health and the Department for Education.
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minorities. That project, however, was eventually shelved in favour of the project
for Understanding Society. The project lead, Richard Berthoud, specialist of
ethnicity and, to a lesser extent, of migration, was recruited for Understanding
Society’s Ethnicity Strand.
So that’s why, that’s one of the main reasons why [ethnicity] was such a strong
emphasis from the start, they had abandoned that one, that separate longitudinal
study, but they were incorporating it into this new, they were incorporating this
strong ethnicity strand.
(Interviewee #3 – UKLHS survey designer, Ethnicity branch)
Regardless of its perhaps somewhat opportunistic roots, the Ethnicity Strand
became a flagship of the survey as a whole, and was responsible for setting up a
number of survey features of great relevance to the present project. The survey
team wanted to cater and appeal to all sorts of users in order to broaden its
audience and justify its cost, and the Ethnicity Strand team set up a extensive
consultation process to that aim. Led in this by Lucinda Platt and Alita Nandi,
they involved a wide variety of potential survey users, from academics to gov-
ernment departments and the ONS, as well as survey design teams from other
countries. The introduction of the ethnic question in the census in the 1980s and
1990s (Ballard, 1996; Bulmer, 1986) and 10 years later the amendments brought
to the census grid for the 2001 census wave (Peter J Aspinall, 2012) had given
rise to lively academic and - to a point - public debate. The new ’mixed’ ethnic
options had been a topic of particular discussion in the 2001 census (the last at the
point where Understanding Society was designed) (Peter J. Aspinall, 2009), along
with the inclusion of the Irish as a distinct ethnic group - the result of intense
lobbying (Thompson, 2015). Prompted by the consultation, the Ethnicity Strand
team also pushes for the inclusion in the Understanding Society questionnaire of
questions which had seldom been asked before in the British context. Notably,
questions on parents’ (and even grandparents’) country of birth, associated with
more continental approaches to population diversity, such as in France (through
the focus on origins and descendants of migrants since the 1990s) and in Germany
since 2005 (through the category of Person with Migrationshintergrund).
The Ethnicity Strand’s key objective was to fill the gap that had been pin-
pointed in the abandoned proposal for the longitudinal survey on Ethnic minori-
ties: namely, the absence of representative longitudinal data on ethnic minorities.
Ethnic minority individuals represent a relatively small minority for randomised
sampling: in the 2001 Census, under 15% of the population identified as some-
thing other than ‘white British’. Sample size shrinks quickly, especially once we
start breaking them down by different ethnic identifications. ‘Other white’, which
was the largest ethnic minority group, amounted to 5% of the population living in
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the UK in 2001; ‘Indian’ was the second largest, with 2% of the population. Ethnic
minority individuals also tend to be concentrated in certain urban areas, are more
likely to refuse to participate in surveys, have higher attrition rates and are more
likely to move often, making them harder to follow and track between different
stages of the process (something noted by various survey designers (Beauchemin,
Algava, & Lhommeau, 2015; Berthoud, Fumagalli, Lynn, & Platt, 2009)). There-
fore, the Understanding Society survey team decided to over-represent ethnic
minority households (households with at least one ethnic minority member) by
means of a sample boost: The Ethnic Minority Boost sample (EMB or EMBS)
was built into the initial survey sample design at wave 1: it added about 1,000
respondents from 5 selected ethnic groups (5,000 in total), and a further 1000
from other targeted groups (Nandi & Platt, 2009). At wave 1, this represented
about 4,000 households.
Initially the UKLHS sampling design registers no explicit interest in migra-
tion. The survey questionnaire includes some questions on migration trajectories
(for a list, see table 2.1 in the first section of the next chapter) as well as, notably,
languages, citizenship, bi-nationality. Most of these questions are grouped into
a questionnaire module - the ’extra 5 minutes’ questions -, which changes from
waves to waves. The extra 5 minutes questions, however, are only asked of
certain categories of target respondents. This changes over time, however: the
target audience for the ’extra 5 minutes’ questions is gradually extended from
EMBS respondents15 to also include foreign-born individuals; and then at wave
6 (2015-2016), the survey incorporates a new sample boost, the Immigrant and
Ethnic Minority Boost Sample (IEMB).
At wave 1, Understanding Society thus comprised individuals in 40,000
households in the UK, making it the largest annual household panel survey. At
wave 2, the survey merged with the BHPS sample. Individuals aged 16 and over
in sampled households were to respond to a questionnaire each year, and would
be providing over different waves a wide range of information.
1.2.2 French survey: Trajectoires et Origines (2008-2009)
The French National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED) and the Na-
tional Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) launched the project
for the survey Trajectoires et Origines (TeO) at the end of 2004. The two institutions
represent two spheres of statistical production and research: on the side of the
INSEE, official statistics; on the side of the INED, publicly-funded academic
research. The cooperation between the INED and the INSEE is behind the main
15As well as respondents from the Comparison sample.
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surveys of reference on migration and minorities in France, but they still remain
distinct entities with distinct statuses, not to mention distinct research priorities
and preferences.16 Funded and supported by several ministries and public in-
stitutions17, the project is co-organised by both the INED and the INSEE and
involves a committee of 15 researchers from various disciplinary backgrounds
and institutions. The aim of the project was to:
seek to assess to what extent origin18 is, of its own right, a factor of inequality or
difference as regards access to different social resources (housing, language and
education, employment, leisure, public service and social aid, contraception, health,
nationality, social and relational networks, matrimonial market...). The survey
will focus on the articulation between origin and other categories of distinction in
French society (gender, class, phenotype, age, neighborhood...) in order to analyse
processes of integration, discrimination and identity construction in French society
as a whole.19
In the 1990s and the 2000s, integration was at the heart of French political
debates around migration. The previous survey, MGIS (1992, also co-developed
by the INED and the INSEE), reflected the theoretical and political enmeshment
of migration and integration. The first French large-scale survey to distinguish
between foreign-born and foreigners, MGIS included retrospective questions
on migration and migrants’ trajectories. Although the survey report initially
concluded on the success of the French Republican model of integration (Tribalat,
1995), Michèle Tribalat later insisted more on what she analysed as integration
failures (e.g. the more withdrawn position of Turkish migrants living in France)
or disguises - specifically how migrant-native couples could ’hide’ co-ethnic
unions between migrants and descendants of migrants (Tribalat, 2009). The TeO
survey was initially pitched in continuity with the MGIS survey: same focus
16A quick word on the INED and the INSEE. The INSEE, the French equivalent of the ONS, is
much, much larger, and is under the authority of the Ministry of Economy and Finances. It has
branches in all parts of France. The INED, in contrast, is a fraction of the size of the INSEE, has only
one location in Paris, and is a public but independent research institution. The INED’s academic
independence is guaranteed by its status of public institution with scientific and technological
vocation (EPST: Etablissement public à caractère scientifique et technique technologique), status
created in the 1980s which also applies to e.g. the CNRS. Revolving doors and sharing of expertise
are not uncommon between the two institutions. Notably François Héran and Patrick Simon, key
INED actors in the development of the TeO survey (respectively as INED director and TeO survey
coordinator), were both former INSEE researchers. It was in fact during his years at the INSEE that
Héran forged his ability to negotiate with the two institutions in charge of controlling the aptness
and ethical compliance of surveys in France, the CNIS and the CNIL - an ability which was to be
heavily relied on in the case of TeO (Héran, 2017, p. 127).
17Notably the Drees and the Dares (respectively Ministry of Health and Solidarity, and Ministry
of Work), Acsé (National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equality of Opportunities), the Halde
(High Authority against Discrimination and for Equality), ANR (National Research Agency), IAU-
ÎdF (Institute of Planning and Urbanism for the greater parisian area) and ONZUS (Observatory of
Sensitive Urban Zones).
18Emphasis added.
19TeO manuscript [unpublished draft], 2014, p.5.
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on immigrants and descendants of immigrants, same institutional cooperation
between the INED and the INSEE. But the TeO team pushed towards a different
route, that of the study of discrimination, notably those faced by racialised
immigrants and their descendants. The French scholarship on discrimination, on
the rise in the 2000s (Garner, Foroni, & Cédiey, 2008), had started switching the
angle from the conceptual approach in terms of integration, turning the question
of the responsibility for social cohesion back towards French society and its
institutions (Fassin, 2002; De Rudder et al.; 2000).
This renewed interest in the diverse experiences and inequalities faced by
minorities coincided with keen interest for data specifically on immigrants and on
integration among policymakers, an interest which some of the survey designers
linked to the 2005 urban riots. The unrest had ’raised questions . . . and there
was a political interest in getting more information, from the observation that
we hadn’t known. . . enough elements to understand what was happening.’.20
François Héran, then director of the INED, connects the political emphasis and
demand notably to Nicolas Sarkozy’s ’obsession’ with immigration (Héran, 2017).
Ministre de l’Intérieur (Home Secretary) from 2002-2004 and from 2005-2007, and
then President of France from 2007-2012, Nicolas Sarkozy was in charge of
immigration policies for almost the entirety of the period which corresponds to
TeO’s design and data collection. Around 2005-2006, a convergence emerged
between the academic interests in the INED, and an explicit political demand
made of the INSEE. Although these interests converged insofar as all concurred
on a need for more data on migrants and descendants of migrants living in
France, they differed quite substantially on the purpose they attributed to this
data and by extension to the survey. This contributed to the confusion which fed
into the heated debates and institutional back-and-forths that came to surround
the TeO survey. Like MGIS, which had stirred the ’controversy of demographers’
(Fordant, 2014), TeO became highly contentious. The contention this time reached
the wider non-academic audience, and turned into a national polemic played out
in the mainstream media. (I return to this episode in the next section).
The data collection for TeO was eventually conducted between 2008-2009.
Subtitled ’Survey on the diversity of the French population’, the final TeO survey
comprises 21,800 respondents, and over-represents immigrants, descendants of
immigrants, as well as natives from overseas departments and their descendants.
It also includes a comparison sample made to represent the ’majority population’,
so labelled because it is constituted of native French born to native-French parents,
who are numerically the majority of those living in France. The cost of the study
is estimated to have been well around €4.5 million in total (Pietri-Bessy & Ménard,
20Interviewee #7 - TeO survey lead.
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2009). The survey remains a ’lone star’ in the French landscape of research and
public statistics, remaining to this day the only survey (with its predecessor MGIS
and its re-edition currently underway)21, to have explored in depth the lives and
experiences of immigrants and their descendants in France, their integration in
French society, and the successes and obstacles that have marked their trajectories
(Héran, 2019, p. xi).
1.2.3 Statistics of discord
The controversy that surrounded the design of the TeO survey has been
analysed by Fordant (2014), and by some of its key actors and survey designers
(see notably Héran (2010, 2019) and Simon (2015) and Appendix 7.3.3 for more
details). What is important to know is that the first TeO questionnaire presented
for approval to the CNIS22 in May 2006 included questions on migration trajec-
tories, nationality, country of birth, parents’ country of birth, first visa obtained
in France, as well as questions on religion and respondents’ self-identified and
socially perceived skin-colour.23 The questions on religion and skin colour were
particularly innovative in the context of a national survey in France. After a
series of extraordinary and extraordinarily heated meetings dedicated to the
question of TeO (Héran, 2010, p. 18), the CNIS finally approved the question-
naire24, only requiring that access to ’sensitive data’ should necessitate a special
licence delivered by the CNIS only.
In spite of the CNIS’ green light, the ’ethnic questions’ on skin colour as
well as the questions on religion soon became the topic of a national debate. The
pressure rose to such levels that the questions on skin colour were eventually
revoked by a decision of the Constitutional Council, mid-November 2007. The
INED and the INSEE were thus forced to cut these questions out of the ques-
tionnaire, replacing them with a broader question on origins: ’When you think
about your family history, what would you say your origin is?’ (Héran, 2010). The
questions on discrimination retained a skin colour category, so that it was possible
for respondents to state that they have been victims of discrimination because
of their skin colour, but not what their skin colour might be. The questions on
21The data collection for the second Trajectoires et Origines survey (TeO2) is currently underway
and the data is due to be made available by 2022.
22CNIS: National Council of Statistical Information, the official body that regulates the produc-
tion and use of public statistics in France.
23The questions on skin colour were in succession: When people meet you, how do you think they see
you in terms of [skin] colour(s)? (open answer, no predefined categories); And what colour would you
personally say that you are? (TeO questionnaire proposal, as approved by the CNIS in 2007).
24The caution at this point bore on questions on immigration status and visa types; religion;
migratory origins; and skin colour.
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religion, which had also been criticised, were however maintained. The contro-
versy tore through political lines (D. Fassin (2012)). Opposition to the survey
linked to French ’Republican’ values was represented amongst conservatives,
yet many in the UMP ranks (including Nicolas Sarkozy) were also in favour of
introducing ethnic statistics, in which they saw a tool to evaluate integration and
to benchmark migrant groups. This did not however come from or translate into
support to the INSEE and especially the INED, suspected to be left-leaning and
complacent towards immigrants (see for instance (Sarkozy, 2007)).
The Left and centre-Left found itself intensely divided - a recurring pat-
tern when it comes to the questions of racism and anti-racism in France. The
Republican argument is shared by many on the left. It considers racial or ethnic
classification to be a danger for French Republican values and unity rooted in
the French revolution. The collection of data on ethnicity, religion or race evokes
the Vichy regime and its Jewish file. The academic side of this line of critique,
which emerged initially during the controversy of demographers around MGIS,
also objects to surveys and statistics on race and ethnicity because of the risk
of essentialising inequalities and already marginalised groups. This critique,
carried notably by the association Pénombre, articulates this risk with a broader
criticism of public statistics (Pénombre, 1999). In addition, racial and ethnic
statistical classifications - and by extension INSEE and especially INED who are
perceived to promote them - are considered vanguards of ’Anglo-saxon’ and
critical-race-theory-inspired research, and accused of over-emphasizing race at
the expense of class.25 In November 2007, SOS Racisme, the biggest anti-racist
organisation in France, launched a petition against the survey’s ’ethnic filing’,
which gathered over 100 000 signatories, including the entire front bench of the
Socialist Party and the future president François Hollande26.
The part of the left who, along with the survey team, supported the intro-
duction of ethnic classifications, did it in the name of anti-discrimination and
with the aim of exposing the reality and scope of racism and racial inequalities
in France. Even within INED, tensions were rife. Some INED researcher with
Hervé le Bras in the lead, attacked the survey and the survey team in the media
(Le Bras et al., 2007). Less known is the resistance presented by INSEE interview-
ers, the survey footsoldiers, who were particularly reluctant to asking questions
they considered intrusive, particularly those about skin colour and religion. The
25This accusation of the role and perspectives of INSEE and INED is for instance made by Beaud
and Noiriel (2021). Their recent book was met with heavy criticism by the younger generation of
French academics who engage with critical race theory (notably intersectionality, Black feminist
scholarship and Critical Race Theory), and consider it relevant to the French context (an example
is Sarah Mazouz (2020)).
26The petition was entitled Fiche pas mon pote!: ’Don’t file my pal’, in reference to the antiracist
slogan of the 1980s-1990s Touche pas mon pote! (’Don’t touch my pal’).
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INSEE union (Inter-syndicale des salariés de l’INSEE) expressed its disagreement
with parts of the questionnaire, those on skin colour especially.27 In a political
climate correctly perceived as intensely anti-immigrant, asking people about their
ethnicity seemed not necessarily irrelevant but untimely, and therefore dangerous
as well as ethically dubious.
1.2.4 Measuring international mobility
Nevertheless, compared to its predecessor MGIS, TeO includes considerably
more information not only on self-identified religion and discrimination, but
also information allowing for the contextualisation of migration experience:
contextualisation in time, in legal status, in the life course, and - crucially for this
research - in family formation (this and its implications for gender studies are
expanded on in the next chapter). There are two explanations that can be put
forward to explain this change from MGIS to TeO. Firstly, it is likely that the TeO
design team, many of whom were respectfully critical of MGIS, took on board
the criticism raised notably by Alain Blum that MGIS had entirely neglected to
consider the migration experience in its single-minded focus on assimilation.
This could be then considered parts of the efforts to create some distance between
MGIS and TeO.
The INSEE side especially was resistant to the self-identified nature of
questions on ethnicity, preferring more ’objective’ measures such as country of
birth. This is perhaps one way to understand why the TeO survey has no measure
of self-identified ethnicity but a question on legal immigration channel, while
Understanding Society included self-reported ethnicity but at no stage enquired
about legal channels of migration. Immigration status no doubt constitutes
’sensitive’ information for those with precarious or no residency rights. These
are categories routinely used by the Home Office and the Ministère de l’Interieur),
and they powerfully shape migration journeys and migrants’ lives in their host
country; as such they are key information, but are not part of survey data on
migrants in the UK, and only partially and cautiously so in TeO.28 In addition,
whereas the TeO survey differentiates between citizen by birth or citizen by
acquisition, the British survey does not allow to identify, except longitudinally,
how migrants may have acquired British citizenship.
The second explanation, which is perhaps particularly helpful to explain the
rise of questions on the timing and transnational practices of family formation,
27Very active and very cautious on ’sensitive’ material, the union wanted for an ethics committee
to be set up and tasked with monitoring the production and the results of all studies which may
refer to ethnic or racial origins.
28The TeO question on the first visa acquired in France was one of the questions the CNIS’ was
initially cautious about, but eventually agreed on.
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may simply be found in the research interest of those who launched and drove the
TeO project. François Héran, then director of the INED and the initiator of TeO,
had written seminal pieces on couple and family formation with Michel Bozon,
also an INED demographer (Bozon & Héran, 2006), and had co-led a survey
specifically on couple formation in the French population.29; Christelle Hamel,
one of the TeO co-leads, had researched transnational marriages, also from a
critical perspective (Hamel, 2008) . Their involvement and recruitment most likely
played a part in putting closer to the survey designers’ heart research interests
around migration as movement through space, borders as well as migrants’ life
course
On the British front, the shift towards more measures of mobility is at first
very subtle: it only appears in the limited space (and limited sample) of the
extra 5 minutes question. The introduction of the IEMB 6 years later marked
the extension of the focus from ethnic minorities to immigrants. Over the waves
before, the inclusion criteria for the extra 5 minutes questions had also been
gradually extended to foreign-born respondents. In addition, from wave 6 on-
wards, the survey turned all foreign-born respondents into Permanent Sample
Members (PSM) (Lynn, Nandi, Parutis, & Platt, 2017). This shift does not serve
this research directly, because it impacts data that comes after the one this thesis
uses. But the process that leads to this change was already underway during
Understanding Society’s initial design phase. Though some in the survey team
argued in favour of following return migrants in the survey(which would have
been ground-breaking, not only because return migrants are great absents in
statistics of migration, but also because it would allow for panel data that would
provide information on respondents pre- and post-migration), the idea did not
get any traction, in the face of the technical difficulties involved. But the survey
still considerably expanded the scope of questions relevant to experience of
international mobility that had ever been available for a household survey in the
UK - let alone a longitudinal one.
1.3 Mobile and/or racialised ’Others’
1.3.1 (Over)sampling and racial focus
When it comes to the praxis of quantitative research, it is not simply about
which questions are included and how they are formulated, but also about who
gets to answer them. Sample strategy, together with rules of statistical robustness,
conditions a lot of the analysis and framing (e.g. the grouping of people and
categories). This is especially constraining when working with minority groups,
29The survey Formation des couples, conducted by the INED in 1983-1984.
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all the more so if one follows a pluralist approach and wants to distinguish be-
tween different minority sub-groups (e.g. migrants of different origins, different
ethnicities). It is perhaps even more important for those quantitative researchers
interested in mixed couples (however defined), since exogamy is a minority
behaviour in almost all groups, majority group included (Kalmijn, 1998). With
survey data, migrants (or ethnic minority groups) need to be over-represented
through dedicated sampling efforts, and it is necessary to identify and pick which
minority groups to focus on and over-represent.30 It is impossible to satisfacto-
rily over-represent all minority groups defined in all possible ways, but equally,
not over-representing any minority group effectively prevents robust statistical
analysis on most of these groups, except if aggregated. The definition and choice
of groups is therefore both necessary and crucial in terms of framing.
TeO’s sampling strategy
TeO’s stated objective in terms of sample design was to over-represent not
only migrants but also children of migrants. In the French context, this was
no small challenge. Since French census data provides the country of birth of
respondents and their nationality but no information regarding the respondent’s
parents, the only way to obtain such information was to retrieve it from local
civil registries (i.e. from birth certificates). The survey design team set up a
highly intricate and labour-intensive operation. In order to create the survey
sampling grid, the INSEE used data from the 2007 census to identify areas with
high concentration of migrants, and then drew on data from EDP (Echantillon
démographique permanent), manually matched with data from the local civil reg-
istries to put together data on respondents’ parents (see Algava and Lhommeau
(2013) and Algava, Lhommeau, and Beauchemin (2018) for more details).
The TeO sample thus over-represents migrants and descendants of migrants
in general, and attributes specific sampling targets to certain countries of origin -
namely South-East Asia, Turkey, Sahelian Africa, and Central and Guinean Africa
- as well as French nationals born in overseas departments and natives born to par-
ents from overseas departments (see table 1.2). The ’target groups’ differ slightly
from those in the previous survey, MGIS: the ’origin groups’ over-sampled then
were from Spain, Portugal, Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, South-Eastern Asia (Cam-
bodia, Laos, Vietnam) and ’Black Africa’. Altogether, these groups were estimated
to account for around 60% of immigrants (Tribalat, 1995). With TeO, the sampling
strategy assumes that the random sampling of ’immigrants’ and ’descendants of
immigrants’ will automatically waive high numbers of Northern African, who
30A point well laid out by Tribalat (1995) for instance
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TABLE 1.2: TeO sample composition: target and effective sample




Immigrants (age 18-60), including from: 9600 8456 88%
South-East Asia 800 774 97%
Turkey 800 830 104%
Sahelian Africa 800 665 83%
Central and Guinean Africa 800 736 92%
Descendants of immigrants (age 18-50), including from: 9600 8110 84%
South-East Asia 800 573 72%
Turkey 800 447 56%
Sahelian Africa 800 480 60%
Central and Guinean Africa 800 333 42%
French overseas department (DOM) natives (age 18-60) 800 712 89%
Descendants of DOM natives (age 18-50) 800 650 81%
Majority population 3400 3781 112%
Total 23600 21761 92%
Table drawn from Algava and Lhommeau (2013), p.33. Data source: TeO1 survey, INED-INSEE, 2008-2009.
form a solid majority of those groups, in the selected areas. The (verified) as-
sumption is that there is therefore no need to set a specific sample target for these
groups as they will be already and sufficiently over-sampled through the design
of the sampling grid. Throughout the sample design process, identities of interest
are largely assigned: nobody is asked whether they identify as immigrants or
descendants of immigrants, it is inferred from their country of birth as it appears
in the administrative registries.
Understanding Society’s sampling strategy
Understanding Society did not - initially - give itself the objective of over-
representing migrants but ethnic minorities. The initial sample boost was the
Ethnic Minority Boost Sample (EMBS or EMB), a top-up of 5,000 households with
the aim of providing 1,000 households for each of the following five ethnic groups:
Pakistani, Indian, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean, Black African (McFall, Nandi, &
Platt, 2016). The EMB was drawn from selected areas of high-concentration of
non-white ethnic minorities identified through the 2001 census data (Berthoud
et al., 2009). Certain additional ethnic minority and immigrant groups did not
have specific numerical targets but were included in the EMB when identified
during screening. These were called the ’second-tier ethnic groups’, by contrast
with the five main target groups. Further, ethnic minority respondents who
appeared at later waves in the sample as temporary sample member (for in-
stance, as co-resident partner of a permanent sample member) would be made
permanent sample member, as an additional form of diffuse oversampling. The
over-sampling methods thus varied by group. These are listed out in the figure
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1.1.
FIGURE 1.1: UKLHS EMB sample composition: Targeted, in-
cluded and excluded groups (Berthoud et al., 2009, p. 9)
Over-sampling and racial Others
For both TeO and Understanding, over-sampling was focused on selected
areas, identified through the census as areas of high concentration of immigrants
(TeO) and non-white ethnic minority households (Understanding Society). These
sampling filters on selected areas of high migrants or minority density were
motivated by issues of costs and a need for efficiency when targeting minorities.
They also imply that the over-sampling is focused on migrant and ethnic minority
individuals and households who are likely most embedded - at least geographi-
cally, but socially as well - in their ethnic/migrant community. This selection bias
is perhaps particularly strong for native-born descendants of migrants who have
chosen to stay in these areas. By contrast, minority individuals who live or move
away from these high density areas have much less chances to be included in
the survey. This is not neutral when studying issues related to families, cultural
norms and integration. Migrants or other minority individuals who intermarry
with the majority group are thus much more likely to end up living in low-ethnic
density areas compared to those who do not intermarry (Muttarak & Heath,
2010).
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A second sampling bias, more obvious perhaps, is that target groups are
exclusively non-white31, an observation which extends to the UKLHS secondary
oversampling strategy. In the case of Understanding Society, it also affects which
questionnaire survey respondents were given. At wave 1, the conditions for
eligibility for the ’extra 5 minutes’ questions (on migration history, trajectories,
national identity, etc.) included being non-white. Hence the extra 5 minutes
questions were not asked of individuals identifying as “British”, “Irish”, or
“other white” – even if they were born abroad. This has immediate effects for
migration research, since, at wave 1, a lot of migrant individuals (including all
white migrants) were not asked to provide any information about their migration
experience, on top of being excluded from the oversampling procedure. Non-
white migrants, by contrast, were indirectly but effectively over-sampled thanks
to the sampling focus on non-white ethnicities.
As seen in table 1.1, the EMB design also uses a more refined grid than the
census ethnic grid when it comes to other non-white groups (table 1.1). The
screening categories which qualify respondents for inclusion in the second-tier
ethnic groups thus break down ’Other Asian’ into ’Sri Lankan’, ’Chinese’, ’Other
far eastern’, ’Turkish’ and ’Middle eastern/Iranian’. The survey designers explain
the use of this parallel grid as follow:
Analysis of Census data on country of birth by ethnic group had shown that people
born in North Africa are recorded by the Census mostly as either ‘white’ or ‘other’.
It was decided to add North African to the list of ethnic groups in the screening
questionnaire, and combine them with (black) Africans in the boost sample. People
born in the middle east (including Turkey and Iran as well as ‘Arab’ countries)
also tend to split between ‘white’ and ‘other’ when nominating an ethnic group in
the Census. This consideration led to inclusion of the following sub-categories in
addition to the target groups: Chinese, other far eastern, Sri Lankan, Turks, other
middle eastern.
(Berthoud et al. (2009), 8).
Because these groups are not target groups, it is understood that their over-
sampling will not yield large enough numbers to analyse them separately any-
ways. The point is merely to inflate the number of ‘non-white’ ethnic minority
respondents, taken as a whole. Indeed, the problem for survey designers appears
to be that respondents ’mistakenly’ self-identify racially. The introduction of
more detailed ethnic/national categories (such as ‘Iranian’ or ‘Turk’) allows to
categorise and over-sample them as non-white, even if they would have other-
wise self-identified as ‘white’ or ‘other’. They are effectively assigned a racial
identity. This last point is where pluralist perspectives on population diversity,
more represented among academics, clash with a still ’dualistic’ government
31They are either specifically defined as non-white (Understanding Society) or expected to be
mostly non-white (TeO)
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views of managing diversity, which has been the object of criticism since the
1990s (Modood & Berthoud, 1997). The final composite classifications used for
over-sampling reflect the clashes of perspectives that underpin this mode of
quantification.
I mean, to be honest, one of the things that was discussed most was [. . . ] the second-
tier ethnic groups. You know, there was an argument that we shouldn’t include those
at all, because they are not going to be of any use to ethnic minority researchers who
are comparing specific ethnic groups, because they weren’t going to be in the white
group and they weren’t going to be in any of the other groups, so they were just.. not
going to be used and therefore it was a waste of money to include them. So that was a
bit of a discussion. And in a way, what we ended up with was a compromise. . . Let’s
say a compromise between the more sophisticated ethnic minority researchers who
take this view that you can only compare specific groups, and the more traditional
government approach, which is you compare white with non-white, that’s what the
official statistics do a lot of the time, right, official surveys simply have two categories,
white and non-white. And for that kind of use – and we do have government users,
right, we have some government co-founders who have some say on what we do
in Understanding Society. And they were mostly interested in us getting a larger
sample of non-whites, they didn’t particularly care which non-white group they
came from, so as far as they were concerned, it was a cost-efficient solution to include
more people from the non-white groups.
(Interviewee #3 - UKLHS survey designer)
The government focus on ’non-white’ ethnic minorities, mentioned in the
extract above, is also relayed by the ESRC directly, which had defined that the
target groups should be non-white minorities. The demands of British and
French goverments reflected a similar focus on non-white populations linked
to migration from ex-colonies, and concern for their integration. This illustrates
governmental understandings of data on migration and population diversity as
something that is mainly useful to managing diversity, and in effect often quite
specifically racial diversity.
1.3.2 Where do white migrants go?
White migrants and their descendants are not targeted in the initial sample
design: the UKLHS over-sampling strategy completely misses these population,
as illustrated in figure 1.2.
The first part of the UpSet plot 1.2 (the coloured barplot) shows the dis-
tribution of Understanding Society’s survey components by combination of
characteristics: the first three bars all refer to non-white ethnic minority groups,
either migrants (first and third bars) or natives with migrant parents (second bar).
The composition of the bars renders well how effective and targeted the Ethnic
minority sample boost (EMB) was: it provided the largest part of the sample
for these groups. When looking only at the General population (GPS) sample
components, it appears clearly that these groups provided neither the largest
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FIGURE 1.2: UKLHS sample by sample components and markers
of alterity (Upset plot)
number of second generation migrants (see fourth bar) nor the largest group
of migrant by much: the fifth and sixth bars, represent white migrants who do
not identify as white British. At the point of the survey’s first collection wave
(2009-2011), the GPS included a large number of white migrants: almost as many,
in fact, as non-white migrants; the difference is that the sample for non-white
migrants was then generously complemented by the EMBS.
Though it did not specifically target them, the French sample did include
European and Northern American migrants, and asked them the same questions
on their migration trajectories as other migrants. In this sense, TeO differed
from the UKLHS initial design, by its interest in migrants taken as a whole.
This difference between the two surveys receded in 2015 when Understanding
Society introduced the IEMB, and started over-sampling and asking all migrants
about their migration trajectories and cultural practices. It would be tempting
to interpret the IEMB as the natural response to a sharp increase in the numbers
of EU/white migration which triggered academic interest and political concern.
This would however reproduce a political trope on immigration that argues that
concern and xenophobia are automatically stirred once a particular threshod
is reached. Yet in both France and the UK, there were large numbers of white
migrants, already at the time of the survey design. EU migration is old in France,
and well documented: MGIS had over-sampled Spanish and Italian migrants and
descendants of migrants. In the UK, the 2001 census had shown that the largest
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’ethnic’ group was the ’Other white’ group, and there had been a sharp increase
of migration from Eastern Europe following the EU enlargements in 2004 and
after. The sharpest part of this increase, however, predated the UKLHS survey
design phase.
The new interest in ’immigrants’ denoted by the IEMB was driven by rising
political and academic interest in Eastern European migrants in particular. It
also became apparent that many of the Eastern Europeans who migrated to the
UK following the 2004 EU enlargement had actually stayed, whereas they had
been perceived as temporary economic migration. In a parallel with the story
of the German Gastarbeiter, these migratory flows appeared un-problematic at
first because (on top of being mostly white), they were not expected to settle. The
2008 economic crisis, accompanied and followed by growing anti-immigration
campaigns encapsulated by Theresa May’s ’hostile environment’ narrative and
the rise of UKip, put immigration in the spotlight. There was growing pressure
from government to come up with data on immigration and immigrants, espe-
cially Eastern European but also EU migrants. This pressure translated into the
ESRC adding immigration on their research priority list.
The UKLHS survey designers were clear on the fact that the pressure was
specifically about Poles and Eastern European migrants. They also expressed
how the implications of the ethno-racial framework and focus became a problem,
in that it poorly accommodated the notion of white ethnic groups. Poles, some
in the survey design team argued, are not an ethnic group - they are a national
group, a migrant group if one will, but they cannot be over-sampled within the
framework of the EMB.
So, I was like. . . quite pushy on [the EMB] not being. . . that this was an ethnicity
strand, that we should collect on the more, kind of the more long-standing. . . stable,
well-known groups, who are also visible minorities, by and large. So when we
did this top-up, the new boost. . . The IEMB, yes. So that was an Immigrant and
Ethnic Minority Boost, so I said ok, [...] now we can get these people in. [...] it was
recognising that this, this issue, that this wasn’t going away, and there would be a lot
of people who do wanted to study Poles, and we simply didn’t have enough Poles,
or. . . whatever, enough Eastern Europeans in the nationally representative study.
(Interviewee #1 – Ethnicity strand, survey design )
From this investigation of the sampling design and the changes in sampling,
the British framework around ethnicity is indeed better described as ethno-racial,
also in terms of sampling design. Notably, the ’ethnicity’ questions seemed
incompatible with the recognition of ’white’ ethnicities. When groups like ’Black
African’ can be operationalised as an ethnic group in spite of its great internal
ethnic variety, surely Poles or Eastern European would also qualify. Who is
not ethnic? had asked Simpson (2002) about the 2001 ethnic census question.
1.3. Mobile and/or racialised ’Others’ 75
The reticence to ’ethnically’ fragment the white group has been noted in other
contexts (Nobles, 2000), also in the UK with regards to the Irish ethnic group and
the reluctance that the ONS presented to introducing that category.32 With the
IEMB, the resistance to make Eastern European migrants into an ethnic category,
combined with a growing political focus on ’immigration’ more broadly, lead
to ’immigrants’ becoming a central category in the 2015 wave, and to measures
of international mobility expanding significantly in the survey over the years.
Ironically, by choosing to expand to all immigrants rather than explicitly target
the population of interest, the sampling strategy lost in efficacy, as the numbers
of Eastern European migrants yielded by the IEMB turned out to be lower than
expected.33
Chapter conclusion
Mixedness is conceived differently in France and the UK. Conceptually, it
is much more tightly connected to migration in the first case than in the second,
where mixedness is primarily defined as mixed-race and mixed identities. This is
linked to different statistical genealogies but this does not actually mean that the
paradigms of mixedness and migration differ much between the two countries.
In both cases, what the surveys are trying to measure are mainly discrimination
and ethnic inequalities, and what they are trying to fight are assimilationist
and non-pluralist pressure, notably coming from the political field and from
government. Sandwiched between narratives of integration and narratives of
anti-discrimination, there is little space left for considerations of trajectories, that
is, for understanding what the process and experience of international mobility
create and represent in terms of mixing and inequalities.
What does all this imply for the quantification of migration? Mostly, that
part of migration that has to do with the migration journey and how this journey
may shape migrants’ lives - the mobility part is relegated to the background. In the
case of TeO, because the attention and controversy is entirely focused on measures
of otherness, specifically ethnic statistics (as well as religion and discrimination,
to a lesser extent); in the case of Understanding Society, international mobility
is something that is evoked by the survey designers mainly to explain why emi-
grants and short-term migrants could not be easily integrated or followed by the
32Thompson (2015) reported that the ‘ONS was reluctant to have it at all... maybe because
it wasn’t driven by colour. [. . . ] The Irish group was a tougher sell – it was about 1997 when
they came around. There was quite a lot of resistance.” . She further commented “ ONS’s
unease with counting Irish was partially because the category did not align well with the state’s
conceptualisation of what racial disadvantage is, and therefore, what the ethnic question was
designed to measure.” (Thompson 2015, 127).
33As mentioned by several UKLHS interviewees.
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survey. Yet in both French and British surveys, the questionnaire and/or sample
design shows a gradual trend towards more and more precise quantification of
migration as movement rather than as proxy for - or subcategory of - ’outsiders’.
Subsequently, the survey focus on migrants who are also racialised.
However, where Blum (1998)’s critique led him to argue that statistics on
ethnicity should therefore be avoided, I consider that they are complementary. In
an intersectional theorisation of migration, researchers need to be able to consider
and problematise together the facts and process of the migration experience, and
the ethnic and cultural contexts in which it takes place. Indeed, there are gender
inequalities in migration experiences and regimes (e.g. gender vulnerabilities to
sexual violence and trafficking (Fund, 2018), the greater disbelief and suspicion of
’sham marriages’ towards male applicants for family migration (Charsley et al.,
2020; Griffiths & Morgan, 2017)) which cannot be simply limited to or conflated
with ethnic difference and discrimination (e.g. intersectional ethnic and racial
discrimination in the country of immigration, or the particular gender relations
and ethnic traditions that orient migration decisions and opportunities in the
sending country).
Yet, the overlap is imperfect and to forget this can be deeply misleading.
First, it feeds into a prejudiced racial narrative of migration that holds all im-
migrants to be racially and culturally alien to an imagined national community
(Anderson, 2016), which in Western countries is assumed to be white and cultur-
ally homogeneous. Furthermore, the conflation between mobility and alterity
creates a framework where it is all too easy to collapse inequalities that de-
rive from mobility (typically, constrained access to paid employment or services
linked to immigration status, social isolation as a result of transplantation, uproot-
ing or reduced language skills) into differences attached to alterity (for instance,
discrimination and cultural differences). One cannot miss the political weight
of this superposition: if we cannot disentangle these two aspects, we jeopardize
our ability to correctly unpack inequalities. We risk underestimating their scope
as well as their main sites and root causes. Ultimately, our diagnosis and the
solutions we propose may be entirely wrong.
Although the terms - and the timing - of debates around quantification of
migration, between mobility and otherness, differ between the two countries, the
degree of overlap between categories and concepts used in French and British
survey design on migrants has increased significantly, thanks to a variety of
efforts coming from different angles. In spite of arguments of profound differ-
ences between French and British data ’regimes of difference’, in both French
and British surveys, the analysis of the sampling design especially shows that
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the effective categories of focus are very similar in pratice. This undermines the
idea that notions of ’otherness’ as measured by ethnicity (or nationality) and
its articulation with migration would differ so deeply between France and the
UK that they could hardly be compared. Le Bras et al. (2007) for instance had
taken the example that Northern African migrants are considered ’as white as
the Scots’ in British classification, whereas in France survey designers would
specifically want to distinguish. As we have seen survey designers took pains to
distinguish them from any ’white’ or majority group in both French and British
sample design. The debates around sampling issues, as technical as they may
seem, are perhaps some of the most fundamental and determinant in terms of
what is open to analysis and what is not. Sampling design is a terrain where lines
have to be drawn around categories to over-sample. Those lines do not always
follow official classifications, as seen with the UKLHS screening categories for
the second-tier oversampling, and in practice, they are roughly similar between
the French and British data.
The contrast between the two statistical regimes and the two national ’mod-
els’ is therefore arguably overplayed, in sometimes dramatic attempts to reinstate
a French (and to a lesser extent, a British) political exception and to resist ’Ameri-
can’ (or continental) influences. In effect, the paradigm clashes are much more
intense internally, across political and academic factions, sometimes across insti-
tutions and the different bodies and interests involved in survey design. Most of
the academics push for more pluralist and discrimination-oriented approaches
to migration and migrants; the French and British government they interact
with tends to be much more focused on measuring the (lack of) assimilation of
’problematic’ and summarily racialised ’Others’.
Importantly, however, the focus on otherness rather than mobility did not
altogether prevent the collection of some data on migration and conjugal tra-
jectories and timing. But it oriented both questionnaires and sample designs
towards migrant populations that are also racialised. In this context, it can be
tricky (though not impossible) to avoid conflating inequalities deriving from
migration trajectories, from inequalities linked to ethnic difference and racial
discrimination. Recontextualising the survey design helps understand how this
relative convergence came about, and why certain aspects of migration and mi-
grants’ lives continue to be left out on both sides of the channel. It also helps
in highlighting how, in both countries, the quantification of migration experi-
ence and mixing is largely polarised around identifying and disputing markers
of an ’otherness’ in which ethnic, racial and migratory notions are more often
combined than competing, and in which the migration journey is little engaged
with. The issue then is not so much that already racialised groups are further
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essentialised (as opponents to ’ethnic statistics’ would argue), but that migration
itself is racialised, made to appear to be relevant only to racialised migrants - this
often in spite of survey designers’ best efforts.
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Chapter 2
The other ’Others’: gender and
migration in French and British
survey data
. . . it matters what matters we
use to think other matters with;
it matters what stories we tell
other stories with; it matters
what knots knot knots, what
thoughts think thoughts, what
ties tie ties. It matters what
stories make worlds, what
worlds make stories.
Haraway (2011, p. 4)
Chapter introduction
Most migration scholars differentiate between ’men’ and ’women’. Likewise,
most surveys include a measure of biological sex (e.g. ’male’/’female’) in their
questionnaire and in their analyses. This applies to migration studies and to
surveys with a focus on migration and population diversity such as TeO and
Understanding Society. This survey data makes it possible to compute sex-
segregated dichotomous tables and analyses of migrants and migration. However,
survey design rarely engage with feminist theories of migration - I use the
term ’feminist’ to refer broadly to people and scholarship that consider women
and their labour as devalued, dominated and exploited, who are committed to
changing this and therefore are critical of dominant intellectual traditions that
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have neglected, ignored, rationalised and/or condoned women’s oppression
(Acker, Barry, & Esseveld, 1983; Oakley, 1998). In the vast majority of feminist
scholarship and activism, this critical perspective and solidarity is not limited
to (cis-)women but includes sexual and gender minorities. It is often the case,
however, that surveys entrench gendered assumptions - most obviously the
gender binary (Westbrook & Saperstein, 2015) - without providing tools for
understanding gender-based differences in relation to gender hierarchies and
social relations. A landscape of migration statistics built on classic economic,
male and Western-centred rationales of (im)migration - even when they are
sex-differentiated - is unlikely to help those wishing to investigate the complex
interplay between gender relations and migration, ’for the master’s tools will never
dismantle the master’s house’ (Lorde, 1984, p. 13).
Of course, the broader issue here is that statistics and survey data are them-
selves, in more ways than one, the ’master’s tools’. As discussed in the previous
chapter, statistics and the state have a very close, mutually-constitutive and
mutually-legitimising relation to one another. This is most obviously the case
for national censuses, but it is no less apparent for publicly-funded, large-scale
surveys, especially when they focus on migration and minorities. That is part of
the reason why critical scholarship - feminism included - has had a long-standing
suspicion of quantitative methods and data (see e.g. Stanley (1983)).
Grappling with the intersection of gender relations and migration is already
a difficult and slippery task in qualitative and theoretical terms - nevermind try-
ing to do so quantitatively. A persistent issue is the difficulty of talking about gen-
der relations and migration without feeding into prejudice and anti-immigrant
sentiment. For instance, the political narratives that followed the events of the
Cologne New Year’s Eve underlined the toxic entanglements between racism,
nationalism and a certain brand of feminism (Hark & Villa, 2020), with Marine
Le Pen jumping on the event. As Judith Butler sharply put it: ’The feminism
that emerged that was against sexual violence did not appear to be also against
anti-immigrant sentiment.’ (Butler, 2020). Yet on the other side, among those that
attempted to criticise the xenophobic turn of the narrative, some turned to gender
cultures and relativism, how African men were just ’that way’, quietly reinstalling
white men as the proper protectors of white women, and ontologising differences
between (racialised) migrants and the (white, Western) native population. To
work on gender and migration is to walk a fine political line. Acknowledging
and exposing gender differences and inequalities, while somehow conveying,
against a monopolizing, ethnocentric-at-best and xenophobic-at-worst brand
of feminism, that these differences cannot be considered or explained away as
natural, immutable, external, culturally determined. In this acrobatic number of
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extracting feminism and gender analysis from cultural ontology or outright racial
and sexist prejudice, survey data is, as I will show, an important but ambivalent
ally.
The question of the marginalisation of gender in the field of migration
studies is old, and it has many different components, some broadly societal,
some internal to academia and to the scholarly field of feminist and gender
studies (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2012). Because quantitative analysis, especially
when based on survey and census data, retains a more institutional quality, an
aura of greater reliability, and a more attentive audience in the media and political
arena, it also acts as a gateway towards mainstreaming theories and influencing
policy-making. Survey design can thus be considered to play a key role in the
(dis)enfranchisement of gender research, inasmuch as surveys will shape, to
no insignificant extent, what can be quantified and hence brought to light and
analysed in quantitative terms. Conversely, if gender and feminist concepts are
inadequately represented in survey data on migration and in most quantitative
analyses, gender is bound to remain stuck at the margins of migration studies.
Yet feminist and gender scholars cannot simply discard survey research on
sweeping accusations of positivism and masculinism, as many did in the past
(Reinharz, 1992; Stanley, 1983). There are some signs that surveys are becoming
more permeable to gender issues and theories. The EU has been promoting
gender mainstreaming since 1998 and has repeatedly called for more quantitative
data on gender so as to better document gender inequalities and to benchmark
EU member states on that front.1 The recognition of the importance of gender
relations and gender equality as a measure of social justice and development is
widespread, touching most social science fields, albeit to different extents (Stacey
& Thorne, 1985). This also finds an expression in surveys and statistics, with
survey series such as the Generation and Gender Program driving the quantification
of gender relations at at national and cross-national level.
But as much as this now acknowledged relevance of gender marks an accom-
plishment for feminists, who after decades of bitter fighting finally do not have to
convince policymakers and survey designers that gender equality matters, it also
warrants close scrutiny. Gender mainstreaming has been accused of co-opting
feminist agendas and instrumentalising narratives of gender equality to serve
research interests and political agendas that are quite different, much less radical,
primarily focused on labour participation and economic performance. Feminist
1Recommendation CM/Rec (2007) 17 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on gender equality
standards and mechanisms (2007) and Recommendation No. R (98) 14 of the committee of ministers to
member states on gender mainstreaming (1998) For a list of all EU recommendations pertaining to
measures and standards of gender equality: https://www.coe.int/en/web/genderequality/stan
dards-and-mechanisms
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denunciation has been particularly vitriolic in international development studies
(Calkin, 2015; Stratigaki, 2004). Stacey and Thorne (1985) argued in the 1980s
already that sociology had been much less profoundly transformed by the incor-
poration of gender than other disciplines such as literature and anthropology -
since core sociological theories, frameworks and practices remained largely un-
fazed. The same line of critique was developed by Watkins (1993) for demography.
Feminist demographers and statisticians have also brought attention to problems
of gender gaps (lack of data) and gender biases (skewed data and categories)
in statistical classifications and survey design. They have raised a variety of
issues, from the conflation of ’women’ with mothers and fertility in demographic
studies (Locoh, Hecht, & Andro, 2003; Watkins, 1993) to the default male ’head
of household’ household survey unit (Brückweh, 2018; Fouquet & Charraud,
1989); from the lack of recognition of women’s qualifications (Amossé, 2004) to
the non-recording of their labour, especially when unpaid and performed within
the family sphere (Riley, 1998, 1999). More recently, the survey classification of
gender as an identity category has also been brought into question by sociologists
of gender, as an example of statistical classifications and survey design failing
to stay up-to-date with contemporary gender theory (Westbrook and Saperstein
(2015).2. The problem is not only that gender diversity and inequalities are not
adequately acknowledged, but that survey data simultaneously reproduces and
confines its users to reproducing its visions of the social world and the blinders
that come with it. Knowledge production, of which statistical production is a
type, is thus in an important sense a cyclical process (Bowker, 1999; Hacking,
2006).
Whether and how these feminist critiques apply to survey data on migration
and population diversity remains as yet mostly unaddressed. Where gender bi-
ases and gaps in the field of migration studies have been pointed out by feminist
sociologists and gender theorists (Kofman, Phizacklea, Raghuram, & Sales, 2000,
2005), the critique has seldom been extended to include quantitative data sources
on migration, let alone the process of survey design that produces the data avail-
able to migration researchers. Not that the role of surveys has not been hinted at:
Lawson (1998) already suggested that the format of survey data might simply
be ill-suited to capturing the necessarily dynamic understanding of gender and
gender relations throughout migration, thus limiting the possibilities of feminist
quantitative researchers on migration; Nawyn (2010) also pondered whether
survey-based quantitative analysis could be completed with ethnographic femi-
nist research in order to legitimize the second and pull the first away from narrow
economic considerations and framework. Such mixed-method approaches were
2See also Spade (2015) for legal and administrative classifications of gender identities
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praised by Pedraza (1991) in her seminal piece ’Women and migration - the social
consequences of gender’. But the question remains open as to what it is that
survey data can and cannot do for feminist research on migration, why, and why
it matters.
The gender analysis I propose to deploy is an analysis of how survey data
present and capture gender relations rather than gender categories, and I am in
this indeed constrained by the data I use. The word ’gender’, after all, never
appears in the survey questionnaires under study here. This chapter is dedicated
to explaining the gender issues, biases, failures and (sometimes) the successes
that appeared in the survey design processes, and were ultimately engraved
in the survey data. In later chapters, when I make use of the same data for
the empirical analysis of gender relations and migration, I will be able to work
around some of the issues I will have outlined and contextualised here; some,
like the binary of the sex/gender variable, I will not be able to avoid. I also focus
on gender relations in the household, and especially between partners, because
that is most relevant to the rest of my thesis.
The chapter proceeds as follows: in the first section, I discuss and map out
the possibilities for quantitative, survey-based research on gender and migration
in France and in the UK (2.1). In the second section, I extend the discussion to
how the surveys under study accommodate and frame intersectional analysis,
which has more often been addressed on the ground of quantitative methodology
rather than quantitative data (Sigle-Rushton, 2014; Wemrell, Mulinari, & Merlo,
2017). (2.2). In the final section, I focus on the conditions - historical, political
and institutional - of emergence of the co-problematisation of gender and migra-
tion in these surveys, and I attempt to provide some sociological and political
explanations as to why gender remains a peripheral topic in survey data and
survey-based research on migration, in spite of surveys like Understanding Soci-
ety and TeO, which are comparatively more hospitable to gender and feminist
research (2.3).
The question that weaves itself through this, which ties this chapter to the
previous and to the broader thesis, is whether and how survey data and statistics
construct gender and gender relations in migration as a matter of otherness, or
as a matter of experience, dynamically shaped by and together with inequalities.
To answer these questions, I have the advantage, as in the previous chapter,
not to be confined to ex post analysis of the finished product that are the survey
questionnaires or the survey data. I also draw on the interviews conducted with
the survey designers themselves, and on the step-by-step process and contextual-
isation of the survey design and choices reconstructed through working papers
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and archives.
2.1 Quantifying migration as gendered and gendering
process
2.1.1 Operationalising feminist and gender theory for quantitative
data on migration
A first necessary step to tackle is the question of how one can operationalise
feminist and gender theory in survey data on migration. At the most basic level,
we need to distinguish between the sexes - allowing for what is sometimes called
the ’add women and stir’ approach (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2000; Kofman, 2004).
As unsophisticated as this may appear now, this still represents progress from
an age where migration was expected to be all-male and migrant men were
expected to be representative of all migrants (and could therefore be the only
ones sampled). Yet the analysis of sex differences is not the same thing as an
analysis of gender relations. It is at best a very first step: necessary, certainly,
but not at all sufficient. Gender, as distinguished from biological sex at birth
and the male/female binary might not be so well understood and integrated
in survey design and questionnaires (if at all) (Westbrook & Saperstein, 2015).
Surveys also need to provide room to capture gender differences: for example, in
order to correctly identify the gendered diversity of migration trajectories so that
those that are more often travelled by women (such as family stage migration
and marriage migration, to give but two examples) are actually quantified, and
survey data on migration is not limited to labour migration. We would also
want survey classifications of migration to give due regards to the heterogeneity
of women’s migration, including that covered by the umbrella terms ’family
migrant’ or ’family migrations’. Accordingly, we would want to be able to study
the imbrication of family life and migration not only for women and those that
would fall under the label ’family migrants’, but also for men and economic
migrants, asylum seekers, etc., and for survey data to allow us to open the ’black
box of the household’ and show the power relations and dissents within.
Hondagneu-Sotelo (2012) helpfully lists six arenas which emerged through
the scholarship on gender and migration: (1) ’mainstream’ sociological research,
which tries to get gender into institutionalised migration research, e.g. on the
demographic composition of migrant stock - this applies perhaps especially
to quantitative research, particularly constrained by institutions of statistical
production; (2) migration and care work; (3) sexualities; (4) sex trafficking; (5)
borderlands and migration; (6) gender, migration and children. The key theoreti-
cal feminist input to the study of migration has been to conceptualise the entire
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migration process as intricately woven and tied to gender relations (Anthias &
Lazaridis, 2000; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1992; Kofman et al., 2000; Pedraza, 1991;
Truong, 1996) - from the context of departure, to the decision to migrate, the mode
of migration, the networks employed, the settlement period, the integration into
the host countries, and the transnational ties and practices with the country of
origin and those left-behind. Morokvasic (1984) theorised the importance of
gendered systems of power and inequality in labour markets, cultures, families
and households to explain both the decision to migrate and the experience af-
ter migration and (Mahler & Pessar, 2009) echoed this with their emphasis on
’gendered geographies of power’ to understand migratory flows (why and how
people migrate) and the social consequences of migration (what happens to them
and to societies when they do).
Through this reconceptualisation, feminist scholarship has built an organ-
ised critique of classic economic theories of migration which, generally attached
to the theorem of wage differentials, conceptualise migrants as 1) individuals,
2) only driven by utilitarian interests and 3) operating as rational agents in a
field devoid of power relations (Borjas, 1989; Massey et al., 1993; Sjaastad, 1962).
The influence of classic economic theories of migration means that adherence
to core theoretical assumptions of methodological individualism and more or
less flat understandings of economic rationality and maximisation is widespread
in migration studies at large (Boswell, 2009). This also extends to the so-called
new economics of migration, which though it theoretically re-centres households,
does so in such a way that it posits them as uniform, power-free, conflict-free,
internally wholly altruistic social units. One central aspect of critical feminist
scholarship has been to uncover the tensions and power relations within the
household, a lens fruitfully applied to migration processes. The critical house-
hold lens described by Nawyn, Reosti, and Gjokaj (2009) is thus to be applied to
the study of households before and after (and ideally throughout) migration.
Following a simple theoretical framework laid out in substance by Mo-
rokvasic (1984) and Hondagneu-Sotelo (1992), we can assess the extent to which
Understanding Society and TeO allow for an analysis of migration both as a
gendered process and as a gendering process. Gendered, in the sense that different
gender identities (’men’ and ’women’ at a most basic level) are associated with
differences in migration trajectories and experiences; and gendering because mi-
gration itself can participate in the production - be it entrenchment, subversion,
or adjustment - of gender relations (Pedraza, 1991).
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2.1.2 International mobility and the life course: migration as gen-
dered process
Let us start with the operationalisation of migration as a gendered process.
By that, I mean that quantitative data would aptly capture and contextualise
gender differences in migration trajectories. Gender relations are dynamic pro-
cesses, phenomenon which at the micro-sociological level we know to be deeply
affected by events of the life course such as couple formation, parenthood and
the timing and social setting of both. Accordingly, gender roles are renegotiated
or reproduced at the various stages and the contrasted circumstances of people’s
lives. If migration is hugely relevant to gender, it is because it is rooted in and yet
also interferes - for better or worse - with these already gendered social processes,
which (re)produce gender roles and inequalities. In Gendered Transitions, Pierrette
Hondagneu-Sotelo stated:
Theories based on structural transformations cannot explain who migrates, when mi-
gration occurs, or how people organize migration. And while structural explanations
can help account for the changing sex composition of the immigrant population, they
cannot account for the distinctively gendered way that immigration and settlement
occurs. [...] political and economic transformations may set the stage for migration,
but they do not write the script.
(Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994), 187)
With this in mind, it is clear that the relevance and the role of gender in
migration is by no means simply a question of who or how many migrated of
whatever sex. Rather it a question of how, why, with whom and when, when
being both in absolute terms (to posit migration in a historical, geopolitical and
economic context) and in individual relative terms (relative to one’ age, stage in
the life course, employment, etc.). The question requires much more than sex-
segregated demographic data on the composition - however precisely drawn - of
migrant stock and/or ethnic minorities. The quantification of mobility, not as an
abstract, instantaneous geographic translation that turns humans into migrants,
but as dynamic and contingent, is no doubt a key point to capture gendered
processes of migration.
This quantification needs to involve a multi-dimensional approach to mo-
bility experience: in other words, it requires that migration be modelled as
movement, through space and borders, but also through time, the life course
and different gender regimes. Practically speaking, the aim is to contextualise
and ’nest’ the event(s) and temporalities of migration, and the modes of migra-
tion, in family formation, parenthood and, ideally, career trajectories. For that
we need co-occuring information on the chronologies of migration and the life
course which we can then superimpose and combine. This co-existence of data is
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necessary for quantitative researchers to be able to factor in the various stages
and core processes on and through which gender inequalities are (re)produced.
The following table list out some of the key information and indicates
whether they are available in Understanding Society and TeO. It is not an exhaustive
list, rather a basic and targeted one, concentrated on questions and data already
used in various data sources, but which very rarely coexist in large-scale survey
questionnaires. The ’yes’ in brackets indicates that the information was not
collected at the start of Understanding Society (waves 1 or 2) but appears in later
waves, generally at wave 6, or at wave 9. The table focuses on three main aspects:
spatiality, legality and couple and family formation.
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TABLE 2.1: Movement and time: variables on migration and





Temporal movement Partner1 Partner2 Partner1 Partner2
Life-course chronology (family formation)
Date of birth yes yes yes yes
Date first met current partner no no yes yes
Date start of current cohabitation yes yes yes yes
Date of current marriage yes yes yes yes
Cohabited before current marriage yes yes yes yes
Start and end dates of other cohabitation spans[1] yes yes yes no
Start and end dates of other marriage spans yes yes yes no
Date of first (eldest) child’s birth yes yes yes no
Date of youngest child’s birth yes yes yes no
Migration chronology
Date first came to the present country of residence yes yes yes yes
Date first emigrated no no yes no
Successive migration spans yes yes yes no
Start and end date of all migration spans no no yes no
When expect to migrate in the future (yes) (yes) no no
Legal chronology
whether citizen of country of residence yes yes yes yes
none/other//dual/more citizenships: which. yes yes yes no
whether citizen of country of birth yes yes yes yes
whether citizen of country of residence by birth yes yes yes no
Whether has indefinite leave to remain (or equivalent) at time of interview (yes) (yes) no no
Other type of residency right at time of interview no no no no
First type of visa/residency right obtained in the country of residence no no yes no
Different visas/residency rights held successively in country of residence no no no no
Start and end date of each legal status span no no no no
Date obtained citizenship of country of residence (yes) (yes) yes no
Legal ground for naturalisation no no yes no
Whether applied for citizenship of country of residence no no yes no
Geographic movement
Country of birth yes yes yes yes
All countries lived in yes yes yes no
Remittances yes yes yes no
Frequency of visits no no yes no
Where first met (country) no no yes yes
Where married (country) no no yes yes
Causes for mobility
Motivations for migration (main/several) (yes) (yes) no no
If family migration/reunification: joined who? no no yes no
If family migration/reunification: brought who? no no yes no
Considers migrating (yes) (yes) yes no
Where would migrate no no yes no
Motivations for considering emigration/return migration (main/several) no no no no
Notes:’(yes)’ indicates that the information is not collected in Understanding Society waves 1 or 2, but is collected later
on (in most cases, from wave 6 onward).
Data source: UKLHS Survey questionnaire (waves 1-8), TeO1 survey questionnaire, INED-INSEE, 2008-2009. Author’s
own compilation.
2.1. Quantifying migration as gendered and gendering process 89
Table 2.1 serves to highlight a couple of points: one, it documents the obser-
vation made in the previous section that the British survey gradually dedicated
more space to the quantification of mobility and that there is therefore a conver-
gence of French and British data on the quantification of migration. That opens a
window for quantitative comparative research.
Second, it demonstrates that both Understanding Society and TeO open up
possibilities that had not been there before for research on gender and migration.
Both surveys collect information on migrants’ mobility as well as on the life
course and relationship patterns, thus making it possible to study migration
as a gendered process, which differentiates between men and women in motives,
channels, calendars, stages and family dynamics of migration. For instance, it
becomes possible to identify sequences of migration in migrant families and in
couple formation, sequences such as family stage migration, which are known to
be highly gendered and gendering3. The ability to differentiate between periods
of cohabitation and marriage also makes it possible to capture various important
elements of family formation, which have been connected to gender relations.
For instance ‘direct marriages’ – couples who start cohabiting only after marriage
– have been associated with a greater attachment to religious values. This way
of entering into cohabitation has been interpreted as signaling more patriarchal
gender norms linked to virginal preservation (Condon & Hamel, 2003; Hamel,
Pailhé, Santelli, & Lhommeau, 2013).
This does not mean that all gendered aspects of mobility are covered, let
alone equally covered, in the two surveys. Because the survey samples individual
respondents rather than all household members, TeO holds much less information
on the partner and, consequently, there is less overall that can be reconstructed
at the couple level. Family stage migration, for instance, can only be identified
through the legal mode of entry, and as a result, it provides no information on
the trajectory of migrant couples who did not use family reunification provisions
or a partner visa (e.g. for E.U. migration). Understanding Society is more
comprehensive on family formation and the life course. However, the British
survey collects no information on the legal channel of migration, something
breached - if briefly - by TeO through the question on first visa type obtained in
France. As a result, gender inequalities linked to legal admission category cannot
be analysed with the British data.
3Men and husbands tend to be the first movers (González-Ferrer, 2011), although that is not
always the case (George, 2005). There is rich qualitative evidence documenting the reorganisation of
gender relations in the context of family-stage migration, with very different dynamics depending
on whether pioneer migrants are men or women (on men as first movers, see Hondagneu-Sotelo
(1992, 2012), and George (2005) for women as first movers)
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Neither of the two surveys make it possible to identify certain highly-
gendered migration routes, for example those linked to sex trafficking
(Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2012). This can hardly be held against them: as is the case for
illegal migration paths more broadly, quantified data and reliable estimates are
difficult to come by, because the population of interest is particularly difficult to
sample and the information is difficult to ask for and to obtain. Yet it is especially
for these largely un-quantifiable flows that quantification is most insistently
demanded in the media and in political arenas4(Boswell, 2009). While we know
from qualitative enquiries that the migration routes travelled by undocumented
migrants are heavily gendered, like the dangers they face on these travels,
there is little quantitative work or evidence on their gendered and gendering
characteristics. One exception is González-Ferrer (2011), who was able to offer an
estimate and a distinct category for migrants who had (at least initially) been
undocumented in Spain.
2.1.3 Gender relations and gendered labour: migration as gendering
process
The surveys make it possible (up to a point, and to different degrees) to
quantify migration not only as mobility but mobility informed by gender theory,
i.e. inscribed in the life course and in family dynamics. But how well do they
fare on the second dimension, when it comes to quantifying not just the gendered
processes - i.e. the gender differences - but the gendering effects of migration, that is,
the effect on gender relations? In theory, this would require two things: quantified
indicators of gender relations, and the ability to compare gender relations before
migration and after. The second is mostly out-of-reach, since migration almost
always means that those who migrate disappear from surveys - even panel
surveys such as Understanding Society. Survey questionnaires sometimes try to
fill this gap by asking for retrospective information, typically about the migrants’
employment status before migration. Though useful, this is still a poor proxy
for gender relations and dynamics, especially since these questions are typically
about individual labour engagement rather than relative to other family members
and partners.
To be fair, quantifying gender relations is as and of itself complicated: there
are different approaches and proxies, none of which fully cover the matter at
hand (Richardson, 2018). That is also, of course, because gender is omnipresent
in our societies, structural, structuring, and differentiating many, perhaps all
spheres of life and society. It would be impossible for any survey to capture
4One of the consequences is that the floor is left to estimates with little to whimsical representa-
tive quality but clear political agendas. For an example see the debates around the creation and
statistical production of Migration Watch in the UK.
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all dimensions, and statistics and survey have never pretended that they could
exhaust all dimensions and possibilities. Understanding Society and TeO oper-
ationalise some key concepts, however: sex-based discrimination; housework
distribution between partners; childcare distribution (only unpaid in the case
of TeO, paid and unpaid in the UKLHS). Understanding Society also includes a
rotating module on the distribution of unpaid care delivered to elderly relatives,
as well as a modules on gender attitudes. Other dimensions, such as the distri-
bution of paid work, the gender pay gap, and financial dependency between
partners can also be reconstructed from the data.
Expressions of gender relations and patriarchal power which have been
the chief target of third-wave feminism - such as coercion and violence (notably
intimate partner violence, domestic violence, and sexual violence) - are less easily
approached through these surveys. The TeO questionnaire does not include any
module or reference to these experiences. Understanding Society has one rotating
module on experiences of harassment. The module enquires about verbal and
physical attacks faced by respondent over the past 12 months. Respondents are
asked where they were attacked or insulted, and are offered the option ’at home’
as one of the available choices. In addition, there is also a question on whether
respondents felt ’unsafe’ (again, at home, in public transportation, etc...), and
questions as to the reasons why respondents felt they had been targeted (e.g.
’sex’, ’age’, ’ethnicity’, ’sexual orientation’). Sexual violence is left out of the
surveys altogether. Similarly, there are very few questions on sexuality (only on
contraception use), and none on gender identity. Understanding Society has one or
sexual orientation, which is part of the special licence-protected data, while TeO
has none.
So it appears that the two surveys also allow for (some) measures of gender
in the country of destination, at the time of the interview. Much less can be
reconstructed from the state of gender relations in the country of origin. This is
almost entirely lacking from the Understanding Society questionnaire, including
its dedicated ’extra 5 min questions’. To some extent, it is possible to compute
whether people had studied, worked and were already married before they
migrated.
Here the two survey depart from one another quite clearly, since TeO makes
much more room for questions on respondents’ situation and cultural environ-
ment before migrating, especially as regards family formation. Notably, the
survey holds information on the sphere of recruitment of the partner, includ-
ing whether respondents met their current partner abroad, in what setting, and
whether the family was involved. TeO’s predecessor, the MGIS survey had
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also specifically enquired about polygamous marriages, whether respondents
were involved in one at the time of the survey, and whether polygamous unions
were common in (migrant respondents’) country of origin5. The MGIS question-
naire also asked respondents about kinship ties with their spouse, and whether
they had been forced into their current or first union. While the question about
polygamy in the country of origin are discontinued, the others are still found in
the TeO questionnaire (see figure 2.1).
FIGURE 2.1: TeO questions on forced unions and kinship ties
between partners
TeO1 English questionnaire, p. 115
The quantification of gender relations in the context of migration and family
formation reproduces a framing that includes and connects forced marriages, kin
marriage and polygamy, all considered and used in political narratives as markers
of backward gender attitudes and intensely patriarchal gender cultures. Further,
the focus on these aspects and these indicators often misses women’s agency
and autonomy. It is a noted historical flaw of demography (and international
development studies) that is had been prone to painting third-world women in
particular as passive objects of patriarchal and culturally essentialised oppression,
5MGIS (INED-INSEE 1994) questionnaire, p. 12 and p. 16
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when it went beyond considering them solely as agents of reproduction (Labourie-
Racapé, Meron, & Locoh, 2004; Locoh et al., 2003).
These indicators (forced unions, kin marriages, polygamy) are not meaning-
less, but they tell us little about the gendering effects of migration. One problem
is that they hold little explanatory or comparative power, since they effectively
concern a mere fraction of respondents, especially in the younger generations
(Hamel, 2008). Crucially, the question of individual agency (or limit thereof) in
partner selection and the related concerns about family pressure and intergenera-
tional violence are operationalised completely differently in surveys like MGIS
and TeO, focused on migrants and minorities, compared to surveys that enquire
about family formation in the general population - as demonstrated by Hamel
(2008). In general population surveys such Formation des couples6 (in Hamel’s
example), demographers were interested in the rise of cohabitation, and whether
family interference and pressures could push couples to marry - or deter, or
delay, for instance in cases of social heterogamy. The framing is miles away from
the one on ’forced unions’ as it is applied to migrant and minority population,
which is derived from a concern about non-assimilation, and inter-generational
violence, especially against women. The problem is not that these phenomena are
quantified, but that quantification reflects the premise that these are qualitatively
different, non-endemic social practices. Accordingly, the modes of quantification
of e.g. partner selection differ in surveys and questions designed for migrants
and minorities, and in surveys for the general population. In practice, however,
there are differences but also continuums in majority native and minority popu-
lations on e.g. family pressure in partner selection (towards social homogamy
and/or ethnic endogamy), on the multiplicity of sexual and/or conjugal part-
ners; and certainly on the matter of conjugal violence which is by no measure
limited to migrant or minority men and families. That is not to say that cultural
specificities do not exist or matter, but that they come out further entrenched
and essentialised from the quantification process. Measuring culturally specific
elements of gender relations has its value, so long as it does not relegate to the
background the possibility to compare on grounds that are also widely practiced
in the majority native population: sexual violence, gender roles and distribution
of paid and unpaid labour, employment opportunities, wage inequality, etc... Yet
on these terrains, surveys have had a mediocre record by feminist standards.
For instance, survey data has been found guilty of failing to recognize and
capture women’s lives and work, especially compared to the minute attention it
dedicates to men’s. This fact has long been known by the feminist demographers
6Institut National d’Etudes Démographiques. (1983). La formation des couples. ADISP. Paris.
Retrieved from http://bdq.quetelet.progedo.fr/fr/Details_d_une_enquete/565.
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who tried to expose it, but it has been brought into the spotlight by recent
publications, e.g. Invisible Women (Criado Perez, 2019). Historically, women’s
participation in the workforce has been systematically underestimated in official
sources (Humphries & Sarasúa, 2012). In the 1990s, Marylin Waring showed that
the UN’s economic performance indicators were designed in such a way that
they actively excluded women’s labour and economic input from their estimates
and calculations – thus her title If Women Counted (Waring, 1989). Even when
recorded in survey data, work that is socially identified as ’women’s work’ tends
to be much less finely captured by statistical nomenclatures, which often batch
it into big umbrella categories (such as ’secretarial work’) that recognise neither
internal variety nor qualification (Amossé, 2004; Fouquet & Charraud, 1989).
This should perhaps not come as a surprise when considering that statisticians
were almost all men for a very long time (Fouquet, 2003). So were indeed most
survey respondents: until the 1990s, household surveys recorded information
from the male ‘head of household’ only, letting women be talked for, if talked
about at all (Amossé & Peretti, 2011).
Things have since improved for women’s voices in statistical production. On
the front of household labour, TeO undoubtedly does better than its predecessor -
MGIS had had no question on housework or care distribution. Continuing the
trend, the TeO2 questionnaire7 has maintained these questions on the household
division of labour, and has finally included a section on gender attitude (or
gender ideology).8 These questions had been suggested but ultimately rejected
for TeO1. The resistance of the INSEE against attitude-based questions, including
(although not limited to) gender attitudes and ideology, was mentioned as a key
element in this decision by several TeO interviewees.
2.2 Intersectional challenges
2.2.1 Quantifying intersectionality: categories and intersections
It has become increasingly clear that while ’women’ (/ ’men’) and ’gen-
der’ are an important axis of difference we cannot really speak of gender inde-
pendently of other social relations. Some migrant women are wealthy, highly
educated and moving within the Global North, and may have good chances
of obtaining secure and high-paying jobs in their host country. Other migrant
women are less privileged, and their experience of migration may be much more
precarious. Gender is only ’one among many divisions in a truly uneven and
heterogeneous society’ (Coward, 1999, p. 211). What feminists need, then, is to
7TeO2 data due for release in 2021-2022
8Information provided by the TeO interviewees also involved in TeO2
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understand how social relations, including but not limited to gender relations,
work together as part of a matrix of domination (Collins, 1990), which produces
intersecting - intersectional - forms of oppression and exploitation.
The concept of ’intersectionality’ was coined in the late 1980s and early 1990s
by Kimberlé Crenshaw (Crenshaw, 1989, 1991), who was building on pre-existing
critical race theory and Black feminist scholarship (bell hooks, 1981, 1984; Hull,
Bell-Scott, & Smith, 1982). But it was mainly in the late 2000s that intersectionality
rose to prominence in gender and feminist research and beyond. Its methodolog-
ical and theoretical scope, usefulness or co-option has been the topic of virulent
scholarly debates( Kathy Davis (2008) and Yuval-Davis (2006). For a compelling
analysis of the debates see Salem (2018)). Although the scholarship on intersec-
tionality is overwhelmingly qualitative and/or theoretical, the notion has reached
quantitative research as well: only the question of how intersectionality should be
operationalised is not necessarily straightforward, and leaves room for different
methodologocal interpretations (McCall, 2005). Quantitative intersectionality can
be intuitively thought of as interacting categorical variables, typically proxies
for gender, race and class (as well as sexual orientation, immigration status,
disability, etc...) in order to identify whether combinations - intersections - of
characteristics may be associated with particular effects. Researchers can remain
at this level (studying inter-categorical inequalities) or they can move towards the
study of intra-categorical complexity. Where an inter-categorical approach uses and
crosses existing categories of race/gender/class, intra-categorical approaches are
critical of existing analytical categories, and tend to focus on particular social
groups at ’points of intersectional failures’ (Crenshaw, 1991), thus highlighting
new (smaller) relevant categories - but not dismissing categories altogether (anti-
categorical complexity) (McCall, 2005). Indeed, even if potentially justified by the
recognition that categories are necessarily imbued with power relations which
they help entrench and reproduce, rejecting categories altogether would make
intersectionality a virtually impractical concept and framing for quantitative
analysis. Statistical analysis requires analytical categories of some sort, and post-
structuralist frameworks therefore show poor compatibility with quantitative
research (see also Oakley (1998)).
Inter-categorical intersectional approaches initially appeared more promis-
ing for feminist quantitative research. It seemed no doubt more practical and
easier to work into statistical modelling, although it faces its own set of feminist
critiques. Some suggested that most modelling methods - including regres-
sions - still rely on a reductive and essentialising understanding of intersec-
tionality, namely that intersectional inequalities are separable and cumulative
(Sigle-Rushton, 2014). This is certainly at odds with Crenshaw’s reasoning, and
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it is not adequately offset by interaction effects, for reasons largely related to
sample limitations. Efforts have been made to come up with alternative mod-
elling techniques for intersectional inequalities, notably by social epidemiologists
(M. A. Green, Evans, & Subramanian, 2017; Wemrell et al., 2017), but for the most
part, quantitative intersectional analyses have remained reliant on descriptive or
regression analysis of interacted and cumulated effects. The question of data and
sample size is central: cutting through categories, such as required by an intra-
categorical approach, implies that one works on a reduced sample, that of a single
social group, and highlights the divides within. This will be a key empirical strat-
egy in the next chapters, which will often present separate models for migrant
women and migrant men, as a way of rendering visible the heterogeneity and
inequalities within these two groups. Such intra-categorical approach requires
adequate analytical categories (constituted through an adequate questionnaire),
as well as large sample size or targeted sample design - most often both (McCall,
2005).
We know that TeO does not record race or ethnicity, which obviously leaves
that side of the intersectional framework unaddressed. Not that this has pre-
vented French social scientists from referring to intersectionality, although 1) the
use of the concept is overall much less prevalent in France than in the UK or
the US and 2) it is often articulated as an intersection of sex and class (more in
line with a tradition of French materialist feminists such as Delphy (1977) and
Kergoat (2004)) than of gender and race, with or without class. Some intersection-
ality scholars have denounced this continental ’colour-blind’ approach (Carbado,
2013), accusing French (and German) feminists of erasing both race and the Black
feminist roots of intersectionality (G. Lewis, 2013). Colour-blind intersectionality
could in fact be forced on quantitative researchers by their data, constrained
by national statistical frameworks like France’s or Germany’s that forbid the
collection of racial or ethnic statistics. Acknowledging the limits imposed by
the data on the design of intersectional research is, however, a very different
epistemological stance from those who argue that race/ethnicity need not be
included because race is allegedly not a structural element of French society (see
previous chapter). Additionally, and as previously mentioned, neither TeO nor
Understanding Society enquire about the respondents’ gender, and a strict sex
binary is enforced throughout the survey questionnaires.
2.2.2 Intersectional discrimination
Crenshaw’s crafting of the notion of ’intersectionality’ came about in the
context of a discussion of the discrimination faced by Black women in the United
States, and of the inability of the American courts to recognise and sanction
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these discrimination. The issue was that since race- and sex-based discrimination
were treated as separate and cumulative social issues, if one could not prove the
existence of racist discrimination and/or sexist discrimination taken indepen-
dently from one another, one could not possibly be victim of both. In contrast,
the intersectional reasoning posited that Black women could face discrimina-
tion and vulnerabilities that were distinct from the simple addition of race- and
gender-based discrimination and inequalities.
Both TeO and Understanding Society include question about respondents’
experiences of discrimination. As we discussed in the previous chapter, the ques-
tions give a number of characteristics to choose from (including ’sex’, ’nationality’,
’skin colour’ (TeO)/’ethnicity’ (Understanding Society), etc...). The respondents
can pick one or several options, signalling what they understood to be the charac-
teristic(s) that had made them a target for discriminatory treatments. The issue is
that although respondents can pick several motives for discrimination, there is no
way of knowing whether these would reflect different discriminatory episodes,
each targeting a single characteristic, or events where it was the combination of
these characteristics that made them a target of discrimination.
Maud Lesné (2015), who worked on the design of TeO, discussed this in her
PhD thesis. One of her key findings, demonstrated through her comparison of
TeO respondents’ questionnaire answers and interview answers, was that the
questions on discrimination under-performed when it came to sex-based discrim-
ination. Although “sex” and “skin colour” were both given as options to choose
from when reporting discrimination, they appeared to not be equally available
– cognitively and socially – to respondents. This lead to an underestimation
of gender discrimination, also relative to racial discrimination. There is every
reason to believe that the exact same problem would apply to Understanding
Society, since the questions are worded and processed in the exact same way
(aside from the fact that the option ’ethnicity’ is replaced by ’skin colour’ in the
French survey).
It was clear, perhaps, to both survey design teams that to the extent that
the surveys focused on discriminations, the focus was on racial discrimination
much more than on discrimination in general, including gender discrimination.
This is further clarified by the targeted audience for discrimination questions
and surveys: The TeO sample for the French survey, and the Ethnic Minority
Boost Sample (for the UKLHS), the Comparison sample or the LDA sample
(non-white respondents in Low Density ethnic minority Areas). While in theory
the experience of discrimination of various sorts may touch all parts of the
native and white (but female, disabled, LGBT+, etc.) population, in practice the
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discrimination that are effectively targeted and recorded are those experienced
by racialised minorities.
2.2.3 Sampling strategies and intersectional failures
The final point I want to make in this section thus brings us back to the
over-sampling strategies investigated in the previous chapter. By constricting
the sample of migrants and the questions on migration (or discrimination) to
racialised minority respondents, the surveys assume that migration is something
that is only relevant to them. At the same time, it focuses all statistical attention
and scrutiny on these racialised others, thus further reinstalling their ‘otherness’,
whereas other types of ‘Others’ (specifically, white others) remain untouched and
unproblematized, in the statistical shadows – at least until they become perhaps
themselves racialised. The argument that the experience of ’visible minorities’
in Britain or in France is qualitatively different from that of white others is of
course valid – on the ground of racism and racial disadvantage. But if we want to
study migration, and especially study it critically and intersectionally, we cannot
pool it together with racial disadvantage - not because they do not intersect (they
certainly do), but because even though they often work together, one cannot be
reduced to the other.
Going back to Crenshaw’s initial case study: it is by comparing black
women’s experiences to those of black men and of white women that the in-
tersectionality of discriminations could be demonstrated (Crenshaw, 1989). Only
the double comparison could highlight the fact that the discriminations faced by
Black women could be reduced neither to only sexist or only racist discrimination,
nor to their simple addition.
Similarly, to be able to statistically construct white migrants (through ade-
quate sample size and information on migration) is a necessary condition and
counter-factual (if nothing else) to rigorously investigate the intersectionality of
migration experiences. This is not an attempt to re-centre whiteness through
white migrants. On the contrary, it is to improve our capacity to quantitatively
investigate and understand the intersectional inequalities faced by racialised
migrants - especially migrant women of colour - by taking stock of the fact
that, in order to do so, we need the meaningful points of comparison that the
intersectional reasoning relies on.
Racialialising the sampling of migrants, whether it operates through selected
ethnic identities (Understanding Society) or selected countries of birth (TeO),
renders this enterprise more difficult, not only because it skews the sample,
but because it frames the reasoning. It precludes the quantification of gender
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relations for minority and migrant population as distinguished from (assumed)
gender cultures. In so doing, there is a risk of reproducing sampling and survey
design on the models of e.g. statistics of deviance, that is, with an essentialising
and monitoring implicit, an emanation and a form of biopolitics in Foucauldian
parlance (Foucault, 1961, 1994). The association between migrant populations
and distant gender cultures is made particularly explicit in the TeO questionnaire
by the pointed questions forced marriages and kin marriages. Gender relations in
the context of migration and population diversity are thus framed as the product
of cultural difference, of the ’Otherness’ of these groups, rather than as something
that is negotiated and reconstructed also on the paths of migration, from country
of origin to country of destination. With these questions, surveys invite the
framing of gender relations in minority group as something imported through
migration, rather than something built with and through immigration regimes
and gender relations in the destination country. The second reading engages the
responsibility and the gender culture of the host society, whereas, in contrast, the
first does not (Delphy, 2006).
2.3 Understanding the window for survey-based research
on gender and migration
2.3.1 Gender mainstreaming and survey inertia
Nevertheless, the surveys did make some space for questions directly relat-
ing to gender relations, even if the space they carved appears at time prone to
essentialist interpretations. Why do these ways of quantifying gender relations
appear when they do in surveys data concerned with population diversity and
migration, and why these questions and not others. One answer, which applies
mostly to the British case, is survey inertia: the BHPS, of which Understanding
Society is the extension (see chapter 1), had included regular modules on the
division of household labour. This was no doubt linked to the fact Jonathan Ger-
shuny, specialist of time-use research, was the Director of the Institute for Social
and Economic Research at the University of Essex, and the Principal Investigator
of the BHPS from 1993 to 2006. Subsequently, and to avoid losing longitudinal
continuity, the UKLHS maintained (some, not all) of these questions. Another
answer is gender mainstreaming: throughout the late 20th century and in the
early 2000s, the topic of gender equality and women’s studies become largely
accepted and institutionalised. Pushed by the EU as well as other international
institutions (notably the UN), gender mainstreaming refers to the widespread
official recognition that gender equality is a priority goal to be advanced on (al-
most) all social and political front, and that this requires better data and improved
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understanding of gender inequalities.
In the context of TeO and Understanding Society, gender mainstreaming
works through two main and interconnected medium: the interest in and request
for cross-national comparative research and, crucially, through the EU. Notably,
the European Generations and Gender surveys,9 and before that the Fertility and
Family survey in the 1990s were already asking questions on household labour
division.10 This also ought to be put in context with the fact that the surveys are
hosted by institutions (the INED and ISER) which have otherwise developed
research on gender, or on issues very closely related to gender (e.g. time-use).
The INED even had an explicit institutionalised focus on gender since the late
1990s. The arrival of François Héran as the new director of the INED in 1999
created a window of opportunity. François Héran had co-led the survey Forma-
tion des couples (Couple formation) (INED, 1983-1984) with Michel Bozon. Very
supportive of sociological perspectives on demographic processes, he actively
encouraged the creation of the research cluster ’Gender, demography and Society’
co-founded by Michel Bozon and Thérèse Locoh, a feminist demographer who
wrote extensively on gender in development programs.
The importance and dynamism of this research cluster at the INED is par-
ticularly noteworthy in light of the fact that France was behind on the ’gender
mainstreaming’ movement, especially compared to Northern European countries.
This applied to demography and statistics but also to international develop-
ment (Labourie-Racapé et al., 2004). Questions of gender were thus often given
little more than polite attention and symbolic means. The combination of a sur-
vey team that includes members directly involved in gender research (several
members of TeO are also part of the ’Gender, Demography and Society’ clus-
ter, now ’Gender and sexuality’), with the international incitement to include
’mainstreamed’ questions on gender relations, facilitated their introduction in
the TeO questionnaire. In the case of Understanding society, the same process of
gender mainstreaming justified that those questions be retained from the BHPS
questionnaire. This process is summarized by one of the French interviewees:
There are generalist surveys which have been taking gender into account, and so
these questions in particular have been integrated into TeO. Hence the example of
the distribution of [domestic] tasks for instance, that is linked to questions that were
taken from the Gender and Generation Survey. And then, for TeO, there are also the
three survey leads, and [one of them] really carried the theme of gender, and was
really militant on the integration of questions of gender in the survey. So I think it is
a conjuncture of, yes, because [gender] is a little bit unavoidable now, surveys take
9The Generations and Gender program is a series of Panel surveys which started in 2000 under
the umbrella of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Since 2009, it is
maintained and developed through a cooperation of national institutes of statistics across Europe.
10Fertility and Family Survey (FFS) questionnaire, 1992, p. 29.
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into question gender aspects and then. . . and then also, someone carried that inside
the survey team.
(TeO – interviewee 511 – INED researcher, and TeO analyst).
It is not just any aspect of gender that thus gets into survey data on migration:
it is those that have become mainstream. The questions on household labour fit
the bill, because they have been around for a long time, they are ’descriptive’ or
’factual’ which statisticians tend to prefer, and they are now common currency in
European statistics. With the EU pushing for member states to collect more data
on gender for cross-national comparison purposes, integrating these variables is
a good way to tick that box - especially since it stirs no feathers.
On the whole there appear to have been very little disagreement within both
survey team either on the legitimacy of gender as a topic, or on the scope that
should be given to gender-related questions in the survey questionnaire. In fact,
most survey designers, British and French alike, describe it as a non-issue: firstly,
they consider that gender is de facto a possible angle of analysis, by virtue of
the ’sex’ category that allows for sex-separated tables and comparison – a classic
demographic simplification of what constitute gender analysis, not to speak of
feminist quantitative research (Locoh et al., 2003). Besides, survey designers
point out, there are variables which can be read as speaking to gender, even if
they are not explicitly about gender. This is the case of variables on housework
distribution and time-use.
• [M. L] Is gender or gender research something that’s present in the survey
design?
• I guess it wasn’t, much less so explicitly. And it’s interesting to raise this
cause. . . [. . . ] because [some of the survey designers] work on. . . time-use,
and you can’t work on time-use without thinking about gender I think. . . .
So, in the sense that there was that perspective, that was going back to the
BHPS, that kind of an interest, even if this isn’t a time-use survey at all. But it
wasn’t discussed, as if we would all discuss as to what made this distinctive,
gender was never highlighted as the thing that made it distinctive. What was
highlighted there was the ability to look at research questions, some of which
you could think about as being gendered.
(Interviewee #112 – UKLHS survey designer, ethnicity strand)
There was no occasion to fight, I mean, there were very few reactions against [the
thematic of gender]
(Interviewee #713 - TeO survey designer)
11Interview conducted in September 2017
12Interview conducted in January 2018. ’M.L.’ refers to the author of this thesis who is here the
interviewer
13Interview conducted in December 2017
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The fact that there are ’no occasion to fight’ about gender, however, can be
interpreted both ways: on the one hand, the topic has indeed indeed ’mainstream’
and reached the field of population diversity and quantitative migration studies:
from this perspective it has gained the legitimacy and institutionalised quality
which feminist scholars longed for (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2012; Nawyn et al., 2009).
On the other hand, the narrative of gender as uncontentious can also be read as
a post-feminist statement that the cause has been won, and deserves no more
argument - and certainly no discussion around data.
2.3.2 Data segregation
Yet as we discussed in previous sections, there are quite fundamental aspects
of gender relations in and out of migration which are not included or adequately
covered. The fact of the improved but limited co-existence of survey data on gen-
der and data on migration has to do with a broader tendency to consider and treat
these two topics as separate. This I call data segregation, echoing Nawyn (2010)
who talked about the segregation of gender research in migration studies. In its
most straightforward form, it plays out in the idea and practice that it is best to
have surveys dedicated to gender issues on the one hand, and surveys dedicated
to migration and population diversity on the other hand. The idea is not new
but still stands that research on gender, although it has gained recognition and
legitimacy, has also been cordoned off in ’dedicated gender spaces’ such as gen-
der institutes, gender studies departments and gender/feminist research clusters
(Nawyn, 2010; Pedraza, 1991; Stacey & Thorne, 1985). In the context of survey
design, this segregation often operates on a technical rather than theoretical level:
largely through the mobilisation of notions of acceptability (whether participants
- or indeed, interviewers and partner institutions - will agree to the question),
reliability (whether respondents will understand the question and answer it in a
consistent way), and arbitration (whether it is justified to dedicate questionnaire
space to this topic at the cost of other topics).
Acceptability is used to disqualify topics deemed ’sensitive’ and ’intimate’.
This applies in particular to questions on sexual orientation, sexuality and gen-
dered forms of violence (Intimate Partner Violence (IPV), sexual violence, etc...).
The fear that respondents will refuse to answer such questions or, worse, that
respondents would be triggered and alienated by these questions - especially
when it comes to violence - is not a small matter. Concern for attrition and low
response rates, as well as notions of respect and consideration towards survey
participants underpin the ’sensitivity’ argument. The label ’sensitive information’
however, can also be understood as reflecting the sensibilities and values of the
survey designers and of the social milieu they come from. Their viewpoint and
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expectations may thus be projected onto the respondents and the data, sometimes
without much empirical basis (Riley & Brunson, 2018). For instance, there had
long been resistances to introducing questions on sexual orientation with the
UKLHS team being divided on this. Eventually, these questions were field-tested
and turned out to be widely accepted by respondents. 14
Such testing was not implemented for TeO, however, and no questions on
sexual orientation (or sexuality) made their way into the French survey, a decision
which was criticized within the INED.15 The notion of ’privacy’ (intimité), tightly
linked to that of sensitivity in the context of gender, is a slippery concept: since
gender relations are largely reproduced and enacted in ’intimate’ spheres (e.g.
within the home) and interactions (e.g. sexuality), it can potentially disqualify
many key gender themes as ’intrusive’. ’The personal is political’ may still need
to be asserted on this front. Institution’s statistical cultures and even national
statistical traditions also have a role in this. The cooperation with the INSEE
imposes a more rigid framework on the French survey, reflective of a statistical
and political tradition less interested in - and less accepting of - the recording of
subjective measures such as ’identities’ and ’ideologies’ - even the INSEE’s work-
ers unions was opposed to ’subjective’ questions. The ’hostilities of the INSEE’,
as one TeO interviewee put it, plays against the inclusion of other questions on
gender in TeO.
The thing that was perhaps the most. . . that most limited questions on gender, in
part, but as for other topics, was that the INSEE is not really, generally does not like
subjective questions, that is, questions on opinions or attitudes. And it so happens
that gender questions are, well, they don’t have to be all like that, but it’s true that,
well – ok, for example, the division of task, that’s descriptive, so there. . . but yeah,
there are other questions that have to do with roles and representations. . . All these
questions on the representations of gender roles, we didn’t ask them because, when
you get to the bottom of it, the INSEE did not really like questions on representations.
(Interviewee #616 – TeO survey designer).
Reliability applies to questions which are expected to not be answered prop-
erly by respondents, because they refer to matters that are fuzzy and not yet
clearly defined in the general consciousness. This typically applies to gendered
14’There was a long discussion about sexual identity and. . . it wasn’t included initially in the study.
But then, I can’t remember when we started asking it but we tested asking people for their sexual identity,
whether they were heterosexual or gay, lesbian, whatever and it went ok! And we did it in the self-completion
questionnaire, so. . . if people didn’t want to answer, they could just say “oh I don’t want to answer this” and
that’s that. And it, it wasn’t the interviewer asking them the question so it was more private. (Interviewee
#2 - Understanding Society survey lead)’
15The lack of questions on sexual orientation and sexuality in TeO was a point of internal criticism
at the INED, mostly emanating from the ’Gender and Sexuality’ cluster which had developed and
already used such questions in its own surveys and research.
16Interview conducted in November 2017
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violence (Jaspard & the Enveff survey team, 2001), but also to gender discrimi-
nation, experiences of which are more internalised, not necessarily labelled as
discrimination by respondents, and are therefore under-identified and under-
reported (Lesné, 2015)).
This finally brings the question of relevance and arbitration. With only limited
questionnaire length, survey designers must make choices. The question then
is often not whether gender is relevant, but whether it is more important than
other aspects of migration or diversity which survey designers and/or survey
ordainers are interested in. Since, on top of this, the quantification of gender rela-
tions may not always be straightforward, and therefore extra questionnaire time
may have to be dedicated to introducing non-intuitive concepts and questions,
survey designers can easily consider that it is too big an investment and sacrifice.
Questions on ethnicity and/or immigration are already a hot potato for survey
designers, who know how political such classifications can become (i.e. the
previous debates around the ethnic question and later on the mixed option in the
British census, and the demographers’ controversy in France). The consultation
process carried out by the TeO ethnicity strand team can also be understood as an
extensive and successful effort to preempt such critique and politicisation. The
French survey team was not sparred this politicisation: the national controversy
on ethnic statistics focalises attention and energy. It is perhaps no wonder then
that survey designers would be reluctant to include more potentially ’sensitive’
questions and, either way, gender is not perceived to be the biggest problem they
have to deal with.
This segregation of gender is in fact not only a question of data design,
but also a feature of the academic field of migration studies more broadly: As
Hondagneu-Sotelo observed ’[...] there is a continued and near total deafness
[towards gender] from scholars working on other core areas of immigration
studies, on segmented assimilation, immigrant religion, transnationalism and
citizenship.’ (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2012, p. 185). Neither the interviewees nor
ultimately the survey data could in good faith be described as gender-deaf. Yet it
is true that through reasoning and mechanisms of survey construction otherwise
justified, gender is constructed as a relevant but largely peripheral topic; a topic
that, in the end, ends up easily squeezed out when the time come for survey
designers to make the ’tough choices’ that decide the final questionnaire. This
peripheral position of gender in the quantification of migration is also apparent
in data usage. Even those few variables on the gender division of household
labour that were included in TeO and Understanding Society were, in the end,
little used by researchers and analysts interested in migration and minorities,
and not at all in this respect by the survey designers themselves (Kan and Laurie
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(2016) is an exception). This lack of success, noted by the French survey designers,
can then end up further justifying the enfranchisement of gender in migration
survey data.
Chapter conclusion
The previous chapter had already dampened the notion of a incommensu-
rate breach between French and British statistical approaches to migrants and
migration. There are no doubt differences in how the two surveys accommodate
gender and migration. But most of those differences are attributable to the differ-
ent survey formats (individual vs. household, targeted with reference group vs.
general with oversampling) rather than to their national anchoring.
The first section of this chapter discussed critically the perimeter and cen-
trality of gender in TeO and Understanding Society. It showed how these surveys
make a gender analysis of migration possible, at least in certain (but key) re-
spects. The second section extended this question, asking whether the surveys
can accommodate intersectional analyses of migration. The answer is yes and
no: the surveys make it possible to address a certain degree of inter-categorical
and intra-categorical complexity. But the window they offer for intersectional
analysis is constrained by the sample, the format of questions on discrimination
and harassment, and the lack of information on race or ethnicity in the French
survey. The final section investigated the political and institutional conditions
of emergence of this window of opportunity. It showed the uncomfortable po-
sition granted to gender in survey design on migration. While the relevance
of gender is not contested, its incorporation is peripheral rather than deeply
involved and transformative of the way migration itself is quantified. Changes
that are transformative require militant demographers in position of decision
and, ideally, power (e.g. François Héran17) as well as favourable political context
and statistical landscapes. These changes face resistance in the field of statistics,
and especially from public statistics, whose statistical ethos (e.g. objectivity) and
conservatism often seem to jar with the very basics of feminist methods and fram-
ing. On the broader political stage, the quantification of migration is tied into
classifications of national ’others’ (be they defined in ethnic or migratory terms)
(see previous chapter), topics and terrains of intense polemics. This contributes to
a ghettoisation of gender (Stacey & Thorne, 1985) and intersectionality (G. Lewis,
2013) in quantitative data and design which, however, the two surveys under
study here managed to (partially) avoid.
17Although François Héran would most likely argue he was not militant but simultaneously
’neutral and engagé’(Héran, 2017)
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As surveyed in the literature review, the quantitative connections made
between migrants’ couples and gender relations have been meager. Gender
differences have mostly been addressed with regards to partner recruitment
and specifically endogamous and transnational arrangements. With regards
to intermarriage, gender asymmetries have been noted, and mainly explained
through reference to gender-racialised affinities and patriarchal control, especially
within certain migrant and ethnic groups, which limits the ’partnering out’ of
women more so than men. I argue that a further - and key - element that frames
both mixedness and gender relations in couples is the migration experience itself.
Building on life-course perspectives, the growing scholarship on family-related
migration, has shown that the way and the timing in the life-cycle at which
individuals both migrate and form relationships has social consequences, also
for women’s empowerment. In the context of international migration, these
are mostly documented with respect to women’s labour market participation
(Cerrutti & Massey, 2001; González-Ferrer, 2006, 2011). But they should not be
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considered to be solely relevant to endogamous migrant families: couples formed
by primary migrants and majority natives (i.e. native born to native parents) also
reflect gendered trajectories of migration and gendered modes of international
partner recruitment.
This matters because there is evidence that the circumstances of migration,
in terms of social and legal framework, as well as in the timing in the life-cycle
can orient and impact family formation, participation in the labour market and
ultimately couple dynamics and gender relations in the household. Indeed, in-
equalities, and perhaps especially gender inequalities, are better understood as
series of contingencies, as dynamic processes that unravel and interlock (Aisen-
brey & Fasang, 2017). People ’grow into their gender’ as they undergo various
’engendering experiences’, of which finding a partner, getting married and having
children are well-documented examples.1 Migration can then also be thought of
as both a gendered and ’engendering’ moment and process, where gender roles
and power relations can be renegotiated and redistributed but often further po-
larised between men and women. Trajectories of family formation and migration
both reflect and reshape gender differences and gender relations (Hondagneu-
Sotelo, 1992; Pedraza, 1991). Gendered paths of couple and migration are then
also paths of gender: they concern and construct migrant men and masculinities,
as they do migrant women and femininities (see chapter 2). These paths and how
they connect to migrants’ partner choice, constitute the focus of this chapter. The
connection between these gendered paths of union-migration and the gender
division of labour in couples will be the topic of the next chapters.
This part of the thesis is structured into two chapters: they both follow the
same structure and develop the same methods. The first, chapter 3, does so with
the French data; the second, chapter 4, mirrors chapter 3 but based on the British
data. I spend more time in chapter 3 explaining the construction of the variables
and the methods used. In chapter 4, I go quicker over the methods, and go into
details only when the data differs from the French data. The limitations of the
methods and approach developed in this part are presented at the end of chapter
4. (The same structure apply to chapter 5 and 6.)
These chapters are organised as follow: they first present a descriptive
account of the distribution (notably in terms of geographic origins, religion,
education) of migrants into different couple types, differentiating between those
formed with other primary migrants, with native-born direct descendants of
migrants (the ’second generation’), and with natives with native parents (labelled
1This point has of course been most famously formulated by De Beauvoir’s ’On ne naît pas
femme, on le devient.’ (1949, p. 285), which has different translations, one of which is ’One is not
born but rather becomes woman’ (Mann & Ferrari, 2017).
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majority natives). I also investigate whether the different couple types also
connect to different calendars of migration and couple formation. The bulk of the
chapters are then dedicated to identifying the differences in the migration-union
sequences associated with migrant women and migrant men, and with each
couple type.
3.0.1 Migrant’s partner selection in France: focus on intermarriage
In the French context, the joint quantitative analysis of couple formation and
migration has been developed almost exclusively in the vein of intermarriage
scholarship (Collet & Santelli, 2012, 2013; Munoz-Perez & Tribalat, 1984; Tribalat,
2009). Rates of intermarriage, especially with the native majority population, are,
as elsewhere, mostly taken as indicators of integration (or lack thereof) (Gordon,
1964; Waters & Gerstein Pineau, 2016), and used to benchmark different migrant
groups (Safi, 2008; Tribalat, 2009), but migrant-native unions have also been
also analysed as a terrain (not just a proof) of integration, intercultural conjugal
exchanges and adaptation (Collet, 2015), and as medium of ’extreme assimilation’,
for higher-class, skilled migrant women especially (S. Scott, 2006). Empirical
research on migrant-native unions in France has shown that migrants in these
relationships are often amongst the most qualified and best integrated migrants
(M’sili & Neyrand, 1998; Munoz-Perez & Tribalat, 1984; Tribalat, 1996). This
is nuanced however by the studies that noted that the degree of integration of
minority partners in mixed couples is dependent on a variety of factors, and that
a high degree of cultural integration can coexist with low economic participation
and performance (Song, 2009) - and vice-versa.
Additionally, in France, as in most European countries, there is little quanti-
tative work that addresses the connection between migration, family formation
(the choice of partner, timing of couple formation and fertility), and changes in
women’s labour performance, let alone in the gender division of labour. The
process of couple formation and its interlocking with migration, is less on the
radar of French empirical research, when compared with the endogamous or
exogamous outcome of partner selection (although there are some important ex-
ceptions, such as Collet and Santelli (2012, 2013) and Hamel, Lhommeau, Pailhé,
and Santelli (2015), Hamel, Pailhé, Santelli, and Lhommeau (2013)). This has not
prevented superficial assumptions which have long assigned migrant women to
a generic category of ’family migration’, pejoratively associated with passivity,
domesticity, and chain migration. Although there is no denial that women are
a majority among family migrants overall, gender asymmetries vary with the
specific category of family migrant: among those who obtained residency rights
(titre de séjour) though family reunification, 71% were women. But among those
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who were granted a partner visa as ’partner of a French national’ (conjoint de
Français), there was almost exact parity between men and women (51% women,
49% men, see Algava and Bèque (2008, p. 3)). At any rate, these legal admission
categories only very roughly capture union-migration trajectories. A potentially
important distinction is missed, for instance, between family-forming migrations
and migrations of reunification. In the case of reunification, the couple was
formed before the migration of either partner, and both were involved in the
design of the couple’s migratory projects. In the case of family-forming migration,
one partner (generally the woman) is ’imported’ by the other, and it is in the
context of this migration that the couple itself is formed. While both fit into the
generic categories of family migrant, ’tied migrants’, and other ’trailing spouses’,
they do not reflect the same mode of recruitment nor the same couple dynamics.
For reunified couples, the migration of both partner was often a joint couple
project, of which even the ’trailing’ or ’reunified’ spouse could have been an
integral part and an active agent. In contrast, ’imported’ migrants2 are in a much
more asymmetrical and unfavourable position towards their sponsor partner.
González-Ferrer (2011) found migrant women in this category to be associated
with the lowest chances of employment. We know - although arguably in terms
too rough - that migrant women and migrant men do not follow the same mi-
gration paths. But we also know that the effect of union-migration trajectories
do not impact migrant women and migrant men in the same way. These union-
migration trajectories, and how they are split between migrant women and men,
and between couple types, are the focus of this chapter and the next.
I consider the couples formed by migrant women and migrant men, and
split them into three groups: (1) migrant couples, (2) couples formed of a primary
migrant and a native with migrant parent, and (3) couples formed between a
primary migrant and a majority native (i.e. a native with two native parents).
The literature on intermarriage has amply demonstrated that rates of mixing vary
by gender and by migrant group. I will show that the mixing of migrants with
majority natives also reflects different trajectories of union and migration, and
that the trajectories that lead to mixing are gendered.
3.0.2 Women’s and men’s migration to France: elements of a gendered
history and reality
The migration of women to France have never been only driven or explained
by the legal pathway of family reunification which, for that matter, long predates
the period since the 1970s that saw it turn into the main legal entry route into
France (Morokvasic, 2010a). Although the literature and the political narratives
2In González-Ferrer (2006, 2011)’s terminology
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on (im)migration long overlooked or dismissed women’s migration, migrant
women were never by any stretch a negligible proportion of France’s immigrant
population (Héran, 2017; Noiriel, 1988). In fact, migrant women have overall
dominated migratory flows to France since the mid-1970s (M. A. Green, Evans,
& Subramanian, 2017), something observed in a variety of Western countries
and described as the ’feminization’ of (im)migration (Beauchemin, Borrel, Rég-
nard, & Santelli, 2015). The ratio of migrant women to migrant men fluctuated
throughout the 20th and 21st century, largely reflecting the economic situation
in France and, connectedly, the relative tightening or loosening of immigration
regulations and criteria. Much like in many other Western countries, periods
of economic growth and relative prosperity in Western countries are associated
with increased demand for (cheap) labour-power (Castles & Kosack, 1973), some-
thing empirically noted by sociologists and demographers (Héran (2018). These
periods have been historically associated with a greater proportion of men’s
immigration (Beauchemin, Borrel, Régnard, & Santelli, 2015). In contrast, in
periods of economic crisis or stagnation, economic immigration is reduced and
other forms of migration, especially family migration, become more prevalent.
Migrants already there, unsure of whether they may be able to come back if they
leave, may decide to settle more permanently than they had originally planned.
Indeed, prior to 1974, migrant workers moved much more fluidly between
France and the country they had initially come from. But with the 1974 closure
of borders to labour migration came the ’end of the norias’, a term employed
by Gérard Noiriel (1988) to describe the back-and-forths and alternations of
short stays in France and in the countries of origin. The obstacles created by
greater immigration restrictions to these transnational practices forced migrants
to choose. Those who decided to stay may therefore have been or become more
open to bringing in relatives to join them. As other channels of migration became
less available, migration flows then become dominated by family migration -
mainly family reunification and partner migration (i.e. visas for partners of
French citizens) - which were themselves dominated by migrant women.
Official statistics provide reliable information on the composition of ordinary
migration flows to France, that is migrants who enters through the established set
of legal pathways.3 The numbers for 2010 published by the French Ministère de
l’Intérieur reported 65 000 student visas (migrants studying in France for at least
a year), 50,000 partner visas (’à titre de Conjoint de Français’: when migrants are
sponsored by their partner, who is a French national), 33,000 family reunification
3François Héran distinguishes ordinary migrations from extra-ordinary migrations, which refer to
migration movements sparked by wars and conflicts, as well as to undocumented and unreported
migrations)
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migrants (when migrants are sponsored by a relative, typically a spouse or
parent, who is not a French national but has the right to live in France), 18,000
migrants who were granted refugee status that year (or the right to stay for long
medical treatment in France), 17,000 who entered for non-seasonal work, and an
additional 12,000 who fell into the ’others’ category.4 Because EU citizens have
been mostly exempted from visas requirements, these numbers do not account
for their migration to France 5. Overall, the numbers of entries from outside the
EU have remained very stable since the end of the 1990s - strikingly so when
considering how central immigration control was in political debates and in the
agenda of Nicolas Sarkozy, who was home secretary (Ministre de l’Interieur) and
then president for most of the period (Héran, 2017; Raissiguier, 2007).
3.0.3 Legal pathways and gendered trajectories
The differences between both the motives and modes of migration of migrant
men and migrant women were, historically, unaddressed and then subsequently
overstated. This is true in France as elsewhere (N. L. Green, 1998; Morokvasic,
2010a; Nawyn, 2010). Researchers also noted a gender convergence following
the clamping down on labour migration in the mid-1970s, mostly due to rising
proportions of migrant men entering as family migrants. Nevertheless, there
remain clear gender differences in the migratory paths walked by migrant women
and migrant men residing in France. The legal admission category provides
important information about how men and women first entered France, although
as noted by González-Ferrer (2011), it tells only a partial and somewhat skewed
story. People use the immigration channels that are available to them: some may
formally arrive under a ’family visa’ and yet not migrate primarily for family
reasons but in search of work or change. Conversely, many of those who legally
enter the country as economic migrants or as students may be encouraged or
driven to migration by a partner or family left behind, who hope to join later or
be rejoined. Individual ’pioneer’ migrants can come to France on a non-family
related visa but later use family-related immigration channels to bring their
families to them. Finally, immigration status changes over time, when migrants
obtain different residency rights, or when their initial visa runs out, leaving them
undocumented.
Nevertheless, the legal admission category is an important factor of differ-
entiation between migrant men and women, and it is a key aspect of the question
at hand since it conditions situations of legal dependency, when the settled or
4The ’other’ category includes isolated minors and ’visitors’. Numbers published on the website
of the Ministère de l’Intérieur (www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr, tab ’Statistiques’). Quoted by
Héran (2017, p. 8).
5Or for Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, who also benefits from visa exemptions
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native partner act as visa sponsor for the other migrant partner. In these pages, I
identify legally dependent partners as ’tied migrants’, because their migration
and residency rights were (at least at first) legally tied to their sponsor partner.
The sponsor partners can be natives or settled migrants. I will sometimes refer
to migrant sponsors as ’anchor migrants’. These categories are useful because
they connect to concepts and realities of legal (and hence also often economic
and material) dependency (Eggebø, 2010). While legal dependency on or over
a partner is not intended to last indefinitely, it can set an initial power balance
and tone in couples (Riaño, 2011; Suksomboon, 2011). As discussed more at
length in the literature review, it also means greater vulnerability for dependent
migrants towards their partner for as long as have not secured independent
rights to remain.
3.0.4 Gender, life course perspectives on migration and couple forma-
tion
As Hamel et al. (2015) argued, combining insights from the sociology of
family and couples, and from the sociology of migration is key here. The relative
timing of events also determines much of the opportunity for mixing: people
who migrated to France as children are more likely to have met their partner
in France and therefore also more likely to have formed mixed unions. On the
other end of the spectrum, migrants who were already in a stable relationship
when they migrated are ’off the matrimonial market’ and thus less likely to form
relationships with natives. This is likely to apply especially to women, and can
be articulated with the gender differences in the propensity to form exogamous
unions, which are well documented (Wang, 2012) though more rarely a point of
focus (Safi, 2008). There are also variations associated with the geographic area
or origin, e.g. migrants from Turkey, who appear overall more endogamous and
more likely to have formed relationships early on, prior to migration. This is
especially true for Turkish migrant women (Safi, 2010). Educational attainment
is also involved in patterns of family formation, both in terms of timing and
recruitment (Blossfeld & Timm, 2003). In a migration context, this is reflected
in mixed migrant-native unions being more likely to involve a higher degree of
qualification, and for the women to be more highly qualified than the men.
In the past, life course perspectives that emphasize the superiority of tra-
jectories over profiles have only seldom been applied to migrant populations
and lives, although this is changing rapidly. An important element has been the
growing attention to age at migration (Adserà, Ferrer, Sigle-Rushton, & Wilson,
2012; Choi & Tienda, 2018). In short, and to simplify, the younger the migrants are
when they arrive then the easier their socio-economic integration. This is mainly
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explained as the result of early socialization in the country, especially through
schooling. Using MGIS data, Tribalat (Tribalat, 1996) highlighted significant inte-
gration differences between migrants who arrived as adults, and those who were
still children at the time of their arrival. Recent research has also shown that child
migrants consequently present different fertility patterns compared to those who
were already adults at the time of their migration (Wilson, 2019), and posits child
migrants closer to the native-born population than to the rest of the foreign-born
population. Adserà et al. (2012), who look at France, the UK and Canada, make
the point that the importance of the age at migration is also connected to the fact
that in the case of migrant children, the migration experience does not directly
interfere with family formation: there is therefore no disruption occasioned by
migration in both the chances and timing of partner recruitment and fertility.
Their results also reveal variations between different migrant groups, as well
as across gender, suggesting that an early age at migration is a more important
feature for migrant men’s assimilation and intermarriage rates than for migrant
women’s (Castro Torres, 2020; Choi & Tienda, 2018).
3.1 Research questions
This chapter is driven by three main research questions:
1. Do migrants who form couples with a majority native French partner differ
in origins, family patterns and calendar, from migrants in other types
of partnerships (i.e. with other migrants or with direct descendants of
migrants)? Does this change with the gender of the migrant?
2. Do migrants who mix with the majority native French group follow differ-
ent trajectories of family formation and migration?
3. Are these trajectories gendered?
To expand briefly:
(H1) In line with assimilation theory, the possibility of mixing with the
majority native group as a first-generation migration implies very fast assimi-
lation, which presupposes a degree of selection among groups towards whom
the majority group is least prejudiced (Gordon, 1964; Kulu, 2019). Considering
(soft) segmented assimilation in France we should observe differences between
migrant groups, who are associated with uneven pace of assimilation (Safi, 2008).
Certain group borders are known to be harder to cross for out-partnering; I expect
Turkish and to a lesser extent North Africans migrants are scarcely represented
among migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples, while European and atheist/agnostic
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migrants may be over-represented. The scale of the differences is expected to be
gendered, with migrant women from these groups being even less represented
in mixed unions than migrant men. This point is well-documented already in the
literature, but it is necessary for the reasoning.
(H2) The hypothesis of fast marital assimilation is more plausible if migrants
arrived at a younger age in the UK, were thus socialised earlier and longer in
France by the time they met their native majority partner, and also had more
opportunities for contact and higher chances of meeting them prior to, or during
partner recruitment and family formation. Therefore one would expect that a
greater proportion of migrants with a native majority partner migrated earlier
in the life-course compared to migrants in relationships with other migrants. In
contrast, and building here on the qualitative literature, one would expect that
migrants in migrant couples are more likely to have migrated much later in the
life-course, past the stage of family formation (and bringing their partner with
them); while the emphasis on transnational couples would suggest that in the
case of MIG-2G couples, a large proportion of migrants would have migrated to
the UK at the same time as they were starting their marital life. However...
(H3) ... these also are expected to be gendered. Both gender relations in the
sending areas and immigration regimes in France may make it more difficult
for women to migrate 1) independently, and especially if 2) single (Kofman,
Phizacklea, Raghuram, & Sales, 2005; Toma & Vause, 2014). One can therefore
expect that it is a smaller proportion of adult migrant women who arrive in
France prior to family formation and are then in a position to form a relationship
with a majority native there. Migrant women may be more likely to come as
marriage migrants, and marriage migration may not be limited to unions with
other migrants or with descendants of migrants.
Thus couples that appear similar in composition (e.g. migrant-native couples
involving the same migrant groups) may, at any point in time, be the result of
quite dissimilar, deeply gendered processes of marriage and household formation.
Mixedness would therefore potentially carry quite different meanings for both
native and migrant partners.
3.1.1 Specific contribution
While mostly descriptive, this chapter makes several contributions to the
literature. With respect to the life-course literature on migration, it offers a
data-driven, complex typology which takes advantage of sequence analysis to
efficiently capture the different key ways in which migration is nested in the
life-course. These union-migration trajectories, thus identified, help make sense
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of how migrants’ choice of partner is also associated with different migration
pathways and family trajectories. Crucially, the reasoning is informed by legal
trajectories, but it is not restricted to migrants who fall under the immigration
regime. By using sequences of union-migration and not only categories of ’re-
unified’ or ’imported’ partners who are legally tied to their legal sponsor, I can
include EU migrants, who have been largely left out of the literature on family
migration and the life-course.
The second key contribution goes to the literature on mixedness. Taking
advantage of the union-migration sequences, I show how they strongly differ-
entiate couple types and especially single out the trajectories of migrants who
mix with the majority native partners. Crucially, I show that the union-migration
sequences followed by migrants in mixed couples are not only different from
those of other migrants, but they are gendered. The literature already established
gender variations in intermarriage rates, and has mostly attributed it to different
affinities or degree of patriarchy within migrant communities (Safi, 2008; Wang,
2012), and different opportunity structures for men and women (Kalmijn, 1998),
I show that intermarriage is also gendered in the sense that the paths that lead
to it are not the same for migrant men and migrant women. These paths, in
turn, matter because they come with uneven degrees of dependency, devaluation
or loss of resources and qualification, and chances of employment, which have
consequences for the power dynamics with the native partner.
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3.2 Data and methods
3.2.1 Data and sample
As detailed in the first chapter of this thesis, the sample of the French
survey Trajectory and Origins (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009) was built so as to be
representative of all people born between 1948 and 1990 (except for the sample
of descendants of migrants who is only representative of those born between
1958 and 1990), residing in mainland France in an ordinary household in 2007
(Algava & Lhommeau, 2013, p. 34). The survey over-represents individuals born
in French overseas departments or born to parents who were themselves born
in overseas department. These populations, however, are not included in the
working sample and the analyses presented in this chapter; a research choice
driven by the theoretical focus on international migration - i.e. across rather than
within national borders. The analyses are systematically survey-weighted so as
to account for the sampling design and for non-random unit non-response.
The research draws on life-course approaches, but it is also limited by
the existing data. I resort to using retrospective information to reconstruct life
sequences. The TeO team dedicated a remarkable amount of questionnaire
space to questions on couple formation: far from being limited to partner’s
demographic characteristics, the survey also includes some information on the
partner’s own migration trajectories and background and on the timing of partner
recruitment.
TABLE 3.1: Sample breakdown
Sub-samples (cumulative criteria) N
TeO survey respondents 21,761
- in cohabiting relationships 13,242
- man-woman relationships 13,155
- both partners of working age 12,612
- migrant respondents only 6,266
- excl. overseas departments natives 5,871
- excl. obs. with key missing values 5,828
Source: TeO1 (INED-INSEE)
The timing of migration (year
and age) is not a constant across mi-
grant groups and migration waves.
For the more recent migratory waves
(e.g. from other EU countries and Sub-
Saharan Africa), people were already
adults at the time of migration in the
vast majority of cases. By contrast, the
proportion of child migrants is consid-
erably higher for migrants from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Portugal, Spain and
Italy, which is also because these are older migration waves. The TeO survey is
cross-sectional and limited itself to the population that was of working age (18-60,
or 18-50 for descendants of migrants) in 2007. Demographic mechanics have
implications for the sample of migrants: those from older waves of immigration
(Italian, Spanish, Portuguese) who first came to France as adults may not be
included in the sample because they would have been older than 60 in 2007.
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In parallel, child migrants from recent immigration waves (from sub-Saharan
countries, for instance) who were not yet 18 in 2007 would not have been se-
lected either. Mechanically then, the sample under-represents early arrivals for
recent immigration waves and over-represents them for older waves (Algava,
Lhommeau, & Beauchemin, 2018; Beauchemin, Algava, & Lhommeau, 2015).
The initial TeO sample of primary migrants in cohabiting man-woman
relationships is constituted of 3266 women and 3018 men (respectively 52% and
48% of the sample). After excluding respondents with key missing values (e.g.
for country of birth, timing of migration and family formation, and partner’s
migratory background), this comes down to 2867 migrant women, and 2961
migrant men.
3.2.2 Variables and model specification
Operationalisation of partner selection
Migrants
According to the French official statistical classification, an (im)migrant is a person
“born abroad and born foreign” - one of the originality of French nomenclatures
discussed in the first chapter, since it adds a legal dimension to the usual criteria
of country of birth. I recoded the ’migrant’ category so as to exclude natives
from French overseas department. Note that the sample in this paper includes
only partnered migrants, that is, respondents who fit into the French ’migrant’
definition and were in a cohabiting man-woman relationship at the time of the
survey interview in 2008-2009. In addition, the working sample was restrained
to couples constituted of two partners of working age (18-60) (see table 3.1).
Couples
Couples were defined in a shamefully heteronormative way as man-woman
couples, that is, when respondents indicated that they had a partner of the other
gender (since TeO only offers two options) who lived with them. Same-gender
couples could not be included because of their rarity in the sample: the TeO
sample only includes 87 coresident same-gender couples.
Exogamy
MIG-NAT couples involve specifically a primary migrant and a French native
with French-born parents. In line with most of the recent French quantitative
scholarship on mixed unions, I have also used migratory background to identify
endogamy/exogamy in other couple types. If both partners were born in the
same country, or have at at least one parent born in the same country (excluding
France’s current national borders), they are considered endogamous. In cases
where individuals were born to a mixed couple - i.e. they have a UK-born parent
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and a foreign-born parent - the non-UK country prevails (minority focus). When
parents were both born abroad, but in different countries, the mother’s country
of birth takes precedence.
Migration trajectories and legal pathways
The variable on legal pathways is based on the first visa obtained in France:
contrary to Understanding Society, TeO asks respondents one question about the
legal framework around migration. Namely, it enquires about the first type of
visa (titre de séjour) which the respondents obtained in France. Those who had
French nationality from birth were not asked the question. Other respondents
can pick between refugee (or relative of a refugee), student visa, work visa,
partner visa (for partners and spouses of a French national), family reunification
claim, other visa, visa exemption (typically for EU nationals), visa application
underway. Additionally, respondents can choose ‘does not know’ or ‘does not
want to answer’. In the classification used in the thesis, these two items along with
‘application underway’ are all coded as missing values, since they provide no
indication on the type of migration, except perhaps the presumption – impossible
to test – that some of those who preferred not to answer the question on visa
were possibly undocumented or had been undocumented in the past.
I have also created a dummy variable designed to specifically identify legally
tied migrants, that is, migrants who when they first migrated to France were
legally dependent on their relationship with their partner as it provided the
ground for their visa claim and therefore also for their right to stay. These include
migrants whose first visa was a partner visa obtained as ’partner of a French
national’. It also includes migrants who came through family reunification pro-
visions when the sponsor for the family reunification was either their current
partner or - much more rarely - a former partner. A further variable identifies
migrants who were legal anchors (’reunifiers’ in González-Ferrer (2011)’s termi-
nology), and sponsored the migration of their partner (or in a few cases, of their
former partner).
Timing and ordering
In order to build the sequences of couple formation and migration, I used ret-
rospective data derived from the questions on the year of the start of current
relationship (I collapsed year of civil marriage, year of religious marriage and
year of start of cohabitation with current partner, and for each couple I retained
as starting date whichever happened first), year of the start of the first relation-
ship (following the same procedure as above), year the first relationship ended,
year of birth, and year first migrated to France. I did not separate marriage and
cohabitation in the sequence analysis. This would have multiplied the number
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of states, which is not conducive to finding sequence groupings (Studer, 2013;
Studer, Ritschard, Gabadinho, & Müller, 2011), especially in the context of small
sample sizes. Moreover, pre-marriage cohabitation is virtually non-existent in
certain migrant groups (e.g. Turks). Distinguishing periods of non-married
cohabitation meant putting more emphasis on group differences rather than on
the sequencing of migration and couple formation in the clustering. Accordingly,
introducing a separate state for ’cohabitation’ in the clustering would have led to
a separate cluster for migrants who cohabited at any stage, regardless of when
in the life-course and in relation to migration this may have been.The start of
either first union or current union is situated either at the year of marriage or the
year when cohabitation started, whichever happened first. The end of the first
union (if applicable) corresponds with the answer given by respondents to the
question ’year when your first union ended’. I also distinguish a separate state of
’childhood’, which ends at age 16. Choi and Tienda (2018) showed that there are
clear variation in rates of intermarriage between those who migrated as children
and those who migrated as adolescent and young adults, with the first presenting
much higher odds of intermarriage than the second. This served to emphasise
the importance of the timing of migration in the life-cycle to understand not only
fertility patterns but partner recruitment, which is assumed to be before the stage
of potential couple formation. The limit of 16 years old is chosen as it is assumed
to remain before the stage of couple formation.
While the survey asks about the date of the respondent’s first arrival in
France, it does not collect the date of the partner’s arrival (if applicable). As
a result, it is not possible to construct couples’ joint timing of migration with
the same complexity as e.g. González-Ferrer (2011). Specifically, it is difficult to
precisely identify and date family-stage migration.
Multiple relationship spells Multiple relationship spells/divorce may denote
less attachment to a strict interpretation of the institution of marriage (more
’modern’ views in Berthoud’s scale of traditionalism-modernism 2005), be less
invested symbolically by family and kin (hence involve less pressure), and prac-
tically happen later in life, at a point where individuals have more material
independence. All of these elements can be expected to affect the power dynamic
of the couple, and they may also make second unions more likely to be mixed
unions (Marsicano, 2012). Hamel et al. (2013) thus find that mixed couples may be
more likely to be second or third unions. The end of the first union (if applicable)
corresponds to the answer given by respondents to the question ’year when your
first union ended’. When individuals reported both distinct divorce date and
separation date, the separation date is used to mark the end of the relationship.
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Geographic sending areas
Due to the limited sample size and the great number of countries represented
in migrants’ origins, it was necessary to aggregate countries of birth into greater
areas. Such groupings are inevitably reductive and disputable, and those I de-
signed and used are the result of a juggling act between sample sizes for different
migrant groups and efforts to have some comparability with the British data
and categories. The groups are: (1) ’EU migrants’ (EU-27 countries, current bor-
ders); (2) North Africa (the Maghreb region, encompassing Morocco, Algeria and
Tunisia); (3) Africa: other (all other African countries); (4) Turkey; (5) Mainland
Southeast Asia (mainly Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand), and (6) ’Other’,
which includes all other countries and areas. The last group is large (over 500
migrants) but very heterogeneous, and no single country of birth or coherent
grouping could be singled out. As for the other groupings, the majority of the
’EU’ category is constituted of migrants from Southern EU countries, i.e. Spain,
Portugal and Italy. They are particularly represented among older migrants,
whereas more recent EU migration to France is more diverse. Over a third of the
group ’Africa: other’ is comprised of migrants from the Sahel region. There is
without a doubt significant heterogeneity within geographic groupings. Both
Southern Europe and the Sahel region were identified by Hamel et al. (2015) as
more gender-conservative compared to other parts of Europe or Sub-Saharan
Africa respectively. This is worth keeping in mind for the interpretation of the
results. For some of the descriptive analyses, I have included more detailed break-
down by sending areas in the appendix. Turkey was attributed its own category
because the sample was large enough to stand separately and it could not be
straightforwardly integrated into another grouping. It has been connected with
distinct patterns of intermarriage and family formation, also when compared to
Northern African countries (see for instance Safi (2010) and Hamel et al. (2013)).
Religion
As mentioned in the discussion in previous chapters, religious identification
is a ’sensitive’ variable under special licence. Here respondents are grouped
into 7 categories: Protestants, Catholics, Other Christian faiths, Muslim faiths,
Buddhists, Other religion (the biggest groups here are people of Jewish faith
and of Hindu faiths), and people who identify as having no religion (atheists
or agnostics). These categories are used descriptively in this chapter, but I also
use a dummy variable (religious/not religious), which simply puts atheists and
agnostics on one side, and everyone who identified a religion on the other side.
Educational level and language skills
Educational level is broken down into four categories based on the highest
educational level reached. These categories include no school qualification or
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qualification lower than the Brevet des Colleges, that is, primary education only
(1); Brevet or professional equivalent (CAP, BEP) (2); Baccalauréat (general or
professional) (3); and further education, which includes any university or further
degree (4). It is difficult to compare educational qualifications between France
and the UK, but the second category could be considered comparable to GSCEs
(although the Brevet examination is earlier), and the Baccalauréat would be
considered an equivalent for A-levels.
Finally, language skills of the country of immigration is an important pa-
rameter to help explain patterns of partner recruitment as well as economic and
social integration. In a couple living in France, it is also key in the sense that poor
mastery of the French language can feed into dependence on the more fluent
partner (or children). Naturally, French language skills often evolve over time, if
only as a function of the length of time spent in the country since migration. I
have included two dummy variables on the degree of mastery of the French lan-
guage.One identifies whether respondents stated that they had difficulties with
the French language (in speaking, listening or writing) when they first arrived in
France. The second enquires about whether they experienced any struggle with
speaking, understanding or writing French at the time of the survey interview.
Both questions were only asked of migrant respondents.
3.2.3 Methods
As discussed earlier in this chapter, there are several dimensions to union
formation, with the most discussed in relation to migration being partner selec-
tion. The chapter will start from this approach, outlining different couple types
defined through the migration ties of each partner: primary migrant (MIG), native
with migrant parents (2G), and native without migration background (NAT). The
chapter will start by mapping out differences by couple types in family patterns
and calendars of family formation, using classic demographic variables such
as rate of marriage, age at first union and age at first birth. This first step will
allow to compare migrant women’s and migrant men’s timings and modes of
transition to partnership and parenthood, depending on their partner selection.
Similarly defined couple types - e.g. migrant-native couples - differentiated only
by their gender configurations (migrant women with native men or the other
way around) may in fact be quite dissimilar as regards modes and calendars of
union formation.
This chapter has an exploratory and descriptive component, as efforts are
aimed at rendering the interlocking of union formation and migration and to ex-
amine these joint trajectories more holistically. It is this interlocking, modelled in
the shape of sequences of union-migration, which will be used in later chapters to
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predict gender arrangements of labour division in couples. This chapter therefore
registers a clear emphasis on the description and construction of these sequences
and their clustering into a coherent typology. The hope is that this typology can
serve as a tool to help understand the heterogeneity of migrants’ trajectories,
accounting simultaneously for heterogeneity in migration experiences on the one
hand and heterogeneous patterns and modes of couple formation on the other
hand.
The method chosen for the purpose is sequence analysis: there are numerous
applications in sociology since Andrew Abbott brought the technique into the
subject’s spotlight (Abbott, 1992, 2001; Abbott & Hrycak, 1990).6 Most relevant to
this research are those that analysed trajectories of family formation, fertility and
work (Aisenbrey & Fasang, 2010, 2017). Aisenbrey and Fasang (2017)’s sequence
modelling of work and family as two different but simultaneous and interlocked
trajectories and ’channels’ was particularly successful in demonstrating how
(intersectional) gender inequalities unravel and are deployed throughout the life
course and throughout series of contingencies on both work and family channels.
For this research, however, it seemed unnecessary to use multi-channel sequence
analysis, since the migration sequence is defined very summarily as before and
after first migrating to France. Castro Torres (2020)’s use of the method is a close
parallel as it concerns itself with the trajectories of international migrants. The
difference is that like Aisenbrey and Fasang, Castro Torres models work-family
trajectories (and controls for age at migration) whereas the sequences presented
in this chapter identifies union-migration trajectories, nesting migration to France
into a broader snapshot of the life-cycle. A more elaborate modelling that would
better account for the complexity of migration sequences, including transnational
practices, stays in other countries, and back-and-forth, would surely usefully
expand on this object, but it is not tackled here.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Descriptive account of migrant women and migrant men’s mi-
gration and family formation
Partnered women and men: couples, migration, legal channels
Table 3.2 provides a first breakdown of migrant women and migrant men,
and of the couples they form (MIG-NAT, MIG-2G and MIG-MIG), with the
number of observations in the survey sample and the corresponding weighted
proportions for each couple type and migratory origin. The table presents the
6For a short review of other work in sociology see Mills (2011, chapter 5).
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larger groupings but a finer breakdown is available in the appendix 1. Further on,
table 3.3 also disaggregates migrant women and migrant men based on admission
category - the first type of visa they obtained in France. The tables include the
sample size for each sub-group (n) as well as the weighted percentages (%-w) for
migrant men and migrant women separately, and together.
As regards partner’s selection, migrants’ overall propensity to form relation-
ships with either majority natives, second-generation natives or other migrants,
varies little with migrants’ gender. Around 60% of partnered migrants, be they
women or men, have another migrant as their coresident partner. 1 in 3 partnered
migrants is in a relationship with a French-born partner without direct migration
background. The remaining partnered migrants (8-10%) are cohabiting with a
second-generation migrant partner. As mentioned in chapter 1, the sampling
of second-generation natives met with a series of difficulties, and the final TeO
sample is much smaller than the sample of primary migrants or that of majority
natives. Even when weighting the proportions to correct for the difficulties faced
by the TeO team to sample natives with migrant parent(s), the proportion of
migrants who partner up with a second-generation migrant partner is small -
less than one in ten partnered migrant. Unions of this sort, which are sometimes
referred to as ’transnational unions’ , are thus overall quite rare, but migrants
are much more likely to form relationships with majority natives (MIG-NAT)
and with other migrants (MIG-MIG) anyways. This applies equally to migrant
women and migrant men. Although migrant women appear slightly more prone
than migrant men to mixing with the native majority group, there are no great
differences between migrant men and women at this level of aggregate.
The breakdown by geographic origins also shows no great gender variations.
In total, about one third of all migrants come from European countries, most of
them from the EU (current borders). Another third migrated from North African
countries (cumulating natives from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). The final
third is split between other African countries, Turkey, mainland Southeast Asia
and ’Others’.
Among partnered migrants, the most common areas of origin are North
African countries (1 in 3), Southern European countries (1 in 5), followed by other
European (EU) countries (around 1 in 10). Migrants from Turkey represents 7%
of all partnered migrants; migrants from the Sahel and from mainland Southeast
Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos) each amount to about 3%. Another group en-
compasses all remaining migrants from African countries outside of the Maghreb
and the Sahel regions. This group constitutes just under 10% of all partnered
migrants. Finally, the ’other’ group, which includes all remaining origins (e.g.
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TABLE 3.2: Couple type and areas of birth by gender of migrants
Migrant women Migrant men Together
n %-w n %-w n %-w
Couple types
MIG-NAT 926 34 826 30 1752 32
MIG-2G 221 9 293 11 514 10
MIG-MIG 1720 57 1842 59 3562 58
Total: all couples 2867 100 2961 100 5828 100
Areas of birth
EU 807 32 725 29 1532 30
North Africa 625 28 752 34 1377 31
Africa: other 461 12 499 12 960 12
Turkey 316 7 366 7 682 7
Mainland Southeast
Asia
264 3 297 4 561 3
Other 394 18 322 14 716 16
Total: all areas 2867 100 2961 100 5828 100
Note: n refers to sample size. %-w refers to survey-weighted percentages.
Source: TeO1, INED-INSEE (2008-2009)
Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.
Russia, North America, Latin America, China, etc.), includes 16% of migrants in
coresident relationships.
FIGURE 3.1: Area of origin over time, among partnered migrant
women and men living in France in 2008-2009
There are more differences between migrant women and migrant men along
migratory origins than couple types. Partnered migrant men were more often
   
Source: TeO1 (2008-2009), survey-weighted
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born in EU countries - effectively mostly Italy, Spain or Portugal - and in the
Maghreb region - Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia (North Africa). In contrast, a
comparatively larger proportion of partnered migrant women came from EU-
countries, especially other EU countries than Southern European countries. This
migratory flow in which women are more numerous is a relatively recent and
growing phenomenon, as is the growth of migrations from ’other’ areas - again,
dominated by women, at least insofar as partnered migrants are concerned.
When taking all European immigration as a whole, it is clear that the EU has long
been a steady supplier of migration to France, although the mass immigration
from Southern Europe, mostly masculine migration, abated over the course
of the 1970s (Beauchemin, Borrel, Régnard, & Santelli, 2015). North African
immigration, which was initially mostly masculine as one can see plainly on
figure 3.3, subsequently came to include more and more migrant women. The
peaks and waves on the bottom plot of figure 3.3 render well the fluctuations
of migration flows, especially with respect to the migration of men, in reaction
to immigration policies and closure (one can note the dip following 1974). In
contrast, feminine migration appears steadier and, as noted by Beauchemin,
Borrel, Régnard, and Santelli (2015), has grown more geographically diverse over
time. A sizeable part of the migrant women who arrived in the 2000s thus come
from ’other areas’.
FIGURE 3.2: Legal mode of entry, by gender
In contrast to the classification by
area of origin, which shows no great
variations by gender, the breakdown
by legal mode of entry (first visa types)
tells of vast gender differences in the
legal pathways of migration. The evo-
lution of admission categories (first
visa type granted in France) helpfully
underlines the changes in the type
of migration. Although the bulk of
migrants - mainly men - arrived in
the early 1970s as labour migrants,
the proportion dropped post-1974 and
never recovered since. Conversely, the
proportion of family-related migration
(family reunification and partners of French nationals) rose, driving most of the
increase in women’s migration to France. It also comprises a growing proportion
of migrant men, especially among those arrived since the late 1990s.
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FIGURE 3.3: Legal mode of entry (first visa type) over time, among
partnered migrant women and men living in France in 2008-2009
   
   
   Source: TeO1 (2008-2009), survey-weighted.
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TABLE 3.3: First visa, tied migration and ordering of migration
and couple formation, by gender of migrants
Migrant women Migrant men Together
n %-w n %-w n %-w
First visa (%)
work 287 11 780 29 1067 20
studies 270 10 387 12 657 11
family 1277 45 680 24 1957 34
none needed 376 14 355 12 731 13
other 657 20 759 22 1416 21
Total 2867 100 2961 100 5828 100
Tied migration
% tied migrants 958 33 322 11 1280 22
% anchor migrants 149 5 506 16 655 11
Ordering
% migrated after or same year
as current relationship
1463 50 826 28 2289 39
% migrated before current re-
lationship
1399 50 2120 72 3519 61
Note: n refers to sample size. %-w refers to survey-weighted percentages.
Source: TeO1, INED-INSEE (2008-2009)
Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.
It is worth noting here already that these proportions are very likely over-
estimated with respect to the overall migrant population; only partnered migrants
are considered here, who in all good logic are more likely than non-partnered
migrants to be already in a relationship at the time of migration. Hence, partnered
migrants would also have been more likely to come through family migration.
A further bias, working in the same direction, comes from the fact that I only
look at migrants who live in France with their partners - those who are the most
settled in France. Those who were also partnered at the time of migration but
with somebody they were leaving behind and to whom they returned eventually
(thus disappearing from the sample) would have also been less likely to come
through family reunification or partner visas.
Keeping in mind therefore this note of caution on how representative this
sample is, this breakdown by admission category powerfully draws out how
gendered the legal pathways into France have been (see table 3.3). Migrant
women’s legal mode of entry was a work visa in 11% of cases. For both migrant
men and migrant women, student visas account for about 1 in 10 first visas; visa
exemptions (the none needed visa category, which typically includes EU citizens
and people who migrated as children and asked for citizenship before turning
18) concern between 12 and 14% of migrants, while the remaining 20% fall into
the ’Other’ category, which includes refugees, those whose visa application was
underway, and those with rarer visa type (e.g. diplomatic visas). Among migrant
men in the sample, 29% arrived as labour migrants and 24% as family migrants,
whereas almost half (45%) of all migrant women partnered in 2008-2009 were
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initially admitted as relatives or partners, with a big increase in the late 1990s-
mid-2000s. In parallel, the channels of migration used by migrant men became
more diverse (Beauchemin, Lhommeau, & Simon, 2016). Both phenomena reflect
responses to the ever more restrictive immigration regime. With the hindsight
of over ten years, we know that Nicolas Sarkozy’s stated objective of drastically
cutting down family migration into France only had a very temporary effect
of delaying the processing of applications. Numbers of family migrants have
remained quite stable since the survey collection and indeed since the early 2000s
(Héran, 2017; Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2021). Immigration restrictions since the
1970s mainly curbed labour migration, which was overwhelmingly (though never
only (Morokvasic, 1984)) masculine. They also increased requirements on family
migration, but never halted it (Héran, 2017; Noiriel, 1988).
Beauchemin, Borrel, Régnard, and Santelli (2015) noted that women’s modes
of migration appeared to diversify towards the end of the 2000s; but the propor-
tion of women who arrived as family migrants is still much higher than men’s, as
is the proportion of tied migrants - those who were specifically dependent on their
partner - among them. One in three women were initially granted admission as
partner/spouse of a French national or of a settled foreigner in France7, compared
to one in ten migrant men. Anchor migrants are overall rarer than tied migrants,
which is easily explained by the fact that while tied migrants are necessarily
migrants, anchors can also be natives. At any rate, the role of anchor remains
very masculine: migrant men acted as legal anchor for a partner in 16% of cases,
three times as often as migrant women (who are anchors in 5% of cases).
This also reflect the fact that the context of women’s migration with regards
to couple formation is quite different from men’s. Half of migrant women were
already married or cohabiting with their current partner when they first migrated
to France, whereas a strong majority of the men migrated before they met their
partner (table 3.3). All of this, however, varies considerably depending on who
they partnered with.
7This can be the current partner or a former partner.
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Does the partner matter? Descriptive analysis by couple types
TABLE 3.4: Migrant women and migrant men in France: area of
origin, religion, education and language skills, broken down by
couple types















EU 44 28 26 32 40 26 23 29
North Africa 16 51 31 28 31 52 33 34
Africa: other 12 3 14 12 11 6 14 12
Turkey 1 6 10 7 2 9 10 7
Mainland Southeast Asia 3 2 4 3 2 1 5 4
Other 24 10 15 18 14 5 15 14
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Religion
Protestant 5 2 4 4 2 1 3 3
Catholic 32 22 23 26 32 21 23 26
Other Christian 13 5 6 8 6 4 6 6
Muslim 16 56 48 38 26 59 48 43
Buddhist 3 2 4 3 0 1 3 2
Other religion 3 1 3 3 3 2 2 2
No religion 29 12 11 17 30 14 14 19
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Education
Further education 44 33 21 30 34 18 24 27
Baccalauréat 19 12 13 15 18 12 13 15
CAP, BEP, Brevet or equivalent 19 23 23 22 24 32 23 24
No or lower qualifications 18 33 42 33 23 38 39 34
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
French language skills
% had difficulties when first ar-
rived in France
62 70 77 71 58 73 77 71
% still have difficulties 32 47 57 48 27 46 56 46
Note: all percentages are survey-weighted
Source: TeO1, INED-INSEE (2008-2009)
Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.
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FIGURE 3.4: Area of origin and religion of migrants by couple
type, among migrant women (right) and migrant men (left) living
in France
The geographic origins of migrants vary as we have seen by gender, but
they also vary depending on migrants’ partner selection (see table 3.4). When
breaking down migrant women and migrant men into different couple types
based on their partners’ ties to migration (native without direct migration back-
ground (NAT); native with migrant parent(s) (2G); or primary migrant (MIG)),
one finds that areas of origin are not equally represented in each type of relation-
ship. Some migrant groups are more likely to form relationships with majority
natives (French nationals without direct migration background) than others; thus
European migrants account for 42% of all migrant-native relationships overall,
while migrants from North African countries are involved in over half of all
unions formed between primary migrants and natives with migrant parents (2G).
Yet migrant women from the Maghreb region represent only 16% of migrant
women - native men relationships (MIGw-NATm). This proportion is doubled
for migrant men from the same region (31% of migrant men - native women
relationships (MIGm-NATw)). European migrants are on the whole less involved
in relationships with other migrants or with second-generation natives. Their
distribution by couple types does not vary widely by gender, although if we were
to break it down to distinguish Southern European migrants, we would find that
the migrant men from this group are more often in MIG-NAT relationships (and
to a lesser extent, in MIG-2G relationships) than women, while the reverse is true
for migration from the rest of the EU.
   
Source: TeO1 (2008-2009), survey-weighted
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The two widest gender gaps concern migrants from the Maghreb region
and migrants from other, un-categorised regions of the world. The first case was
already mentioned, but the second one is asymmetrical in the other direction: in
MIG-NAT relationships, the proportion of migrants coming from ’other’ parts
of the world is much higher when the migrant partner is a woman, rather than
a man (24% against 14%). These gendered variations in the geographic profiles
of each couple types are only partially explained by the fact that these migra-
tory flows were historically also gendered (with men numerically dominating
migration from North Africa (and from Italy, Spain and Portugal), and women
coming more often than men from other EU countries (see table 3.4 above). The
composition of MIG-NAT couples, with respect to the geographic origins of the
migrants involved, appears quite different from the recruitment of other couple
types. In addition, it is more gendered, with variations depending on the gender
configuration of the couple (migrant woman/native man or migrant man/native
woman), whereas the two other couple types are mostly very consistent across
gender (see figure 3.4).
The distinctiveness of migrant-native couples comes out again with regards
to religious affiliations. Notably, they involve a much higher proportion of
atheist and agnostic (no religion) (and other Christians) migrants (close to one
in three migrants in a relationship with a majority native; in comparison the
proportion for other couple types is closer to one in ten ). Another third of the
migrants in MIG-NAT relationships identifies as Catholic (compared to around
one in five for other couple types). Muslim migrants represent almost half of
the migrants in migrant couples and over half of migrants in relationships with
’second generation’ French natives. However, Muslim migrant men also represent
one in four migrant men partnered with a majority native French - though the
proportion is lower for Muslim women in MIG-NAT relationships (16% of all
MIG-NAT relationships involving migrant women). Puzzingly, the proportion
of ’other Christian’ is sizeable among migrant women who mix with the native
majority group - 13% -, which is twice the proportion for migrant men in similar
relationships.
This singularity of migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples is also reflected in ed-
ucational level, with a greater proportion of highly-educated individuals amongst
migrants involved in MIG-NAT relationships, compared to migrants in other
union types. As illustrated by table 3.4, this is especially true for migrant women
partnered with majority natives, a strikingly large proportion of whom had access
to further education (44%). This proportion is much higher than for migrant
women in other partnerships (26% when the partner is a native with migrant
parent(s), 21% when the partner is also a migrant). It is also higher than for
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migrant men in MIG-NAT relationships (34%) or indeed in any partnerships.
Around 1 in 3 migrant women or men in migrant couples have no more than
primary schooling qualification, a proportion only slightly lower (27%) when
migrant women partner up with a native man with migrant parent(s). Migrants
with little formal schooling are however much less represented among those who
form relationships with majority natives. Without knowing whether couples are
educationally homogamous, it is not possible to assess here whether this singu-
larity of migrant-native couples results from mixing being more likely among
highly-educated individuals (if MIG-NAT couples are mostly educationally ho-
mogamous, as e.g. Nottmeyer (2014) found) or whether this is better explained
in terms of exchange theory (if highly-educated migrants are more likely to be in
relationship with majority natives, but only if they ’marry down’ from the point
of view of educational level (Kingsley Davis, 1941; Merton, 1941)). Exchange
theory has been mostly used to describe intermarriage involving highly-educated
minority women and migrants (Basu, 2017). When looking at MIG-NAT rela-
tionships, the proportion of highly-educated migrant women is indeed 10 points
higher than that of men.
Exchange theory would appear to account better for this gender gap than
gender asymmetries in assimilation levels. There is no such gender difference
in language skills (last section of table 3.4). Migrants who mix with the majority
native group struggle less often with the French language overall, compared to
migrants in other types of partnerships. Around 60%, men and women, stated
that they had some language difficulties when they first migrated to France. The
proportion is 10 percentage points higher when they partnered with a direct
descendant of migrant, and higher still if they partnered with another migrant
(77%). But in contrast to educational level, this is mostly consistent between
migrant men and migrant women.
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Legal pathways: partnerships and gendered paths
TABLE 3.5: Migrant women and migrant men in France: legal
pathways, broken down by couple types














Admission category (first visa, %)
work 13 7 11 11 21 26 33 29
studies 16 12 7 10 16 7 12 12
family 36 59 47 45 27 38 20 24
none needed 20 13 11 14 15 11 11 12
other 16 9 24 20 20 17 24 22
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
% tied migrants 29 50 33 33 12 27 8 11
Note: all percentages are survey-weighted
Source: TeO1, INED-INSEE (2008-2009)
Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.
FIGURE 3.5: First visa type by couple types, among
migrant women (left) and migrant men (right) living
in France
The descriptive break-
down by areas of origin,
religion, education and ex-
ogamy brings out clear differ-
ences in the patterns associ-
ated with the different cou-
ple type, the most obvious
point being the singularity
of mixed (MIG-NAT) relation-
ships. This suggests that the
recruitment of migrant part-
ners into such mixed unions
differs markedly than for
other unions. The story so far
is not strongly gendered. This
changes considerably once we
start considering not only
where migrants came from,
but also how they came. Ta-
ble 3.5 gives the weighted percentages of admission category by couple types, for
migrant women and migrant. MIG-NAT couples still stand out, but importantly,
and as the plot 3.5 illustrates, there is much more asymmetry between migrant
men and migrant women. The gender asymmetry is the widest for MIG-2G
and MIG-MIG couples, who include a much larger proportion of male labour
migrants than female labour migrants, and a much larger proportion of female
   
   Source: TeO1 (2008-2009), survey-weighted
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family-related migrants compared to male family migrants. Most migrant women
(59%) who form unions with natives descendants of migrants came as family
migrants. This asymmetry is not surprising as such, we had already identified
this in the previous section. More surprising is the fact that family migration
also represents the most common legal pathway for migrant men who partner
with descendants of migrants (38%). Thus ’transnational’ unions involving mi-
grant men are less common than those involving migrant women, but are by no
means rare within the group of MIG-2G unions (although this type of unions
are themselves quite rare). In fact, family migration represents an important
category of admission for migrant men in all partnership types, never under 20%
of partnered migrant men in all couple types. The proportion is closer to (or
more than) 50% for migrant women, except for those in MIG-NAT relationships.
Migrant women who mixed with the majority native group are still more likely
to be family migrants than any other legal category, but comparatively less often
(36%) than for women in other partnerships.
It is useful at this point to specifically consider the proportion of tied mi-
grants, that is, the subgroup within family migrants who came specifically as
tied partners.8 Tied migrants form the majority of family migrants for migrants
in all couple types (except for men in migrant couples). It is when looking at tied
migration that gender asymmetry becomes most obvious, while the gap between
couple types narrows somewhat. Tied migration concerns a third of migrant
women in relationships with either another primary migrant (MIG-MIG), or a
majority native (MIG-NAT), half of those with a second-generation partner (MIG-
2G). These proportions are always at least twice as high as the equivalent for
migrant men (8% (MIG-MIG), 12% (MIG-NAT) and 27% (MIG-2G) respectively).
When considering migrant couples, this can be interpreted as underlining the
gendered nature of family-stage migration, that is, when a partnered migrant mi-
grates first, independently, and then brings their partner to them through family
reunification. This proportion can also reflect migration trajectories whereby peo-
ple migrate independently, before couple formation, and later seek a partner from
their country of origin, whom they bring to them through family reunification.
We could thus approximate that women appear to be four times more likely to be
the second (tied) partner in these union-migration trajectories, compared to men.
However, we should also consider that some of the migrants who migrated as
children may later be matched with a primary migrant - a practice documented
by Charsley, Bolognani, Ersanilli, and Spencer (2020) in the British context. This
8There would be no great relevance in showing the breakdown for anchor migrants here, as
it would concern almost exclusively migrant couples. Indeed, a migrant can hardly operate as a
legal anchor for a native partner. There are a handful of cases in the sample where migrants in
relationships with native partners reported having in the past brought a former (migrant) partner
through family reunification.
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could account for the drop between the proportion of family-related migration
and that of tied migrants for migrant women especially (from 47%, for family
migration, to 33% for tied migrants).
The key findings from these tables are that the legal admission category
strongly differentiates migrant women and migrant men (much more so than
area of origin, religion or education). This is especially true when it comes to
tied migration - i.e. when couple and migration are legally interlocked. The
second important finding is that MIG-NAT couples are associated with a greater
diversity of legal pathways, and notably with a greater proportion of migrants
exempted from immigration control. The gender profiles appear at first to be less
obviously gendered, although the identification of tied migration nuances this by
highlighting that the category ’family migrant’ includes a much bigger proportion
of tied migrants among migrant women, than among migrant men in MIG-NAT
relationships. This emphasizes the need to consider migration trajectories and
couple formation together in order to grasp the gendered dynamics at play.
Gendered calendars of migration and couple formation
Here the relative timing of migration and couple formation is helpful in
showing how different couple types are associated with different models of part-
ner recruitment. The fact that women are much more often than men already
partnered at the time of migration holds true across all couple types, but the
proportion varies depending on the choice of partner. Migrant women who
form a union with a native man without direct migration background are much
more likely than others to have migrated independently from (i.e. prior to) this
relationship. Two thirds of them migrated before starting their current relation-
ship, whereas this applies to no more than half of those who partnered with a
second-generation migrant and only to two out of five of those in relationship
with another primary migrant. Migrant men with native majority women are also
the most likely to have migrated before becoming involved in this relationship
(84% of migrant men in MIG-NAT relationship, against around 65% of migrant
men in other union types). Migrant-native relationships with a majority native
thus appear to be frequently associated with separate calendars of migration
(first) and couple formation (later), whereas partnerships that do not involve a
majority native more often involve a relationship that pre-dates migration.
However, simply ordering the two events does not contextualise migration
and couple formation in the life course, which is what the timing part of table 3.6
addresses. Migrant women were on average younger than migrant men (24 years
old and almost 28 years old, respectively) when they formed their first union.
The same difference applies to the timing of children, since migrant women were
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aged around 25 on average when their first child was born, and migrant men
around 29. For both events (union start and children’s arrival), migrant couples
are associated with an earlier calendar of family formation compared to other
couples, especially MIG-NAT couples. Gender differences in the timing of family
formation are expected: it is a well-known demographic fact that family events
such as marriage or the arrival of children tend to happen earlier in the life-course
of women than of men, something which is reflected in the calendars of migrants’
family formation.
Altogether, most couples involving a migrant are married, but migrant
women in migrant couples are more often married than other women. They
are mothers 9 times out of 10 (8 out of 10 for other migrant women) and twice
as many of them have large families, i.e. three or more children. MIG-NAT
couples appear more ’informal’, further on in the second demographic transition
(Potârcă, Mills, & Lesnard, 2013). 9 Thus MIG-NAT couples are associated with
comparatively postponed couple formation and parenthood, a lower marriage
rate and are less likely to be living with young children.10 Furthermore, one in
four migrants in a relationship with a majority native had other relationships
prior to this one, a proportion much higher than those of other couple types.
One of the most important observations based on table 3.6 is the variation
of migrant women’s timings of family formation and migration with each couple
type. As far as migrant women’s process of family formation is concerned, it
appears to matter whether their partner is a majority native, a second-generation
migrant or a primary migrant. In contrast, for migrant men, the timing of family
formation differs little between MIG-MIG and MIG-2G couples. It is only when
the partner is a majority native that the transition to first union and to first child
is slightly delayed. In addition, while men and women migrated to France at
about the same age (around 20, though a little older for migrant couples), we
can observe that migrant men in these relationships were on average two years
younger when they migrated, compared to their female counterparts. MIG-NAT
couples also offer a contrasted picture. While those couples that involve a migrant
man and a majority native woman are in all aspects almost perfectly aligned with
native couples,when a migrant woman is involved, migrant-native couples are
much more likely to be married, although they are not more likely to be living
with children.
9The ’“second demographic transition” (SDT) brings sustained sub-replacement fertility, a
multitude of living arrangements other than marriage, the disconnection between marriage and
procreation, and no stationary population.’ (Lesthaeghe, 2010, p. 211)
10Although this is also linked to the fact that the sample of descendants of migrants is younger
on average, ergo more likely to have children who are still young. Indeed, parenthood is equally
common for migrant women with native partners, be they majority natives or descendants of
migrants.
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TABLE 3.6: Migrant women and migrant men in France: unions,
timing and ordering, breakdown by couple types















% exogamous 100 28 7 41 100 19 7 36
% still with first partner 73 88 90 84 73 84 86 82
% married 77 87 89 85 71 85 90 84
% coresident children under 16 59 75 71 67 60 80 69 68
% parents 82 83 91 87 82 90 90 88
% more than 2 children 24 22 45 36 29 25 45 38
Timing

















































% migrated before current rela-
tionship
64 52 43 51 86 65 68 73
% migrated before first relation-
ship
58 50 42 48 84 65 66 71
Note: all percentages and means are survey-weighted
Source: TeO1, INED-INSEE (2008-2009)
Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.
Exogamy Finally, a word about exogamy of origins - origins defined here
through the area of birth of ego or ego’s parents. Exogamy refers therefore to cou-
ples where partners (or partners’ parents) come from different great geographic
areas (following e.g. Hamel et al. (2015)’s operationalisation). By design MIG-
NAT couples can only be exogamous. 7% of migrant couples involve partners
with different migratory origins. When primary migrants form a relationship
with a second-generation natives, the rate of exogamy is higher, but varies de-
pending on who the primary migrant is, and who the native with migration
background. MIG-2G couples involving a migrant woman are exogamous in 34%
of cases, in contrast with those that involve a migrant man, and are exogamous in
only 23% of cases.11 The small sample size for MIG-2G couples warrants however
that we take this gender variation with some caution. MIG-2G couples are much
more likely to be exogamous (minority-minority) than migrant couples. When
both partners migrated, partner selection and couple formation is more likely to
have happened first, in the country of origin, and couples migrated together (or
11The proportions for couples that do not involve a primary migrant partner are not displayed
in the table, but they are available in the appendix, table 3. It is interesting to note that 30% of
2G-2G couples are exogamous - around the same combined proportion as MIG-2G couples. For
further empirical enquiries into unions between primary migrants and second-generation natives
in France, see for example Bélanger and Flynn (2018) and Eremenko and González-Ferrer (2018))
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in stages) afterwards. We would expect that a higher proportion of those who
partnered with French natives met them in France, post-migration. Their sphere
and mode of recruitment may have been affected by migration, by giving them
access to new environments in which to meet potential partners, by enabling
(or forcing) socialisation with other groups, by reducing family or community
influence and weighting over partner selection, and so forth.
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3.3.2 Sequence analysis: couple formation in motion
Introducing sequence analysis methods and sequences
This section presents the process and the results from the sequence analysis.
The analysis does not apply to the entire life course, or even the entire adult or
working life. The sequences nest the event of the first migration to France in the
localised context of couple formation, from five years before respondents first
migrated to France (’mig-5’), to five years after (’mig+5’).
Most sequence analysis techniques in use in the social sciences are related
to algorithmic (Abbott & Tsay, 2000) or correspondence analysis methods (Ro-
bette, Bry, & Lelièvre, 2015). Optimal matching (OM) analysis is by far the most
widespread sequence analysis technique. It has the major conceptual advantage
of jointly addressing the different temporal aspects of a sequence: the moment of
a transition, the duration of a stage, and the order within the sequence (Aisenbrey
& Fasang, 2010, 2017; Wu & Li, 2019). I use optimal matching analysis for the
dissimilarity matrix, with substitution costs indexed on the transition rate be-
tween each state; more common transitions are thus assigned a lower cost, while
rarer ones are considered to denote greater distance between states. Homoge-
neous patterns of sequences are then identified based on the dissimilarity matrix,
through a combination of algorithms. Namely, I use hierarchical clustering (Ward
technique) to identify a substantive structure and logic in the clustering and par-
titioning around medoids (PAM) to delineate the final clusters12. The clustering
is survey-weighted, and as are the associated quality measures.
I designed five states on which the sequences of couple formation draw: (1)
‘childhood’ (younger than 16), (2) single, before any cohabitation/marriage span,
(3) cohabiting/married with current partner (4) cohabiting/married with former
partner (when the partner at the point of the interview is not the first partner), (5)
period in-between 1st and current partner. The fifth state is essentially a period
where individuals were of age and presumed to be on the partnership market,
since we know that they had had a first union before and would form another
union (their current one) at a later point in life. We have no way of knowing
whether they were single or had other relationships for the period in-between.
The construction of states (for state sequences) is such that each year is assigned
one state, and each sequence is constituted of 10 successive states (10 years). The
survey offered the possibility of a finer sequencing, namely by month, but the
much higher rates of missing values was deterring.
12All the analyses pertaining to the sequence analysis in this chapter and the next were computed
using the WeightedClusters (Studer, 2013) and TraMineR R packages (Gabadinho, Ritschard,
Müller, & Studer, 2011)
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Figure 3.6 shows the weighted distribution of all individual sequences. The
Sequence frequency plot identifies the most common individual sequences, start-
ing from the bottom.13 The most common individual sequence is one where
respondents were children for the entire sequence, that is, from five years be-
fore migration to five years afterwards. The second most common individual
sequence describes respondents who were single before they first migrated to
France, and entered their first relationship the same year they migrated.
FIGURE 3.6: Sequences of family formation around migration
(weighted)













































































First migration to France
The two plots in figure 3.7 contrast migrant women and migrant men’s
migration-union individual sequences. They powerfully illustrate how gendered
the distribution is.
Migrant women are overall more likely to be in a relationship (larger orange
area). The sequence plots illustrate that their migration is also more likely to take
place in the context of an already existing and established relationship.
Most striking is how the comparison exposes a much greater temporal
interlocking between migration and the formation of a first relationship for
13The weighting of sequences groups together identical sequences, which is why the ’weighted
ns’ appears much smaller than the full unweighted sample of migrants (n=5987)
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migrant women. This is denoted by the vertical drop at mig=0 (figure 3.7. It is
much steeper on the right plot, and signals the common transition between being
initially single and entering a first partnership (marriage or cohabitation) the same
year as migrant women first arrived in France. Such sequencing identifies and
cover marriage migration (Charsley, Storer-Church, Benson, & Van Hear, 2012)
and more generally what Lievens (1999) labelled ’family-forming’ migration.
There are of course different ways of dating the beginning of a relationship and
it is likely that many of these couples knew each other prior to the point where
they were married or moved in together. Indeed, the migration context itself can
delay this stage when couples are geographically separated by migration and
borders, and therefore cannot live together, or when marriage is postponed until
a point where the partner in France is financially secure enough. Thus one can
expect that most relationships started - romantically and logistically - some time
before they appear in the sequences as cohabiting or married relationships.






























































Migrant women’s sequences thus reflect much more change around the time
of migration. This is consistent across couple types (see figure 3.8). The sudden
increase in the proportion of migrant women married or cohabiting the same year
as their migration to France is visible in all couple configurations. This contrasts
with migrant men, whose timing of migration and couple formation appear
mostly unconnected, except when they partner with descendants of migrants.
(see plot for Migrant men - partner 2G with the drop at mig=0 (in figure 3.8). There
is no such discernible drop in the union-migration sequences for migrant men
in other types of partnerships. This first glimpse at union-migration sequences
confirms what we had noted earlier about MIG-2G couples, namely that this
couple type included a greater proportion of tied migrant men. Overall, however,
it is a very small proportion of migrant men who were not single before the
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year they migrated; this proportion is a little bit higher for those with a migrant
partner.
Looking specifically at migrant-majority native couples (MIG-NAT), one
can also see on the bottom right of figure 3.8 the greater incidence of multiple
partnership spells among migrant women who eventually partner up with a
majority native French partner (the red area on the graph). The vertical drop
marks that the aforementioned superimposition of migration and family forma-
tion applies to a non-trivial proportion of migrant women in relationships with
native majority men - and not just to migrant couples or ’transnational couples’.
In contrast, migrant men in MIG-NAT relationships appear the most likely to
have migrated during childhood (blue area), and least likely to have migrated
while already in a relationship. These are only exploratory comments based on
FIGURE 3.8: Sequences by gendered couple types





































































































































a visual analysis of the sequence plots. However, the clustering of sequences
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helps elucidate these differences by gender and couple types in union-migration
trajectories.
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Partitioning into migration-union sequence clusters
The combination of optimal matching and clustering therefore allows the
delineation of clusters of sequences and to pick a number of clusters that strike a
satisfactory compromise between simplification (there could be as many clusters
as different sequences), substantive interest, and robustness. Given the limited
sample size, it is important to avoid having too many clusters. Figure 3.9 presents
the hierarchical cluster tree for the first 6 sequences.
FIGURE 3.9: Sequences tree display: family formation and migra-
tion (weighted)
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FIGURE 3.10: Cluster cutoff criteria for migration-couple forma-
tion clusters derived with sequence analysis and partitioning
around medoids (weighted)
































ASWw ( −1.39 / 1.16 )
HG ( −1.51 / 0.91 )
PBC ( −1.74 / 1.23 )
HC ( −0.89 / 1.68 )
TABLE 3.7: Quality measures for sequences












aSource: TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009)
As visible in the cluster tree (fig-
ure 3.9), the strongest distinction is
between adult migrants and child mi-
grants (level 2 in the tree). In other
words, between the first generation mi-
grants and the 1.5 generation (those
who migrated as children or in their
early teenage years). Amongst adult
migrants, the clustering then sets apart
a group who migrate before family
formation as single adults (level 3 -
mostly young adults). In contrast with
these independent adult migrants, a
further branch of the tree refers to migrants whose couple formation either pre-
ceded or coincided with migration (level 4). The coinciding of migration and
couple formation may be that of a first relationship, or a family reconfiguration
and the start of a later relationship, but we need a minimum of five clusters
to capture trajectories involving several partnership spans. Having six clusters
further differentiates between two groups of single adults: those just out of child-
hood and those older, and seemingly more durably installed in single life, around
the time of their migration.
The figure 3.10 shows the quality measures for the partitions, calculated for
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any number of clusters between 1 and 10. Six clusters appears to be a reasonable
cut-off point, since it is a local peak on several measures, most importantly the
Point Biserial Correlation (PBC)14 and the weighted average silhouette width
(ASWw)15. The quality measures for six groups (see table 3.7) also rule out
the possibility of the partition being no more (or little more) than a statistical
artefact. According to 1990’s indicative silhouette width range, an AFWw above
0.5 identifies a reasonably coherent and robust structure.
Typology of six union-migration sequences
The typology of sequences, whose construction I have detailed, thus leads
to a classification in six groups. I have labelled these migration trajectory types as
follows: Child migrants, Single young adults, Single adults, Formation first partnership,
Established first partnership, and Partnership reconfiguration. The silhouette width
plots for each group is presented in figure 3.11. The most characteristic sequences
of each cluster are represented towards the top of each plot, while those on the
edge of the group, which are least consistent with the rest of the cluster, are
located at the bottom. The silhouette width plots help visualise the degree of
homogeneity within each sequence cluster. The first and fifth clusters show
very consistent sets of sequences of childhood (cluster 1) and uninterrupted first
relationships (cluster 5), whereas the cluster with partnership reconfiguration
(cluster 6) appears much more heterogeneous. The sequence most characteristic
of this group involves migrants entering a new (second or more) relationship
around the time of their first migration to France. This new relationship does not
immediately succeed the first relationship.
14HG refers to Hubert’s Gamma and HC to Hubert’s C. They follow a similar logic to that of
the Point Biserial Correlation(PBC) in that they are (differently) measures of the capacity of the
partition to reproduce the distance matrix (Liao (2010) and Milligan and Cooper (1985), for HG
and HS (Hubert & Arabie, 1985)
15A high ASWw signals a high coherence, namely high distance between groups, and high
homogeneity within the groups (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 1990)
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FIGURE 3.11: Sequence clusters: silhouette widths
150 Chapter 3. Gendered trajectories of union-migration to France










































































































































The sequence plot for each cluster is presented in figure 3.12, and tables 3.8
and 3.9 provide a descriptive breakdown of how different couple types, areas
of origin and more or less highly-educated migrants are distributed between
union-migration sequences.























25 10 6 36 17 6 100
Couple types
MIG-MIG 21 12 5 34 25 4 100
MIG-2G 30 10 7 42 9 3 100
MIG-NAT 30 8 8 37 7 10 100
Areas of birth
EU 34 10 5 28 14 8 100
North Africa 26 10 5 41 16 2 100
Africa: other 12 12 8 39 21 7 100
Turkey 27 16 0 24 29 2 100
Mainland South-
east Asia
39 12 12 23 12 2 100




19 6 12 39 14 10 100
Baccalauréat 20 8 6 43 14 9 100
CAP, BEP, Brevet
or equivalent
44 9 3 30 10 4 100
No or lower qual-
ifications
23 15 4 34 22 3 100
First visa types
work 16 14 13 33 17 8 100
studies 17 18 23 33 3 7 100
family 19 8 2 46 19 5 100
none needed 53 8 3 17 12 7 100
other 27 9 6 28 24 6 100
Tied migrants 1 5 2 60 26 6 100
Note: all percentages are survey-weighted
Source: TeO1, INED-INSEE (2008-2009)
Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.
Child migrants (cluster 1) refers to individuals who migrated when they were
still (young) children (the blue refers to those younger than 16 years old). Adult-
hood and family formation years are thus outside of the sequence altogether,
making for very consistent, transition-free sequences. This cluster accounts for
one in four partnered migrants, women and men. Consistent with marital as-
similation and the concept of the ’1.5 generation’ coined by Rumbaut (1994),
this sequence is more common for migrants who form relationships with native
partners (native majority or descendants of migrants). EU migrants and migrants
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27 14 20 24 11 4 100
Couple types
MIG-MIG 19 17 22 23 15 3 100
MIG-2G 32 11 13 36 6 2 100
MIG-NAT 42 11 19 19 4 5 100
Areas of birth
EU 42 16 8 18 10 5 100
North Africa 25 15 25 27 7 2 100
Africa: other 7 15 40 21 13 5 100
Turkey 30 12 7 34 15 1 100
Mainland South-
east Asia
35 25 19 11 10 0 100




21 9 28 26 11 5 100
Baccalauréat 23 8 20 29 15 5 100
CAP, BEP, Brevet
or equivalent
47 11 14 18 8 3 100
No or lower qual-
ifications
21 24 17 24 11 3 100
First visa types
work 12 23 25 24 12 4 100
studies 14 18 47 19 1 1 100
family 41 10 7 34 6 2 100
none needed 50 9 7 14 13 7 100
other 26 10 21 19 19 4 100
Tied migrants 0 3 11 69 12 5 100
Note: all percentages are survey-weighted
Source: TeO1, INED-INSEE (2008-2009)
Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.
from mainland Southeast Asia are most likely to fall into this ’child migrants’
cluster (at a rate of about 35%) , especially EU men (42% of male EU migrants
are child migrants). Migrants from Subsaharan Africa and the Sahel, in contrast,
mostly migrated as adults. In terms of educational attainment, migrants with
lower to medium education are over-represented, but the cluster still accounts
for one in five migrants with further education. Many in this sequence were
exempted from having to obtain a visa, which likely reflects the high rate of Euro-
pean migrants as well as those who entered as former colonial subjects (e.g. the
migration of ’pieds-noirs’ and ’harkis’ from Algeria who came to France before,
and especially during and immediately following Algerian independence).
Single young adults (cluster 2) includes those who migrated while just about
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adult or even teenager, most between 16 and 20. Compared to the single adults
group, they are of course younger, but their trajectory is also less characterised
by long periods where they remain single. Their migration precedes their first
relationship, but often not by much, and they appear to partner up early. This is
a smaller cluster, comprising 10% of migrant women, and 14% of migrant men.
In terms of proportion, this cluster is more or less evenly represented among
all couple types and across origins with three exceptions. Firstly, it represents
a larger proportion of migrant men (17%) in migrant couples (presumably the
’pioneer’ migrants who later bring a migrant spouse), secondly, it accounts for a
larger share of migrant men from mainland Southeast Asia (25%), and of migrant
women from Turkey (16%). When compared with other clusters, migrants in this
cluster are more likely to have little to no education. Unsurprisingly cluster 2,
like cluster 3, involves a high number of labour and student migrants.
Single adults (cluster 3), tend to be single throughout the entire sequence,
signalling a migration process that is temporally completely disconnected from
that of family formation. Migration here happens long before the formation of the
first couple. This cluster concerns mainly men (20% of migrant men); few women
(6%) followed this path of union-migration. Migrant couples are slightly more
common for migrant men, while migrant women in this cluster are slightly more
likely to have a majority native French partner. The cluster includes relatively
few of the migrant men who form relationships with descendants of migrants in
France. This type of union-migration sequence is highly gendered with regards
to migrants’ geographic origins. It includes virtually no migrant women from
Turkey, but over 1 in 10 women from Southeast Asia and from the ’Other’ groups.
A high proportion of the (few) women in this group are highly-educated, which
also applies, although less starkly, to migrant men. Migrant men’s geographic
origins differ markedly from those of the migrant women in this cluster. Migrant
men from Africa are disproportionately represented: the cluster accounts for 25%
of male migrants from the Maghreb and a staggering 40% of male migrants from
other African regions. Migrants who initially entered on a student visa, especially
men, very often fall in this cluster (almost 50% of men with student visa)
Formation first partnership (cluster 4) identifies a group of migrants for whom
migration happens mostly simultaneously (the same year) or in quick succession
with the formation of the first relationship (as measured by first marriage or
first cohabitation). This cluster can be expected to cover most or all of so-called
’marriage migration’, ’transnational marriages’ and other ’mail-order bride’ type
arrangements, whereby migration is tightly tied in with (and at least in some
cases a motivation for) the formation of the relationship. It can also include
couples that were formed very quickly following migration and couples who
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waited to get married or to start cohabitation until the migrant partner could join
the other in France. This is by far the largest union-migration cluster for migrant
women (36%) and a large cluster among migrant men (25%). It is more common
(42%) among migrant women in relationships with second-generation partners
and it also concerns a large proportion (34%) of migrant women in migrant
couples. Less expected perhaps, is the fact that it is also the most common union-
migration sequence among women in relationships with majority native French
partners (37%). This contrasts with the migrant men in the cluster, however,
with men in MIG-NAT relationships being under-represented and men in MIG-
2G unions being vastly over-represented (36%, when the cluster only accounts
for 20% of migrant men overall). The coinciding of the formation of the first
couple with migration to France is particularly common among migrant men
from Turkey (34%) and to a lesser extent the Maghreb and mainland Southeast
Asia. In comparison, migrant women from ’other’ regions of the world fall most
often into this cluster (44%), as do migrant women from North Africa (41%)
and other African regions (39%). EU migrants are under-represented for both
genders. A feature of the cluster is the concentration of highly-educated migrants
within it, especially women’s: it accounts for almost 40% of migrant women with
further education and 43% of those with a baccalauréat. The cluster is in fact quite
polarised in terms of women’s education: it also includes 34% of migrant women
with no qualifications. The profile of migrant men is similarly U-shaped, with a
relatively high proportion of migrants with further education and baccalauréat or
equivalent, but also a sizeable proportion of migrants with no school diploma
beyond primary schooling. It represents the largest group of family-related legal
admissions (46%) for women and the second largest for men, most of which is
tied migration (60% of all tied migrant women and 69% of tied migrant men
follow this sequence). However, it also involves about one in four male labour
migrants and one in three female labour and student migrants. This underlines
that a not insignificant part of this cluster, especially among women, involves
people who likely migrated independently and formed a relationship shortly
thereafter.
Established first relationships (cluster 5) is comprised of individuals who
were in their first relationship long before they first migrated to France, and
remained in the same relationship long after. From at least five years before
migration (for most of them), to at least five years after migration, these mark
durable relationships, in which the migration project and experience is nested.
As well as established couples migrating at the same time (joint migration),
this cluster is likely to include most of family-stage migration, especially from
the perspective of the second (reunified) partner’s migration. It includes more
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migrant women (17%) than migrant men (11%) and, logically, mostly migrant
couples. 25% of migrant women in migrant couples migrated within the context
of an established relationship (15% of migrant men). These trajectories are most
common among migrant women from Turkey (39%). They also account for a
considerable share of female migration from North Africa and from the ’other’
group and for male migration from ’other’ areas. The migrant men mostly have
some school qualification, whereas a larger chunk of the women have none
beyond primary school. The ’other’ legal admission category is over-represented
in this group, likely signalling a larger than average proportion of refugee families
and couples.
Finally, the cluster partnership reconfigurations (cluster 6), which I also call
Multiple partnership spells or multiple partnerships for short, is a much smaller
group. It is characterised by sequences where migration interlocks with either
the end of a first partnership or the start of a new partnership spell that does
not correspond to the respondents’ first relationship. In this cluster, migration
is part of a family trajectory that is more complex than the overall sequence
childhood –> adult and single –> first relationship. In this sense, it reflects less
linear and less common trajectories (in that having had a single partner is the
experience of the majority of partnered migrants). This cluster includes 6%
of migrant women, and only 4% of migrant men. It clearly stands out from
other clusters: almost 60% of migrant women who follow this union-migration
path form relationships with majority French native partner. The proportion is
comparatively less marked for migrant men (38%). This suggests that Hamel et
al.’s finding that mixed migrant-native relationships were more often associated
with complex relationship patterns is more valid for- and mainly driven by-
migrant women (Hamel et al., 2015). Migrants in this cluster are largely recruited
among European migrants, whereas migrants from North Africa, Turkey and
mainland Southeast Asia are rare (between 0 and 2%). The cluster also includes
a larger-than-average share of baccalauréat graduates and migrants with further
education. Admission categories are varied, distributed between all categories,
except for the fact that migrant men are more likely to be visa-exempt and almost
never entered on a student visa or as family migrants.
Union-migration sequences: gendered paths to partnering
From the description of the clusters, it is clear that they depict highly gen-
dered stories of migration and couple formation. It is also clear that the stories
differ depending on the couples that migrants form and that each sequence
cluster is associated with different proportions of couple types (table 3.10).
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Among child migrants, women are more likely to partner with another
migrant, while men are more likely to partner with a native partner without mi-
gration background. The sequence Single young adults differentiates little between
men and women: it is in the Single adult cluster that a clear gender gap emerges.
Women who migrated as single adults are evenly distributed between those
with a migrant partner and those with a native NAT partner. In contrast, men
from this sequence cluster ended up in migrant-migrant relationships two times
out of three. It appears that the migrants most likely to partner with majority
French natives are child migrants and those whose migration happens in the
context of multiple partnership spells, to which one must add independent adult
migration in the case of women. In comparison, the relationships of migrants in
the Established first partnership clusters are (logically) much more likely to be with
another primary migrant.
The breakdown of each couple type by gender and by union-migration
sequence, as illustrated in figure 3.13, shows a different picture from the distri-
bution by area of birth of by religion. Each couple type is still associated with
a different distribution between sequence clusters, but the plot also highlights
a degree of gender asymmetry which was not as visible before. The paths that
migrant women and migrant men take to live in similar partnerships in France,
for example, in a union with a majority native French partner, diverge. Child
migration is by far the most common path that brings migrant men to MIG-NAT
unions, but for migrant women it is ’marriage migration’ - the formation of a
first partnership. Similarly, migrant men in migrant couples are much more
likely to have migrated as ’young single adults’ or ’single adults’, whereas their
female counterparts migrated much more often in the context of the formation of
their first couple, or while already long partnered. The sequence profile of the
couples formed by migrants with French-born descendants of migrants is the
most gender-symmetrical and involves a high proportion of marriage migration.
3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Gendered calendars of union-migration
This descriptive analysis of union-migration trajectories brings out gendered
experiences and paths of migration that go beyond numerical asymmetries in
migration flows by origin. It is not simply that migration from, for example,
Northern Africa, involves more men than women, it is also that men and women
from Northern Africa do not journey to France in the same way and at the same
point in the life-course and in the cycle of family formation. In part, this reflects
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TABLE 3.10: Migrant women and migrant men: partner by union-migration sequence
Migrant women
MIG-2G MIG-MIG MIG-NAT Total
Child migrants (1.5G) 11 49 41 100
Single young adults 8 66 26 100
Single adults 9 46 45 100
Formation 1st partnership 10 55 35 100
Established 1st partnership 4 82 14 100
Multiple partnerships 4 36 59 100
All 9 57 34 100
Migrant men
MIG-2G MIG-MIG MIG-NAT Total
Child migrants (1.5G) 13 41 47 100
Single young adults 8 69 23 100
Single adults 7 65 28 100
Formation 1st partnership 17 59 24 100
Established 1st partnership 6 84 10 100
Multiple partnerships 5 57 38 100
All 11 59 30 100
a Note: 41% of migrant women in the child migrant sequence cluster were in
a coresident relationship with a native man with native French parents at
the time of the survey.
b All percentages and means are survey-weighted.
c Source: TeO1, INED-INSEE (2008-2009).
d Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age
18-60
158 Chapter 3. Gendered trajectories of union-migration to France
the known fact that family formation happens later in men’s life than in women’s
life.
The sequence analysis proved particularly powerful in revealing gender
difference, not only in the timing of family transition and migration, but also
in the order, of events pertaining to migration and partnering, as well as the
duration and juxtaposition of each state. Migrant women who live with a partner
are more likely than migrant men to have already been in that relationship
when they first migrated to France. Migrant men, comparatively, are more likely
to have migrated before meeting their partner, as children or as single adults.
Most migrant men who have a partner they live with were thus not part of
that relationship when they first migrated to France. Overall, men’s calendar of
couple formation places migration firmly ahead, and family formation firmly
later. This is not so for migrant women. This matters to understand the unions
migrant women and migrant men form, and the dynamics within those unions.
The most striking finding from the sequence analysis is perhaps how often
the moment of couple formation and the moment of migration are simultaneous
for migrant women. The literature had already found descriptive evidence that
migration and family were more closely tied together for women (insofar as more
women than men migrated after family formation and migrated as ’tied’ family
migrants (Krieger, 2019; Taylor, 2007)). But the sequence analysis compellingly
underlined how these processes are tied not only by conditionality (when family
formation enables or motivates women’s migration) but also temporality (when
migration and family formation happen in the same short space of time - in this
case, one year). This had sometimes been correctly assumed, but not empirically
established in the scholarship on migration and family formation. Furthermore,
the one term that specifically implies this co-occurrence of migration and couple
formation - ’marriage migration’ - had mostly been treated as if it were relevant
only to ’transnational couples’ (between natives from the second-generation and
first-generation migrants) or in the context of sham marriages.
Most empirical evidence concurs that insincere and short-lived ’marriages of
convenience’, contracted for the sake of obtaining residency rights or citizenship,
are mostly anecdotal (see M’sili and Neyrand (1998) but Azzolini and Guetto
(2017) for nuances). Without presuming therefore about the durability or au-
thenticity of marriage migration, the sequence cluster formation 1st partnership is
nevertheless a major feature of women’s migration. It is in fact the most common
sequence for migrant women in all partnership types. Importantly, this union-
migration pattern is not specific to groups identified as more endogamous. The
’importing’ of co-ethnic migrant spouses has been mostly problematised with
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regards to migrants from the Maghreb and from Turkey in the case of France
(Beck-Gernsheim, 2011; Safi, 2010). Instead, the couple-forming cluster represents
at least one migrant women in four (and up to almost one in two) in any of
the migrant groups, including EU migrants. This union-migration trajectory is
much more common among migrant women, but it is also associated with 25%
of partnered migrant men on average. In fact, sequences in which migration is in-
terlocked with family formation (cluster 4 to 6) represent 40% of men’s migration
compared to only one in three migrant men who migrate as single adults (either
cluster 2 or 3), before forming a relationship. In other words, it is a minority of
partnered migrant men who fit into the archetypal concept of the male economic
migrant. However, this may not apply to migrant men overall, as those who do
not partner up, or who return, may be more likely to fit into this male, single and
labour-driven picture of the economic migrant.
This typology of sequences thus reveals clear differences between migrant
men and migrant women, in conjunction with geographic origins, legal admission
category and educational attainment. A lot of the overall, roughly gendered
elements were known: men are more likely to migrate as single adults, they are
more likely to have come through a work visa, and so forth. The typology of
sequences, however, allows us to refine where these differences happen and play
out, and to contrast them with one another. Among others, the distinction brought
about by the partitioning between single young adult and single adult, is instructive.
The contrast between men and women is the largest of all for the latter: very
few women but a great many men fall into the union-migration sequence of
single adult. Its defining characteristic is a prolonged period, from before to after
migration, where individuals are neither married nor in a cohabiting relationship.
In the other cluster of single migrants, the young single adult sequence, individuals
do not remain single for very long after reaching adulthood; we find a greater
representation of women in this cluster, and most of the ’anchor’ migrant women
(who mostly arrived of student visas). The men in this category are more often
independent migrants, meaning that they came before meeting their partner
and met a partner either there or after the partner had migrated. They are also
more likely to have come with a work visa; it is the extended period of single life
during which migration occurs which appears to be the most specifically male
feature of union-migration sequences. In contrast, female migration is far more
often characterised by legal dependency via tied migration.
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3.4.2 Different trajectories of union-migration by couple type and by
gender
Looking specifically at migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples, it is clear that
migrant women are much more likely to follow a native majority French man back
to France than migrant men are to follow a native majority French woman. The
overall gendered rates of intermarriage showed no great discrepancy between
migrant women and migrant men in the proportion that forms relationships with
majority native partners. Distinguishing between migrant and religious groups
resulted in some gender differences emerging, which suggested varying degrees
of affinities for intermarriage (and possibilities for intermarriage) for women
and men who migrated from the EU and North Africa. Like (Collet & Santelli,
2012; Hamel & Rault, 2014), I found that mixed migrant-native unions in France
are also more likely to be second unions, compared to unions formed with a
second-generation migrant, or another migrant, but that the contrast is stronger
for migrant women.
However, it is by looking at legal pathways and union-migration trajectories
that a gendered story of MIG-NAT mixing emerges most powerfully. Migrant
men are most likely to mix with the majority group when they migrate as children.
While migrant women are also often child migrants, most of those who form MIG-
NAT relationships migrated as adults with their migration mostly coinciding
with couple formation. These gendered paths to migrant-native mixedness
suggest different interpretations for what mixing with the majority native French
group effectively represents for migrant men and migrant women. For migrant
men, mixedness can be interpreted straightforwardly as trajectories of marital
assimilation. It involves migrant men who migrated as children, were therefore
socialised in France and presumably assimilated to the point where they could
meet and be deemed suitable partners by majority native women. This applies
especially to EU migrants who arrived as children.
This narrative of the assimilation of the 1.5 generation can not account
for most of migrant women’s mixing with the majority group. The fact that
many migrant women migrated very shortly before or after officially entering a
relationship with a majority native French man defeats the idea that they could
have already been very assimilated by the time the couple was formed. This is
confirmed by the greater proportion who still struggle with the French language.
Something else is involved which is perhaps best described by Varro’s analysis
analysis of the transplantation of migrant women in relationships with majority
native partner (1984). Varro described American women who had either followed
their French partner to France or had met them in France briefly after migrating
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there for what they thought was going to be a limited period of time, which
turned into a life-long commitment. The migration-union trajectory of the femme
transplantée (transplanted woman) is associated with legal dependency on the
partner, and the partnership is perhaps best understood through exchange theory.
Rather than getting to mixedness through assimilation, migrant women may
thus find (on the partnership market) opportunities to mix with a member of the
majority group and hence migration to a Western country, that are not so open
to (or tempting for) migrant men. However, this involves them following their
partner, often being legally tied to them, and quite possibly accepting educational
hypogamy (downward matching). The fact that migrant women in MIG-NAT
unions tend to be highly-educated could support this interpretation. It matches
the analyses proposed by qualitative studies, such as Dos Santos Silva (2012)
on Brasilian migrant women with majority native French men, Suksomboon
(2011) on Thai migrant women in MIG-NAT couples in the Netherlands, or
Riaño and Baghdadi (2007) on South American women in similar partnerships in
Switzerland.
Importantly for the later parts of this thesis, these are also trajectories of
migration and mixedness which the aforementioned qualitative research asso-
ciates with very one-sided gendered power dynamics. That is, that ’transplanted’
women find themselves very dependent on their partner - socially, culturally,
financially and legally - and unable to resist their French partner’s arrangements
and gender expectations, which may not be what they aspired to.
Whilst ’transplanted men’ in unions with majority native French women
exist, they are much rarer: men rarely agree to follow their partner and to
’transplant themselves’ for them. In addition, even when they do so, men may
still be able to yield patriarchal authority to counteract the power imbalance
in the couple. This is what Collet (2015) contends in her analysis of ’conjugal
mixedness’. The connection between partnership, gendered migration trajectories
and gender dynamics in the couple, is precisely what will be addressed in the
next chapter.
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FIGURE 3.13: Union-migration sequences by couple type, among
migrant women (left) and migrant men (right) living in France
   




and gendered trajectories of
family formation and migration
Chapter introduction
Sociological and demographic scholarship on migrant families living in
the UK has grown significantly in recent years (e.g. Charsley, Storer-Church,
Benson, and Van Hear (2012), Hannemann and Kulu, Hill (2015), Kulu (2019),
and Kulu, Hill and Hannemann (2016)). This literature, on top of the already well-
established scholarship on ethnic minorities in Britain, has provided us with a
detailed analysis and enhanced understanding of how fertility patterns and rates
of inter-ethnic unions vary by ethnic group and between primary migrants and
the British-born ’second-generation’ (Berrington, 1994; Coleman, 1994; Muttarak
& Heath, 2010). Yet how this also reflects differences along migration paths and
trajectories is patchily addressed and understood. Certain paths of migration
and couple formation have been the topic of intense political, media and research
coverage - mainly marriage migration in the context of co-ethnic unions between
South Asian migrants and UK-born children of migrants (e.g. Ballard (1990),
Charsley et al. (2012), and Shaw (2014)). In contrast, little is known about how
family formation and migration interlock in the trajectories of other couples and
other migrants, including mixed couples formed between primary migrants and
majority natives. Migrants who form a union in their country of birth, before
migrating to the UK, are logically more likely to have partnered with a fellow
national, who may come with them, precede them or later join them. Conversely,
those who migrate as children or independently, before couple formation, are
more likely to be in contact with British natives at a time where couple formation
may be on the table for them. The sequencing of migration and couple formation
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may thus diverge between migrants in relationships with other migrants, and
migrants in relationships with natives. This matters for understanding how
gender operates in migration, because men and women tend to not follow quite
the same timing of couple formation, nor the same migration path; for instance, in
2014, almost three quarters of migrants granted family visas by the Home Office
were women (Home Office, 2019). This could be connected to gendered rates of
exogamy, but it could also highlight the fact that a similar household composition
- e.g. migrant-native couples - may conceal different trajectories of migration and
couple formation, depending on whether the migrant partner is a woman or a
man. Different sequencing of migration and couple formation, in turn, may foster
different couple dynamics and therefore gendered trajectories of migration may
be linked to gender relations in the household post-migration - this will form the
topic of the next part of the thesis. In this chapter, as in the previous one, I focus
on investigating the timing and sequencing of migration and couple formation for
migrant men and migrant women. Specifically, I concentrate on whether different
couple types - i.e. migrant/migrant (MIG-MIG), migrant/native descendant of
migrant (MIG-2G), and migrant/native majority (MIG-NAT) - are associated with
different union-migration trajectories, and whether these are consistent across
gender configurations.
Migrant families and Intermarriage in the UK
Similarly to France, the topic of intermarriage has long attracted the atten-
tion of sociologists and demographers, but migrant-native couples have scarcely
been studied in the UK, where mixedness has other avatars. In British studies,
it is mainly the inter-ethnic lens of mixedness which has prevailed. Berrington
(1994, 1996)’s seminal papers dissected trends of intermarriage across different
ethnic groups, using data from the UK Labour Force Survey and the 1991 cen-
sus. She found significant differences between ethnic groups, with much larger
proportions of exogamous couples among people of Caribbean, Chinese and Sub-
Saharan African ethnicity, compared to individuals with Indian, Pakistani and
Bangladeshi ethnicity. Similar ethnic differences in inter-relationship rates were
mentioned in Coleman’s work (1994). The 2011 British Census established that
while nearly 1 in 10 partnered individuals is in an inter-ethnic relationship, this
proportion is lower for White British (4%), Bangladeshi (7%) and Pakistani (9%);
it is much higher for other ethnic groups, notably White Irish (71% partnered are
in an inter-ethnic union), Other Black (62%) as well as among people identifying
with a mixed ethnic group (85% of whom are in inter-ethnic relationships). Of all
inter-ethnic relationships, only 4 in 10 involve a White British partner; among
those that do, the most common constellation is with a White British partner
and an ’Other white’ partner (ONS, 2014). Analysing data from the General
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Household Survey, Muttarak and Heath (2010) also found that both men and
women identifying with a South Asian ethnicity appeared more likely to be in
intra-group relationships compared to other ethnic groups, notably people of
Caribbean, Chinese, and Black African ethnicities.
Because this literature is interested in inter-generational integration and
patterns of convergence (notably in family formation and fertility), primary
migrants are generally distinguished from UK-born descendants of migrants.
In all ethnic groups, South Asians included, UK-born descendants of primary
migrants (the ’second generation’) are associated with higher propensities to
form unions with a member of the native majority group - White British - than
primary migrants (the ’first generation’) from the same ethnic group. This was
already noted by Berrington (1994), and confirmed by Muttarak and Heath (2010).
Nevertheless, the lower rates of exogamous unions among the South Asian
’second generation’ in comparison to other groups led these authors to suggest
that Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi minority groups were likely to follow
a pluralistic rather than a linear path of inter-generational assimilation. They
explained this by these groups’ strong community structures and support and by
cultural norms which encourage the recruitment of endogamous partners.
Inter-generational differences in intermarriage have thus been covered ex-
tensively, whereas heterogeneity within migrant groups and among primary
migrants who follow different migration paths have hardly been addressed. The
only distinction that now appears regularly is between those who migrated be-
fore adulthood - the ’1.5 generation’ - and those who migrated as adults (see
e.g. Kulu and Hannemann (2019) and Kulu, Hill and Hannemann (2016). Distin-
guishing child migrants has indeed proven relevant to explain different fertility
patterns among primary migrants (Wilson, 2019). The reasoning stems from
acculturation-based hypotheses: the point is to establish how early exposure to
the native majority society started, and for long it has been going on in migrants’
lives. This explains why primary migrants’ age at migration and years since
migration to the UK are now factored in (Kulu, Hill & Hannemann, 2016; Kulu,
Hill, Milewski, Hannemann, & Mikolai, 2019)), but why it would not necessarily
lead to a wider and more complex problematisation of migration journeys in
the empirical scholarship. Accordingly, while there are rich and detailed empir-
ical breakdowns of differing rates of inter-ethnic unions across ethnic groups
and generations, there is virtually nothing on whether mixedness, for primary
migrants, may also reflect alternative migration journeys and modes of partner
recruitment.
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4.0.1 Transnational couples and gender relations
In the qualitative literature, the articulation between family formation and
paths of migration has been made, quite specifically, to address so-called ’transna-
tional unions’: unions involving the descendant of a migrant and a primary
migrant from the same ethnic group. Primarily focused on Pakistani Muslims
and Indian Sikhs, the scholarship highlights connections between the formation
of ethnically endogamous unions between British natives and foreign-born indi-
viduals, and particular migration paths, namely marriage migration (Charsley,
Bolognani, Ersanilli, & Spencer, 2020; Charsley et al., 2012; Shaw, 2014). These
transnational unions, more common among South Asian groups, have also been
associated with different modes of partner recruitment - namely arranged or
semi-arranged marriages - and in the case of Pakistani and Bangladeshi com-
munities in the UK, with higher rates of cousin marriages (Qureshi, Charsley, &
Shaw, 2014; Shaw, 2014). In these scenarios, the family of UK-born children of
migrants finds and suggests suitable partners selected in the community of the
parents’ country of origin. If the match is agreed, the migrant partner will look
to move to the UK, with the UK-born partner generally acting as the sponsor
partner in the application for spouse visa. In practice, the percentage of family
migrants in the whole of UK-bound migration is rather small. At its latest peak,
in 2006, it amounted to 74,000 migrants, one in five non-EU migrant for that year.
South Asian migrants form the biggest group, but not the majority among family
migrants (34% in 2010).
Differences within the South Asian group Sociologists have pointed out,
however, that there are cultural divides within the South Asian groups with re-
gards to family formation and marriage migration. Ballard (1990) contrasted Sikh
and Hindu on the one hand, and Muslims on the other hand. Where early cohorts
of UK-born Sikhs did look for migrant partners recruited among Punjabi Sikh,
later cohorts proved more likely to partner with other UK-born Sikh partners
(or recruited from the Sikh diaspora worldwide). Muslim Pakistani, in contrast,
continue to recruit partners in Pakistan much more frequently, specifically in the
Mirpur district whence their family had come. This was in large part because
of the obligations that parents (the primary migrants) felt they had to honour
towards their relatives and community in Pakistan (see also Shaw (2014) and
Qureshi et al. (2014)).
A further distinction concealed by both an ethnicity-based or country-of-
birth based approach is one that contrasts South Asian migrants who came
directly to the UK, and the ’twice migrants’ described by Bhachu (1985), who first
migrated to East Africa, and later to the UK. The direct migrants who came in
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the 1950s and 1960s were mostly drawn from rural areas, and from the regions of
Mirpur and the Punjab (Gardner, 1995). In contrast, the ’twice migrants’, mostly
Indian Sikhs and Indian Muslims, were more urban, mostly professionals, who
spoke English fluently. In addition, by the time they arrived in the UK, their
links to South Asia had already grown more tenuous. Their migration trajectory
helps explain why Indians have been associated with greater socio-economic
integration in the UK compared to Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups (Modood
& Berthoud, 1997). In Bhachu’s account (1985), East African Asians appeared
less insistent on traditionally arranged matches, and newly-married couples
were more likely to live in nuclear rather than inter-generational households;
women were also more likely to be in the labor force, to be graduates and to
delay marriage and childbearing. Thus different cultural rules are associated
with different modes of partner recruitment, and different interlocking of union
formation and migration. Researchers have also noted a shift in perceptions of
transnational and arranged marriages, with the UK-born generation - especially
young women - who want to be involved in the choice of partner, are interested in
’love marriages’, and describes the process of matches as ’assisted’ or even simply
’introduced’ by parents or relatives rather than ’arranged’ (let alone forced) (Ah-
mad, 2012; Twamley, 2014). Finally, Charsley et al. (2020), Charsley, Bolognani,
and Spencer (2017) noted that for British-born Pakistani and Bangladeshi women,
marrying a partner in Pakistan or Bangladesh who subsequently moves to the
UK can actually be an act of empowerment, as it means that their partner, rather
than themselves, have to uproot to the other’s family Lievens (1999).
Thus the association that would equate family migration with marriage
migration, marriage migration with South Asians, South Asian with Islam and
all of it with acute patriarchal violence and domination, hides many layers of
complexity and nuances. Firstly, family migration to the UK involves much
more than marriage migration: people also migrate as reunified children, or in
the case of family-stage migration, as reunified partners. Many couples will
have been formed for years before they can reunify (or start their cohabiting
life) on British soil. It is quite a misconception to assume - even in the case
of marriage migration - that the couple has just been formed for the purpose
of migration. Secondly, while South Asians form the biggest group of family
migrants, there is also a lot of heterogeneity within the group with regards to
marriage practices and couple formation(Shaw, 2014) . Hindus and Sikh have
followed different patterns of assimilation and union-migration for native-born
children, compared to Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims. At the very least,
this would imply that we need to distinguish between Indians and Pakistani or
Bangladeshi migrants. Thirdly, the association between marriage migration and
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an avenue of patriarchal domination is disputed, especially because contrary to
the political implicit, marriage migrants are also men (Charsley, 2005). As for the
role of Islam, Qureshi et al. (2014) also discuss how young women draw on it as
a resource to assert their agency in terms of partner recruitment and marriage
decision. There is much generational diversity among British Pakistani Muslims.
4.0.2 Exogamy, marriage and cohabitation
Importantly, while South Asians are the bigger group among non-EU family
migrants, they are not the only group for whom migration may be relevant to and
connected with family formation - although they may well be the group whose
migration and family formation are most tightly monitored and policed (Turner,
2015). On the other end of the spectrum, the migration and family trajectories
of European and Old Commonwealth countries in Europe go almost entirely
un-researched.1 EU migrants have arguably been the most invisible, since until
very recently their migration and hence also their family forms did not come
under the scrutiny of the Home Office. As a result, we know very little about
how they migrate, at what stage in their life-course, and with what outcomes.
The group made of European and Old Commonwealth countries shows the
highest propensity to be in an exogamous relationship. It is by and large the
group most likely to mix with the White British native majority population (Kulu
& Hannemann, 2019; ONS, 2014). Kulu (2019) interpret it as a sign of rapid
marital assimilation, but also suggest that ’marriage migration may have played
an important role’ (Kulu & Hannemann, 2019, p. 193), thus diversifying the
association between marriage migration and South Asian migration.
With regards to Caribbean migrants, Foner (1979) described an initial mi-
gration wave with pioneer migrants - typically men - joined by common-law
wives or girlfriends shortly thereafter, while children remained in the care of their
grandmothers until their parents had made enough money to afford to bring
them to the UK (see also (Olwig, 2007). Even if the first generation of Caribbean
migrants to Britain may have adapted, to some extent, to the marital norms of
Britain in the 1960s and 1970s,2 they have remained less likely to marry and
more likely to cohabit, have single-parent families or remain single compared to
other ethnic groups, including the White British native majority (Hannemann &
Kulu, Hill, 2015). Black Caribbeans are also one of the most exogamous ethnic
groups, which is perhaps not unrelated to the higher degree of informality in the
1see Kulu (2019), for an exception.
2Foner thought that the first generations to have arrived in the UK had turned somewhat
more traditional in their marital forms and timing (they appeared quicker and more likely to
marry) compared to the Caribbean family system they had come from, where families were
centred on generations of women, and in which premarital relationships and informal unions were
widespread (Shaw, 2014).
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union they form. Indeed, cohabitation and exogamy tend to be connected, in the
sense that the level of mixed unions tend to be higher among non-marital unions
(cohabiting and non-cohabiting) compared with marital unions (Berrington, 1994;
Brown, 1984; Kulu & Hannemann, 2016) although, as Berrington (1994) noted,
this is also confounded with age (younger people are more likely to cohabit) and
with ethnicity (e.g. the Black Carribean group as just discussed). Highly-educated
migrants to the UK have been associated with higher rates of mixing with the
majority native-born population (Kulu & Hannemann, 2019). There is also a
similar effect for migrants with good English skills, and for those less religious.
4.0.3 Migrants’ couple formation and gender asymmetries
The extent to which these paths of migration and mixedness differ by gender
has rarely been a focal point, although migrant spouses, implicitly female and
implicitly South Asian (Simmons, 2008; Wray, 2011), have long been politically
targeted. Claire C. Alexander (2013) links this to the growing (and somewhat
ironic) notion that family migration is a zone of unregulated border governance,
whereby migrant women ’brought over’ to marry co-ethnic British natives can
easily settle in, have children etc. The policy management of family migration is
perceived therefore as a matter of social order, including gender order. Equating
family migration with marriage migration and ’chain migration’ within South
Asian communities, the heavily racialised and gendered narrative paints migrant
spouses/partners as caught in a series of patriarchal relationships, from the
family who ’marry her off’ to the UK-based family she marries into, all of which
make her ill-equipped for integration into British society (Charsley & Shaw,
2006; Wray, 2011). It also provide anti-patriarchal justifications for the political
narrative targeting family migration. In this discourse, the migrant woman is
not only a wife but a submissive one, perceived to be entirely outside the labour
market, either on welfare benefits or as a housewife, which further compromises
acculturation and socio-economic integration (Home Office, 2002, 2011).
Beyond the narrow focus on ’transnational unions’, the question of gender
differences in intermarriage was tackled by Smith, McDonald, Forster, and
Berrington (1996), who found two exceptions to the quasi-symmetry between
men and women’s propensity to endogamy: Pakistani/White and Other
Asian/White unions. In the first case, Pakistani women/white men were much
less common than the reverse. In the second case, it was the other way around:
Other Asian women were more likely to be in inter-ethnic relationships with
White men than Other Asian men were with White women. These gender
asymmetries have persisted: in 2011, the Chinese ethnic group presented the
widest gender gap in ethnic exogamy: Chinese women were twice as likely to
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be in a inter-ethnic relationship compared to their male counterparts; ’Other
Asian’ women were also more often part of inter-ethnic couples compared to
’Other Asian’ men, as were ’Other white’ women compared to ’Other white’ men.
The reverse was true for the Arab, Black African and Black Caribbean groups,
all of whom were associated with higher rates of inter-ethnic relationships for
men rather than for women. The same also applies (although the gender gap
was much smaller) for Pakistani and Bangladeshi (ONS, 2014). When women
from a particular group are more exogamous than men, explanations generally
revolve around gendered and racialised - orientalist, in Edward Said’s sense
(Said, 1978) - representations: the British majority group may portray Asian
women as submissive and attractive embodiment of femininity and Asian men
as inadequate (e.g. effeminate, unattractive) embodiment of masculinity, making
them unevenly suitable partners. When migrant men are more exogamous
than women, on the other hand, this tends to be analysed as the expression
of patriarchal gender norms among the migrant/ethnic group, which exert
stricter monitoring and control over women’s sexuality and choice of partner.
Opportunity structures and gendered-asymmetric migration flows are also
acknowledged to play a role (Kalmijn, 1998; Muttarak & Heath, 2010).
In general, compared to migrant men, migrant women are more likely to
enter as family migrant, and they are more likely to be in married relationships.
Migrant women from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are most likely to be
married compared to natives and to any other migrant group Kulu (2019) and
they are also more likely than almost any other group to be in an endogamous
relationship. They tend to enter their relationship earlier in the life course,
whereas, in general, migrant-native unions with a majority British-born partner
tend to be formed later in the life course; this applies to migrant women and men
(Kulu, 2019).
4.1 Contribution and research question
From this survey it is clear that while there is an understanding - especially
in political narrative - that migration paths and modes of couple formation differ
by gender, and that this has consequences for gender relations in couples, in
the UK, this has been patchily addressed in empirical research. The question
and relevance of gender relations in shaping trajectories of migration has been
raised and investigated mostly with regards to South Asian migration, especially
Muslim migrants, and it has been almost entirely focused on co-ethnic unions and
marriage migration. In the story of how gender interlocks with family formation,
migration and ultimately gender relations, the matter is poltically treated as if
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the root causes are to be found solely in differing gender cultures and sustained
endogamy. The question I develop here, which mirrors the previous chapter,
is whether trajectories and life-course calendars of migration distinguish the
migration of women and men beyond particular migrant groups and cultures,
and whether this is dependent on the choice of partner.
Migration and family formation may be temporally detached, for instance
when migration happens years before couple formation, or years after. Even when
the initial events that mark the start of couple formation or the first migration to
the UK are separated by many years, they may still vastly influence one another
(in terms of partner recruitment, or mode of migration for instance). But it is
also often the case that the two processes happen simultaneously, or in close
succession.
This chapter, which is primarily descriptive in aims, makes several contribu-
tions to the literature, while also building the blocks for the analyses conducted
in the next part of the thesis. Firstly, it systematically investigates gender differ-
ences in timing of family formation and in partner recruitment among migrants.
Secondly, it presents a methodological approach for modelling migration tra-
jectories as interlocked with different stages of the life-course and of couple
formation. Lastly, it shows how migrants’ exogamy reflect not only group dif-
ferences (propensity to endogamy) but also gendered paths of migration and
couple formation. This nuances understandings of ’mixing’ as meaning different
things for migrant men and migrant women involved. Which typical paths lead
to a mixed union with a British majority native for migrant men and migrant
women? How do union-migration paths vary overall for men and women of
different migrant groups? Through this focus on union-migration trajectories,
and its use of sequence analysis, the chapter offers a more holistic and incisive
grasp of how gender differences unravel in and throughout migration. It also
highlights how important the circumstances of migration are to the formation
of mixed couples, and hence how immigration restrictions themselves limit the
possibility of mixing.
The questions that guide the analysis mirror the previous chapters:
1. Do migrants who form couples with a majority native French partner differ
in origins, family patterns and calendar, from migrants in other types
of partnerships (i.e. with other migrants or with direct descendants of
migrants)? Does this change with the gender of the migrant? Considering
patterns of soft segmented assimilation in the UK, we should observe
differences between migrant groups, who are associated with uneven pace
of assimilation (Muttarak & Heath, 2010). Notably, I expect that South
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Asians and Muslims are comparatively scarcely represented among MIG-
NAT couples, while Caribbean, European and atheist/agnostic migrants
may be over-represented.
2. Do migrants who mix with the majority native French group follow differ-
ent trajectories of family formation and migration?
3. Are these trajectories gendered?
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4.2 Data and methods
4.2.1 Data
The data used here is, as discussed before, extracted from Understanding
Society, the UK Longitudinal Household Survey (University of Essex & Institute for
Social and Economic Research, 2019). In order to match as closely as possible the
time frame for the French data, the analysis focused on data from the second wave
of the survey, which was collected between 2010 and 2012. Wave 1 would have
been an even better temporal fit, but the module on household labour (which is
key in the next analytical stage) only appears in the questionnaire at wave 2. The
second wave is also the point at which the sample from the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS) was integrated in Understanding Society. The analysis is
directed at individuals who were in a cohabiting relationships when they were
interviewed for the survey’s second wave of data collection. In addition to the
main data, I took advantage of the dataset on partnership histories re-released
in 2020 (ISER & University of Essex, 2020). This dataset contains information
about all partnership spells reported by adult respondents in Understanding
Society(UKHLS) and British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) samples, with
spells ranging from 2018 as far back as 1912. Some relevant questions (notably
on language skills and religion) were not asked (or asked again) at wave 2 but
appeared in previous or later waves. In cases where answers were missing for
Wave 2, I imputed answers from either the latest previous waves, or alternatively
the earliest later wave with a non-missing answer.
TABLE 4.1: Sample breakdown
Sub-samples (cumulative criteria) N
UKLHS individual survey respondents (w2) 54,565
- in cohabiting relationships 34,281
- both partners were full survey respondents 27,058
- man-woman relationships 26,826
- both partners of working age (18-60) 18,200
- exc. key missing valuesa 17,286
- with individual partnership history data 15,678
- migrant respondents only 2623
Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex)
Wave 2 (2009-2012)
aKey missing values refer to missing values for mi-
gration background (whether UK-born) and for couple
type.
Not all individuals who took
part in the survey at Wave 2 are
included in the dataset on partner-
ships history (see table 4.1 for the
sample breakdown), and the sam-
ple shrinks significantly if we only
keep couples where both partners
appeared in this dataset. Indeed,
information on past relationships
and their timelines are missing
for many respondents or for their
partner (for instance when the
partner was only a temporary sam-
ple member or proxy respondent).
Questions on partnership history were asked at Wave 1 for the UKLHS sample,
and only partial information is available for people who entered the survey after
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Wave 1.3 For the analyses that do not require a detailed timeline of partnership
histories, the chapter will use data from the main survey, so as to maximise
sample size and use.
The final sample of migrants in coresident relationships ends up at about
half the size of the equivalent TeO sample. However, the data here is complete
and mostly symmetrical for both partners, which allows for a much more detailed
analysis of the couples’ dynamics. In contrast to the TeO sample, however, the
number of individuals cannot be equated to the number of couples: here one
couple includes two individuals who are both respondents in the survey. Hence
the number of couples in the sample is half the number of individuals, and
individual observations are not independent from one another but coupled, as
well as nested in households.
Sample restrictions that apply to all analyses are the following: only re-
spondents in cohabiting relationships, and for which the partner is also a survey
respondent at Wave 2; I include only respondents in man-woman relationships
that involve two individuals of working age (18-60).
4.2.2 Variables
Key variables: migration, family formation, timing
Migrants
In UKLHS data, a (im)migrant is defined straightforwardly as an individual who
was born outside the current national borders of the United Kingdom (it therefore
includes for instance British citizens born in former colonies). As we have seen
in earlier chapters, the sampling of migrants is in fact more specific than that;
nevertheless the formal definition and variable remains solely based on the place
of birth as in or outside the UK’s current borders. Understanding Society provides
information on the citizenship of respondents at the time of data collection (for
certain waves), but the questionnaires do not enquire about nationality at birth. It
is not possible therefore to construct the category of primary ’migrant’ to be fully
identical to the French statistical category of immigrant as born abroad and born
foreign. Since according to the French survey designers, it is at any rate a tiny frac-
tion of individuals born abroad who were not also born foreigners (Beauchemin,
Hamel, & Simon, 2016), I assume that this does not distort the analyses to any
significant extent. The classification for second-generation migrants is similarly
altered, since second-generation migrants’ parent(s) are considered migrants by
the same definition that applies to primary migrants. The category native (NAT)
3For more details on the construction and data of the partnership history dataset, see Nandi,
Menon, and Smith (2020)
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encompasses all individuals born in the UK regardless of their nationality at birth
or later. As in the larger working sample, the sample of migrant is restricted
to those who, at Wave 2 of Understanding Society, were 1) partnered and lived
with their partner; 2) between 18 and 60 years old; 3) whose coresident partner
was also aged 18-60. Together these specifications construct the category that
the sample here under study can hope to be representative of, namely partnered
migrants of working age in coresident relationships. Migrants who were either
single, or in a non-cohabiting relationship (whether that be with partners abroad
or partners residing in the UK), are entirely excluded from the analysis.
Couples
At Wave 2 of Understanding Society, the survey included 250 individuals in same-
sex relationships; once applying the same filters (fully productive interviews only,
coresident, partnership history, etc.), this number dwindles to a very small group
of individuals, and an even smaller number of couples. In this chapter as in the
previous one the framing is therefore restricted to man-woman couples. Couple
types (native couples, migrant couples, and so forth), associated characteristics
and estimates refer to coresident couples as they were reported at Wave 2. These
include married and unmarried couples as well as a small number of couples in
a civil partnership.
Timing and ordering: sequences of migration and couple formation
Understanding Society does not provide any information regarding either the
mode of entry into the UK, or the immigration status at the point of survey data
collection. This is in line with other British surveys, a situation deplored by
quantitative migration researchers (e.g. Demireva (2011)). Importantly for this
research, it is not possible to identify people who were, or are legally dependent
on their partner for residency rights in the UK and, concurrently, one cannot
precisely distinguish in this data between those who would be identified, in legal
immigration regulations, as family migrants (spouse visas, family reunification)
from independent migration (work visas, student visas) and refugees/asylum
seekers. It is only through the reconstitution of sequences of family formation
and migration nested within the life course, that one can hope to identify -
not without imprecision - whether migration happened before and presumably
independently from the couple, or if it happened during the relationship.
In order to build the sequences of couple formation and migration, I used
retrospective data derived from the questions on the year of the start of current
relationship (I collapsed year of civil marriage, year of religious marriage and
year of start of cohabitation with current partner. For each couple I retained
as starting date whichever happened first). I also use the year of the start of
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the first relationship (following the same procedure as above), the year the first
relationship ended (if applicable), the year of birth, and the year the migrant
respondent first migrated to France. All these events are considered as nested
within the life course, and as such, it is the age at which they occurred, and
the context of their happening and the time that separates them that matters.
Similarly to the French chapter, the state sequences distinguish a ’childhood’
state, which ends at age 16.
Ordering and timing of migration and couple formation
I also included a simple variable for the ordering of migration and couple
formation, which is coded ’migration before couple’ if migrants arrived in the UK
before marriage or the start of cohabitation (whichever happened first) with their
current partner. When the migration year was after the starting year of the current
relationship, I coded it ’couple before migration’. This category also includes
individuals who married or started cohabiting the same year they first migrated
to the UK, on the reasoning that it appears more likely that these couples were
already formed before migration, rather than to assume that within less than a
year of first migrating to the UK, individuals married or moved in with a partner
they had not been involved with prior to migration.
Further variables and controls
Exogamy
I have included two operationalisations of couple exogamy, to reflect the distinct
British and French statistical approaches to mixedness. The first type of exogamy
refers to inter-ethnic mixed couples, defined as couples for which the ethnic
identity of one partner (as defined by the box they checked for the question
on ethnic identity) differs from that of the other partner.4 The second form of
exogamy relies on migratory background to identify endogamy/exogamy. It
is similar to the classification used in French statistics (as well as most other
continental European statistical definitions on which ’ethnic statistics’ are based
(Morning, 2008)). If both partners were born in the same area, or have at least
one parent born in the same (non-UK) area, they are considered endogamous. In
cases where individuals were born to a mixed couples - i.e. they have a UK-born
parent and a foreign-born parent - the non-UK country prevails (minority focus).
When parents were both born abroad, but in different countries, the mother’s
country of birth takes precedence.
4Following the 2001 Census ethnic categories, the UKLHS ethnic categories were:
British/English/Scottish/Welsh/Northern Irish; Irish; Any other White background; Indian;
Pakistani; Bangladeshi; Any other Asian background; Caribbean; African; Any other Black back-
ground; Arab; Any other ethnic group, as well as the four mixed ethnic options: White and Black
Caribbean; White and Black African; White and Asian; Any other mixed background.
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Geographic areas of origin
I aggregated regions of origin of migrants (and, occasionally, of natives’ parents)
following a classification close to that of Kulu and Hannemann (2016)). The
aggregates are: (1) UK ; (2) EU-27 countries5, plus the other EEA countries
(Switzerland, Norway and Iceland); (3) Caribbean countries; (4) African countries;
(5) India; (6) Pakistan and Bangladesh6; (7) South East Asia (plus Sri Lanka) ;
and (8) all other origins (e.g. Canada, the United States, Canada, China, Hong
Kong). The same classification is used for parents’ area of birth. A more detailed
breakdown of the country of birth represented in the sample is presented in the
appendix (see Appendix table 4).
Working with these country-of-origin aggregates involves no trivial amount
of simplification and problematic labelling. For instance, children of the ’twice
migrants’ born in East Africa will appear in this classification as African. As
demonstrated by e.g. Westwood and Bhachu (1988), aggregating Sikh, Muslim
and Hindu from Punjabis, Tamils, Gujarati, Goans and Bengalis into ’Indian’,
’Pakistani’ and ’Bangladeshi’ origin or ethnic minority groups is decidedly reduc-
tive. However, in view of the limited data and sample available, it seems the only
feasible option.
The ’other’ group as a whole is large but no specific country or coherent
aggregates within it provides a large enough sample that would allow for it to
be analysed separately. Migrants from Turkey were not numerous enough to
be singled out, and in light of the existing research and the previous chapter,
could not be aggregated with another group (e.g. Africa or Europe) either. Some
researchers have justified aggregating migrants from Western, English-speaking
countries, namely Irish migrants with migrants from North America, Australia
and New Zealand (e.g. Demireva (2011) and Kulu (2019)). This, however, would
result in batching together Irish migrants, who have not fallen under British
immigration regulations for decades, and other migrants who have to compose
with the immigration regime. I therefore decided against it.
5A note of caution here: because the EU has expanded over time, some of the migrants who fall
into this category may have migrated before their country became a EU member state. They would
not have been considered EU migrants at the time of their migration. It would not be entirely
valid therefore to state for instance that none of these migrants faced immigration regulations that
constrained their entry, the terms of their remaining in the UK, or their right to be joined by their
family members if applicable.
6The literature on Bangladeshi migration and notably marriage-related migration to the UK
is much more limited than that on Indian or Pakistani migration, but suggests similarities with
Pakistani migration. Like migration from Pakistan, migration to Britain from Bangladesh has
been since the 1980s numerically dominated by marriage-related migration involving the already-
settled British Bengali community (Charsley et al., 2012; Gardner & Shukur, 1994). The relevant
scholarship also gives anecdotal evidence of relatively high rates of arranged or semi-arranged
marriages (Gardner, 1995, 2006)
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Educational level, Religion, religiosity and language skills
I classified respondents’ educational level into five categories, based on the
highest educational qualification obtained: tertiary education (mainly university
degrees); other higher education (e.g. nursing degrees), A-levels, GSCE, no
qualification or lower than GSCE.
The different religious affiliations were clustered into the following cate-
gories: Protestants (all Anglican and protestant confessions); Catholic (Roman
Catholic, under the authority of the Pope); Other Christian faiths; Muslim; Hindu;
other religions (an eclectic mix including Buddhist, Jewish, Sikh and other faiths);
and those declaring no religion. The majority of UKLHS respondents were not
asked about their religious identification at Wave 2, and the variable yields a large
number of missing answers.7 A simpler ’religiosity’ dummy variable contrasts
respondents who identify as having a religion (regardless of which one), with
respondents who stated that they have no religion.
English Language skills Unfortunately, there was no question asked about
English language skills at Wave 2, so I resorted again to cross-wave imputation.8
If respondents indicated that they had any difficulty doing any of a number
of tasks in English (routine daily interactions, reading, phone conversations,
completing forms), either at wave 1 or at wave 5, they were identified as having
’some difficulties’ with the English language. If they answered the questions
and reported no difficulty for any of the tasks, they were identified as having
no difficulty with English. In cases where the information was missing, but the
respondents had identified English as being their first language, and/or they
were UK-born to UK-born parents, it was assumed that they would not have any
particular difficulty with the English language. As with the questions on religion,
the numbers of missing values were high. I present descriptive analyses in this
chapter for these variables, analyses which exclude cases with missing answers,
but I do not include them at in the more complex models in later chapters.
7Only new entrants and people who had not been able to give a full interview before were
asked about their religion at Wave 2. To compute this variable I pooled together the little data that
was available in Wave 2, with data from Wave 1’s module on religion and from the last wave of
the BHPS (wave 18). In spite of these efforts, the variable still yields a large number of missing
answers, which is reflected in the standard errors.
8The language module came up at wave 1, and then not before four waves later, at wave 5. I
have pooled together the data from wave 1 and that from wave 5, a triangulation which still leaves
many missing answers, some due to attrition.
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4.2.3 Methods
Weighting and statistical tools
All analyses are survey-weighted unless specified otherwise, using the
weights made available by the survey design team.9 The weighting accounts for
non-random missing values and for the complex survey design, which is clus-
tered and stratified, and includes the Ethnic Minority Boost Sample. Whenever
the issue of strata with a single primary unit arose, the standard error estimates
for such strata are calculated on the distance from the mean across strata, rather
than a strata mean (Pitblado, 2009), as recommended by Understanding Soci-
ety’s survey design team (Lynn, 2015). When applicable, standard errors are in
brackets.
Analytical methods
I will not repeat here the technical details of the sequence analysis - the
reader is referred to the previous chapter. As before, the sequences range from
five years before migration to five years after migration. The sequences are
left-truncated if migrants were not yet born on any of the given years before
migration; they are right-truncated by the year of Wave 2 interview, as couples’
trajectories are not accounted for after that. As before, I use optimal matching for
the dissimilarity matrix and base the distances on the frequency of transitions
between states. The computation of the dissimilarity matrix and the clustering
are survey-weighted.10 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the sample is much
smaller than the one exploited for the sequence analysis of migrants living in
France (about half of the equivalent TeO data). All analyses are survey-weighted
unless specified otherwise.
9Specifically, I use the Wave 2 cross-sectional weights for main interview data from UKLHS full
respondents (drawn from the GPS, EMBS and BHPS samples). Proxy respondents are excluded
since the proxy questionnaire skipped questions that are essential to this research (e.g. on certain
timings of family formation and on household labour contribution). Having not made use of the
extra 5 minutes questions, it was not necessary to use the related weights.
10The tools used for the sequence analysis and clustering allow to factor in survey weights, but
not to account for stratified survey design. This is a possible flaw of the weighting strategy used
here for optimal matching and clustering applied to UKLHS data, an issue which does not arise
for the TeO analyses.
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4.3 Results
4.3.1 Partnered migrants in the UKLHS: couple types and geographic
origins
TABLE 4.2: Couple type and areas of birth by gender of migrants
Migrant women Migrant men Together
n %-w n %-w n %-w
Couple types
MIG-NAT 541 30 406 24 947 27
MIG-2G 217 9 265 9 482 9
MIG-MIG 1644 61 1638 66 3282 64
total: all couples 2402 100 2309 100 4711 100
Areas of birth
EU 383 32 296 28 679 30
Caribbean 49 2 54 2 103 2
Africa 337 16 408 21 745 18
India 263 12 262 13 525 12
Pakistan/Bangladesh 430 10 476 11 906 11
Southeast Asia 172 8 124 6 296 7
Other areas 308 20 250 19 558 20
total: all areas 1942 100 1870 100 3812 100
Note: n refers to sample size. %-w refers to survey-weighted percentages.
Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012)
Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.
FIGURE 4.1: Area of origin over time, among partnered migrant
women and men living in the UK in 2009-2012
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The figure 4.1 illustrates the distribution of migratory origins by year of
arrival, among partnered migrants living in the UK at the end of the 2010s.
One should keep in mind, however, that the figure represents the (weighted)
distribution of migrants’ origin in the UKLHS sample, and not migration waves
as such, let alone number of entries per year or any such estimate. The general
upward trend is largely attributable to the fact that migrants recently arrived are
less likely to have left the survey (because of e.g. return migration, survey attrition
or death), and will therefore be represented in the sample in proportionally larger
numbers. Nevertheless, for both partnered migrant men and migrant women,
the share of European migrants increases sharply in recent migration, i.e. among
migrants who arrived in the 2000s. The rise is most noticeable for the year 2004
and after, which marked the EU-enlargement and the accession of Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia,
and Slovenia to EU-membership. The waves of migrant women and migrant
men do not appear very differentiated, certainly less so than in the French case.
Caribbean migrants constitute a small fraction of the population under study
here. This is also to be understood in the context of their lower rates of marriage
and cohabitation (Hannemann & Kulu, Hill, 2015; Kulu, 2019), which implies
that they would be less represented among partnered migrants.
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FIGURE 4.2: Area of origin and religion of migrants by couple
type, among migrant women (right) and migrant men (left) living
in the UK
The figure 4.2 provides a visualisation of the breakdown of areas of origins
and main religions, by couple types and by gender. The singularity of migrant-
native couples (MIG-NAT) is apparent on both aspects. As noted by many
researchers, including some who used UKLHS data, European migrants are
much more likely than others to form relationships with majority natives. They
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are by far the most represented origin among migrants in relationship with a
majority British native. This applies to migrant women/native men couples, as
well as to migrant men/native women couples. The second most represented
geographic group for migrants in MIG-NAT couples is the ’other’ category. In
contrast, when looking at migrant couples and MIG-2G couples, the proportion of
African, Indian and Pakistani migrants is much more sizeable. Interestingly, the
plots for MIG-NAT couples and for MIG-MIG couples are symmetrical, showing
no signs of significant gender difference in terms of geographic origins. The
plot for MIG-2G couples is more lopsided, reflecting different composition (or
recruitment) for migrant men and migrant women. Migrant men who partner
up with descendants of migrants born in the UK are more likely to come from
Pakistan/Bangladesh, India or Africa; migrant women in MIG-2G unions come
comparatively more often from Europe or from the ’other areas’ group. The same
analysis broadly applies to the distribution by religious identification in each
couple type. Couples formed by a primary migrant and a UK-born descendant
of migrants differ by gender, with migrant men being more likely to identify
as Muslim, and migrant women more likely to be Catholic. Other couple types
are symmetrical from the point of view of gender, but show stark variations
across couple types. Migrant-native couples contrast sharply with the other
two types, with a much larger proportion of non-religious migrants - close to or
over 1 in 2 migrants in a migrant-native couples. This supports other research
that found religiosity to be associated with higher propensity for intra-group
marriage (Kulu & Hannemann, 2016)). Migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples also
involve a greater proportion of protestant migrants, something which aligns
with the idea that migrants who are culturally close to the majority (Anglican,
protestant) British-born population are more likely to form unions with them
compared to other groups. On this note, it is interesting here to observe that
Catholic migrants are evenly represented across couple types and gender (with
the exception of men in MIG-2G couples, who are less often Catholic), which
would suggest that they do not enjoy a greatly facilitated access to - or partner
recruitment in - the British majority population. Nevertheless, there is still a clear
contrast with non-Christian faiths, e.g. Muslim and Hindu migrants who are
almost never involved in migrant-native couples (MIG-NAT); at the same time,
Muslim migrants constitute the largest religious group in MIG-2G couples and
in migrant couples, and Hindu migrants form a sizeable section (about 15%) of
migrant couples.
An interesting point here is brought by attention to fluency in the English
language. One finds little difference between couple types and between genders
- except when it comes to migrant-native couples. The proportion of migrant
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TABLE 4.3: Migrant women and migrant men, by couple types















EU 45 24 26 32 39 13 26 28
Caribbean 2 6 1 2 2 6 1 2
Africa 12 12 18 16 20 17 21 21
India 1 9 18 12 1 23 16 13
Pakistan/Bangladesh 0 21 13 10 1 31 13 11
Southeast Asia 10 6 8 8 7 1 7 6
Other areas 30 20 16 20 31 8 16 19
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Religion
Protestant 13 8 6 8 16 6 5 8
Catholic 21 20 21 21 19 5 19 18
Other Christian 10 7 12 11 6 6 12 10
Muslim 1 26 23 17 3 38 22 19
Hindu 1 4 13 9 0 7 13 9
Other religion 10 8 9 9 2 13 7 7
No religion 44 27 17 26 54 25 22 30
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Education
Tertiary education 45 47 41 42 38 33 43 41
Other higher education 16 17 16 16 14 12 13 13
A-levels 10 4 8 8 11 11 10 10
GCSE 13 10 10 11 18 11 8 11
No or lower qualifications 16 22 26 23 20 34 27 26
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
English language
% have difficulties with English 35 48 69 57 15 46 67 53
Note: All percentages are survey-weighted.
Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).
Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.
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TABLE 4.4: Migrant’s union formation, exogamy, ordering and
timing















% interethnic couples 63 40 16 33 45 25 16 24
% exogamous (migratory origins) 100 58 22 49 100 26 17 40
Unions and children
% married 73 89 88 84 73 90 87 84
% coresident children under 16 50 64 63 59 48 73 62 59
% parents 75 89 86 83 78 83 87 84
% more than 2 children 11 26 24 20 10 24 22 19
Ordering
% migrated before relationship 73 51 39 51 89 66 52 63
% migrated before 1st relationship 66 47 35 46 85 63 47 58
Timing (mean)
















































Note: All percentages and means are survey-weighted.
Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).
Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.
women in migrant-native relationships who reported some difficulties in English
(35%) is more than twice that of migrant men in relationship with a native (NAT)
woman (15%).
4.3.2 Timings and ordering of migration and couple formation: gen-
dered calendars
4.3.3 Union-migration sequences
The typology of union-migration sequences was built using the same ap-
proach as in the chapter on France-bound migrations. The states used for the
state sequences are similarly defined as (1) childhood (16 years old or younger);
(2) single (and at least 17 years old); (3) first relationship (whether cohabiting or
married); (4) in-between (time between the end of the first relationship and the
start of the relationship the respondent was a part of at the time of the UKLHS
Wave 2 interview); (5) later relationship (refers to the relationship at Wave 2 if
it is not the respondents’ first relationship). As in the chapter on France, the
’in-between’ state can cover periods of other relationships and/or periods of
single life. States referring to periods of relationship (i.e. ’first relationship’ and
’later relationship’) include both periods of cohabitation and marriage with one
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partner. The starting date of a relationship is either the start of cohabitation or
the date of marriage (or civil partnership), whichever happened first. In cases
where respondents gave distinct separation and divorce date for the end of the
first relationship (if applicable), the separation date is used as end date.
FIGURE 4.3: Union-migration sequences (weighted)













































































First migration to the UK
As was the case with the TeO data, the most common sequence is that of
child migrants, when migration to the UK occurs between 5 and 11 years old (see
figure 4.3). The second most common sequence is also the one that sees migration
coincide with the formation of the first relationship. Whereas with the TeO data,
the quality assessment of the partitioning pointed to an optimum at six clusters,
with the UKLHS, the quality measures are best overall for a clustering into five
groups (see plot 4.4). The quality measures for a partitioning in five clusters are
satisfactory; they are presented in the appendix, table 5.
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FIGURE 4.4: Cluster cutoff criteria for union-



































ASWw ( −2.02 / 0.93 )
HG ( −1.48 / 0.94 )
PBC ( −1.52 / 1.22 )
HC ( −0.87 / 1.53 )
2 4 6 8 10
The five clusters thus formed
through optimal matching and parti-
tions around medoids are very simi-
lar to those identified with the French
data. The one difference is that the
same population that was divided into
two clusters in the last division in the
French typology (’young single mi-
grants’ and ’single adult migrants’)
is collapsed into one cluster (’single
adult’) in this classification’. The ’sin-
gle adult’ group is not split by an extra
partition. Moving from five to six clusters leads to a distinction among child
migrants, between those who migrated very young, and those who migrated
in their early teens (see Appendix, table 12). In this the results of the sequence
analysis differ between the French and British cases. The difference is, however,
very minor. Other clusters appear entirely consistent with the classification based
on the French data (see figure 4.5).
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The gender difference in the union-migration is again clearly apparent when
plotting migrant women’s and migrant men’s sequences side-by-side (figure
4.6). The drop at mig = 0 (year of first migration to the UK) in the plot of
women’s sequences contrasts with men’s sequences. It marks, as in the previous
chapter, the simultaneity of (first) couple formation and migration as a important,
common and distinctive feature of women’s migration.


















































As expected, women are more likely than men to fall into the sequence
’formation 1st partnership’. This is true across couple types but the contrast
with migrant men is in no small part attributable to migrant-native (MIG-NAT)
couples. Figure 4.7 shows the breakdown of sequence clusters by couple types,
distinguishing between migrant women and migrant men. One can see that
among MIG-2G couples, the proportion of migrant men who migrated around
the same time as they were forming their first union is only very slightly lower
than that of women. The difference is starker among migrant couples, but still
concerns a large proportion of migrant men (over 30%) as well as migrant women
(over 40%). The gender difference is more acute among migrant-native (MIG-
NAT) couples, with migration coinciding with the start of the first relationship
for slightly under 30% of women, but only half of that for men. The asymmetry
(or symmetry) across the vertical axis of the barplots in figure 4.7 helps visualise
the gender differences (or similarities) in the distribution of union-migration
sequences.
MIG-2G couples are mostly symmetrical, with less obvious differences
between migrant women and migrant men’s sequences of union-migration, com-
pared to other couples. The main point of gender asymmetry is child migration,
which concerns a greater proportion of migrant men than migrant women. The
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sample size for migrants in relationships with descendants of migrants is, how-
ever, rather small (hence the large standard errors brackets). In migrant couples,
single adult migration is more common among men, while the coincidence of
migration with the formation of the first partnership is more common among
women. In other respects, the distribution of sequences does not change markedly
between men and women.
Migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples stand out visibly, and this in two differ-
ent ways: the distribution of sequences is most obviously asymmetrical, signify-
ing that the paths of union-migration leading to a relationship with a majority
British native are more acutely gendered; and the prevalence of child migration
is uniquely high, compared to other couples. This is especially true for migrant
men: almost 60% of migrant men in a relationship with a majority British native
(MIG-NAT) migrated when they were children, long before family formation
years. This is three times the proportion for migrant men in migrant couples,
and twice the proportion for migrant men in relationship with a descendant of
migrant. Likewise, 40% of migrant women with a British-born partner with no
direct migration ties migrated as children (25% for migrant women in MIG-2G
couples, and under 20% of women in migrant couples). In addition, migrant
women in MIG-NAT couples are the ones most likely to have migrated as single
adults, both compared to their male counterparts, and to migrant women in other
types of relationships. While the proportion of single adult migrants is indeed
higher for migrant men than for migrant women in migrant couples and in
MIG-2G couples, this is reversed for migrants in MIG-NAT couples. This brings
some further nuance (if any was needed) to the image of single adult migrants
as the default migrants and as default-masculine. When looking at partnered
migrants, the union-migration sequence that locates migration after childhood
but (generally long) before couple formation concerns only a small proportion of
migrants (under 20% overall); and, in the case of MIG-NAT couples, it concerns a
greater proportion of migrant women than migrant men.
The figure 4.7 thus illustrates three key points: (1) how the different couple
types are associated with different distributions of union-migration trajectories;
(2) it highlights the singularity of migrant-native MIG-NAT couples’ trajectories;
and (3) it shows how trajectories varies depending on the gender of the migrant
considered.
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FIGURE 4.7: Union-migration sequences by couple type, among
migrant women (left) and migrant men (right) living in the UK
4.4 Discussion
My first hypothesis, already well-established in the literature, was that, from
the point of view of geographic origin, the composition of migrant-native (MIG-
NAT) couples would differ compared to other couple types. Indeed, European
migrants notably, appear in much greater proportion in MIG-NAT couples com-
pared to migrants from other groups, as do migrants who declare no religion.
This would suggest that fast marital assimilation is more available or accessible
for these groups, while it is not for South Asian migrants and for either Mus-
lim or Hindu migrants. This is not necessarily, or not only, about endogamous
preferences on the side of the migrants, but also about the constraints linked to
migration timing and regime. Contrary to EU migrants who have been mostly
free to come and go independently, family migration has been the main mode
of entry for South Asian migrants for some decades. By definition, this mode of
migration involves an already-established relationship, or at the very least depen-
dence and reliance on established relatives. Except for couples formed between
migrants and second-generation migrants, differences in the geographic origins
of migrants in different couple types were not clearly gendered. The greater
proportion of migrant men from Pakistan/Bangladesh and India in relationships
with UK-born descendants of migrants could reflect the practice of finding over-
seas, co-ethnic partners for the British-born second-generation, something which
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All migrant women (part-
nered)
24 13 39 17 6 100
Couple types
MIG-NAT 40 19 28 4 9 100
MIG-2G 26 13 47 7 7 100
MIG-MIG 16 10 44 25 5 100
Areas of birth
EU 22 15 43 11 9 100
Caribbean 53 20 14 7 5 100
Africa 30 15 28 25 2 100
India 19 6 53 21 1 100
Pakistan/Bangladesh 35 5 44 15 0 100
Southeast Asia 15 12 40 23 10 100
Other areas 19 15 37 19 9 100
Qualification (highest)
Tertiary education 17 15 44 16 7 100
Other higher education 21 17 35 20 5 100
A-levels 30 15 39 12 4 100
GCSE 62 6 19 9 4 100
No or lower qualifications 19 7 44 24 7 100
Note: All percentages are survey-weighted.
Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).
Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.
has been documented for South Asian migrant groups (especially Pakistani and
Bangladeshi) and is seemingly more common for second-generation daughters
than sons (Charsley et al., 2020). In line with this interpretation is the propor-
tion of migrant men in these couples whose migration coincided with couple
formation.
The migration-union trajectories undertaken by migrants in relationships
with majority natives are not typically the same as those of migrants in migrant
couples (who tend to be already in a relationship when they migrate) or those of
migrants who form a union with a native descendant of migrant (who are more
likely to have migrated around the same time as their relationship started). If we
consider that the third sequence cluster (Formation 1st partnership) likely covers
most of marriage migration, then it is worth noting that while MIG-2G couples
have the highest proportion of such union-migration trajectories (especially for
men), they still represent a very small proportion of (any) sequence and do not by
any means have the monopoly of marriage migration (see figure 4.8). In fact, and
as ventured by Kulu (2019), a non-trivial proportion of migrant women partnered
with a native majority man fit into this same migration-union cluster. It is actually
the second most common trajectory for MIG-NAT couples involving a migrant
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All migrant men (partnered) 30 19 28 17 7 100
Couple types
MIG-NAT 62 14 15 3 6 100
MIG-2G 35 17 38 4 5 100
MIG-MIG 16 21 32 24 7 100
Areas of birth
EU 27 21 26 14 12 100
Caribbean 52 7 16 11 13 100
Africa 33 22 22 15 8 100
India 16 17 45 21 1 100
Pakistan/Bangladesh 31 17 39 13 0 100
Southeast Asia 33 20 19 24 5 100
Other areas 31 16 27 19 7 100
Qualification (highest)
Tertiary education 25 21 28 20 6 100
Other higher education 29 18 33 8 12 100
A-levels 25 29 34 12 1 100
GCSE 64 10 13 6 6 100
No or lower qualifications 26 15 30 21 8 100
Note: All percentages are survey-weighted.
Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).
Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.
woman. This undermines the credibility of the equation that treats marriage
migration as an expression of minorities’ endogamous matrimonial strategies
only.
FIGURE 4.8: Couple types distribution by union-migration clus-
ters, by migrants’ gender
Migration-union trajectories thus distinguished couple types, but also re-
vealed gender differences within couple types, depending on the gender configu-
ration of the couple. Among the migrants in relationships with native majority
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partners, migrant men and migrant women proved to have followed rather differ-
ent trajectories of migration and couple formation. The migrant men who form
relationships with native majority women are overwhelmingly recruited among
child migrants. In contrast, migrant women in relationships with native majority
men are comparatively much more likely than their male counterparts to have
arrived into the UK as adults, whether independently (Single adult sequence) or
coinciding with the formation of their first relationship (Formation 1st partnership
sequence). One way to interpret this gendered trajectory is that migrant men who
form relationships with native majority are on a path of fast intra-generational
assimilation, reflected in their marital assimilation. It is facilitated by the fact that
many of the migrant men involved are European and white. In contrast, couples
formed by a migrant woman and a native majority also involve paths of marriage
migration, reflecting international partner recruitment which selects primarily
highly-educated migrant women. It is interesting to note, however, that the
partnered women, those who migrated as single adults, and the women who mi-
grated after the end of a first union spell (cluster mutliple union spells) were almost
as likely as child migrants to have formed relationships with majority natives -
an observation which does not apply to migrant men (see figure 4.8). This could
suggest that for women who migrate with a certain degree of independence from
the institution of marriage and their (first) partner may be in a position to follow
particularly rapid paths of acculturation and marital assimilation (something
suggested for instance by S. Scott and Cartledge (2009) in the context of European
migration, and by Collet (2015)).
More generally, the sequence analysis paints a complex but highly gendered
picture of migration trajectories. Very consistent with the analysis drawn from the
French data, the decomposition by sequence clusters highlights the complexity
of how migration and couple formation meet and overlap in the life-course. The
interlocking of migration and couple formation is particularly tight for migrant
women, for whom the transitions of migration and entering couple life come often
simultaneously. However, the analysis shows that the migration of men is often
entangled in couple formation too, even if for a larger proportion of them, couple
formation happens long before or long after. The breakdown by educational
level brings further gendered nuance: even within migration sequences, the
recruitment can be quite different: an important point is the particularly high
educational level of migrant women in marriage-migration sequences, something
which echoes studies of women’s geographical hypergamy (see e.g. Suksomboon
(2011) but also Basu (2015)).
These two chapters (chapter 3 and 4) thus contribute to the literature on mi-
gration and notably family migration by constructing a methodological approach
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to tackle the migration trajectory more comprehensively and more holistically
as nested in the life-course. This refines understandings of family migration,
identifying distinct paths where migration and partnerships are intertwined -
when migration coincides with the formation of a first relationship; when it
happens within the context of a long-going relationship; when it happens af-
ter the dissolution of a first relationship, and/or involves a later relationship.
Specifically, this is an important empirical contribution for feminist scholarship
on migration. This approach also help emphasise the significance and relevance
of gender relations when considering the different ways in which migration
and family interlock, even when the migration itself does not fit in the narrow
box of the legal admission category of family migrant. Indeed, union-migration
paths reflect deep divides between migrant women and migrant men, which are
reflected in legal admission category (see chapter 3) but also extend beyond them
and especially beyond legal distinctions between family and work migration.
Further, these chapters contribute to the scholarship on mixedness and
intermarriage by bringing another dimension to how gender plays out in mixed
unions. The fact that intermarriage rates vary by gender and by ethnic or migrant
group is well-established in the literature (Wang, 2012). It is generally explained
by gender asymmetries within groups, opportunity structures, as well as gender-
racialised affinities and orientalist stereotypes that make some minority women
(and some minority men) more attractive partners for the majority group than
others. I show that gender also strongly differentiates between the paths that
lead migrant women and migrant men to intermarriage.
4.4.1 Limitations
In this part of the thesis which encompasses chapter 3 and 4, I have built
a typology of trajectories followed by (ultimately) partnered migrants. In the
definition of partnership I have however reproduced a narrow definitions that
emphasizes the nuclear man-woman family and household co-residence among
those often tied by legal marriage. Such focus has rendered many immigrant
families invisible in the past (Ishii-Kuntz, 2000): female-headed families with no
resident husband or partners, transnational families, extended families, families
that are not based around a couple or blood ties such as co-residence groups,
which emerge out of the conditions of migration.
One obvious limitation of the approach developed here is that it is entirely
focused on partnered migrants, which implies a non-trivial selection bias, since
many migrants might remain single and the trajectories of those who are likely
to differ and to be more embedded in family formation. Further, the analysis
I have conducted only considers partnered migrants whose partner also lives
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in France with them. The couples geographically separated by migration, as
described by Hochschild (2000) and Parreñas (2005), or by Palenga-Möllenbeck
(2013) for European care chains, are absent. The sequences also do not model
the arrival of children in family formation sequences, although I have tried to
account for that in the rest of the modelling. Finally, the sequence design does
not allow for the integration of more complex migration sequences. So-called
’birds of passage’ (Piore, 1979) - migrants whose migration is either temporary
or circular (Morokvasic, 1984; Piore, 1979) - would have little chance of being
adequately represented here.
Yet one aspect of what has been described as the ’feminization’ of migrations
to France or the UK is the return migration of those (mainly single men) who
decided not to stay when the labour market and immigration policies became
less hospitable. Many migrants whose experiences in France or the UK perhaps
did not live up to their expectations returned to their country of origin before
they could enter the surveys, and we have very little information on them. The
lack of data on the number of people who leave and, more importantly, who they
are, why they left and what happened to them after they did, remains a major
shortcoming of most survey-based quantitative migration research. As in most
empirical analyses of migration, I too cannot account for return migration. It is
likely that a significant proportion of migrant workers in Europe, who arrived in
the second half of the 20th century, have since left (Böhning, 1984; Courbage, 1995;
Dustmann, Bentolila, & Faini, 1996) 11. The gender composition of the migrant
population, captured at any single time in a given survey, is therefore distorted
by the unequal capacities of (cross-sectional) methods and data to account for
migrants who leave, and for the fact that those who stay are more likely to have
or to bring a family in their host country.
The retrospective re-construction of their relationship story by respondents
may also warrant some caution. I have chosen to rely on a compound variable
that situates the beginning of a relationship at the point where it appears official
to respondents - either because they consider it to be official (for first relation-
ships) or because they married or moved in together. The fact that migration
and couple formation appear to happen simultaneously or in close succession for
many migrants, women especially, may perhaps reflect in some cases relation-
ships that actually pre-existed, but became official when the project of migration
was brought up. In addition, married and cohabiting relationships are by no
means the only forms of relationships. Non-cohabiting relationships are one of
11For instance, Böhning (1984) gauges that as many as two thirds of Germany’s Gastarbeiters
went back, whereas it is often assumed that most settled in Germany, ultimately bringing their
partner and family to them.
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the features of the ’second demographic transition’. Marsicano (2012) found that
mixed couples are more likely to be non-cohabiting partnerships, and if cohab-
iting, are less likely to be married. This she interpreted as a reflecting precisely
the social cost of mixing and the fear of community and family disapproval,
which is partially avoided by choosing more informal (and discrete) modes of
partnership. The analysis presented in the present thesis, in addition, also does









Trajectories of migration and
mixing and the gender division
of labour in France
Chapter introduction
In the previous part, I showed that migrant women and migrant men fol-
low different path of union-migration, and that these paths also vary widely
depending on the couple they form and the partners they pick. I now use this
part to investigate whether these paths - these sequences of migration and couple
formation - can help make sense of the gender division of labour deployed in
migrants’ couples. This part tries to answer two questions: one naive, and one
trickier; the first one could be formulated as such: from the point of view of
gender equality in couples, is it better for migrants to mix with majority natives?
But the second question complicates this by asking - does it depend on the gender
of the migrant involved, and on how they got there?
Intermarriage, gender specialisation and exchange theory
Intermarriages between migrants and natives specifically, have also been
connected to lower specialisation of labour between partners, which Nottmeyer
(2014) links to a higher degree of positive assortative mating on human capital
(notably education) (see also Chiswick and Houseworth (2011) and Furtado and
Theodoropoulos (2010, 2011). In Becker-inspired approaches (G. S. Becker, 1981,
1985), couples in which both partners have the same educational level and career
prospects have less incentives to specialise. Migrants who intermarry - especially
migrant women - are, as observed earlier in this thesis, often highly-educated,
(Hamel, Lhommeau, Pailhé, & Santelli, 2015). Subsequently, they are more likely
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to be matched or hypogamous in educational terms, and therefore, one would
expect, less likely to specialise in domestic labour.
Yet Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith (2000) also found differences
by gender on human capital selectivity among intermarried migrant men and
women. This suggests that the specialisation of labour in the household may also
be a function of the gender of the intermarried migrant partner. Indeed, Basu
(2017) observed that the degree of labour specialisation was much higher when
the migrant partner was a woman: the division of labour was more polarised in
intermarriages involving migrant women, compared to those involving migrant
men. This was also Nottmeyer (2014)’s finding. In line with status exchange
theory, some have theorised that migrant women may choose to bargain away
their career aspirations and accept a more domestic role in exchange for the higher
status attached to partnering with a native. Grossbard-Shechtman (1993) and
Grossbard-Shechtman and Fu (2002) found this approach to hold truer for women.
Although the vocabulary of exchange theory presents this as the outcome of a
bargain, it is unclear however whether the women involved actually anticipate
and consented to such a deal, or whether it is the product of the asymmetry of
power between them and their native partner. That is certainly what some of
the literature suggests, notably with respect to migrant women whose decision
to uproot to join or marry their native European partner was also motivated by
hopes of gender-egalitarian relationship and opportunities that were, ultimately,
disappointed. Overall, previous literature on immigrants in Europe, Australia
and the USA has found that male migrants’ labour performance mostly benefits
from intermarriage. This benefit (measured in terms of income gains) is thought
to be the result of their ability to tap into the native partner’s social networks
and better socio-economic integration (Meng & Gregory, 2005; Nottmeyer, 2014).
For migrant women, on the other hand, intermarriage can be associated with a
wage penalty. Explanations vary from un-observable heterogeneity to greater
specialisation in the domestic sphere at the cost of labour market participation
(Basu, 2015). But they may also have to do with how people migrated and met -
in other words, union-migration trajectories.
The power relation in mixed couples can be heavily tilted in favour of the
native partner because of their greater familiarity, integration and networks in
the country of immigration. This asymmetry can be rooted in or reinforced
when it is reflected in legal dependency - when the migrant partner obtained
the right to enter and settle in the country as ’partner of nationals’ (conjoint de
Français). Furthermore, the migration experience itself can affect the bargaining
power of the migrant partner by devaluing their qualifications and isolating them
from their social and family networks, typically in the case of couple-forming
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migration. The observation that partner and family visa can become a tool of
power and be used to impose patriarchal divisions of roles and labour, had been
made by Nicollet (1992, p. 310) long ago in studies of the Sub-Saharan African
couples formed in the first waves of family reunification. Zehraoui (2003) made
this point with regards to Algerian couples formed when women joined in France
their already-long settled husbands. The issue has also been raised with regards
to intermarried migrant-native couples across Europe (see Bensaid (2013, pp. 116–
117) and Riaño and Baghdadi (2007)).
More specifically, we would expect that this effect on dependency and
power relation is heightened when women follow specific paths of migration -
notably those that match best with the categories of ’reunified’ migration and
’family forming’ migration (González-Ferrer, 2011; Huschek, de Valk, & Liefbroer,
2011). In the sequence typology I designed, that would the sequences formation
1st partnership and established first partnership. Marriage migrant women also
have higher fertility levels than women who did not migrate in the context
of the formation of a relationship (Kulu & González-Ferrer, 2014; Wolf, 2016).
Conversely, some studies investigated the potential advantages of anchor spouses
in the couple’s power balance and gender division of labour (Beck-Gernsheim,
2007). (Lievens, 1999). When contracted by migrant women, the ’debt’ of having
been brought in is part of a migratory context and arrival that is prone to fostering
patriarchal models, where the settled or native husband is an indispensable
intermediary and referent. We could expect this to apply to native majority
women, although, as seen in the previous chapters, couple-forming sequences
of union-migration are rare among intermarried migrant men. In the context
of intermarriage, there may also be a native ’premium’, which tilts the power
balance further in the favour of the native man, but could also potentially have
the opposite effect when the native partner is a woman...
On the other hand, natives are unlikely to hold a great advantage over their
migrant partner if the latter migrated as children: the 1.5 generation’s social
capital and autonomy is likely mostly restored by the time they start partner
selection. As it happens, we know now thanks to the previous part that the
trajectories of migrant women and migrant men in mixed unions are different,
and that women’s path to mixing with the French or British majority groups
involve a high proportion of couple-forming migration and legally tied migration.
If the context of migration and family-formation matters for the gender division
of labour, we should expect to find differences between the mixed couples formed
by migrant women and those formed by migrant men.
This is the core hypothesis: that union-migration sequences matter for the
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gender division of labour. This does not mean that nothing else matter. I expect
that this is combined with other factors: the area of origin (which gives a measure
of distinct gender-socialisation or ’gender cultures’), and mixedness as such.
We know that there are differences in the gender division of housework along
ethnic lines in the UK, with different ethnic groups operating with more or
less gender-specialisation. Migrants may arrive with gender representations and
expectations that are the product of their socialisation in the country of emigration
and in their community. These can significantly differ from dominant gender
attitudes in Western countries of immigration (Roeder & Mühlau, 2014) and be
reflected in their expectations and practices of gender-specialisation of labour,
and not always in the direction of more patriarchy. Concurrently, migrants who
arrived as children are more likely to be influenced by the gender norms of the
country of immigration, whereas those arrived adults may be more set on the
gender norms they have been socialised to in their country of birth. Finally, even
among adult migrants, Espiritu (1999) suggested that the process of international
migration and mixedness could weaken conservative gender expectations around
the male breadwinner/female homemaker specialisation models. Both migration
and conjugal mixedness (Collet, 2015) may therefore create situations in which
individuals are confronted with different gender practices and norms, which
may contribute to them re-thinking or re-negotiating their gender expectations.
Both migration and mixedness, because they tend to be associated with greater
distance from family and kin, may make straying from expectations (including
gender expectations) potentially easier, because less easily noticed, and less easily
sanctioned by relatives and community.
5.1 Theoretical framework and research questions
Here the gender division of labour - la division sexuelle du travail - is under-
stood as a foundational feature of the stage, production and reproduction of
gender relations and inequalities (the rapports sociaux de sexe, Kergoat (2017)).
Migration and intermarriage play into this when they create situations of vul-
nerability and dependency for migrant women and constrain them to abide by
gender expectations of feminine domesticity, devotion and seclusion projected
upon them by their native or more settled husbands. Mounchit (2018) anal-
ysed the biographic trajectories of ’reunified’ migrant women from Sub-Saharan
Africa, describing both their shock and disempowerment after arrival and their
confinement into a highly gender-specialised division of labour where they had
no access to paid work and thus no financial autonomy. In these accounts, it is
the interlocking of migration, the couple dynamics and patriarchal expectations
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which, together, create and impose a strict gender-specialisation of paid and
unpaid labour.
In this chapter, I therefore approach the entities of the couple and the family
as social units crossed and structured by power relations (Kellerhals, Troutot, &
Lazega, 1984). These power relations depend on the distribution of resources
between members. Although the economic parameters factored in relative re-
sources theory are important (Blood & Wolfe, 1960), these are not the only capitals
involved in setting the balance of power: capitals include the ’native’ and ’ma-
jority’ premium, as well as high education. The bargaining of resources is also
structured by gender relations, which allows men to negotiate better deals out
of unfavourable asymmetries. The gender division of labour, constructed in this
way, is not simply a production of power relations in general, but a production
and an expression of gender relations especially: it produces gender roles that
are both separate and hierarchised (Delphy, 1977; Kergoat, 2004, 2017). This
also implies that specialisation means something very different depending on
whether it is gender-conforming or gender-subversive. While not limited to
economic dimensions only, it is clear from the literature that the distribution of
money is important, especially in the form of economic dependency. In this theo-
retical framing, migration and mixedness are conceived as engine, mechanism
or obstacle for the acquisition of power advantages by each partner, man and
woman, and therefore have to be considered as factors in themselves (Parrado
& Chenoa, 2005). This framing adds another, possibly competing, dimension to
one that would explain differentiated modes of gender divisions of labour in mi-
grants’ couples mainly as the expression of (generally more conservative) gender
cultures, more or less diluted through intra- or inter-generational assimilation.
From this approach, I can set three competing hypotheses, whose merits
will be assessed against and in combination with one another:
(1) Acculturation-based hypothesis: In line with the assimilation hypothesis,
I expect that for a migrant, partnering with a majority native partner denotes
a high degree of integration; thanks to greater exposure to French (or British,
in the next chapter) gender norms as well as facilitated integration into French
social networks and labour market, for migrants to be with a native majority
partner (French-born to French-born parents) should be associated with more
gender-equal divisions of both paid and unpaid labour, compared to other part-
nered migrants. By the same reasoning, migrants who partner with a native
descendant of migrants may see their couple adopting modes of gender divisions
of labour that are different but closer to those of migrant couples, because of
partial but incomplete inter-generational assimilation. Intermarriage in this case
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is understood as selecting both natives and migrants among the more indepen-
dent and least attached to traditions, including gender roles. The effect should
be similar for migrant men and migrant women and be quite robust to a variety
of migration trajectories and modes of couple formation, and mostly vary by
generation/integration levels. Notably, it should increase with years spent in the
country (intra-generational acculturation and intregration into the labour market,
etc.).
(2) Native advantage hypothesis: Because of the power imbalance (linked to
social, legal, linguistic dependency etc.) between migrant and native partners,
migrant partners in relationships with native partners will take on a compara-
tively greater share of the unpaid labour and a smaller share of the paid labour
(bargaining power). This is the ’native premium’ hypothesis. It should result
in more gender-specialisation when the migrant partner is a woman and less
gender-specialisation when the migrant partner is a man.
(3) union-migration trajectories hypothesis Migration-union sequences have
an impact on the gender division of labour because the ways in which people
migrate and form their relationship impact the power dynamic between partners.
Specifically, couple-forming and couple migration are expected to tilt the power
balance against migrant partners because they correspond to situations where
migrants are uprooted and in a (socially, linguistically) dependent situation. This
may not apply to the same extent to migrant men in the established first relation-
ship cluster, who likely include lead migrant men. In comparison, intermarried
migrants who migrated as children were therefore already long established in
France when they met their native partner. The migrants in the child migrants
cluster are therefore expected to be in a more favourable situation compared to
marriage migrants. In addition, adult single migrants, i.e. those who migrated
independently, may be less familiar with French society compared to child mi-
grants. However, as far as the couple is concerned, their migration and economic
survival did not depend on their partner, and I expect migrant women in this
cluster to be in less gender-specialised relationships.
The effects of gender cultures, assimilation and power relations as affected by
the migrant/native asymmetry and by the migration sequence are not expected
to be mutually exclusive. Rather, my contention is that gender cultures and
assimilation do not explain the whole story. It is therefore also that intermarriage
covers different gender realities for migrant men and migrant women, in part
because it involves different trajectories of union-migration. I expect effects to
be intersectional and to differ across gender, migrant groups, as well as class (I
use the rough proxy of educational achievement). High degrees of educational
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achievement have been associated with more liberal gender attitudes, higher rates
of dual-earner couples and somewhat more equal divisions of domestic labour.
In the context of intermarriage and migration, Suksomboon (2011) suggested
that migrant women may exchange a high degree of qualification for the chance
to migrate to a more prosperous and enviable (or perceived to be so) Western
world - thus trading educational hypogamy (when their partner is less educated
than themselves) for geographical hypergamy (because their Western partner has
citizenship and offers residence in a more favourable part of the world). Although
exchange theory can be usefully applied to partner selection, it does not give any
lead about the gender arrangements that couples will develop once the stage of
couple formation is over;
Institutional and social framework
As a regime of gender-division of labour, Cunha and Atalaia (2019) charac-
terised France as one of the European countries that is low gender-unequal with
high commitment to paid work (the cluster also includes Sweden, Denmark and
Portugal). They found that, relative to other European countries clusters, women
in France allocated the least time to care work, little time to housework and the
most time to paid work. In comparison, they found that men allocated more time
to housework and care work than men in other clusters. Although the welfare
state is, as in other corporatist welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990), structured
around a female homemaker/carer and male main breadwinner model, France
also has a long tradition of female full-time employment (J. Lewis, 1992). Notably,
women tend to return to full-time work quickly after the birth of a child, a social
fact attributed to a history of universal nursery services and education for chil-
dren (Fagnani & Math, 2011). Nurseries are mainly public, the costs are heavily
state-subsidized, places are available for all pre-school children age 0-6 and in-
deed take-up is near universal (OECD, 2010; Jan Windebank, 2001).1 According
to the OECD, in 2006, 43% of children under the age of three attended a creche.
Since motherhood is known to be a defining moment in the gender-specialisation
in couples, its effect may be somewhat mitigated by this institutional framework.
The choice for French mothers is generally a stark one: between working full-
time and not working at all (hence no specialisation of paid labour, or complete
male specialisation of paid labour). The division of housework remains deeply
gendered. According to the time-use survey Enquête Emploi du Temps et Décisions
dans les Couples (INSEE, data from 2009-2010), French women spent 3 hours 44
minutes on housework such as shopping and making food, compared to slightly
over 2 h per day for men. In comparison, British women spent 4 h 08 a day
1Parents who prefer nannies and childminders are also supported by tax allowances and cash
subsidies for childcare costs (Jan Windebank, 2001).
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on similar tasks, but the time dedicated to them by British men was the same
as French men (UK Time Use Survey (2014-2015), comparison compiled by the
OECD time-use database2).
The INSEE thus provides little information to help understand how and if
migration or mixedness affects the provision and division of unpaid and repro-
ductive labour. The INSEE’s Emplois du temps surveys, which are the main source
of time-use data (the last one was conducted in 2009-2010), do not over-represent
migrants or identify descendants of migrants. The little sociological scholarship
that connects migration and/or intermarriage with the gender division of labour
in couples is overwhelmingly qualitative.
Conversely, the INSEE publications periodically remind us, migration means
a loss of qualification and a drop in employment for both male and female mi-
grants, at a national or international scale (see notably Faugère and Bouvet (2016)
and Mikol and Tavan (2006)). In France, studies of the early performance of new
arrivals are bleak, as many of the migrants that have arrived since 2000 could not
(or would not, or were discouraged in their attempts to) enter paid work within
the first three years after arrival. Certain modes of migration were especially
at risk of inactivity. Based on the 2006 longitudinal Survey of the Trajectories
and Profiles of Migrants (PPM), 60% of those who arrived as spouse/partner
of a French citizen and over 80% of those who arrived as a reunified partner
or relative were not engaged in paid work after a year (Algava & Bèque, 2008;
Bèque, 2007). These reports found that migrant women were both less likely to
work prior to migration and more likely to disengage from the labour market
following migration to France. Whereas half of the women surveyed in the
PPM were employed a year before migration (compared to 74% for men), this
proportion dwindled to 26% who had secured paid employment a year after
migration (in comparison to 67% for men). The drop in economic activity was
especially high for highly-educated migrant women with 48% of migrant women
with tertiary education transitioning from economic activity to inactivity after
migration. Some migration paths were most affected (family migration and
marriage migration).They are also numerically dominated by women, although,
as established in the previous part, marriage migration or family reunification
involving reunified or ’imported’ men is not exceptional, and it has become more
frequent(Beauchemin, Borrel, & Régnard, 2013).
2OECD. (2021). Gender data portal [Oecd.stat]. Retrieved March 27, 2021, from https://www.
oecd.org/fr/parite/balancing-paid-work-unpaid-work-and-leisure.htm.
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5.2 Data and methods
5.2.1 Data and sample
The data on which this chapter builds its analysis is drawn as before from
the French survey Trajectory and Origins. In the first part of the analyses presented
in this chapter, the sample includes all respondents in coresident man-woman
couples formed of two partners of working age (18-60) at the end of 2008 (halfway
through the TeO data collection phase). In the later part of the chapter, the sample
is further reduced and involves only migrant respondents.
5.2.2 Variables
Indexes of household labour specialisation have been designed and em-
ployed previously, for instance by Stratton (2005). Basu (2017) and Nottmeyer
(2014) usefully applied it to the study of migrant-native intermarriage house-
hold dynamics. In contrast to these studies, however, I designed the scores for
labour division so as to be explicitly gendered - hence my referring to them as
scores of gender-specialisation and not simply specialisation. As discussed, a high
degree of specialisation takes on very different social meanings depending on
whether the partner doing most of the household labour is a man or a woman
(e.g. a ’modern man’ or a ’kept woman’ or, perhaps more commonly, a ’normal’
woman and a ’tamed’ man). In societies where women have long been doing
and continue to do most of the reproductive and unpaid labour, where such
labour is in fact largely identified as ’feminine’ and accordingly devalued, the
type of specialisation that involves women doing most of the unpaid labour
and men little of it can be considered largely gender-normative. The reverse
specialisation that sees men doing most of the unpaid labour and women most
of the paid labour is, in contrast, subversive of socially ascribed gender roles
and expectations. Charsley (2005)’s work on marriage migrants and notably
Pakistani migrants to the UK showed the relevance of this for migrants, and
the social pressure, perceived stigma and intense discomfort that can come with
reverse gender-specialisation of paid and/or unpaid work. Furthermore, in an
overwhelming majority of cases, the partner ’specialised’ in housework is, in fact,
the woman. In light of this social reality, it makes little practical sense to refer
to an unspecified ’degree of specialisation’ - a methodological choice which has
been defended as ’gender-neutral’ (e.g. Nottmeyer (2014)), but which would be
perhaps better described as ’gender-blind’. The literature on household labour
also tends to separate housework and childcare. Admittedly, micro–level gender
theories appear to apply better to housework than childcare (Sullivan, 2013). The
other difficulty is that childcare represents extra labour, which couples without
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co-resident children will by definition not undertake. However, since my rea-
soning is based not on absolute labour but on partners’ share of the couple’s
labour, this particular problem is avoided. The theoretical approach in terms of
gender division of productive and reproductive work also warrant that unpaid
care work be included. The variables on the gender division of unpaid labour
therefore include some aspects of childcare, and all models include a control
variable for whether the couple lives with children under 16. The French data
is however very limited with respect to how couples and families organise and
distribute childcare.
Gender division of unpaid labour
With respect to unpaid labour and especially reproductive labour, the French
data offers a series of four questions which are directly relevant to the distribution
of housework and childcare. These include ’Who is responsible for the grocery
shopping?’, ’Who is in charge of preparing daily meals?’, ’Who looks after the bills and
budgeting?’ and finally "Who is responsible for bringing the children to school?".
For each of these questions respondents can pick between ’Always or mostly me’,
’Always or mostly my partner’, ’Mostly shared’, ’Others’.3 While doing the grocery
shopping, the daily meals and taking the children to school (if applicable) are
all strongly correlated, the managing of the family budget and bills stands apart.
Therefore I do not aggregate it with the others in the construction of the variable
on unpaid labour distribution. For the questions on grocery shopping, meals and
school, the answers are recoded as follow:
• If the respondent identified themselves as a woman and they indicate that
the task is mostly or only their responsibility, the variable takes on the value
1. If they say it is mostly or only shouldered by their partner,4 it is coded as
-1. If they pick the ’mostly shared’ or ’others’ options, it is coded as 0.
• The same coding process is applied to cases where the respondent identifies
as a man, only it is reversed, so that if the men states that they are the main
or sole person responsible for doing any of these housework or childcare
task, this will be coded as -1, whereas when they say it is mostly (or only)
undertaken by their partner, it will be +1.
• These recoded numerical values for each variable are then added.
3The question on school trips has the extra options ’The older children bring the younger ones to
school’ and ’The children go alone’.
4Since the sample has been reduced to man-woman couples only, the partner identifies as a
man in this scenario.
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Unpaid labour score (individual, unstandardised)
= groceries + meals + school trips
The score thus range from - 3 to + 3 but needs to be standardised to account
for the fact that not all couples undertake the same total amount of unpaid labour
(e.g. depending on whether have children or not). This score is therefore divided
by the total tasks undertaken by the couple (i.e. not outsourced to paid help or to
a third party). The final standardized couple score for the gender distribution of
unpaid labour Suit thus runs:
Suit =
groceries + meals + school trips
total applicable answers
(
Score according to ego
Total tasks undertaken by the couple
)
This score ranges from -1 to 1 and indicates the degree to which the couple
conforms to a gender-segregated division of unpaid labour (score close to 1) or,
on the contrary, upholds a division of unpaid labour that runs counter to gender
expectations, i.e. if the man takes on most or all of these tasks (score close to -1).
Scores around zero indicate more egalitarian arrangements, reflecting situations
where tasks are either shared or equally distributed between partners.
Gender division of paid labour
While TeO provides a variety of measures for survey respondents’ labour
market engagement, it holds comparatively little information on their partner’s
paid labour. Crucially, the partner’s typical work hours are not recorded. The
gender division of paid labour is therefore approached in this chapter through an
admittedly rather crude employment status dummy: ego and ego’s partner are
each either in paid employment (’actif occupé’) or they are not. These two binary
measures of labour market engagement (engagement at the time of the survey
collection in 2008-2009), one for each partner, are then combined and gendered,
into a new variable with four categories:
• Only the woman is in paid employment.
• Only the man is in paid employment.
• Both are in paid employment.
• Neither are in paid employment.
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There are then arranged on a scale of -1 to +1, with
• - 1 = gender-reversed (only the woman is employed)
• 0 = egalitarian (both work or neither of them work)
• 1 = gender-comforming (only the man works).
This is evidently a very rough way to approach the gender division of paid
labour. With the British data, it will be possible to consider a finer distribution
based on the hours spent in paid work by each partner, relative to the other
partner. As household-level data, in which moreover measures of time-use are
well-represented, Understanding Society is no doubt superior to TeO when it comes
to analysing household and couple micro-level dynamics.
Gender specialisation of labour
The variable for the overall gender specialisation of labour builds on the two
score variables for the gender distribution of paid and unpaid labour by simply
adding them:
The index for the gender specialisation of labour time is then constructed as
follows, where Sit refers to the gender specialisation of labour in an individual i’s




Suit stands for the gender specialisation of unpaid labour tasks, while Spit
represents the gender specialisation of paid work in the couple. The gender
specialisation index ranges from -1 to +1. 1 identifies a completely gender-
conforming and gender-specialised distribution of paid work, housework and
childcare taken on by the couple, whereby the man does all the paid work and the
woman is not in paid work but is responsible for all the housework and childcare
(as measured by the available variables).
Subsequently, this index can be dealt with as a continuous scale of gender ar-
rangements, the highest scores signalling a very patriarchal, gender-conforming
division of labour, and the lowest (negative) scores marking a reversal of gender
roles. More gender-specialised arrangements are often described as more ’tradi-
tional’ and more equal arrangements (where both paid labour and unpaid labour
are more evenly distributed between men and women) as ’modern’. There are
some issues with that, not least because historically migrant women - especially
working-class women - have often engaged in paid labour. I use a scale that is
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not unlike the scale of ’traditionalism’ used by Muzhi Zhou and Kan (2019), but I
call it a scale of gender-specialisation.
Gender specialisation considers specialisation as articulated with gender: a
specialisation that is gender-normative, with women taking on more or all of
the unpaid labour and men taking on more or all of the paid labour, does not
mean the same thing as an equally specialised but reversed division of labour
- quite the contrary, in fact. The measure of gender specialisation goes from
very specialised along gender-normative lines, to not very specialised, to very
specialised in gender-subversive terms.
GII: the Gender Inequality Index
This chapter takes advantage of a further measure, the Gender Inequality
Index (from hereon, GII). The GII is a country-level measurement designed and
produced by the United Nations, which define it as "a composite measure reflect-
ing inequality in achievement between women and men in three dimensions:
reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market".5 Each (participating)
country is given a GII score which ranges from 0 to 1: the closer to 1, the greater
the degree of gender inequality. The GII is calculated every year since 2011 but is
not available for all countries (or all years), and some imputations were necessary.
I used the 2010 GII measures or the first measurement after 2011. For countries
that did not have a GII score, I used the regional estimate. With the TeO survey,
access to the TeO detailed grid of all countries of birth is tightly restricted, and I
could only use the rougher grid, which gives only aggregates for rarer origins
(e.g. ’North America’). I computed GII scores for these missing countries by
using the regional estimate or if needed by averaging the GII scores of the largest
countries in the aggregate.6 Individuals are associated with the GII score of their
country of birth in the vast majority of cases. It is evident that using the GII, and
using it this way, is not without flaws: the gender equality situation of countries
of origins may have changed significantly since migrants moved to France or
Britain. Using 2010 GII score does not reflect this. Nevertheless, it is a useful,
one-dimensional numeric measure that can be substituted or added to country
of birth or geographic areas as a measure of the context of gender socialisation
that migrants may have been exposed to. The GII score can also be interpreted as
5See technical note 4 at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2020_technical_notes.pdf
for more details on the Gender Inequality Index and on the calculations that underpin it. The
GII data used here is available on the United Nations Development Programme webpage: http:
//hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/68606#
6See appendix 5 for the full table and the imputations.
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denoting the room for women’s empowerment and autonomy in the country of
origin.7
Other controls
I also included in the models measures of age, to account for cohort differ-
ences. This means either a measure of the couple’s average age (calculated at
the level of the couple as the mean between the woman’s and the man’s age) or
individual age (in models structured around individual migrants rather than at
couple level), and their respective quadratic terms. In addition, all models include
age gap between partners, measured as the age difference in years between the
man’s age and the woman’s age (man’s age - women’s age). Indeed, for women
to form unions with much older partners can potentially heighten the power
differential and encourage gender-specialisation, since the men will be compara-
tively much more advanced in their career and the women comparatively much
less (Bozon, 1990a, 1990b; Wheeler & Gunter, 1987) - although there is little robust
empirical evidence on the topic, and it is moreover focused on majority native
Western groups. Nevertheless, this may matter in the context of migration and
international or transnational partner recruitment. In addition, Oksuzyan et al.
(2017) suggest that there may be a selection effect, with large age gaps involving
younger women and older men reflecting more gender-conservative arrange-
ments and views. The models also control for the presence of children (of either
or both partners’) under 16 years of age living in the household. Finally, models
include a measure of educational level, which for parsimony’s sake aggregates
the education variable presented in chapter 3 into a categorical variable with
three categories (primary schooling; secondary schooling or professional degree;
tertiary or other higher education) or, in the most complex models, only as a
dummy for tertiary/higher education to identify highly-educated individuals.
5.2.3 Analytical methods
The main statistical tools used in this chapter involve survey-weighted
distributions and linear regression models, using the scores mentioned above
as dependent variables. The modelling strategy involves separate modelling
for migrant men and migrant women and a step-wise progression, using the
union-migration sequences designed in the previous chapter as predictor, along-
side notably couple types and geographic area of origin. I first model unpaid
7Other studies have also used country-level composite measures of gender equality/women’s
empowerment for similar purposes. For instance, Roeder and Mühlau (2014) include the Gender
Empowerment Measure (GEM) in their modelling. However, the GEM has a lower coverage
than the GII and is somewhat elite-biased. The GII, on the other hand, is more embedded in and
confounded with measures of human development at large (Klasen, 2006).
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labour and paid labour separately and then as an aggregate through the gender-
specialisation score. Missing values were omitted in the modelling. Coefficients




5.3.1 Descriptive results: Couples’ gender division of labour in
France
FIGURE 5.1: Histograms: gender specialisation
of labour across all couples (France)
.
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Note: Survey-weighted histogram density and smoothed
splines (bandwith = 0.1).
Source TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).
Universe: all coresident man-woman couples (18-60).
The plots in figure 5.1 illus-
trate the density of different levels
of gender division of labour on the
scales and index described above,
for all cohabiting couples aged 18
to 60 (including native couples).
The density distribution of paid
labour shows that an overwhelm-
ing majority of co-resident couples
in this age bracket are dual-earner
couples, with both partners in em-
ployment (or neither in employ-
ment). A much smaller proportion
of couples are in a sole male bread-
winner arrangement and an even
smaller proportion in a sole female
breadwinner model. Plot 3 shows
the distribution for the gender di-
vision of unpaid labour. While
there is a local peak at the middle -
signalling an equal distribution of
unpaid labour tasks between man
and woman - it is plain that most
couples fall on the positive side
of the graph, that is, the gender-
specialised side, with many with a
score of 1, marking the fact that the
woman in the relationship is the
main person in charge of all the
tasks included in the variable. The
gender-specialisation index (plot
1) reflects the aggregation of the
two other scores. Very few cou-
ples are in the negative (the high
bar at zero identifies those with a
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score of zero, not inferior to zero), which underlines how rare gender-reversals
are when it comes to the division of labour. The histogram pulls towards the right,
with most couples falling between 0.3 and 0.5, which can be therefore considered
the ’normally’ patriarchal degree of gender-specialisation in French society.
Couples’ migratory types and gender specialisation
The barplots underneaths (figures 5.2 and 5.3) present a first rounded
overview of how the division of paid and unpaid labour varies by couple type.
The bars represent the mean scores for gender-specialisation, paid labour divi-
sion, and unpaid labour division, for each couple types (NAT-NAT, NAT-2G,
MIG-NAT, etc.). A first observation is that all scores on all indexes are positive:
all couple types, on average, specialise along expected gender lines and roles.
The degree of specialisation, however, varies by couple type and labour type.
Looking first at gender-specialisation overall, couples that include at least
one native partner without migratory ties (NAT-NAT, NAT-2G and NAT-MIG)
appear to be overall less gender-polarised than other couples. However, the dis-
aggregation between unpaid and paid labour shows that much of this difference,
if not all, is located in the realm of paid work. Here couples with one (or two)
native partner(s) are strongly differentiated from couples composed of first or
second-generation migrants. Couples who include at least one native partner
without direct migratory ties (NAT), regardless of the migratory ties of the other
partner, thus present at first glance a more equal distribution of paid labour
between men and women. By contrast, couples that include no native (NAT)
partner seem to have a higher incidence of paid work divisions structured around
a male sole-breadwinner model. The average score is slightly higher still when
first-generation migrants are partnered with second-generation migrants (MIG-
2G). At any rate, the clearest line in the gender division of paid labour lies between
couples with a native partner born to native parents and couples without.
Yet this line is not visible as such with respect to unpaid labour distribu-
tion. Here couples with a native (NAT) partner are no less patriarchal in their
division of housework and childcare responsibilities than other couples. Thus
couples composed of two French-born partners born to French-born parents are
as unequal in the gender-distribution of this labour as migrant couples. Only
migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples present a slightly lower (if still far from equal)
average score. These descriptive observations are supported and refined by the
models presented in table 5.1.
Included in table 5.1 are the linear models which use the gender-
specialisation index, the paid labour division score and the unpaid labour
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FIGURE 5.2: Barplots: Gender division of labour, by couple types
division score as dependent variables. The models include the migratory couple
types, as well as the controls. Using native couples without direct migratory ties
(NAT-NAT) as the baseline, I found that couples involving primary migrants
and/or direct descendants of migrants (MIG-MIG, MIG-2G and 2G-2G couples)
appear to have more gender-specialised divisions of labour between partners.
However, this effect is only significant for the gender division of paid work and
no such relation is found for the distribution of housework and childcare. That
said, the third model, for the gender division of unpaid labour, also identifies
a significant and reverse effect associated with migrant-native (MIG-NAT)
partnerships. MIG-NAT couples are associated with a less unequal gendered
division of housework and childcare responsibilities, compared to native
(NAT-NAT) couples. None of the other couples, including migrant couples and
couples involving second-generation migrants, can be significantly differentiated
from couples composed of two majority native French partners.
One should already note that the variable for the distribution of unpaid
labour shows little sensitivity. It does not register statistical significance for
factors which we would expect to impact the gender division of unpaid labour.
The most blatant is the presence of children, which increases the overall time
spent by couples on unpaid labour (both housework and childcare) but women’s
much more so than men’s. The fact that the model finds no significant association
with children can only be interpreted as the reflection of the limit of the index.
This type of index will be compared and complemented with one based on the
sharing of unpaid labour time in the next chapter, which uses the British data.
It is useful to mention that, although rarely significant, the coefficients for this
variable are consistent (in terms of direction) with effects identified by the labour-
time based measure. This suggests that this variable lacks in sensitivity but is not
altogether misleading.
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Paid labour Unpaid labour
(1) (2) (3)
(Intercept) .159 (.149) .124 (.212) .195 (.187)
Couple types [ref=NAT-NAT]
2G-NAT −.023 (.026) −.014 (.032) −.032 (.032)
2G-2G .090 (.043)∗ .129 (.057)∗ .051 (.039)
MIG-NAT −.014 (.030) .066 (.036) −.093 (.040)∗
MIG-2G .091 (.022)∗∗∗ .182 (.028)∗∗∗ −.001 (.025)
MIG-MIG .093 (.015)∗∗∗ .185 (.021)∗∗∗ .000 (.019)
Age (couple average) .002 (.008) .002 (.011) .002 (.010)
Age-squared (couple average) −.000 (.000) −.000 (.000) .000 (.000)
Age gap (man-woman) −.002 (.002) −.005 (.003) .001 (.003)
Children under 16 [ref:no] .064 (.018)∗∗∗ .079 (.022)∗∗∗ .049 (.026)
Education [ref:primary or lower]
Secondary/professional qualification .012 (.024) −.012 (.033) .036 (.030)
Higher/tertiary education −.008 (.026) .011 (.035) −.027 (.033)
Both partners unemployed [ref=no] −.081 (.029)∗∗ −.076 (.032)∗ −.086 (.045)
Deviance 1792.366 2856.178 3173.227
Dispersion .154 .246 .273
Num. obs. 11629 11629 11629
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
Source: TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).
Universe: partnered migrants (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).
Gendered effects of couple types
The effects of couple types thus identified may, however be dependent on
or affected by the gender configuration of the couple (which goes back to the
previous research hypotheses). Since migrant women and migrant men follow
different migratory paths, migrant-native couples may not present the same
associations with the gender-specialisation of labour depending on whether the
migrant partner is a woman or a man (and, symmetrically, whether the native
partner is a woman or a man). I start to explore this with figure 5.3, which
replicates figure 5.2 discussed above, but splits each mixed couple type (MIG-
NAT, MIG-2G and 2G-NAT) into two gendered categories. MIG-NAT couples
are divided between couples composed of a migrant woman and a native man
(MIGw-NATm) and couples composed of a migrant man and a native woman
(MIGm-NATw). The same goes for MIG-2G couples (now MIGw-2Gm and
MIGm-2Gw) and 2G-NAT couples (now 2Gw-NATm and 2Gm-NATw), as per
the same classification of gendered migratory couple types used in chapter 3 and
4.
This gendering of mixed couples brings to light certain sharp differences
amongst migrant-native couples (MIG-NAT). Most strikingly, the more ’equal’
distribution of paid labour which they had been associated with in the former
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FIGURE 5.3: Gender specialisation by gendered couple types
analysis appears to be entirely driven by those couples where the native partner
is a woman and the migrant partner is a man. These couples appear to have a
lower prevalence of male sole-breadwinners compared to any other couple type
except those made of a native (NAT) woman and a second-generation migrant
man. This creates a very contrasting picture with the other gender configuration
for MIG-NAT couples, that is, when the migrant partner is a woman and the
native partner a man. These couples have a much more gendered specialisation
of paid labour, on par with second-generation couples and migrant couples. Their
distribution of unpaid labour, however, appears somewhat more equal, if only
slightly, than other couples.
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TABLE 5.2: Survey-weighted linear models: Gender specialisation




Paid labour Unpaid labour
(1) (2) (3)
(Intercept) .168 (.149) .143 (.212) .194 (.187)
Couple types [ref=NAT-NAT]
2Gw-NATm −.011 (.028) .005 (.037) −.027 (.042)
2Gm-NATw −.035 (.039) −.032 (.048) −.038 (.044)
2G-2G .090 (.043)∗ .128 (.057)∗ .051 (.039)
MIGw-NATm .014 (.046) .151 (.052)∗∗ −.122 (.063)
MIGm-NATw −.046 (.032) −.033 (.044) −.060 (.039)
MIGw-2Gm .127 (.038)∗∗∗ .242 (.045)∗∗∗ .012 (.042)
MIGm-2Gw .060 (.021)∗∗ .132 (.031)∗∗∗ −.011 (.023)
MIG-MIG .092 (.015)∗∗∗ .184 (.021)∗∗∗ .000 (.019)
Age (couple average) .002 (.008) .001 (.011) .002 (.010)
Age-squared (couple average) .000 (.000) −.000 (.000) .000 (.000)
Age gap (man-woman) −.002 (.002) −.005 (.003) .001 (.003)
Coresident children under 16 [ref=no] .065 (.018)∗∗∗ .080 (.022)∗∗∗ .049 (.026)
Education [ref= primary or lower]
Secondary/professional qualification .011 (.024) −.013 (.033) .036 (.030)
Higher/tertiary education −.009 (.026) .008 (.035) −.026 (.033)
Both partners unemployed [ref=no] −.082 (.029)∗∗ −.078 (.032)∗ −.086 (.045)
Deviance 1791.077 2848.081 3172.380
Dispersion .154 .245 .273
Num. obs. 11629 11629 11629
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
Source: TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).
Universe: partnered migrants (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).
FIGURE 5.4: Couples’ joint employment status, by gen-
dered couple types
Couples composed
of a migrant man and a




On the other side, MIGw-
NATm couples, with a
migrant woman and a
native man, divide paid
labour much more evenly,
and involve a greater
proportion of sole male
earners. The contrast
between the two types
of migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples is clearly visible on figure 5.4, which
breaks down the mode of paid labour division by gendered couple type. Whilst
over 30% of MIG-NAT couples involving a migrant woman fit into a sole male
breadwinner model, this is the case for only about 20% of MIG-NAT couples
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formed instead by a migrant man and a native woman.
Interestingly, because MIG-NAT couples with a migrant woman and a native
man are associated with slightly more patriarchal arrangements with regard to
paid labour division, and somewhat less patriarchal arrangements with regard
to unpaid labour, these two dimensions balance out in the gender-specialisation
index. As a result, these couples cannot be significantly differentiated from native
majority (NAT-NAT) couples with respect to gender-specialisation overall.
Migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples aside, the disaggregation of couple types
by gender configuration does not otherwise change the direction or significance
of the association between couple type and gender division of labour. However,
it is worth noting that the magnitude of the effect varies: thus couples composed
of a migrant woman and a native man with migrant parents (MIGw-2Gm) are
associated with a 0.24 increase in scores for the division of paid labour (a large
effect when recalling that the index range only runs from -1 to 1). This suggests
that a larger proportion of couples formed by a migrant woman and a second-
generation man are structured around a sole male breadwinner model, which is
then reflected in the gender-specialisation score. The reverse gender configuration
(migrant man with second-generation woman) is also associated with more
gender-specialisation, but the coefficient is much reduced (half of the coefficient
associated with MIGw-2Gm)
A couple of further general findings can also be drawn from this first, broad
brush investigation of the connections between migration ties, partnerships and
the gender division of labour. Unsurprisingly, age and living with co-resident
children are both factors associated with a greater gender-polarisation of labour.
Equally unsurprisingly, all couple types are, on average, patriarchal. Looking at
these couple types as aggregates, one can find none that subvert gender roles. In
effect, the practical scale only ranges from ’very patriarchal’ to ’somewhat more
equal’ and all mean scores are found in between 0 and 1. Thus native majority
(NAT-NAT) couples are not more equal than others when it comes to distributing
housework and childcare, using this scale. It might appear as if native women are
more likely to be in paid employment and therefore less likely to be in male sole
breadwinner couples. However, when it comes to unpaid reproductive labour,
native couples’ practices appear as equally gendered (i.e. equally unequal) as
those of migrant couples and/or descendants of migrants.
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FIGURE 5.5: Couples’ joint employment status, by area of
birth
The analyses just pre-
sented did not differenti-
ate between different mi-
grant groups. In so
doing, they aggregated
groups with potentially
very different gender prac-
tices. Another obvious
shortcoming is that they
look at partnering as a
an outcome rather than
a process. As the previ-
ous chapter showed, cou-
ple formation takes on a
variety of forms and tim-
ing in the context of mi-
gration. Migrants’ trajec-
tories to partnership differs depending on the partner they end up with (be it
majority native, primary migration or second generation and vice-versa). These
trajectories - that is sequences of migration and couple formation - may be a
constitutive part of the gender arrangements in the destination country. Like-
wise, gender cultures in migrants’ countries of origin and communities can set
constraints around migration and what mode and calendars of migration are
acceptable for men and women. But they could also durably influence their
gender arrangements and practices even after migration.
There is no denying that the gender division of paid work in couples presents
a stark contrast depending on the migrant group at hand. Figure 5.5 presents
the distribution of couples’ joint employment status by migrant group, includ-
ing those born in France (whether direct descendants of migrants or not). EU
migrants and migrants from Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia (mainland
Southeast Asia) appear overall indistinguishable, with low rates of sole male
breadwinner arrangements (under 25% of couples), high rates of dual-earners
(around 75%) and rare unemployment. In stark contrast to this, migrants from
Turkey are in sole male breadwinner couples in about 60% of cases and the
proportion of unemployed couples is also higher (around 12%). The latter also
applies to migrants from North Africa and to a lesser extent to migrants from
other regions of Africa. For both groups, and for the ’other’ migrant group,
sole male breadwinner couples represent about 40% of co-resident couples. The
next section tries to understand exactly how geographic origin, migration-union
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sequence and the choice of partner play out for migrant men and for migrant
women.
5.3.2 Gendered paths of migration, gendered outcomes
In this section the focus thus shifts from all couples to the couples formed
by migrant respondents only. The aim of this section is to understand the role
played by the type of partnership, the country and community of origin and the
migration trajectories in explaining the gender division of labour post-migration.
The statistical models which this section builds on uses the gender division of
paid and unpaid labour (tables 5.3, 5.4) or the overall gender-specialisation as
the dependent variable. They are presented in a step-wise fashion: in all three
tables, the first section (comprising the first two columns) includes the main
geographical areas of origin (EU, Turkey, North Africa, Other Africa, mainland
Southeast Asia and Other) as the independent variable. The next two columns
are models that do not have areas of origin as covariates, but include sequences
of union-migration, following the classification designed in chapter 3 (labelled
’migration sequence’ in the models). The final section of the tables (comprising the
last two columns) includes both area of origin and migration-couple formation
sequences. All models factor in the migratory ties of the migrant’s partner (MIG,
2G, NAT) and control for the length of time (in years) since migrants first moved
to France. All the other control variables are also included. The modelling
strategy systematically distinguishes between gender. Table 5.3 presents models
for migrant women only; table 5.4 models for migrant men. Table 5.5 then
juxtaposes the gender-specialisation models for migrant women and migrant
men, in adjacent columns, to facilitate the comparison between migrant women
and migrant men.
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Women’s migration sequences and partnerships
The first section of the table (first two columns, models 1 to 2) tests the
effects of migrant women’s area of origin on the gender division of labour. When
controlling for the migratory background of the partner (whether native, migrant,
or second-generation) as well as the presence of children, age and education, the
models find certain areas of origin to be significantly associated with specific
patterns of gender division of labour. Migrant women from Turkey tend to have
a much more patriarchal distribution of paid labour compared to women born
in EU countries. A similar connection also comes into statistical significance for
the gender division of unpaid labour, but not until union-migration sequences
are also integrated in the model (model 6). Migrant women born in the Maghreb
region are also associated with a higher incidence of sole male breadwinner
relationships, as are migrant women from mainland Southeast Asia. The coeffi-
cients are, however, much smaller than those observed for Turkey and are not
significant when combined into the gender-specialisation index (see table 5.5
further on). In contrast, migrant women from other African regions appear to
have, on average, slightly more egalitarian relationships than European migrant
women with respect to how couples divide responsibilities for housework and
childcare. Although there is no significant difference in paid work division, the
distribution of housework and childcare is less gender-polarised and so is the
overall gender-specialisation of their relationships (table 5.5).
The second set of models (model 3 to 4) test the association between the gen-
der division of paid and unpaid labour, and migrant women’s union-migration
sequences, without accounting for area of origin. Using the single adult cluster
as reference level, model 3 finds the couple-forming sequence (first partnership
formation) and the established first partnership sequence to be connected with a
clear gender-polarising effect on the division of paid labour. No significant effects
are found for unpaid labour division for established relationships. But there is a
significant effect associated between the sequence formation first partnership and
migrant women taking on more of the housework and childcare tasks on average.
A slightly larger effect is observed for migrant women who migrated as children.
As far as paid labour division is concerned, the migrant women from the ’1.5
generation’ do not significantly differ from those who migrated as single adults,
prior to couple formation. However, with respect to unpaid labour, they appear
to be in more patriarchal relationships.
The final section of table 5.3 (models 5 to 6) accounts simultaneously for
area of origin and the union-migration sequences. The overall conclusion is that
effects are not cancelled out or reversed by this combination and remain fully
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consistent with the other models discussed above. This defeats the hypothesis
of either gender cultures or sequences of migration being confounding factors
for one another: their effect appears distinct. The gendering effect of certain
union-migration sequences - established first partnerships, for paid labour, and child
migrant for unpaid labour - remain significant after controlling for area of origin
and therefore cannot be simply attributed to specific gender cultures. Conversely,
certain migrant groups (notably migrant women from Turkey and, to a lesser
extent, Maghreb and Asian countries) are more likely to find themselves in a
male breadwinner setup of paid work division, regardless of their trajectory of
migration and family formation. The statistical robustness of the connection is
not the strongest, but considering the limits of the dependent variable, these are
nonetheless important findings, which the next chapter will expand upon.
In all the models for migrant women, the effects associated with couple
types are similar in orientation and significance. For migrant women, being
in a relationship with a native French partner without migratory background
(MIG-NAT couples) rather than a migrant or second-generation native partner is
strongly associated with a more egalitarian division of unpaid labour (but not
paid labour). The effects of the control variables are mostly consistent across all
models. The length of time spent (presumably in France) since the first migration
is strongly associated with a more equal gender division of paid labour, which is
likely mainly driven by the fact that migrant women’s chance of employment
tend to improve over time (González-Ferrer, 2011). Once accounting for years
since migration, the effect of age is not significant, although age gap is associated
with a slight patriarchal effect. The presence of children consistently and strongly
polarises the gender division of labour on both paid and unpaid fronts, regardless
of geographic origins or family trajectories. Migrant women who went into
further education appear to have more egalitarian division of labour, which
plays out mainly in the distribution of unpaid labour. Because of the way the
scores of gender division were built, this cannot be simply attributed to a greater
propensity to outsource housework and/or childcare. The next sub-section
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Men’s migrations and partnerships
When considering the equivalent models for migrant men (table 5.4), some
of the same observations apply. Models 1 to 2 (with areas of origin) reiterate the
greater gender polarisation of labour in relationships formed by migrant men
from Turkey. Compared to EU migrant men’s couples, and with respect to paid
labour, a greater gender-polarisation is observed in couples with migrant men
born in North Africa and ’other’ areas, although the coefficients are much smaller
than for Turkey-born migrants. Men’s area of origin appears to be more tightly
connected to the gender division of unpaid labour than women’s: men born in
Turkey are more likely to be in relationships with more patriarchal division of
labour, compared to migrant men born in Europe. Migrant men from any African
region and from Asia actually appear to contribute to unpaid labour slightly
more than European male migrants, though that difference is only significant
for Southeast Asian migrants. In contrast, the area of origin of migrant women
showed little association with unpaid labour distribution (except for migrant
women from Africa outside of the Maghreb region).
Models 3 and 4 in table 5.4 show weaker connections between men’s
migration-partnering sequences and the gender division of labour in their
relationships in the country of destination when compared to migrant women
(table 5.3 above). For migrant men, having a long-established first relationship
at the time of their migration is associated with higher gender-specialisation
compared to men who migrate as single adults, prior to family formation. This is
mostly true in terms of paid work distribution, but it is also valid in the gender
division of housework and childcare. That being said, the significance and
magnitude of men’s sequences of migration-partnering are smaller than those of
migrant women, suggesting that men’s timing and ordering of family formation
and migration is less crucial for gender dynamics than women’s. Indeed, once
combining origin and sequences (models 5 to 6), the effects of sequences are
further reduced, while the effect of area of origin remains unchanged. Only
the connection between established first relationship and paid work division
remains statistically significant, which likely reflects the fact that these sequences
correspond to family-stage migrations in which men are much more likely to be
the lead migrant rather than the reunified migrant (González-Ferrer, 2006, 2011).
Thus the effect associated with this sequence can be interpreted as reflecting the
combined effect of migrant men’s lead migration and migrant women’s reunified
migration.
Couple-forming migration (sequence formation 1st partnership) is not associ-
ated with any significant effect, although there was a significant effect for both
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paid and unpaid labour with migrant women. Furthermore, the presence of chil-
dren in the household does not impact the gender division of labour in migrant
men’s relationship to the same extent as it did migrant women’s - especially
when controlling for area of origin. Thus where migrant men come from emerges
as the strongest predictors in the gender division of labour, much more so than
the circumstances in which they migrated and came to form their relationships.
Migrant men’s geographic origins has explanatory power for both the gender
division of paid and unpaid labour; men’s high educational level is associated
with a more equal division of unpaid labour, but bears no significant connection
to the division of unpaid labour.
As in the models for migrant women, the effects of couple types are con-
sistent and suggest that migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples are more prone
to egalitarian arrangements. Compared to migrant men partnered with other
migrants, and all other things being equal, migrant men in MIG-NAT unions
contribute more to unpaid labour tasks overall. What is more, this effect is also
reflected in the division of paid labour between partners, which contrasts with
MIG-NAT relationships involving migrant women. Migrant men mixing with the
majority native French group is associated with a large and strongly significant
negative effect on gender-specialisation, i.e. a positive effect for gender equality
in the couple. This can be interpreted as signalling the fact observed earlier
in the chapter that these couples are much less likely to organise paid labour
distribution around a sole male breadwinner model, in comparison to any other
couple involving a primary migrant (men or women). I refer the reader back
to figure 5.4. Interestingly, the time spent in France since migration shows a
connection to gender division that does not mirror the one observed for migrant
women. No significant effect can be found for the gender division of paid work,
while there is a significant positive effect for unpaid labour. Thus it would appear
that migrant men’s longer exposure to French majority norms (as measured by
the length of time spent in the country) does not as such increase gender egalitar-
ianism in unpaid labour distribution. Men’s age is positively associated with a
more gender-polarised division of unpaid labour (where women’s age was not
significant). The quadratic term indicates a slight upward curvature, suggesting
that the effect levels somewhat past a certain age. Age gap is strongly significant,
associating couples that involve older migrant men with younger women with a
higher incidence of sole male breadwinner situations.
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5.3.3 The gender specialisation of labour: different mechanisms for
migrant women and migrant men
This section moves on to directly comparing gender-specialisation (the ag-
gregate of unpaid and paid labour distribution) for migrant women and migrant
men, using the same stepwise progression. Models for migrant woman and
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Migrants from Turkey, both women and men, continue to be associated with
more gender-specialised divisions of labour overall, regardless of the migratory
background of their partner and the migration-union sequence. In comparison
with EU migrants, other groups are not significantly more patriarchal when using
the compound gender-specialisation score. As observed in the previous tables,
North African migrants (men and women) tend to be in relationships where the
incidence of sole male breadwinner is on average higher. However, because their
distribution of unpaid labour tasks is somewhat more gender-equal than those of
EU migrants’ couple, the paid labour and unpaid labour aspect levels out in the
gender-specialisation approach. This is not the case for Turkish migrants, who
abide by stricter gender roles and specialisation in both types of labour, hence
also in overall gender specialisation. Migrant women from Africa (excluding the
Maghreb) are associated with more gender-equal arrangements overall, as are
migrant men from the ex-Indochina region (mainland Southeast Asia).
An important point highlighted by table 5.5, and already mentioned in the
previous analyses, is the enduring significance of union-migration sequences,
which is not simply cancelled out once accounting for area of origin. Therefore,
this cannot simply be considered to be a feature specific to particular migratory
flows and gender cultures. Specifically, two union-migration trajectories consis-
tently contrast with the baseline of single adult migrants: when migration coincides
with the formation of the first official relationship (formation first relationship) and
when it happens in the context of an already existing and steady relationship
(established first relationships). The first of the two is associated with more gender-
specialisation of labour in couples when concerning migrant women. The second
is connected with more patriarchal divisions of labour for both migrant men and
migrant women.
Figure 5.6 focuses on the regression coefficients of union-migration se-
quences for the gender-specialisation index in the full models just discussed
(models 5 and 6 in table 5.5 illustrate the asymmetrical effect and relevance of
union-migration sequences). There are clear and significant variations in the
gender division of labour in couples, depending on migrant women’s sequence of
migration and couple formation - even when we keep the area of origin constant.
Compared to women who migrate as single adults, most other sequences (child
migration excepted) are negative for gender equality in couples, with the effect of
partnership reconfiguration being particularly strong. In contrast, migrant men’s
sequences matter less (and area of origin matters more) and the coefficients point
to a effect that is reverse (see figure 5.6). The absence of statistical significance is
also linked to the smaller number of men who follow these sequences of couple-
related migration (seq 2 to seq 4 on the coefficient plot), as shown by the long tails
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FIGURE 5.6: Coefficient plots: effect of union-migration sequences
for gender specialisation
Estimates (scaled) from survey-weighted linear models. Not displayed but included in
the models are: couple type, area of birth, years since migration, age and age-squared,
age gap, whether the couple has coresident children under the age of 16, and a control for
unemployed couples.
of the confidence interval. In addition, while migrant men’s higher educational
attainment shows no connection to the gender-specialisation of labour, all models
concur in pointing to a greater capacity of highly-educated migrant women to
negotiate a more gender-balanced division of labour in their relationship.
The effect of acculturation is largely cancelled out by the integration of union-
migration sequences. However, it becomes significant again when controlling for
different migrant groups. This confirms that there is a form of intra-generational
acculturation over time when it comes to the gender division of labour, but it
is segmented by migrant groups and only significant for migrant women. This
is probably best explained in the terms of Kalmijn (2010) that different migrant
groups follow similar processes of assimilation, but starting from different levels:
thus when it comes to gender arrangements in the household, different migrant
groups start from different levels of gender-polarisation. The fact that there is
no significant effect for migrant men further suggests than men’s propensity to
contribute to housework/childcare and to be in dual-earner rather than single
male earner relationships is more stable than migrant women’s. While this is
clearly influenced by the migrant group (where they were born) and to a point
by how they migrated, migrant men’s gendered practices of labour division is
little impacted by time and exposure to life in France. In other words, as far as
migrant men are concerned, the effect of gender socialisation (migrant group),
mainly, and the effects of migration’s disruption (through mode of migration),
more peripherally, are much more relevant than how long they spent in France
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to explain the gender-specialisation of labour in their relationships.
Focus on migrant-native couples
Looking specifically at mixed (MIG-NAT) couples, I find that migrant men
who form relationships with majority French natives are strongly differentiated
from other partnered migrant men with respect to how their couple split labour
between men and women. This is not, however, simply attributable to the higher
number of child migrants in this group, i.e. an effect of the gender acculturation
and assimilation of the 1.5 generation migrant men who grew up at least partly
in France. Indeed, compared to those who migrated as single adults, men who
were still children at the time when they first migrated to France do not appear
significantly more egalitarian in their practice; what is more, controlling for men’s
union-migration sequence does not make the effect associated with mixed unions
disappear. If anything, it actually slightly increases the size of the effect. Thus it
would appear that men who partner with French natives from the majority group
tend to contribute more to unpaid labour and are less likely to be sole male earners
compared to other partnered migrant men. This could be an effect of self-selection:
mixing is socially sanctioned and migrants who ’marry out’ (or to ’partner out’)
are likely to be those who are less bound to traditions of endogamy and possibly
gender roles. In addition, endorsing conservative gender expectations may in
itself makes migrant or minority men less likely to be recruited as a partner by
a member of the majority group. Thus in the same way that mixed couples are
more likely to be cohabiting, they may hold more egalitarian views and abide
by more egalitarian practices. This is consistent with the fact that a higher-than-
average proportion of these migrant men/native women (MIG-NAT) couples
include highly-educated migrants, but the distinct effect of tertiary education is
accounted for in the model. Thus remains the effect of the power balance between
woman and man being tilted in favour of the native majority woman.
In support of the interpretation of native advantage, we find that there is no
such overall balancing when the make-up of the migrant-native couple involves a
migrant woman and a native majority man. As seen in the previous section, these
couples are associated with a slightly more equal division of unpaid labour, but
this does not extend to paid labour division. At the level of gender-specialisation,
both dimensions level out. These unions are not significantly dissimilar from
migrant couples, from the perspective of migrant women. The fact that being
with a majority native French partner is associated with a slightly more gender-
equal distribution of housework and childcare responsibilities could be attributed
to more gender-egalitarian attitudes on the side of the native men, and/or to
a selection effect. That is, the migrant women likely to mix with the majority
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group could be selected among the most independent and most attracted by
egalitarian possibilities. For the third-world women described by Suksomboon
(2011) and Riaño and Baghdadi (2007), egalitarian attitudes and hopes were
important incentives to form a relationship with a native Westerner, whom they
imagined as holding less gender-conservative views than the men from their own
communities. However, regardless of the particular gender ideologies of either
partner - which cannot be assessed here - this does not seem to affect the gender
division of paid labour. Migrant women in relationships with native majority
men are not significantly less likely to be financially dependent on their partner
than migrant women in other types of relationships. In the case of intermarried
migrant women, there is no evidence of a positive effect of, for example, having
access to native’s networks through the native partner, or of native majority men
being more open to their migrant wives or partner participating in paid work.
Going further: the weight of religion, the GII, and legal dependency
In this final results section, I further explore three dimensions. First, the
importance of religiosity in explaining the gender specialisation of labour and
differences between migrant groups. Second, the relevance of the gender equality
framework of the country of origin, measured through the Gender Inequality In-
dex score of the country of birth. Finally, the extent to which the effect associated
with union-migration sequence reflect situations of legal dependency, when the
migrant arrived on a partner or spouse visa.
Religiosity has a straightforward effect. I found that migrants who identified
as religious (rather than non-religious) were overall more likely to divide paid
and unpaid labour along gender lines than migrants who identified as having
no religion. Factoring in religiosity did not cancel the effect associated with the
different migrant groups - except for African migrants from outside the Maghreb
region. It even increased the gender-polarising effect associated with Turkish
migrants. This does not quite match Steinbach’s findings (2009), who suggested
that religiosity explained most of the differences in the division of household
labour between native majority German and Turkish migrants or direct descen-
dants of migrants. Steinbach used a more detailed scale of religiosity however,
which allowed her to distinguish not only between religious and non-religious in-
dividuals (indeed, very few in certain communities, including the Turks, identify
as non-religious). It also allowed her to distinguish within religious individuals,
those who had an active religious practice, as distinct from those who identified
with a religion but did not regularly attend services or religious events. The more
basic religious/not religious scale I used would not capture this finer dynamic.
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The GII proved to be a poor replacement for area of birth. The models were
a poorer fit than when including separate areas of origin and when adding the
GII score to models that included area of origin as independent variable, the
coefficients for different migrant groups were little affected. Nevertheless, adding
the GII score of the country of birth to the existing model was a way of identifying
gender cultures beyond the institutional framework of opportunities for women
in the country of origin. The effect of the GII was not significant and, surprisingly
enough, the coefficient was negative, suggesting that a lower GII (meaning higher
on the gender equality ranking) would be (though not significantly) associated
with more gender-specialisation, and vice-versa.
FIGURE 5.7: Coefficient plots: Stepwise modelling of gender
specialisation, with sequences (2) and GII and religion (3)
Estimates from survey-weighted linear models. Not displayed but included in the models
are: years since migration, age and age-squared, age gap, whether the couple has coresi-
dent children under the age of 16, and a control for unemployed couples.
Figure 5.7 presents the step-wise modelling of the gender-specialisation of
labour, for migrant women (in green) and migrant men (in yellow and orange)
respectively. The darker dots and tails identify the coefficients and confidence
intervals (at the 0.95 level) for the smallest models (1), which only includes
partner choice and the area of birth of the migrant (as well as all the usual controls,
although they are not all displayed in the figure). I then added to the modelling
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the union-migration sequences (2) and finally the GII score and religiosity (3).
The progression highlights the fact that except for religiosity, the expansion of
the models did not much alter the effects the migratory ties of the partner and
with the migrant group. The effect connected to being in a relationship with a
native majority partner is distinctly away from gender-specialisation for migrant
men. It is unaffected by sequences of migration, the GII of the country of birth
and religiosity. The equivalent effect of mixing with the majority French group
for migrant women is not so clear-cut. While slightly negative, it never steps into
statistical significance, or more specifically not when the models include migrant
women’s area of birth.
The last parameter that needed investigating was the legal admission cate-
gory of migrants, and specifically if migrants had (at least initially) been spon-
sored by, and therefore legally dependent on, their partner (and in a few cases, on
their former partner). Since much of the relevant literature focuses on ’reunified’
or ’imported’ migrant women who arrive as dependent on their partner, it is
important to know whether the legal dependency is at the root of the difference
observed for union-migration sequences of couple-forming and established rela-
tionships. Figure 5.8 shows the coefficients for the sequence, as displayed before
in figure 5.6 for models 5 and 6 in table 5.5. They are identified as ’m1’ in the
legend. But in addition, this plot also includes the coefficients for models that
add a control for legally tied migrants. These are identified in the legend as
’m2’. The ’tied migrants’ category refers to migrants who were initially brought
in by a settled migrant partner through family reunification, or who obtained
their first visa in France as ’partner of a French national’. The objective here is to
test whether the asymmetry inherent in legal dependency suffices to explain the
differentiated gendered effects between sequences. As shown on figure 5.8, tied
migrant women are indeed and clearly associated with more gender-specialised
divisions of labour. No similar (or reverse) effects can be observed for tied mi-
grant men. Including a control for legally tied migrants in the models increases
the confidence intervals of union-migration sequences. It dents the statistical
significance of migrant women’s union-migrations sequences, but the coefficients
remain little changed, which suggests that legally tied migration is not the whole
story when it comes to how migration-union trajectories play into the gender
division of labour.
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FIGURE 5.8: Coefficient plots: Stepwise modelling of gender
specialisation, with (m2) and without (m1) legally tied migration
Estimates from survey-weighted linear models. Not displayed but included in the mod-
els are: couple type, area of birth, years since migration, age and age-squared, age gap,
whether the couple has coresident children under the age of 16, and a control for unem-
ployed couples.
5.4 Discussion
Do union-migration sequences matter for gender equality in couples?
From these analyses, a picture emerges which suggests that, though the gen-
der division of labour is a complex construct and only approximately captured
by the measure I have used in this chapter, the particulars of migration experience
and trajectories matter. Other factors, such as area of origin, parenthood and years
since migration, also matter but the way men and women migrate and meet sig-
nificantly affects the manner in which they (re)produce the gender-specialisation
of labour and roles in their relationship. This appears to be especially valid
for migrant women. Women are more likely to migrate in the context of a re-
lationship either just formed or long tied, and are more likely to follow or join
their partner as legally tied migrants. Ultimately, their mode of migration shows
significant associations with the gender-specialisation of labour. This is mainly
driven by a higher incidence of paid work arrangements structured around a
sole male breadwinner, especially in the case of two union-migration sequences :
couple-forming migrations and established relationships.
In addition, arriving as a legally tied migrant is associated with a clear
gendering effect for migrant women, who are more likely to take on (even) more
of the housework and childcare responsibilities. They are also at higher risk
of being out of the labour market and hence economically dependent on their
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sponsor partner. This may be a self-selection effect, in that women who agree
to become legally tied to their partner might also be more likely to endorse
gender-specialisation of labour and more conservative gender ideologies that
put the career of husbands first and give women a role focused on the family.
But the qualitative literature surveyed provided ample evidence that that is not
always the case. Moreover, even when it is not the case, the legal dependency
and the uprooting associated with the process of tied migration has the capacity
to confine migrant women to more domestic and dependent role whether they
aspired to them or not (Riaño & Baghdadi, 2007; Suksomboon, 2011).
The effect of migration sequences and legal mode of migration is indepen-
dent from the effect of migrant groups, religion and gender opportunities in the
country of origin (insofar as it can be measured based on the GII). For migrant
women, all sequences when migration happens during a relationship (either
established or in formation) are thus connected with more gender-specialised
roles in the household. This contrast with the migration of single adult women.
These women are comparatively in more gender-equal relationships. Women
who migrated as children or quickly partnered as young adults, are mostly in
a less favourable position (in terms of gender equality) compared to those who
migrated as single adults. The effects are rarely significant, but we could draw
from the comparison the interpretation that the migration of girls and very young
women generally happens under the authority of parents, and is therefore not
associated with the same independence as single adult migrant women. It may
be this independence that single adult migrant women can then build on to
negotiate more egalitarian arrangements in their relationships.
Union-migration sequences appear less decisive for migrant men, except
when migration happens in the context of a stable relationship, in which case it
is also associated with heightened gender-specialisation for migrant men. This
makes sense once we consider that, when couples organise relationships together
but do not migrate at the same time (family-stage migration), men are more
likely to be sent ahead first (lead migrants) (González-Ferrer, 2011; Hondagneu-
Sotelo, 1992). When their wife joins them later, it is as a dependent spouse,
who - less familiar with the country of immigration - will often have to rely on
them for their residency right as well as for social networks and help dealing
with the language barrier, etc. Hondagneu-Sotelo (1992) reported anecdotal
evidence of lead migrant men who had to learn domestic skills during the time
they spent separated from their wives, and who continued contributing more to
housework after reunification. The analyses presented here finds little evidence
of this, although they are inhibited by two limitations. Firstly, the construction
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of the sequence variables and the modelling do not precisely single out family-
stage migration; the union-migration sequences only capture the interlocking
of migration and couple formation for one partner (not for both). Secondly,
the analyses are limited by the roughness of the measure for the division of
unpaid labour. Not only does it rely on tasks (rather than labour time) and on
the estimation of one partner only, but it also does not include the most routine
household labour tasks (cleaning, tidying, laundry), which are also the most
stubbornly gendered (Coltrane, 2010).
When controlling for other factors, couple-forming migration seems to
edge migrant men towards more gender-equal relationships. Even if this is not
significant, it backs up the idea that these migration trajectories come with forms
of uprooting and dependency for the side of the migrant partner which affects
the power balance in the couple. Indeed, marriage migrants (men and women)
often find themselves socially isolated, reliant on their settled or native partner
and family or networks. Difficulties with the language, obtaining recognition
for their qualifications and securing paid employment, may confine migrants
in this cluster to more domestic roles. For migrant men, it also means that the
position of breadwinner might be out of reach, and even reversed when they find
themselves economically dependent on their wives (Charsley, 2005; Fleischer,
2011)
Does mixing with the native majority French group mean more gender-equal
couple arrangements for migrants?
For migrant men, having a native woman partner without a direct migration
background is strongly associated with a more equal division of paid work. This
could be because of these native women’s better integration into the labour-
market. One hypothesis was that these couples were more likely to involve
female sponsors and tied male migrants. Since sponsors have to be economically
active, this would pave the way for more gender equality (or even a gender
reversal) in the division of paid labour (and through relative resource and time
availability, in the division of unpaid labour). However, the effect remained after
controlling for tied migration and was therefore not limited to tied male migrants
- who are, at any rate, rarer. Mixing with the native majority group was associated
with more gender equal relationships for migrant men. This can be interpreted as
a selection effect, with out-partnering being more likely to appeal to men who are
already willing to break away from norms of endogamy. Therefore they may also
be more open to step away from strict gender roles in labour division. It may also
be an effect of conjugal mixedness and of the power balance between men and
women being somewhat levelled when the woman is a French majority native
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and the man a primary migrant (even if a child migrant). The two hypotheses
are not mutually exclusive and the qualitative literature finds evidence for both
Collet (2015) and Fleischer (2011).
In contrast to suggestions made in the literature that having a native partner
would increase migrant women’s labour market engagement (Baker & Benjamin,
1997), I found that partners being native (NAT or 2G) did not help predict the
division of labour in couples once accounting for union-migration trajectories.
The findings thus concur with González-Ferrer (2011), who found no consistent
effect of being in a migrant-native relationship on the labour performance of
migrant women living in Spain. Neither could a robust effect be found between
having a native French majority partner and more equal gender divisions of
domestic and care work. The idea that migrant women fare better, emancipation-
wise, when they partner up with a French majority native compared to another
migrant or a descendant of migrants is thus not clearly supported by the analysis.
The models find more robust support for the effects of women’s migration-union
sequences, areas of origin and educational attainment. It is not being with a
majority native itself which results in more gender equality, but rather that the
paths that lead there are both self-selective and often involve more room for
empowerment (e.g. education in the country of destination and independent
migration), as well as comparatively less room for spousal dependency.
Some group borders are more easily crossed (Choi & Tienda, 2018; Wang,
2012). EU migrant women likely combine racial and cultural closeness (majority
white and Christian or no religion) with the French native group, which is asso-
ciated with greater levels of intermarriage and assimilation. But crucially, their
migration, employment and family lives are (mostly) unhindered by immigra-
tion regulations and their qualifications are likely better recognised. Migration
therefore does not mean a loss of resources and qualifications to the extent that it
might for non-EU migrant women. In addition, their labour participation and
performance is less likely to suffer from racist and intersectional discrimination
which mainly targets ’visible’ minorities (Beauchemin, Simon, Hamel, Lesné, &
de l’enquête TeO, 2010). The fact that these EU migrant women, together with
highly-educated migrant women, represent a large proportion of the migrant
women involved in the migrant-native (MIG-NAT) category is a more convincing
explanation as to why migrant-native couples have less unequal divisions of
labour compared to other couples formed by migrant women. It is in other
words more about the selection criteria of migrant women by French majority
native men, and their migration-union paths, and less (or nothing) to do with the
presumably more gender-equal practices of the French majority men involved.
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This point is fruitfully supported by the two levels of comparison I drew
on this chapter. In latter part of the chapter, it was useful to be able to compare
migrant-native couples with couples formed by other migrants, but also with
couples formed by natives, as I did in the beginning of the chapter. The conclu-
sion we can draw from this, is that in comparison to migrant women in other
relationships, migrant women who form unions with majority French native
men might fare slightly better in terms of gender equality in labour division,
although most of this effect is linked to area of origin and sequences of migration.
However, in comparison to native majority couples, these unions are clearly
more patriarchal, especially with regards to paid labour division and economic
dependency.
Neither French majority natives nor EU migrants appeared more egalitarian,
across the board, than other couples. EU migrant men could not be significantly
distinguished from migrants from African regions outside of the Maghreb, and
appeared less gender-equal in their division of labour compared to men born in
mainland Southeast Asia. Only migrant men from Turkey (and to an extent North
Africa) were significantly more likely to have gender-specialised relationships
than EU migrants. Similarly, migrant women from Turkey were more likely than
EU migrant women to be doing most or all of the housework and childcare tasks
and to be out of the labour force and economically dependent on their husband.
However, the opposite was true for women of Sub-Saharan and Sahelian Africa.
Switching the independent variable as as I did in the last models, in order
to use an ethnic (and interethnic) lens rather than one based on area of origin
and migration status, confirmed the analysis. Crucially, the importance of union-
migration sequence for migrant women was reaffirmed, as was the disconnect
between the effect of sequences for migrant men and for migrant women.
5.4.1 An effect of time: acculturation or autonomisation
The effect of the time spent in France (years since migration) warrants
particular attention here. The analysis of the models found a linear (if small)
but very significant negative association with the gender-specialisation of labour,
for migrant women only. This indicates that, for migrant women, the odds of
being entirely economically dependent on their husband/partners declines with
time. This effect is reduced by accounting for union-migration sequences but it
remains significant. This can be connected with the analyses of the post-migration
processes and trajectories of ’reunified’ and ’imported’ migrant women which
recent qualitative literature has unearthed.
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This echoes the stories recalled by Mounchit (2018) of the ’reunified’ migrant
women from Sub-Saharan Africa, who had joined their settled or native hus-
bands in France. Initially, there was a period of ’first shock’ and isolation8, during
which these women found themselves in a vastly asymmetrical power balance
towards their sponsor partner. This translated into (and was experienced as) an
acutely patriarchal gender relationship that confined them to domestic roles and
economic dependence, even when they had been economically autonomous prior
to migration. Although the migration and initial couple experience itself was
profoundly disempowering, migrant women did not simply accept or remain
forever locked in a status of ’dominated wife’ (Hervouet & Schiff, 2017). Gradu-
ally, they negotiated job training, and sought and found paid work. This restored
a degree of economic autonomy, a form of self-determination and life outside of
the home and conjugal circle and decisively shifted gender relations in the couple
towards a (comparatively) more equal distribution of power and arrangements
in the couples. Thus the analysis may here capture the agency of migrant women,
which is often missed in reductive or purely descriptive representations of family
reunification and migration. Migrant women’s lives are better characterised by a
process in which dependency and autonomisation co-exist and are interlocked
(Morokvasic, 2010b), something which also applies to migrant women who form
relationships with majority French men (Hervouet & Schiff, 2017). This does not
exclude the possibility of a parallel process of gender acculturation (Roeder &
Mühlau, 2014) which could also affect the gender division of unpaid labour. But
this was not captured by the measure I used.
No such effect for paid labour could be identified for migrant men. It is
reasonable to suppose that migrant men are indeed less likely to be initially
expected (or pushed) by their partner to stay out of paid work and to take on a
domestic and secluded role. On the contrary, both native and migrant women are
likely to mobilise networks and dedicate important amounts of time and family
resources to helping migrant men find paid employment or start a business as
soon as possible (Baker & Benjamin, 1997; Falquet, Hirata, & Kergoat, 2010; Ferree,
1979; Pedraza, 1991). Indeed, there is evidence of such gender asymmetries in
the urgency and intensity with which men’s and women’s unemployment is
handled by families and couples in general (Rao, 2020). However, the length of
time spent in the country did have a small connection to the gender division of
unpaid labour, which could suggest a small gender acculturation effect.
A high educational level was found to foster slightly more gender-equal
8These ’first shocks’ were observed by Albert Nicollet (1992, p. 68) in his studies of Black African
migrant women in Le Havre.
244
Chapter 5. Trajectories of migration and mixing and the gender division of
labour in France
divisions of labour, mainly unpaid labour. While education level does not signifi-
cantly alter the gender division of paid labour in the form of women’s economic
dependency, it seems to provide a bargaining chip. This allows highly-educated
women to negotiate for the housework and childcare to be (more) equally shared
between partners. Additionally, it suggests that highly-educated migrants are
more willing to contribute to unpaid labour as well.
5.4.2 On the use of considering paid labour and unpaid labour divi-
sion separately, and together
Separately analysing the gender division of paid and unpaid labour, as I
did in many of the models, highlighted the difference between them. While
undoubtedly connected, the way couples split paid work and housework or
childcare is sensitive to different factors. Age, for instance, matters more for
unpaid labour than paid labour division, with older men being more likely to
be in relationships that assign all or most of the unpaid labour to women. The
distinction between the two also helped to understand more finely what the
driving factors were in the gender-specialisation of labour as a whole.
In this chapter, the division of paid labour appeared altogether more sen-
sitive to migration experiences, couple types and variations by migrant groups.
This may be because paid work is more public and more institutionalised and
is therefore more affected by external factors, changes linked to migration and
’othering’, such as discrimination and devaluation of qualifications. This would
also have a direct and immediate effect on migrants’ labour performance and
opportunities. In contrast, the gender division of unpaid labour is largely private.
It can therefore even act as a ’buffer’ or compensatory mechanism, a way to
re-establish gender roles and identities when the gender division of paid work
is not gender-conforming. For example, when migrant men are unemployed or
poorly-paid and the woman becomes the main or sole breadwinner, yet still does
most or all of the couple’s housework and care work (Charsley, 2005). It makes
sense therefore that the division of unpaid labour would be more stable, less
prone to change (other than perhaps slow acculturation). The next chapter will
bring further elements of interpretation, thanks to a more detailed measure of





the gender division of labour: the
British case
Chapter introduction
As dissected in the literature review, there is a wealth of British literature
on the gender division of labour and its ties to gender equality in the labour
market, in the household and in representations and social norms (Baxter &
Wright, 2000; Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000; Bianchi, Sayer, Milkie, &
Robinson, 2012; Rosemary Crompton, Brockmann, & Lyonette, 2005; Gershuny
& Sullivan, 2003; Kan & Pudney, 2008). Most of this research, in the UK as in
France (or indeed most Western countries) has focused on the majority, White and
native-born population. As a result, it has largely remained blind to how gender
inequalities and gendered labour may be associated with migration as well as
ethnicity, socio-economic status and, of course, gender. As Kan and Laurie
(2018) noted and as discussed in chapter two, this is partly because the data
did not allow for disaggregation by ethnic group, let alone by migration paths.
Although research on migration and migrants in the UK has grown tremendously
in recent years, the connection with gender relations has therefore seldom be
drawn empirically. It has also never crossed path with the British scholarship
on intermarriage. This scholarship is (as elsewhere) largely focused on rates of
intermarriage across different groups. It engages much more rarely with the
’social consequences’ of intermarriage (Kalmijn, 2010), let alone with its gender
consequences. Moreover, mixing and intermarriage in Britain have been mostly
conceptualised and analysed through the lens of mixed-race and inter-ethnicity
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(e.g. Berrington (1994, 1996), Coleman (1994), Muttarak and Heath (2010), and
ONS (2014)). This means that, conceptually, it has been further removed from the
consideration of migration paths and the inequalities they carry.
6.0.1 UK-bound migration, ethnicity and gendered division of do-
mestic labour
There is virtually no empirical research dedicated to UK-bound migrants’
gender division of domestic labour, but precious insights can be drawn from
the (rare) available research on ethnicity and domestic labour. Kan and Laurie
(2016, 2018) found clear differences along gender and ethnic lines, even when
controlling for employment and educational level of both partners. Notably,
ethnic Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi women were shown to have higher
housework hours and shares than other women, while Black Caribbean men
contributed more to housework than other men. Kan and Laurie (2018, p. 60)
have argued that migration may play a role: ’Immigration experience is another
key factor influencing the intersectionality between gender and ethnicity.’ Ac-
cordingly, they distinguished primary migrants who arrived to the UK after the
age of 12 from the ’1.5 generation’ (migrants who arrived in the UK when they
were still children), grouped with the ’second generation’, those born in the UK to
migrant parent(s). Descendants of migrants, as well as child migrants educated
in the UK, may mix norms and gender ideology from their culture of origin and
from the UK (Nandi & Platt, 2014). In the acculturation approach, adult primary
migrants, more so than child migrants, are expected to bring with them and
enforce gender norms, values and expectations from their country of origin. Mi-
gration matters for gender, then, but only insofar as it is related to acculturation.
The social and gender implications of migration and family trajectories per se are
not problematised, except in qualitative scholarship on marriage migration.
Gender equality: a matter of acculturation into British society?
When gender has been connected to migration in the UK, it has been largely
been around integration concerns and assumptions of patriarchal practices and
cultures. Politically, these particular concerns about gender relations in migrant
families are mostly raised to justify greater obstacles to immigration and no-
tably transnational, co-ethnic marriages. As Charsley, Bolognani, and Spencer
(2017) argued, there is much valid criticism to be made towards the theoretical
idea and conceptualisation of integration, which, being often narrowly defined,
bears its own exclusionary project (Modood, 2012; Spencer & Charsley, 2016).
Certainly the term integration is often used with connotations that go beyond
a more humble understanding of social cohesion, and carry no small amount
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of normative cultural expectations. In the context of gender relations, it often
pits a ’gender-equal’ and progressive British majority society against ’traditional’
and patriarchal immigrants. The expectation is that when acculturated to British
gender norms, migrants and their descendants would gradually become more
attuned to gender equality views and practices. The normative part of this nar-
rative of integration, in which gender equality becomes a feature and a marker
of ’Britishness’ is doubtless disputable. It has notably been tackled in critical
scholarship on marriage migration to the UK (Charsley, Bolognani, Ersanilli, &
Spencer, 2020). Yet the empirical question also needs addressing.
Analysing differences in gender practices and inequalities solely through the
lens of cultural background and acculturation has its limits. Cultural ideologies
about women and gender roles are only one part of a complex interplay (Brah &
Phoenix, 2013), and varying degrees of acculturation to British majority norms
may only partially explain variations in the gender division of labour. Thus,
Archer (2002) objected to interpreting South Asian ethnic girls’ educational and
employment aspirations purely as the expression of their cultural background
and instead emphasised the role that British society’s institutional racism and
sexism may play in framing Asian girls’ expectations and hopes. Discrimination
is another possible explanation for observed difference between migrant groups
on the labour market. By constraining access to paid employment for certain
categories of migrants, discrimination can also impact on the gender division of
labour as a whole, and many minorities are found to face discrimination and eth-
nic penalties (A. F. Heath, 2018; Li & Heath, 2018). British society seems overall
much more hospitable towards ’Other White’ (rather than non-white) migrants,
although this lower level of prejudice is changing due to the increased visibility
and politication of white migrants, especially Eastern Europeans and other EU
migrants (Demireva, 2011). Discrimination may also be intersectional (Cren-
shaw, 1989) in that specific obstacles to employment apply to certain racialised
categories of migrant women. There is ample evidence of persisting ethnic dis-
advantage in employment in the UK, with some groups such as black African,
black Caribbean, Pakistani and Bangladeshi associated with higher rates of un-
employment and lower earnings. Rates of unemployment are especially high for
some women (notably Pakistani and Bangladeshi) and some men (notably Black
Caribbean)
There is also some empirical research on the effect of family migration
on gender relations (especially employment) in Britain within couples. These
have focused on internal family relocation (i.e. internal ’tied’ migration). Taylor
(2007) thus found that tied migration significantly reduced the probability of
employment for both husbands and wives. The effects were similar in size, but
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wives were much more likely to be tied migrants than husbands. However, no
such parallel was found for domestic and care labour.
6.0.2 UK-bound migration, ethnicity and gendered employment
In general, migrant men are more likely to be employed than UK-born
men (84% vs 79% in 2019), but migrant women are less likely to be involved in
paid work compared to UK-born women (67% vs 73%). In 2019, the Migration
Observatory noted that that this was true across all migrant groups with the
exception of migrant men born in Central, East and Southeast Asia (71%) and
EU-born women, who had higher rates of employment than British-born women.
They found wide differences in rates of employment between groups, as well as
the gender gap within groups.
FIGURE 6.1: UK migrants’ employment by area of origin and by
gender (Fernández-Reino & Rienzo, 2021)
These differences in migrants’ employment and occupational achievement
by migrant and ethnic group, cannot be simply attributable to differences in
human capital (Demireva, 2011). Different ethnic groups have also been associ-
ated with different gender cultures with regards to how women’s employment is
perceived. Ballard (1983) observed that in the Jullundri Sikhs communities, there
were less objection to women and wives entering the labour force compared to
Mirpuris. At a broader level, Charsley et al. (2020) and Shaw (2014) notes that
in Indian families, women - including marriage migrants - are often expected to
work and contribute to the family income. In contrast, women in Pakistani and
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Bangladeshi families are more often expected to fulfil a purely domestic and care-
focused role and are therefore much more rarely involved in paid employment
(see figure 6.1). The segmented assimilation approach has shown that integration
patterns depends on the segment of society migrants integrate, so that one can be
acculturated (also in terms of gender norms) without being economically very
integrated (e.g. Black Caribbeans in Britain) or have strong ethnic community
and culture while being economically integrated (e.g. Indians).
British institutional framework for the gender division of labour
The British welfare state has generally been characterised as one of the non-
interventionist liberal countries (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Soskice & Hall, 2001).
This is also the case in the context of research on cross-national variations in
time-use and household labour distribution (Cunha & Atalaia, 2019; Gershuny &
Sullivan, 2003; Kan, Sullivan, & Gershuny, 2011).1 This cluster refers to welfare
regimes which provide low levels of welfare support and social policies that are
generally built around the assumption that the market’s self-regulation is most
efficient in fostering human development. Accordingly, state interventionism in
social and family policies is limited (one measure of this is, for instance, lower
total social expenses). This also means that a wide array of social services and
support are provided by private providers and insurance schemes (e.g. pensions,
extended medical care). This is particularly salient in the UK with respect to
nursery care and childcare services, which are mostly market-based or provided
by employers. They tend to be very expensive and with limited availability. There
is also limited parental leave, especially for fathers. The same diagnosis applies
to elderly care. The gender ideology model inherent to this type of welfare state
has been labelled ’modified breadwinner’, reflecting the idea that most women
are expected to take part in paid employment, but also to provide most of the
domestic and care labour for the family, since there is no public institutional
structure or support for it to be outsourced.
With respect to the comparison of the British and French ’gender regimes’,
the literature has established several, now well-known features, chiefly based
on cross-national comparisons of women’s employment (Gregory & Windebank,
2000). In these studies, the British model contrasts with the French model mostly
in the extent to which women and couple resort to part-time work. Compared
to France, the UK is characterised by lower rates of female economic inactiv-
ity but much higher rates of women in part-time work. The dominant model
is therefore a dual-earner couple in which the man works full-time and the
1Other states associated with this cluster are Australia, Canada, and the USA.
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woman part-time. In contrast, France has somewhat higher rates of female inac-
tivity, but much higher rates of women in full-time employment and of couples
formed by two partners who both work full-time (Franco & Winqvist, 2002).
This difference is also reflected in gender attitudes, with the evidence suggesting
that British couples exhibit a much stronger preference for the full-time (male)
breadwinner/part-time (female) carer model (Rosmary Crompton & Feuvre,
2000). Based on the Labour Force Surveys,2 Rosmary Crompton and Feuvre
(2000) found that among couples with children, the proportion of partners both
working full time constituted the majority in France, but under 30% of those
couples in the UK, who were more likely to be in male full-time/female part-time
situations (40% of UK couples vs. only 16% of couples in France). The proportion
of sole male breadwinners was indeed slightly higher in France (36% vs. 30%
in the UK), from which it follows that French couples should be comparatively
more often associated with female economic dependency (sole male breadwinner
situations). However, if we think of the gender division of paid work in terms
of couples’ division of labour time rather than couples’ joint employment status,
then we should also consider that the proportion of women who take on as much
or more of the labour time as their partner is lower in the UK compared to France.
6.1 Research questions
This chapter follows the same architecture as the previous chapter, following
the theoretical thread that the gender-specialisation of labour in migrants’ families
is a reflection of both cultural and gender socialisation (which can potentially
be mixed) and power relations which are potentially affected by the mode of
migration and partner recruitment.
(1) In line with the assimilation hypothesis, I expect that for a migrant, part-
nering with a majority native British partner denotes a high degree of integration;
by extrapolating this through the notion of gender-acculturation, I can assume
that the gender division of labour in these couples will resemble those of majority
native couples, and will differ significantly from that of migrants partnered with
other migrants. Direct descendants of migrants are expected to be in the middle
between the two. However,
(2) Having established in part 2 of this thesis that migrant women and
migrant follow different paths of migration and couple formation, including
between those who form unions with native majority partner, I expect that there
will be variations in the gender division of labour depending on:
2Labour Force survey data from 1999 for the the UK and from 2000 for France
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- the gender of the migrant partner (in MIG-NAT couples) - the union-migration
trajectories
(3) Notably, I expect that trajectories of couple-forming migration have a
particularly disempowering effect on migrants who follow them, which should
lead to more gender-specialisation when they involve migrant women, and less
when they invole migrant men. Other trajectories involving already-partnered
individuals at the time of their migration are expected to diminish women’s
bargaining power but not necessarily men’s because, in contrast to marriage
migration, men tend to be first movers and decisions to migrate as a couple are
mostly done for the benefice of the husband’s employment, etc (Mincer, 1978).
(4) Taking stock of the differences between France and the UK, especially
as regards paid work, I expect that the gender division of paid labour based
on employment status may show less variations, because it is less suited to the
gendered stratification of employment in the UK (especially female part-time
work). Accordingly, and taking advantage of the richer data available for the UK,
this chapter develops a second measure of gender-specialisation alongside one
that mirrors the French index. I also expect that if there are divergence between
the French and British analyses, they are likely to be more marked in the division
of paid labour. The reasoning is migrants’ labour performance is more directly
affected by migration experience and trajectories (through the devaluation of
qualifications, career or training interruptions, language barriers etc) and that, in
addition, the gender division of unpaid labour has been found to be less sensitive
to external changes such as policy changes (Pailhé, Solaz, & Souletie, 2019; Vagni
& Cornwell, 2018), also because of the performative gendered dimension of
housework, i.e. ’doing gender’ (Robinson & Milkie, 1998; West & Zimmerman,
1987). Therefore, the gender division of labour might be more stable during and
after migration compared to the division of paid employment.
6.2 Methods, data and analytical categories
6.2.1 Couples disagreements, combinations and imputations
With the TeO data we had no choice but to rely on individuals’ assessment
of the distribution of housework and childcare. In the UKLHS data, in contrast,
partners are matched and they each provide their own answers. This enriches
the data but also complicates analyses since partners’ answers do not necessarily
concur, and that leaves the researcher in a position where they have to arbitrate
or combine answers. There is some empirical evidence to suggest that people’
perception of their contribution to housework, even in absolute terms, is often
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quite skewed. While both men and women tend to over-report the time they
spend on housework (S. Berk & Shih, 1980), couples may also tend to minimize
the gender gap in unpaid labour, with women over-reporting the time they spend
on housework (though less than men overestimate their contribution). What is
more, partners do not necessarily agree on their contribution relative to that of
their partner, although perceptions align more often about the woman’s hours
(Kamo, 2000). Rather than arbitrating between the two partners’ answer, I have
chosen to combine answers at the couple level, through either averaging between
the two partners’ answers, or aggregating answers and calculating each partner’s
share. Both methods may lead to underestimating the gendered polarization
of domestic work. Nevertheless, considering the nature of the subject and the
difficulty in obtaining more reliable data (such as time-diary data), this provides
a suitable measure (see for instance (Schober, 2009)).
6.2.2 Operationalising the gender division of labour in couples: dis-
tribution of tasks, status and labour time
I have created two indexes of gender specialisation of labour. The first
mirrors the index used with the French data. The second takes advantage of
questions on time spent weekly on paid work, housework, and unpaid care,
questions which were not part of the TeO questionnaire but are acutely relevant
to the question under study. The variables on the gender division of unpaid
labour include childcare and care labour. As with the French data, all models
include a control variable for whether the couple lives with children under 16.
Index 1: gender-specialisation of tasks and employment
The Domestic Labour module which kicked in at Wave 2 of Understanding
Society included questions that follow exactly the same template as the questions
on housework in TeO 3. The gender division of unpaid labour is here once again
tackled through the distribution of responsibility for tasks. These tasks include
grocery shopping and daily cooking (as with the French data), but also cleaning
and washing/ironing. I used the question on ’who is mostly responsible for
childcare?’, which provided a (broader) replacement to the question on ’who is
responsible for bringing the children to school’, asked in the French questionnaire
but not the British one. As in the previous chapter, when respondents identify
the woman in their couple (either themselves or their partner since this study
focuses on man-woman couples) as taking charge for any of these housework
or childcare task, this is coded as 1. If instead, the man is identified as being
3For instance: ’Here are some household jobs. Could you please say who mostly does this work
here? Is it mostly yourself, or mostly your spouse/partner, or is the work shared equally? - First,
grocery shopping...’ Domestic Labour Module, UKLHS Wave 2 questionnaire)
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the main person responsible for any of these tasks, this results in a -1. When
individuals state that the tasks is taken on by ’paid help only’ or ’other’, this is
coded as zero (neutral) since it does not alter as such the division of the remaining
labour between partners. Answers are then aggregated as follow:
Unpaid labour score (individual, unstandardised)
= groceries + meals + cleaning + washing/ironing + childcare
The score thus ranges from - 5 to + 5, but needs to be combined, to account for
both partners, and standardised. Both partners’ scores are added and divided by
two, leaving us with an average of their answers. This score is then divided by
the total tasks undertaken by the couple (i.e. not outsourced to paid help or to a
third part). In cases where the total number of tasks undertaken by the couple, as
identified by one partner, does not match the total declared by the other partner,
the highest total is retained. The final standardized couple score for the gender
distribution of unpaid labour tasks Suit thus runs:
Suit =






This unpaid labour scores ranges from -1 to 1: a score closer to 1 indicates
that the couple conforms to a very gender-segregated division of unpaid labour,
while a score closer to -1 indicates that the couple upholds a division of unpaid
labour that runs counter to gendered expectations, i.e. the man takes on most or
all of these tasks. Scores around zero indicate more egalitarian arrangements, and
reflect that tasks are either shared or equally distributed between partners. It is
constructed in the same way as the French score for unpaid labour division, but
because it is based on a wider selection of housework tasks, it can be expected
to more finely capture variations in gender distribution of housework. This
expectation is further justified by the fact that, in contrast with the French score,
this one includes some of the most routine parts of housework (cleaning, tidying
and laundry), which are also the tasks that have been less affected by men’s
increased contributions to housework and have therefore remained most gender-
segregated Bittman and Wajcman (2000), Kan and Gershuny (2010), and Sullivan
(1997)).
To continue mirroring the French data, the gender specialisation of paid
employment is first constructed around a simple dummy, based on employment
status: individuals are either in paid work (employed or self-employed) or not.
The couples’ joint employment status is then coded as follow: situations where
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only the man is in paid work are given the score of 1. When the situation is
reversed, the score is -1. When both partners are in paid employment, or neither
of them are, the gender-specialisation of paid work is considered neutral, and the
variable codes 0.
The first index for the gender specialisation of labour time is therefore,
exactly like in the French chapter, based on the following equation, where Sit
refers to the gender specialisation of labour in an individual i’s couple, at the




Suit stands for the gender specialisation of unpaid labour tasks, while Spit
represents the gender specialisation of paid work in the couple, based on the
couple’s joing employment status. The gender specialisation index ranges from
-1 to +1. 1 identifies a completely gender-conforming and gender-specialised
distribution of paid work and housework and childcare taken on by the couple,
whereby the man does all the paid work and the woman is not in paid work but
is responsible for all the housework and childcare.
Index 2: gender division of labour time
Another way of operationalising the division of household labour is to base
it on how unpaid reproductive labour time and paid labour time is distributed
between men and women in couples. Understanding Society’s Wave 2 question-
naire involves questions on how much time individuals typically spend weekly
on household tasks (for instance, “About how many hours do you spend on
housework in an average week, such as time spent cooking, cleaning, and doing
the laundry?”); on caring (unpaid) for someone (or several people); and on paid
labour. To compute an individual’s total hours spent on paid labour per week,
I added weekly hours spent in waged employment and weekly hours spent in
self-employment (when applicable). Although answers given by respondents
to surveys questions formulated in this manners have proven less accurate than
diary-based estimates, errors are mostly random (Kan & Pudney, 2008).
By aggregating the answers given by the two members of a couple, we can
then calculate gendered ratios representing women and men’s share of different
types of labour. Hours reported by each partner are divided by the total of the two
partners’ combined weekly hours. This leaves us with a percentage representing
their respective share of the couple’s total household labour time. Because I am
interested in gender specialisation, and not just any specialisation, the variable of
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interest in this case will be more specifically the woman’s relative share of the
total time spent by the couple on housework per week. This approach has the
notable advantage of avoiding arbitrating between partners’ perception of their
own and their partners’ contribution, and/or imputing the couple’s division
based on one partner’s perception only. Measure in terms of labour time may
also be able to capture asymmetries in the gender division of unpaid labour more
finely than tasks-based measures.
Two scores of gender division of unpaid labour time and paid labour time
thus emerge: the first one aggregates hours spent on housework and unpaid care;
the second combines hours spent on paid employment and self-employment.
In the first case, the focus is on the woman’s share of unpaid labour, and in the
second case, it is on the man’s share of paid labour. This simplifies interpretation,
as both of these indicators are expected to often work together in the same direc-
tion, i.e. that when a woman does a greater part of the housework, the man will
be doing a greater part of the paid work and vice-versa, as per time-availability
constraints theory. The equations underneath formally present the construction
of these indexes, with STuit representing the gender Specialisation of Time spent
on Unpaid labour in the couple of which individual i is a member around the














The gender specialisation of unpaid labour time STuit is thus a percentage
of the hours spent weekly by the woman on unpaid reproductive work huw, out
of the total of hours spent by the couple as a whole (both man and woman) on
such work. The gender specialisation of paid labour time STpit represents the
proportion of the couples’ hours of paid work that is done by the man.
Finally, I combine STu and STp to obtain a compound index of the gender
specialisation of labour time, following the calculation below.
STit =
STuit + STpit − 100
100
This index thus ranges from -1 to +1, with values around zero indicating
little or no gender-specialisation of labour time. This can mean that both unpaid
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labour time and paid labour time are equally distributed between man and
woman; or it can reflect situations where a more gender-specialised division of
time on one front (e.g. paid labour time) is compensated by a gender-subversive
division of time on the other front (e.g. the man spends more time on unpaid
labour than the woman does). Values close to 1 would suggest almost complete
gender-specialisation, with men doing all or almost all of the paid labour time
and none or almost none of the unpaid labour time. Negative values indicate a
reversal of gender-specialisation of labour time, where -1 would be a complete
reversal, with women doing all of the couple’s paid labour time, and none of the
couple’s unpaid labour time.
This focus on gender-specialisation of labour, either through tasks or labour
time provided by men and women respectively, is one way of approaching the
gender division of labour. It is conceptually particularly interested in asym-
metries between partners, on the assumption that these asymmetries betray
power imbalances in the couple, which can also be translated more broadly into
situations of precariousness, financial dependency, constrained access to and in-
volvement in paid work, etc. From this perspective, there is no reason to exclude
unemployed couples from the analysis (defined as neither partner doing any
hour of paid work in the previous week). The fact that these couples have no
paid work time to share simply means for us that there is no imbalance between
partners as regards paid work time. These couples’ distribution of paid work
time is thus considered to be equal (half and half), and is coded zero (neutral) in
both indexes of gender specialisation – a semantic but not a theoretical stretch.
However, it is possible that unemployed couples represent a singular case in the
division of labour. As a category, they constitute only a fraction of couples, but
enough of the total that, for the sake of rigor, I include in all models a dummy
variable that controls for couples’ unemployment.
I end up with two indexes for the overall gender specialisation of labour in
couple: Sit replicates (although with slightly richer information) the modelling
strategy designed with the French data. STit proposes an approach that could
not be constructed using the French data: instead of reasoning in terms of em-
ployment status and responsibility for tasks, the variable is constructed on the
distribution of paid and unpaid labour time. The gendered division of unpaid
labour time, since it integrates care time, can be considered a (rough) measure
of the distribution of reproductive labour, rather than a narrower measure of
housework distribution, which would arguably miss an important aspect of what
the gender division of labour is about (Bhattacharya, 2017; Kofman, 2014).
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Other variables
I have not included marital status in the analyses, not because it is not
relevant to couples’ gender arrangements (it is), but because in the context of mi-
gration it is a somewhat complicated to interpret. For instance, almost all migrant
couples are married ( indeed most migrants are married), and cohabiting couples
are virtually non-existent in the sample for certain migrant groups (e.g. Pakistani
migrants). Marriage is also to a large extent necessary to certain migratory paths
- e.g. spouse visas - but this would only affect certain migrant groups and not
others - typically not EU migrants.
6.2.3 Methods and tools
Systematically gendering
As mentioned in the construction of the variables for the gender division of
labour, one of the major difficulties of working at a couple level is that we always
have to factor in two pieces of information instead of one, and often have to
arbitrate between them. Couple are matched through couple types (e.g. migrant-
native), but in most respects the analyses are based on individual rather than
couple-based or couple-matched characteristics. Notable exceptions are couple’s
age (average across the two partners) and age gap (calculated as the age of the
man, minus the age of the woman) as well as the key dependent variables of
gender division of labour.
Sample, weighting and statistical tools
As before, all analyses are survey-weighted unless specified otherwise. The
statistical methods employed include descriptive methods and survey-weighted
linear regression models. The weighting accounts for the complex survey design
– with cluster, stratification and boost samples – and for non-random missing
values. Standard errors are in brackets. All regression models control for (but
do not always display in the tables): the presence of dependent children under
16 living in the household; the age of women (or the age of men when the
models segregate by gender and focus on women/men only); age gap; and
whether the couple is not engaged in any paid work at the time of the interview
(combined hours of paid work in past week: 0). Whenever the issue of strata
with a single primary unit arose, the standard error estimates for the strata with
a single primary units are calculated on the distance from the mean across strata,
rather than a strata mean (Pitblado 2009), as recommended by the Understanding
Society design team (Lynn 2015).
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6.3 Results
6.3.1 Couples’ gender division of labour in the United Kingdom
When taken as a whole and put side by side, it is apparent that while the
gender division of paid and unpaid labour time reflect some broad symmetry,
but no perfect resemblance. The plots in figure 6.2 illustrate the density of
different levels of gender division of labour, for all cohabiting couples aged 18
to 60, on the scale and indexes described above. The column on the left provide
visualisation for the variables involved in the first index of gender-specialisation.
The density distribution of paid labour indicates that an overwhelming majority
of co-resident couples are dual-career couples, in the sense that both woman
and man are in paid employment. A much smaller proportion of couples are
in a male-sole-breadwinner arrangement and an even smaller proportion in a
female-sole-breadwinner model. Here having the two variable construction side-
by-side is instructive: the plot that illustrates the density distribution for men’s
percentage share of paid labour time provides further information in showing
how this dual-employment category is very skewed to the right. It peaks on
an equal distribution of paid labour time,4 but also shows high densities on the
right of this centre peak. This indicates that in many couples, women and men
are in paid employment but the men do more hours than the women, and in a
not-insignificant proportion of cases, do all of the couples’ hours of paid work.
The distribution of unpaid labour appears very consistent across the two
relevant variables (gender division of domestic and childcare responsibilities (on
the left) and gender division of housework and care time (on the right). Both
plots present a similar shape, with a gradual, almost linear increase of density as
the distribution of unpaid labour becomes more gender-specialised. However,
one can note, a relative peak at an equal distribution, but not to the extent
that it catches up with the density level observed for fully gender-specialised
arrangements (couples where the woman reports doing all of the unpaid labour
and the man none of it).
The compound measures of gender specialisation appear overall consistent,
although the second index, based on labour time distribution, paints a some-
what more patriarchal picture, with more couples appearing closer to 1, that is,
completely gender-specialised division of labour. This is mostly explained by
the greater sensitivity of the labour time approach to gender asymmetries in the
division of paid labour time among dual-employment couples.
4In this case, the bar at 50% also includes couples where neither partner does paid work, which
contributes to the peak effect at this point.
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FIGURE 6.2: Histogram: gender specialisation of labour across all
couples (UK)













































































Note: Survey-weighted histogram density and smoothed splines (bandwidth =
0.05)
Source UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2(2009-2019.
Universe: all coresident man-woman couples (18-60))
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6.3.2 Couple types and gender specialisation
These first measures showed varying levels of gender-specialisation in the
partnered population at large. From hereon, I distinguish between different
couple types, based on the migratory background of both partners. The first
question I try to answer here is whether there are measurable differences in the
gender division of labour between partners, depending on the type of couple.
Figure 6.3 shows the mean score for gender-specialisation (index 1), the gender
division of paid labour, and the gender division of unpaid labour. The equivalent
barplots for scores based on labour time are not included here but they look very
similar. The table 6.1 presents the results from the regressions that simply model
the association between couple type and gender division of labour, controlling
for age, the presence of dependent children in the home, and the educational
level of both partners. The top part of table 6.1 gives the results for the models
that use the variables of the first index of gender-specialisation as dependent
variables. The bottom part of the table uses the variables based on the division of
labour time as dependent variables (index 2).
FIGURE 6.3: Gender specialisation by couple types
The mean gender-specialisation of most couple does not differ from the
mean of native majority couples (NAT-NAT, both partners born in the UK to
UK-born parents). Thus, couples constituted of a native majority partner and
either a descendant of migrant or a primary migrant are not distinguishable
from native majority couples in terms of gender-specialisation of labour. This
also applies to unions formed by two UK-born descendants of migrants, in
which the gender division of both paid and unpaid labour is consistent with
that of native majority couples. The couples that are the exception are migrant
couples, and couples formed by a migrant and a direct descendant of migrant.
It is specifically in relation to paid labour that these couples differ notably from
the others, with a greater proportion of male-sole-breadwinner couples. This
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greater specialisation of paid labour drives the significant association found
between these couple types and a higher score on the gender-specialisation index
(index 1). Interestingly, the first index does not capture significant differences in
the division of unpaid labour, suggesting that all couple types are more or less
evenly patriarchal in their gender division of routine housework and childcare
responsibilities. In contrast, measuring the division of unpaid labour in terms of
the women’s share of the couple’s total household and care labour time brings
out significant associations. In couples formed by two migrants or one migrant
and one descendant of migrant(s), the women’s share of unpaid labour time is a
couple of percentage points higher than in native majority couples (4% higher for
MIG-2G couples, and just under 3% for migrant couples). Similarly, every other
point of the analysis in terms of labour time (Index 2) comfirms the results based
on housework and childcare responsibilities (Index 1).
Unsurprisingly, living with dependent children is closely related to more
gender-specialised divisions of labour: the presence of children under the age of
16 in the home is connected with a 10% increase in men’s share of paid labour
time, and a 7% increase in women’s share of unpaid labour time. The effects
are also significant when looking at the other measures of labour distribution.
The role of age is slightly more ambivalent: younger couples appear somewhat
more egalitarian than older couples when it comes to the gender division of
unpaid labour, but this does not apply to paid work. The labour time measures
find no significant linear association between age and paid labour distribution
between men and women, while the more basic measure on employment status
(index 1) finds a negative connection, suggesting that there would be more dual-
career or female-breadwinner couples among older couples than among younger
couples. As regards educational level, higher education (including university-
level and other types of higher education) is associated with slightly less unequal
arrangements within couples.
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(Intercept) .335 (.034)∗∗∗ .364 (.049)∗∗∗ .304 (.038)∗∗∗
Couple type [ref=NAT-NAT]
2G-NAT
−.024 (.013) −.017 (.019) −.030 (.018)
2G-2G −.030 (.033) −.034 (.046) −.032 (.037)
MIG-NAT −.000 (.016) .025 (.022) −.025 (.019)
MIG-2G .070 (.026)∗∗ .132 (.034)∗∗∗ .009 (.030)
MIG-MIG .074 (.014)∗∗∗ .138 (.021)∗∗∗ .010 (.018)
Age (couple average) −.009 (.003)∗∗−.019 (.004)∗∗∗.002 (.003)
Age-squared (couple average) .000 (.000)∗∗∗ .000 (.000)∗∗∗ .000 (.000)
Age gap (man-woman) −.003 (.001)∗∗∗−.001 (.001) −.005 (.001)∗∗∗
Coresident children under 16
[ref=no]
.166 (.009)∗∗∗ .181 (.013)∗∗∗ .152 (.012)∗∗∗
Education [ref= < GSCE]: GSCE −.014 (.010) −.024 (.014) −.003 (.012)
Education: Higher/tertiary −.056 (.010)∗∗∗−.062 (.015)∗∗∗−.051 (.013)∗∗∗
Both partners unemployed [ref=no] −.147 (.012)∗∗∗−.177 (.011)∗∗∗−.117 (.020)∗∗∗
Deviance 1968.934 3767.305 2781.838
Dispersion .114 .219 .162
















(Intercept) .225 (.034)∗∗∗ 61.487 (2.313)∗∗∗61.452 (2.001)∗∗∗
Couple type [ref=NAT-NAT]
2G-NAT
−.030 (.015)∗ −1.722 (.977) −1.279 (.921)
2G-2G −.061 (.036) −2.696 (2.450)−3.457 (2.175)
MIG-NAT .014 (.018) 2.334 (1.153)∗−.947 (1.073)
MIG-2G .098 (.026)∗∗∗ 4.741 (1.620)∗∗4.755 (1.532)∗∗
MIG-MIG .088 (.017)∗∗∗ 5.271 (1.131)∗∗∗3.438 (.954)∗∗∗
Age (couple average) −.002 (.003) −.305 (.188) .112 (.165)
Age-squared (couple average) .000 (.000) .006 (.004) .005 (.003)
Age gap (man-woman) −.005 (.001)∗∗∗−.188 (.062)∗∗−.342 (.057)∗∗∗
Coresident children under 16
[ref=no]
.193 (.010)∗∗∗ 11.285 (.643)∗∗∗7.981 (.638)∗∗∗
Education [ref= < GSCE]: GSCE −.018 (.011) −.748 (.718) −1.016 (.632)
Education: Higher/tertiary −.080 (.012)∗∗∗−3.512 (.784)∗∗∗−4.395 (.671)∗∗∗
Both partners unemployed [ref=no] −.190 (.015)∗∗∗−13.878 (.785)∗∗∗−5.054 (1.241)∗∗∗
Deviance 2274.789 9673883.228 7930104.159
Dispersion .133 561.196 463.885
Num. obs. 16707 16847 16707
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).
Universe: partnered migrants in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60.
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6.3.3 Insights from gendering partnerships
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the connections between couples’
migratory configuration and the gender division of labour may be dependent on
couples’ particular gendered (and not just migratory) profile. It may be of use
therefore to distinguish between different kinds of ’mixed’ couples (i.e. where
partners have different relationships to migration) along gender lines. Figure
6.4 offers the same kind of visualisation we just analysed, but 2G-NAT, MIG-
NAT, and MIG-2G couples are each split into two categories reflecting the two
possible gender configurations. Table 6.2 shows the result for the corresponding
survey-weighted linear regressions models.
FIGURE 6.4: Gender specialisation by gendered couple types
This analytical approach serves to highlight some important points. No
statistical differences emerge with regards to couples with at least one native
majority partner regardless of the migration background of the other partner
and the gender configurations of the couple. Using both measuring strategies
of gender-specialisation further demonstrates this consistency across all types
of native majority couples, which as detailed also extends to migrant-native
majority couples (MIG-NAT). The models also confirm that migrant couples
are significantly associated with more gender-specialised divisions of paid and
unpaid labour, although the effect is much stronger for the division of paid work,
and indeed there is no significant association with the gender division of unpaid
labour tasks.
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FIGURE 6.5: Couples’ joint employment status, by gen-
dered couple types
What the gendering
of couples brings to the
analysis is a distinction be-
tween migrants and UK-
born direct descendants of
migrants. In the models,
with the controls, we find
that when those couples
that involve a migrant
woman and a British-born
man with migrant par-
ent(s) (MIGw-2Gm) are as-
sociated with significantly
more gender-specialised
divisions of labour. This
is consistent across both measuring strategies, with the labour time approach
additionally finding a significant 5% increase in these women’s share of unpaid
labour time (as well as a 5% decrease in their share of paid labour time) compared
to native women in native majority couples. Conversely, the task-based measure
found no significant association. However, the reverse gender-configuration of
MIG-2G couples, namely MIGm-2Gw (migrant man, native woman with migrant
parent(s)) is associated with a much more nuanced effect, smaller in scale, and
only significant for paid labour division.
This empirical evidence effectively supports the argument postulated by
Charsley et al. (2017) (see also, Charsley et al. (2020), Charsley, Storer-Church,
Benson, and Van Hear (2012) in support of the ’Lievens hypothesis’ (Lievens,
1999)); namely, for women who are direct descendants of migrants, marriage with
a migrant man is not necessarily a marker or a vector of patriarchal imposition.
Instead, they suggest that for some women who are UK-born descendant of
migrants (in their respective case studies, the native-born daughters of Pakistani
migrants living in the UK and of Turkish migrants living in Belgium), marrying a
migrant partner could be a way to negotiate independence and agency against
family pressure and gender norms.
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FIGURE 6.6: Mean gender-
specialisation score by gendered
couple types (index 2)
Contrary to what appeared in the
French data, however, couples comprising
descendants of migrants (2G-2G) do not
significantly differ from other native cou-
ples on any axis or measure of labour divi-
sion between men and women in couples.
This could be interpreted as suggesting
that the UK performed better than France
in terms of assimilating descendants of
migrants to prevalent gender practices of
labour distribution in the majority popu-
lation. There are however two points of
caution to consider. Firstly, the sample size
for descendants of migrants is small, not
insignificantly smaller than for the French
survey, which as we have seen specifically over-sampled descendants of mi-
grants born in France. This reduces both the statistical power and the chances
that these models yield statistically significant results for couples that include
descendants of migrants. Secondly, the idea that migrants and descendants of
migrants’ gender practices is best interpreted as integration (or lack thereof)into
the majority British population on the basis of how more or less patriarchal these
practices are, is somewhat flawed, since the native majority population is in
many regards not gender-equal. Couples comprising men and women who are
both British-born and born to UK-born parents, divide paid and unpaid labour
unequally between genders. While native majority women appear to have a
better access to paid labour, the gender distribution of unpaid labour appears as
unequal in native majority couples as in most other couple types. Keeping this in
mind, it is possible to offer some trails for interpreting this difference between
the behaviours associated with descendants of migrants in France and in the
UK. Such a trail can be found for instance in Ichou’s work (2015) on educational
performance of descendants of migrants in both countries. Ichou explains the
lower performance of this population in France by the class origin of their mi-
grant parents - showing that that the migrant populations that migrated to the
UK were selected from higher social strata in their country of origin, compared to
France-bound migratory flows. This in turn meant that descendants of migrants
in the UK are more likely to have parents and especially mothers who, in line
with their class origins, value, emphasize and support educational capital and
performance - more so than in France. Roeder and Mühlau (2014) found that
a high degree of educational achievement, especially in migrant women, was
linked to increased pace and odds of declaring and adopting gender-egalitarian
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beliefs post-migration. Accordingly, descendants of migrants in the UK are more
likely to have had educated mothers compared to their counterparts in France -
especially if their mother identifies as ’Other white’, ’Chinese’, ’Black Caribbean’
or ’Black African’ (Ichou, 2015, p. 35).
In general, when using this very rough scale of migrant / native with direct
migration background / native majority (no direct migration background), mi-
grant women appear to experience more gender-specialised couple arrangements,
doing more unpaid labour and less paid labour than their partner, relative to
non-migrant women in various couple types. The exception is when migrant
women are partnered with native majority men.
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TABLE 6.2: Gender division of labour (index 1 (top) and Index 2













(Intercept) .335 (.034)∗∗∗ .365 (.049)∗∗∗ .303 (.038)∗∗∗
Gendered couple type [ref=NAT-
NAT]
2Gw-NATm
−.058 (.019)∗∗−.052 (.026)∗ −.065 (.024)∗∗
2Gm-NATw .010 (.019) .016 (.027) .003 (.024)
2G-2G −.030 (.033) −.034 (.046) −.032 (.037)
MIGw-NATm .011 (.021) .054 (.029) −.031 (.023)
MIGm-NATw −.016 (.024) −.015 (.032) −.017 (.030)
MIGw-2Gm .084 (.038)∗ .153 (.044)∗∗∗ .015 (.048)
MIGm-2Gw .057 (.038) .110 (.051)∗ .003 (.036)
MIG-MIG .074 (.014)∗∗∗ .138 (.021)∗∗∗ .011 (.018)
Age (couple average) −.009 (.003)∗∗−.019 (.004)∗∗∗.002 (.003)
Age-squared (couple average) .000 (.000)∗∗∗ .000 (.000)∗∗∗ .000 (.000)
Age gap (man-woman) −.003 (.001)∗∗∗−.001 (.001) −.005 (.001)∗∗∗
Coresident children under 16
[ref=no]
.166 (.009)∗∗∗ .181 (.013)∗∗∗ .152 (.012)∗∗∗
Education [ref= < GSCE]: GSCE −.014 (.010) −.024 (.014) −.003 (.012)
Education: Higher/tertiary −.056 (.010)∗∗∗−.062 (.015)∗∗∗−.051 (.013)∗∗∗
Both partners unemployed [ref=no] −.146 (.012)∗∗∗−.177 (.011)∗∗∗−.116 (.020)∗∗∗
Deviance 1966.524 3763.565 2779.657
Dispersion .114 .218 .161
















(Intercept) .226 (.034)∗∗∗ 61.500 (2.314)∗∗∗61.489 (2.000)∗∗∗
Gendered couple type [ref=NAT-
NAT]
2Gw-NATm
−.070 (.021)∗∗∗−3.922 (1.354)∗∗−3.089 (1.207)∗
2Gm-NATw .010 (.021) .431 (1.361) .487 (1.293)
2G-2G −.061 (.036) −2.688 (2.451)−3.449 (2.175)
MIGw-NATm .031 (.022) 3.009 (1.541) .155 (1.222)
MIGm-NATw −.011 (.029) 1.405 (1.639) −2.486 (1.766)
MIGw-2Gm .118 (.038)∗∗ 5.510 (2.199)∗6.015 (2.300)∗∗
MIGm-2Gw .077 (.035)∗ 3.967 (2.352) 3.470 (2.003)
MIG-MIG .088 (.017)∗∗∗ 5.286 (1.132)∗∗∗3.455 (.954)∗∗∗
Age (couple average) −.002 (.003) −.305 (.188) .109 (.165)
Age-squared (couple average) .000 (.000) .006 (.004) .005 (.003)
Age gap (man-woman) −.005 (.001)∗∗∗−.195 (.062)∗∗−.348 (.057)∗∗∗
Coresident children under 16
[ref=no]
.193 (.010)∗∗∗ 11.274 (.644)∗∗∗7.983 (.638)∗∗∗
Education [ref= < GSCE]: GSCE −.018 (.011) −.746 (.718) −1.017 (.633)
Education: Higher/tertiary −.080 (.012)∗∗∗−3.525 (.785)∗∗∗−4.415 (.671)∗∗∗
Both partners unemployed [ref=no] −.189 (.015)∗∗∗−13.842 (.786)∗∗∗−5.036 (1.243)∗∗∗
Deviance 2271.153 9664166.924 7921538.381
Dispersion .133 560.632 463.384
Num. obs. 16707 16847 16707
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).
Universe: partnered (coresident man-woman) migrants, both partners age 18-60.
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6.3.4 Migrant women and migrant men: from gendered paths to the
gendered labour of love
Building on this rough outline of partnerships, what is at stake is to assess
whether these differences reflect cultural differences and areas of socialisation or
contrasting experiences of migration - or both.
FIGURE 6.7: Couples’ joint employment status, by
individuals’ area of birth
The analysis shifts here
from all couples to migrant in-
dividuals in different couple
configurations. The regression
models are complexified and
gender-segregated, with dif-
ferent models fitted to migrant
women and migrant men re-
spectively. I proceed in step-
wise fashion. First, I model
separately the statistical rela-
tionship between the gender
division of paid and unpaid
labour and (1) migrants’ areas
of origin (as well as couple
types and other covariates),
and (2) migrants’ union-migration trajectories. Then in a second stage I com-
bine both in single models (the third column section of tables 6.3 and 6.4). The
first table (table 6.3) displays the models’ results and fit for the weigthed sam-
ple of igrant women. The second table (table 6.4) displays the equivalent for
migrant men. In both tables, the dependent variables are the scores for the
gender division of paid labour (1) and unpaid labour (2). The top half of the
tables present the estimates for models based on joint employment status and
housework/childcare tasks. The bottom half display the estimates for models
based on time-distribution. Finally, the third table (Table 6.5) uses the compound
gender-specialisation indexes as dependent variables, putting models for migrant
women alongside those for migrant men to facilitate comparison.
The first column section includes the variable on the birthplace of migrants,
as well as the migratory background of their partner. EU-27 migrants form the
baseline category for the first, and migrant couples for the second - since the vast
majority of migrants are partnered with other migrants. All models control, as
before, for age, the presence of children under the age of 16 in the household,
and whether respondents had access to university or another form of higher
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education.
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The first table, on migrant women, reveals a number of significant asso-
ciations. At the same time, adding the birthplace of migrant women or their
union-migration trajectory, or both, makes couple types’ effects drop below the
threshold of statistical significance. Considering the limited sample size and
statistical power, this does not mean that we can rule out the possible relevance
of couple types. Nevertheless, it contrasts with the strong association found
between Pakistani- or Bangladeshi-born migrants and more gender-polarised
divisions of both paid and unpaid labour. Compared to migrant women from
EU-27 countries, according to this model, Pakistani- or Bangladeshi-born migrant
women tend to be in couples in which they bear on average 10% more of the
couples’ unpaid labour time, and in which male partners take on almost 12%
more of the couple’s paid labour time. The labour-time approach also shows that
Indian-born migrant women take on a greater share of the unpaid labour time,
although not significantly less of the paid labour time - something that concurs
with the observations made by Charsley et al. (2020, ch. 7) on e.g. Sikh transna-
tional marriages.5 Women in other migrant groups did not differ significantly
from European migrants.
The second category of models, (centre column section) replaces area of ori-
gin with union-migration sequences. The baseline category here is the sequence
cluster of ’single adult migrations’. With the tasks and employment status-based
dependent variables (top half), only the sequence cluster for the first partnership
formation appears significantly associated with a more gender-specialised divi-
sion of paid labour. The labour-time based models also associates the partnership
formation sequence with a gendering effect but in unpaid rather than paid labour
time distribution - namely a 10% increase in women’s share of couples’ unpaid
labour time.
The models presented in the last two columns on the left (Table 1) include
both areas of origin and union-migration sequences as predictors. The effects
of both are significant: migrant women from Pakistan/Bangladesh remain the
only group consistently associated with more gender-specialised divisions of
paid and unpaid labour. Indian migrants are also associated with more gender-
specialisation but specifically of unpaid labour. Likewise, when considering
the association between sequences of first couple formation and partnership
reconfiguration on the one hand, and more gender-specialisation of labour in
the other hand, we find that it remains significant even when keeping area
5Charsley et al. (2020, p. 198) note that while marrying a woman from ’back home’ can be
associated (or even motivated) with the expectation that she would be more willing than a British-
born woman to extensively provide domestic and care labour, ’[i]n Sikh families, expectations of a
more ‘traditional’ Indian bride often went alongside an expectation that they would take up paid
employment.’
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of origin constant. The positive coefficients associated with these interwoven
sequences remain strongly significant. Notwithstanding area of origin, when
women migrate at around the same time as they form their first relationship,
this is associated with these women taking on a relatively smaller share of the
paid labour time. By contrast, when women migrate after the end of a first
relationship and, often, around the time where they start another partnership,
this is not connected to any significant difference in paid labour distribution
compared to couples formed by migrant women who migrated as single adults,
prior to partnership formation. The division of unpaid labour, however, is more
gender-specialised. Compared to women who migrate as single adult migrants,
those who follow a union-migration trajectory of partnership reconfiguration take
on a share of housework and care time that is 10 percentage points higher, and
this regardless of area of origin. In addition, controlling for area of origin sees the
child migrant sequence now associated with a comparatively slight but significant
gendering of the division of unpaid labour.
Looking now at the mirror models fitted to the sample of migrant men (table
6.4), I find that migrant men from Pakistan/Bangladesh are similarly associated
with more gender-specialised divisions of paid labour and unpaid labour, and
Indian migrant men with more gendered domestic and care arrangements. In
contrast, Caribbean migrant men are connected with a greater prevalence of
gender-equal or gender-reversed divisions of paid labour (but not unpaid labour),
something supported by the literature that points to the greater proportion of
male unemployment and female-breadwinner households among Caribbean
couples (Foner, 1979; Li & Heath, 2018). Migrants from the residual ’other areas’
also divides paid labour in a more gender-specialised way compared to European
migrant men, the reference group.
All effects of areas of origin survive the introduction of sequence variables
within the model (full models, last two columns in table 6.4). The coefficients
associated with men’s union-migration sequences, however, reveal a clear con-
trast with those of migrant women. The sequence cluster formation 1st partnership
is connected to a gender-subversive effect on paid labour, with migrant men
having followed this sequence having less of a monopoly on paid labour time.
Similarly, partnership reconfiguration sequences are associated with a more equal
division of unpaid labour, the complete inverse of the associations observed for
migrant women. This association however is not significant once controlling
for area of origin, whereas the link between formation 1st partnership and paid
labour division endures and indeed the effect is larger when we introduce areas
of origin into the models. The same observation applies to the effect of areas
of origin. Areas of origin being reported as Pakistan/Bangladesh, India, the
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Caribbean and ’other areas’ are still linked to significant effects when accounting
for different union-migration sequences, and indeed some coefficients - all those
that significantly link to paid labour division - increase.
FIGURE 6.8: Coefficient plot: association be-
tween sequences of union-migration and the gender-
specialisation of labour-time
It is interesting to note
that the two measures of paid
labour divisions yield notice-
ably different results in the
case of migrant men. Thus
some of the models that use
the measure of paid labour di-
vision based on joint employ-
ment status as dependent vari-
able find that having a native
majority partner (rather than a
migrant partner) is connected,
for migrant men, with lower
propensity of sole male bread-
winner arrangements. This is
in line with the analyses from
the chapter on France, which
associated MIG-NAT relation-
ships, when they involved mi-
grant men and native major-
ity women, with less gender-
specialisation of paid labour. However this is not confirmed by the time-
distribution approach. In the models that use the division of paid labour time as
the outcome variable, there is no significant association between MIG-NAT part-
nerships and lower gender-specialisation of paid labour in couples. On the other
hand, there is a statistically robust and large effect of such relationship for the
division of unpaid labour time, something which was not captured by the models
using housework/childcare tasks distribution as outcome variable. This suggests
that migrant who partner with majority native British women, compared to those
with primary migrant or second-generation partners, do proportionately more of
the unpaid labour as measured in time but not clearly so in tasks.
Finally, the table 6.5 shows the models for the two compound indexes of
gender-specialisation, for migrant men and migrant women respectively. As in
the previous tables, the top half and bottom halves use task-based variables and
labour-time distribution variables respectively as dependent variables. Migrants
from Pakistan/Bangladesh, both women and men, continue to be associated with
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more gender-specialised divisions of labour overall, regardless of the migratory
background of their partner and the migration-union sequence. Migrant women
from India also tend to be in couples with slightly more gender-specialised
divisions of unpaid labour, while men born in the Caribbean are associated with
more egalitarian couples. The category ’other areas’ is associated with more
patriarchal divisions of labour in couples, for migrant men especially, but the
variety of origins covered by this category makes this observation difficult to
interpret, or only to say that European migrants appear significantly less gender-
specialised than migrant men who fall into this ’other’ category of origin.
The most important points highlighted by this table and the gender-
specialisation index is the gendered effect and relevance of union-migration
sequences. Figure 6.8 presents a visualisation of the divergence between
the effects of union-migration sequences for migrant women and migrant
men respectively There are clear and significant variations in the gender
division of labour in couples, depending on migrant women’s sequences of
migration and couple formation - even when we keep the area of origin constant.
Compared to women who migrate as single adults, most other sequences (child
migration excepted) have a positive effect on gender-specialisation, which
can be extrapolated as a negative impact on gender equality in couples, with
the effect of the partnership reconfiguration sequence being particularly strong.
In contrast, migrant men’s sequences matter less (and men’s area of origin
matters more), with the corresponding coefficients pointing to an inverse effect
(see figure 6.8). The absence of statistical significance attributed to to migrant
men’s sequences is also linked to the fact that a substantially smaller number
of men follow these sequences of couple-related migration (seq 2 to seq 4 on
the coefficient plot), as also shown by the long tails of the confidence interval.
In addition, while migrant men’s higher educational attainment shows no
connection to the gender-specialisation of labour, all models concur in pointing
to a greater capacity of highly-educated migrant women to negotiate a more
gender-egalitarian division of labour in their relationship.
276 Chapter 6. Trajectories and labour: the British case
TABLE 6.5: Survey-weighted linear regression models: Gender-












(Intercept) .826 (.225)∗∗∗ .832 (.245)∗∗∗ .432 (.254) .217 (.273)
Partner: [ref: migrant (MIG-MIG)]
native 2G (MIG-2G) −.002 (.041) .034 (.046) −.040 (.040) −.069 (.038)
majority native (MIG-NAT) −.002 (.031) −.002 (.034) −.038 (.037) −.076 (.041)
Where born [ref: Europe]
Caribbean .039 (.062) .014 (.070) −.161 (.071)∗ −.142 (.071)∗
Africa .023 (.038) −.009 (.045) −.004 (.039) −.039 (.046)
India .041 (.037) .076 (.041) .049 (.044) .052 (.049)
Pakistan/Bangladesh .209 (.043)∗∗∗ .233 (.037)∗∗∗ .232 (.045)∗∗∗ .281 (.047)∗∗∗
Southeast Asia .060 (.043) .037 (.047) −.063 (.050) −.003 (.074)
other areas .043 (.036) .095 (.039)∗ .091 (.040)∗ .108 (.044)∗
Sequences[ref: single adult]
formation 1st partnership .056 (.037) .100 (.040)∗ −.023 (.034) −.049 (.040)
established 1st partnership .040 (.046) .124 (.050)∗ −.027 (.047) −.006 (.053)
partnership reconfiguration .114 (.056)∗ .199 (.055)∗∗∗ −.042 (.065) −.058 (.079)
child migrant (1.5 G) −.020 (.057) .074 (.060) −.058 (.050) −.036 (.059)
How long in the UK (years since mi-
gration)
.000 (.002) −.001 (.002) .003 (.002) .004 (.003)
Age −.030 (.012)∗ −.034 (.013)∗∗ −.007 (.013) .001 (.014)
Age-squared .000 (.000)∗ .000 (.000)∗∗ .000 (.000) −.000 (.000)
Age gap −.002 (.002) −.004 (.003) .004 (.003) .001 (.003)
Coresident children < 16 .202 (.027)∗∗∗ .215 (.029)∗∗∗ .156 (.030)∗∗∗ .170 (.034)∗∗∗
Higher/Tertiary education −.099 (.024)∗∗∗ −.122 (.028)∗∗∗ −.012 (.025) .006 (.029)
Both partners unemployed −.178 (.026)∗∗∗ −.253 (.043)∗∗∗ −.197 (.028)∗∗∗ −.229 (.044)∗∗∗
Deviance 208.983 197.665 172.858 186.264
Dispersion .134 .148 .136 .159
Num. obs. 1510 1303 1248 1156
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05.
Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).
Universe: partnered migrant women or migrant men (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).
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TABLE 6.6: Survey-weighted linear regression models: Gender-












(Intercept) .732 (.246)∗∗ .754 (.261)∗∗ .487 (.265) .260 (.267)
Partner [ref: migrant (MIG-MIG)]
native 2G (MIG-2G) .010 (.043) .041 (.045) −.027 (.040) −.058 (.037)
majority native (MIG-NAT) .009 (.034) −.018 (.036) −.034 (.036) −.073 (.041)
Where born [ref: Europe]
Caribbean −.016 (.071) −.040 (.083) −.216 (.084)∗ −.191 (.087)∗
Africa −.057 (.065) −.072 (.073) −.098 (.074) −.120 (.087)
India −.064 (.066) −.003 (.072) −.040 (.076) −.021 (.088)
Pakistan/Bangladesh .098 (.070) .146 (.068)∗ .138 (.075) .200 (.086)∗
Southeast Asia .003 (.051) .004 (.056) −.109 (.060) −.034 (.081)
other areas .018 (.043) .088 (.045)∗ .082 (.049) .103 (.057)
Sequences [ref: single adult]
formation 1st partnership .058 (.039) .103 (.043)∗ −.045 (.033) −.087 (.038)∗
established 1st partnership .052 (.049) .143 (.052)∗∗ −.047 (.047) −.035 (.051)
partnership reconfiguration .135 (.059)∗ .233 (.059)∗∗∗ −.022 (.064) −.039 (.075)
child migrant (1.5 G) −.027 (.061) .052 (.065) −.060 (.052) −.035 (.059)
How long in the UK
(years since migration)
.002 (.003) .002 (.003) .002 (.002) .003 (.003)
GII score (country of birth) .214 (.136) .174 (.145) .140 (.144) .096 (.170)
Religiosity [ref: no religion] .038 (.032) .003 (.035) .067 (.031)∗ .082 (.034)∗
Age −.028 (.013)∗ −.032 (.013)∗ −.012 (.013) −.002 (.014)
Age-squared .000 (.000)∗ .000 (.000)∗ .000 (.000) .000 (.000)
Age gap −.002 (.002) −.003 (.003) .005 (.003)∗ .003 (.003)
Coresident children < 16 .192 (.028)∗∗∗ .214 (.030)∗∗∗ .150 (.031)∗∗∗ .169 (.034)∗∗∗
Higher/Tertiary education −.103 (.025)∗∗∗ −.119 (.028)∗∗∗ −.020 (.026) −.002 (.030)
Both partners unemployed −.191 (.028)∗∗∗ −.271 (.047)∗∗∗ −.205 (.031)∗∗∗ −.239 (.050)∗∗∗
Deviance 191.347 175.785 149.731 159.684
Dispersion .135 .144 .128 .148
Num. obs. 1387 1188 1150 1066
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05.
Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).
Universe: partnered migrant women or migrant men (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).
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FIGURE 6.9: Model estimates: couple type, geographic origin and
the gender specialisation of labour time for migrant women and
migrant men
Estimates from survey-weighted linear models. Not displayed but included in the models
are: age and age-squared, age gap, whether the couple has coresident children under the
age of 16, and a control for unemployed couples.
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FIGURE 6.10: Model estimates: stepwise modelling, gender-
specialisation of labour time
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6.4 Discussion
Do union-migration sequences matter for gender equality in couples?
It emerges from these analyses that while the gender division of labour is
affected by a broad range of factors, migration experiences matter - for women
especially. The effect of women’s union-migration sequences are clear and sig-
nificant, and remain so even when making space for other explanations: the
relevance of sequence was not specific to certain migrant or minority groups,
but sufficiently robust to account for migratory origins, gender opportunities in
country of origin (through the GII) and religion.
The timing and interlocking of migration and couple formation can there-
fore be considered a strong, enduring and independent factor, connected to both
dimensions of labour division - paid and unpaid - in migrant women’s relation-
ships. All sequences characterised by an interlocking of migration and couple are
thus connected, for migrant women, with more polarised gender roles in their
relationships. This stands in contrast with women who migrated as adults but
before couple formation, who are associated with comparatively less gendered
divisions of labour in the household - but who are also a minority. Women
who migrated as children are in a more equivocal position - in some models,
the child migrant sequence was connected with a gendering effect, compared to
independent adult migration, but the effect is overall slight and more volatile.
It is perhaps that as children typically migrate with parents, their migration
happens under the authority of parents and fathers - if not that of a partner. The
migrations of women in the single adult sequence cluster, in comparison, may
both exhibit and foster greater independence and autonomy which in turn gives
them better ground to obtain (comparatively) more egalitarian relationships.
By contrast, for migrant men, the effects of migration-union sequence are
more tenuous. While not statistically significant for gender-specialisation as a
whole, the direction of the estimated effects of men’s union-migration sequences
suggest that when men’s migration is not detached from couple formation (i.e.
long before), this may be linked to somewhat less gender-specialised arrange-
ments in the home. In particular, the results support the idea that couple-forming
migration (of which marriage migration is a case) tend to put the joining migrant
(’marriage migrant’ or ’imported migrant’ in González-Ferrer’s typology (2011))
in a more vulnerable and dependent position. This translates into reduced bar-
gaining power, henceforth a more domestic and secluded role for female marriage
migrants, and no breadwinner role for male marriage migrants. In the case of
migrant men, it is only in the field of paid labour division that couple-related
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sequences of union-migration are associated with more equal arrangements. The
migration of men coming through family or spousal channels may result in more
complicated or delayed integration into the labour market compared to adult
single migrants.6 Situations of the sort have been thus reported by Charsley
(2005) and discussed by Beck-Gernsheim (2007). Migrant men who find them-
selves financially and/or socially dependent on their native-born or pioneer
migrant spouse may find the experience distressing, especially as it collides with
representations of masculinity. This point is also raised by Strasser, Kraler, Bon-
jour, and Bilger (2009) in the context of female sponsors for family reunification.
As taking on more of the domestic care responsibilities may deepen what can
be experienced as an unwelcome and painful reversal of gender roles, men in
such situations may be resistant to doing so. ’Doing gender’ theories would
suggest that they may even do comparatively less than others, precisely as a
compensatory mechanism, although I found no statistical evidence for this on
the basis of this (admittedly limited) data. This reversal of gender roles in the
division of paid labour has been associated within the scholarship with acute
couple tensions, which can escalate to ’domestic violence, or even marital break-
down’7. This is not in any way specific to migration or migrants. It serves as a
reminder, however, that what the analysis and the models here identify as more
gender-equal divisions of paid labour are by no means synonymous with couple
harmony or happiness (or with a more equal division of unpaid labour).
Overall, migrant men’s mode and timing of migration matter little for their
domestic engagement, whereas women’s migration sequences matter for both
unpaid and paid labour division. For migrant men, the effect of area of origin
and religion appear to contain much more explanatory potential than for women.
Having a native majority partner without a direct migration background is
associated for migrant men with a more equal division of paid work. This could
be because of these native majority women’s better (or firmer) integration in
the labour-market, and also because these couples are more likely to involve
female sponsors (see French chapters). Sponsors have to be economically active
(Charsley et al., 2020), something which applies to female sponsors as well as their
male counterparts and would thus drastically increase (potentially permanently)
the proportion of couples where women are in full-time paid employment. In
any case, the effects of migration trajectory and timing on gender-specialisation
6As mentioned before, stock data is partial towards ’successful’ migrants, who have higher
odds of remaining in the country and of appearing in the data (Dustmann, Bentolila, & Faini, 1996).
Migrants who migrated independently but whose labour market and/or social integration was
more difficult are also more likely to have gone on or gone back.
7In the words of Beck-Gernsheim (2007, p. 283). A perhaps clumsy ordering that seems to put
domestic violence one step below separation on the scale of the severity of consequences. Then
again, there are many normative undertones looming behind definitions of what constitutes a
good and a bad couple, perhaps especially when it comes to migrant or minority couples.
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is not significant for migrant men once areas of origin, GII score and/or religion
are accounted for. A consistent finding across models was that migrating after
childhood but before couple formation (the single adult sequence cluster) was
associated with less gender-specialisation in couples compared to other union-
migration trajectories. This finding concurs with Cerrutti and Massey (2001)’s
observation that women who were single at the time of migration were then
more often involved in paid work at the later time of the survey interview, and
had higher salaries on average compared to other migrant women. This was also
González-Ferrer (2011)’s finding, although she noted that the effect only stood
for women who had been single at the time of migration, but were married at the
time of the survey interview. In this research, I have chosen to focus exclusively
on respondents who were partnered at the time of data collection. Therefore
it may be that the positive effect I find to be associated with migrant women’s
single adult migration are in fact limited to migrant women who did not remain
single.
Do migrant women in relationships with British-born majority men get a bet-
ter deal in terms of gender equality?
Contrary to suggestions made in the literature that having a native partner
would increase migrant women’s labour market engagement (Baker & Benjamin,
1997), I found that the migration or native background of partners did not help
predict the division of labour in couples once accounting for union-migration
trajectories. In this the findings concur with González-Ferrer (2011) who, look-
ing at migrant women living in Spain, found no consistent effect of being in a
migrant-native relationship on their labour performance. Neither could a robust
effect be found between having a native British majority partner and more equal
gender divisions of domestic and care work. The idea that migrant women fare
better, emancipation-wise, when they partner up with a British majority native
compared to another migrant or a descendant of migrant(s) is thus not sup-
ported by the analysis. Instead, the models point to a greater effect of women’s
migration-union sequences, areas of origin and educational attainment. It is not
so much, therefore, that being with a majority native means more gender equality,
but rather that the paths that lead there are both self-selective and more often
involve room for empowerment (e.g. education in the country of destination,
independent migration) and/or less room for spousal dependency (e.g. legal,
social and linguistic dependence on the male partner). With regards to European
migrant women, not only do they combine the racial and cultural closeness
with the British majority native populations (majority white and Christian or no
religion) that is associated with greater levels of intermarriage and assimilation
(Kulu & Hannemann, 2019; Muttarak & Heath, 2010), but their migration and
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couple formation experiences are unhindered and mostly unconstrained by the
immigration system (something which can soon be expected to change). Addi-
tionally, the greater likelihood that their qualifications will be recognised and the
fact that they are less likely to suffer from racist and intersectional discrimination,
probably significantly facilitates their integration into the labour market. The
fact that these European migrant women, together with highly-educated migrant
women, represent a large proportion of the migrant women that make up the
migrant-native (MIG-NAT) category provides a more convincing explanation as
to why migrant-native couples have less unequal divisions of labour compared
to other couples formed by migrant women. It is in other words more about
the ability of migrant women to select British majority native men, and their
migration-union paths, and much less about presumably more gender-equal
practices of British majority men.
Indeed, neither British majority natives nor European migrants appear
across the board more egalitarian than other couples. European migrants could
not be significantly distinguished from migrants - men or women - from Africa or
Southeast Asia (which could also be linked to heterogeneity within that category),
and appeared less gender-equal in their division of labour compared to Caribbean
migrant men. Only migrant men from Pakistan or Bangladesh - and, to a point,
men from India and ’other areas’ - were significantly more likely to have gender-
specialised relationships than European migrants.
The effect on gender equality of having a British native majority partner is
slightly more ambiguous when considering migrant men. It is mostly not signifi-
cant when including all covariates in the larger model, and generally disappears
or fades once areas of origin are introduced in the analysis. Nevertheless, there
are hints that native majority women may acquire - in relative terms - a greater
degree of bargaining power within the couple when they are partnered with a
migrant man.
Overall, it appears to matter little whether migrants have migrant or na-
tive partners, and whether native partners have migrant parents or not. The
conceptual approach that uses migration background as an identity category
is arguably then not the most useful for the study of gender inequalities and
relations. Migration experience and its particulars and interlocking with family
formation matters; community and socialisation matter. Being a migrant or a
descendant of migrant does not explain much. We learn more, in terms of gender
relations, by looking at trajectories of migrations than by searching for profiles of
migrants - a methodological distinction and orientation which Howard Becker
insisted was crucial to the sociological exercise and analysis of migration, and its
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political interpretations (H. S. Becker, 1998).
Labour time or responsibility distribution
In almost all respects, the labour time approach proved more sensitive
and painted more polarised pictures of gender roles in couples. The approach
based on employment status and distribution of tasks, was useful in giving more
weight and visibility to situations of economic dependency, notably couples
that function on a male-sole-earner model. From this perspective, it captured a
different and complementary aspect to that painted by labour time approach. On
the ground of unpaid labour, however, the task-based measure captured much
less variation than the time-based measure, even though the tasks that could be
included were more numerous and thus the measure theoretically more robust
than the equivalent designed for the French data. How to interpret this? Perhaps
asking people how much time they spend weekly on housework and care does
not carry the same normative weight as asking ’who is mainly responsible’ for
such-and-such household task. This latter frame might push survey participants
to select ’shared’, arguably a vaguer, blanket term as a survey answer. It may
be therefore that time-based questions and measures are more reliable, but this
would need to be assessed against measures and data that are known to be of
greater precision, notably time-diary data.
6.4.1 Limitations
In addition to those previously discussed, the analyses in this chapter and
in the previous one are limited by three methodological obstacles. Firstly, causal
claims are prohibited by the nature of the data. In the absence of an experimental
or longitudinal design that would follow migrants before and after migration,
it is impossible to back up causal explanations about the impact of migration
sequences and partnering on the gender division of labour.
Secondly, the comparisons I have drawn have always been either between
migrants from different areas of origin or between different migrants and native
groups. Not included within this are also comparable individuals, from the same
country of birth and with similar characteristics and relationships, who did not
migrate.8 This would provide an important point of comparison and constitute
perhaps a better method to identify what the combination of migration sequences
and mixedness creates. But, to the best of my knowledge, there is no large-scale
data that would fit this purpose.
8This could include for instance couples formed by French ’expats’ with natives of the country
they reside in.
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Thirdly, the analysis is also limited by the fact that it does not reconstruct
the migration trajectories of both partners so as to securely identify pioneer or
lead migrants and ’trailing’ or joint partners. Yet we know these to be key aspects
of migration trajectories, not only in that they reflect deeply gendered patterns,
but also in that they have gendering effects (González-Ferrer, 2011; Hondagneu-
Sotelo, 1992, 2000). Combining the union-migration sequences and the ’legally
tied’ status in the French models was an effort to narrow this down, but what can
be done is limited by the absence of information on admission category in the
British survey, and information on immigration status in both French and British
surveys.
A final limitation of the analysis in this chapter is the same as in previous
chapters. The focus on partnered migrants constitutes a bias and it may influence
the results. Migrants who stayed in the destination country until the point of
the interview are more likely to be ’success stories’ compared to all those who
migrate and then return. Moreover, migrants who form relationships in the
country of immigration or found a way to live with their partner are a different
sample and tell a different story from the many who either remained single, or
could not be (re)united with their partner, left behind in the sending country.
This research does not engage with these transnational relationships, where co-
residency is suspended, renounced or delayed past the survey date and further
empirical research is needed to investigate this. In addition, focusing solely
on those migrants who are partnered and co-resident with their partner is not




In the first part of this thesis, I contextualised and historicised the construc-
tion of ’mixed couples’ and the survey data and survey categories on mixedness
and migrants in the French and British surveys. I discussed why and how mix-
ing, migration and gender relations could be connected. In the second part, I
described the different couple types formed by migrants, focusing on mixed
couples formed with majority native partners, and I constructed a typology of
union-migration sequences. I thus showed that for migrant women and migrant
men, mixing (or non-mixing) is associated with different trajectories of migration
and partnering. This emphasis on trajectories detached the analysis of migrant
women and men’s couple formation from one that only considers differences
between different migrant groups. Of course, trajectories and groups overlap to
some extent, since the migration of some groups is much more constrained (by
immigration regimes and by social norms including gender norms) than others -
typically intra-EU migration. In the last part, I analysed the connection between,
on the one hand migrants’ trajectories of union-migration, and on the other hand
the gender division of labour in couples.
This chapter streamlines the findings, by comparing the French and British
cases, focusing especially on the consistencies between them. While France and
the UK share very similar colonial pasts and immigration regimes, the two coun-
tries have often been contrasted as different models of welfare (Esping-Andersen,
1990) and integration (Favell, 1998), and the scholarship has highlighted some
differences in the gender division of labour. I discuss the insights from the com-
parative frameworks, taking stock from the fact that cross-national differences
were difficult to precisely investigate in the context of limited sample size and
differences in questionnaire design. Because the thesis is focused on first-hand mi-
gration journeys, its framework and scope are centred on primary migrants, but I
also make some space in this chapter to discuss the scope and relevance of this
research for second (and third, etc.) generations. The first section of this chapter
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is dedicated to gendered paths of union-migration and mixing for migrants living
in France and the UK at the end of the 2000s; the second section concentrates on
how these connected to gender-specialisation in couples. I discuss the insights
from using the two cases and data-sets in a continuous and complementary way,
as well as comparatively stricto sensu. In the fourth section, I reflect on how this
inform understandings and implications of mixedness for gender relations in the
context of migration. In the fourth and final section, I go back to the question of
survey design, as pivotal for quantitative and critical scholarship on gender and
migration.
7.1 Gendered paths, gendered labour
7.1.1 Gendered paths of migration and partnering
With respect to sequences of union-migration, the sequence analysis identi-
fied trajectories of couple formation and migration that were overall very similar
between the French and the British case. Five sequences overlap perfectly. The
fact that there is a sixth one, in the French case (Single young adults), is puzzling,
perhaps suggesting that there was a greater occurrence of teenage and young
adult migration coming into France and settling there, compared to the UK. The
breakdown by first visa type showed that many of the women in this group
entered through family migration (mainly family reunification) while the men’s
first titre de séjour was most commonly a working visa (see figure 7.5). In terms
of the men, we could hypothesise that they are part of the population of young,
sometimes minor sans-papiers whose situation was later regularised. This is
merely speculative, however.
Putting aside the young single adults cluster, the five other sequences of union-
migration appeared identical in construction between the French and the British
data. This is striking when considering that there was little overlap between
the main migrant groups represented in the French and British data. Primary
migrants living in the UK at the end of the 2000s were in large proportions
South Asians, whereas they were much more often Northern Africans migrants
in France. Conversely, there were few South Asians in the French sample. This
reflects the particular historical connections with different areas of the world,
which are the result of British and French colonial geographies and imperialist
past. Even the category of migrants identified as ’EU-27’ effectively covered
somewhat different populations, with many South Europeans in the case of
France, and more exclusively Western and Eastern Europeans in the British data.
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FIGURE 7.1: Migration-union sequences, by couple types. Mi-
grants in France (left) and the UK (right)
Survey-weighted distribution (%) of partnership types, for migrant men and migrant
women, for each union-migration sequence cluster.
Source: TeO (left column) | Understanding Society, wave 2 respondents (right column)
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In spite of this diversity, however, the gendered paths of migration and
couple formation which I have identified were very consistent between the French
and British cases. They also correlated in the same way with the formation of
different couple types. Importantly, the trajectories that brought migrant women
and migrant men to form relationships with majority native partners (whether
British or French) were broadly similar on both sides of the channel. They showed
that though the proportions of migrant men and migrant women who enter such
relationship do not differ, they connect to different - gendered - paths. Migrant
men who partner with majority natives were, overwhelmingly, child migrants.
Accordingly, they were, at least for some years of their childhood and teenage
years, socialised and most likely schooled in their country of immigration. It
is credible therefore that mixing with the majority group in their case chiefly
identifies and rewards a high degree of assimilation to the majority society in the
immigration country. The trajectories that connect male primary migration and
mixing with the majority native group can thus be relatively straightforwardly
interpreted as paths of intra-generational and marital assimilation. Migrant men
who partnered with majority native French or British partners were thus the least
likely to have difficulties with the local language. These paths of fast-tracked
marital assimilation are also ethnically selective: they mainly concern European
(and, more generally, white) child migrants.
In contrast, the high frequency of couple-forming migrations among migrant
women partnered with majority native French demonstrates the limits of the
assimilation hypothesis to understand migrants’ mixing with majority natives.
Migrant women in such relationships, in comparison to their male counterparts,
more often migrated as adults, more often in the context of the formation of
their relationship, and they were more likely to struggle with the language of the
country of immigration. Although a significant proportion of these women also
migrated as children, the rate of couple-forming migration suggests that there is
another common path into unions with majority natives, specifically for women.
This path, furthermore, is not a function of early exposure and therefore cannot
be expected to mark a high degree of assimilation.
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FIGURE 7.2: Migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples in France. Distri-
bution of sequences, for migrant women and migrant men
FIGURE 7.3: Migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples in the UK. Dis-
tribution of sequences, for migrant women and migrant men
In the case of couples in France, unions formed between a migrant woman
and a majority native are more often associated with couple-forming migration
than with child migration. That is not quite the case in the UK, where mixed
unions are mostly formed by former child migrants, men or women. Indeed,
the proportion of child migrants in MIG-NAT unions is even higher than in the
French case: involving 60% of migrant men and 40% of migrant women partnered
with a British majority native. Yet here also the proportion of couple-forming
migration among migrant women in partnerships with native majority British
men is high, much higher than in the reverse gender configuration of migrant-
native unions (30% vs. 15%). The British case also reveals a high proportion
of single adult migrant women among those who mix with the majority native
group.
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Part of this discrepancy between the French and British case can be ex-
plained by the re-distribution of the migrants who, in the French classification,
would fall into the cluster of Single young adults. In the absence of this cluster
in the British classification, these migrants are likely split between the Child mi-
grants and Single adults categories, inflating the ranks of both compared to the
French distribution. We could also link this to the particularly high proportion
of international students in the UK compared to France. In 2008, the number of
non-citizen students enrolled in a British university was almost twice the number
for French universities (462,609 for the UK, and 243,463 for France (OECD 2021)).
It is plausible that student migration play a role in this since migrant-native
unions are more likely to involve highly-educated and educationally homoga-
mous partners (Nottmeyer, 2014), which are exactly the profile of couples often
formed at university (Blossfeld & Timm, 2003; Bozon & Héran, 2006). But since
we do not know whether migrants initially arrived in the UK with a student visa,
nor if studies provided the initial motive for their migration, we cannot further
substantiate this explanation.
Alternatively, or in addition, the greater frequency of single adult migration
among migrant-native couples in the UK could be linked to the particular migrant
population represented by the Irish and migrants from the Old Commonwealth.
Since these migrant populations are formed of native English speakers, and with
the great majority of them being white, one could have expected that they would
be more likely to follow paths of fast assimilation and marital assimilation, and
could alter the distribution towards a greater proportion of child migrants and
single adult migration. Yet removing them from the sample does not change
the distribution in any decisive manner, and the slight differences between the
French and British couples persists.
In spite of these variations, the general findings stand and are consistent
across the French and British data. Kulu (2019) had correctly hypothesized that
both marital assimilation and marriage migration were likely at be at play in the
couples formed between primary migrants and the majority native group in the
UK. One of the important contributions of this thesis is to have established that
these are indeed different paths to mixing and that these paths are profoundly
gendered (see figure 7.2 and figure 7.3).
From this finding, I derive two observations: firstly, a larger proportion
of male child migrants than female child migrants have grown to form unions
with majority native partners. Migrant women who migrated as children are
comparatively slightly more likely to form unions with other migrants and this
is consistent between the French and British data. This suggests that migrant
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families may exercise more control or pressure on the partner choice of daughters.
Sons, in contrast, may enjoy a greater degree of independence in partner selection
and may be in a better position to choose to ’partner out’. This is consistent with
observations made by e.g. Charsley, Bolognani, Ersanilli, and Spencer (2020) and,
in a more general tone, by Varro (2003), who ventured that the mixing of women
is often perceived as more problematic or subversive than that of men (see also
Caballero (2012) on the British case and MacMaster (1997) for French-Algerian
intermarriage).
Conversely, the fact that a large proportion of couples involving a majority
native partner and a migrant woman derive from couple-forming migration
suggests that there is an international marriage market on which migrant women
(but not migrant men) can be recruited by majority native British and French
men (and vice-versa). Conjugal arrangements that have been characterised as
’geographic hypergamy’ typically involve women from the South and native men
from the North (here, France and the UK). Couple-forming migration sequence
involving a native majority partner concern migrant women much more than
migrant men.
That migrant men and migrant women in mixed relationship would follow
different paths of migration and couple formation matters for how we interpret
both mixedness and gender relations in the context of migration. Indeed, with
different union-migration paths also come different couple dynamics and differ-
ent degrees of dependency from the migrant partner on the native partner. Based
on the French data, the legal dependency that derives from being on a partner
visa is much more common for migrant women, especially those who follow
couple-forming migration trajectories (see figure 7.4). Thus the higher rates of
couple-forming migrations among migrant women partnered with majority na-
tive men also means higher rates of legally tied migration. Accordingly, mixing
with the majority native French group often correlates with ’imported’ partners
and legal dependency for migrant women, but not for migrant men.
Therefore, it is not only that calendars of migration and couple formation
are different for men and women, with many more men migrating independently
and prior to couple formation. It is also the case that even when migrant women
and men follow the same sequences of migration and couple formation, they still
use different legal channels. This point was made clear by consideration of the
legal admission category, which the French data allows for. It highlighted, for
example, that when men are already in an established relationship when they
migrate, it is generally on a work visa, while for women in the same sequence
cluster, it is as a reunified partner, on a dependent visa. This reflects the fact
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FIGURE 7.4: Proportion legally tied migrants by sequence cluster
that women and men do not hold the same position in relationship and that
in migration decisions, men tend to be attributed the role of first mover, and
women that of second, tied mover (González-Ferrer, 2006, 2011; Mincer, 1978).
This is true for intra-national relocations (Krieger, 2019; Taylor, 2007) as it is
for international migrations. This finding has been documented in previous
studies, but what this thesis contributed was its demonstration that, in the case
of international migration, this phenomena is not limited to migrant couples, or
couples formed between migrants and natives with migrant parents. It applies
also to those couples formed between primary migrants and majority natives, a
couple type that rarely involves tied migrant men and often involves tied migrant
women.
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7.1.2 From gendered paths to gender roles
Considering migrant groups
Overall, partnering with a majority native (relative to partnering with an-
other migrant or a direct descendant of migrant) was not very decisive for the
gender division of labour, in comparison to the effects associated with migrant
groups (as measured by area of origin), and trajectories of union and migration.
Here again, however, the story was very much gendered, although some elements
were constant across men and women. I start with the latter.
Certain migratory origins are systematically associated with a more gender-
specialised division of labour; the groups that stand out in this way are Turkish
migrants in France and migrants from Bangladesh or Pakistan in the UK. Mi-
grants from these groups very rarely formed relationships with majority French
or British natives and were much, much more likely to be partnered with other mi-
grants or direct descendants of migrants from the same country of origin (Turkey,
Pakistan or Bangladhesh). They combined a high frequency of couple-forming
migration with a high degree of gender-specialisation.
Indian migrants, in the UK, and Northern African migrants, in France,
presented more mitigated patterns. In the case of India-born migrants, the gender
division of labour was more polarised in certain models, but only for unpaid
labour, not for paid labour. This echoes findings from qualitative research that
showed that Indian families living in the UK often expect women to engage in
paid work and to contribute to the family income (Ballard, 1983; Charsley et al.,
2020; Charsley, Bolognani, & Spencer, 2017). The particular gender expectations
of this group thus do not entail gender-specialisation of paid labour, as is more
often the case among Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants, but they do apply to
housework and care work, which is highly gender-specialised (Kan & Laurie,
2018). However, this particular mode of gender-polarisation of labour associated
with Indian migrants disappeared once controlling for religiosity and GII score.
In the case of Northern African migrants in France, both men and women,
the reverse seemed true: the distribution of paid labour was more gender-
specialised in some models, but the variables on the division of housework
and childcare did not pick up any significant variation. One should also note
that Northern African migrants in France differ from Indian migrants in the
UK in a variety of ways. Among other things, they tend to be extracted from
less privileged classes compared to the British South Asian migrant populations
(Ichou, 2015); they are more likely to form unions with majority natives. Cases
of Algerian or Moroccan migrants forming relationships with native majority
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French partners are thus not quite so rare as they are among Turkish migrants in
France, or Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi migrants in the UK.
In contrast, certain groups, especially Caribbean migrant men residing in the
UK and to a lesser extent men born in Africa outside the Maghreb region residing
in France, were associated with less gender-specialised arrangements, compared
to EU migrants. These effects were particularly enduring for Caribbean migrant
men, and they played out both in paid labour and unpaid labour distribution,
who appeared more likely to be in comparatively more egalitarian or gender-
reverse relationships, compared to EU migrants living in the UK. Considering the
very limited sample size, however, these results have to be considered indicative.
Furthermore, co-resident man-woman couples are a less common form of family
among Caribbean migrants than among other populations, especially migrant
populations (Kulu, 2019). This is important to keep in mind when extrapolating
results, as the analyses presented here are restricted by the couple framing I
employed. In addition, the effects only applied to Caribbean migrant men, in
comparison to EU migrant men. No such difference was observed between
Caribbean migrant women and EU migrant women.
Indeed, the effects associated with migrant groups (as measured by areas of
origin) were often not symmetrical between migrant men and migrant women
from the same areas. Thus migrant men from Southeast Asia appeared more
likely to be in gender-equal or gender-reversed divisions of labour, but this did
not apply to migrant women from the same areas. One can contrast this with
Turkish migrants (in France) and Pakistani/Bangladeshi migrants (in the UK),
specifically with respect to the gender division of paid labour. In these two
cases, the gender-specialisation of paid labour was particularly skewed towards
men when their partners had been born in Turkey or Pakistan/Bangladesh. As
appeared in various analyses, Turkish and Pakistani or Bangladeshi migrant
women are at particularly high risks of being outside of the labour market and
economically dependent on their husband as the couple’s sole breadwinner.
The contrast was not quite so strong with regards to unpaid labour, and the
greater gender-polarisation of domestic and care labour in these migrant groups
appeared to be more driven by migrant men than women. It is clear, however,
that these groups tend to implement a more rigid separation of gender roles. As
noted in the relevant literature, part of the motive for marrying a woman born
in Turkey or in Pakistan or Bangladesh are to honour kin networks and debts
(Ballard, 1990), but it is also often linked to wishes to partner with women who
are expected to be more traditionally-minded’, more willing to abide by a strict
gender-specialisation of labour and less likely to question the man’s status as
head of household (Huschek, de Valk, & Liefbroer, 2011; Milewski & Hamel,
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2010). Indeed, this can be an explicit element of the bargain, enforced more easily
by the fact that migrant women in these groups very rarely migrate autonomously
and mostly as dependent. It is unlikely that patriarchal expectations play the
same role in men’s migration. Indeed, in the case of male marriage migrants, who
are not uncommon among both Turkish and Pakistani/Bangladeshi migrants,
the expectations of the women they join and who sponsor their migration might
well be towards greater gender-egalitarianism rather than less (Charsley et al.,
2020; Lievens, 1999). This brings me to discussing the role of union-migration
sequences, which lends some credence to a broad interpretation of the Lievens
hypothesis.
Considering trajectories: couple-forming and couple migration, and single
adult migration
The effects linked to areas of origin, especially with the British data, were
oftentimes stronger and/or larger for migrant men than for migrant women.
In contrast, for migrant women, the effect of union-migration sequence often
appeared much more significant for gender dynamics in their relationship, post-
migration. Among the key findings that were consistent across French and
British analyses was the patriarchal effect of trajectories of couple-forming and
established couple migration, when these involved migrant women. Thus for
migrant women, the sequence clusters Formation first partnership and established
first migration were consistently associated across models with greater gender-
specialised divisions of labour. This allows me to state two conclusions, with
some degree of security about their reliability since the findings were consistent
across the two national cases and datasets.
Firstly, one can safely state that couple-forming migration, as captured
by the sequence cluster formation first partnership, tends to be associated with
more gender-specialised division of labour in couples when compared with
autonomous migration, prior to couple formation. In both French and British
analyses, the effect was larger for the gender distribution of paid labour, but also
noticeable (if not always significant) in the unpaid labour distribution. There
is therefore evidence that this particular interlocking of migration and the life
course leads to migrant women being notably less engaged in the labour market
and more likely to be economically reliant on their husband. This is not limited to
certain migrant women, certain migrant groups or endogamous couples, since the
effect persisted in the models that controlled for these other explanations. This is
connected to - but not explained away by - the phenomena of legal dependency,
when migrants (mainly migrant women) are initially legally tied to their partner
for residency rights in the UK or France.
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The fact that this same sequence of family-forming migration is associated, in
migrant men, with noticeably less gender-specialisation in couples corroborates
the theory that this migration trajectory contributes to reshuffling power relations.
It suggests that, schematically, in the process of this union-migration trajectory,
migrants loses some bargaining power relative to their partner, who often sponsor
their migration. This is likely due in no small part to the fact that these migrants
may find it particularly difficult to find paid employment following migration,
which is reflected then in the gender division of labour. But it also likely reflects
their isolation from kin and support networks and a more general dependency
on the native/settled partner for linguistic help, network and money. In fact,
based on the qualitative literature, it is quite possible that native/settled partners
are conscious of this lopsided power dynamic between them and their migrant
partner. For instance, UK or French-born women who are direct descendants
of migrants (or were child migrants) may anticipate that a transnational union
will mean that they will not have to uproot. It will be their husband who will
be more isolated and dependent on them, and therefore will not be in a position
to question their autonomy or to assert patriarchal demands (Charsley et al.,
2020; Lievens, 1999; Shaw, 2014). In parallel, settled or second generation men
may expect that a marriage migrant wife will have more ’traditional’ gender
values, and (correctly) assume that the women will be in a difficult position to
question them (Charsley, 2008). This mode of migration trajectory and partner
selection implies a mix of power and gender representations: in the first case,
aspirations for gender-egalitarianism; in the second case, aspirations for rigid
gender roles and docile ’traditional women’. The heightened gender division
of labour associated with this sequence is linked to the fact that in the case of
marriage migrant women, the women’s migration is expected and organised to
fill in a family role (González-Ferrer, 2006).
The sequence established first partnership was also linked to greater gender-
specialisation for migrant women. This is consistent with the explanations above
since many women in this cluster mostly migrated as family migrants and were
admitted in France as the ’tied partners’ (of a settled migrant or a French na-
tional) in half of cases. It is reasonable to conclude that most women in this
sequence cluster were joining their partner, either after years of marriage but
delayed cohabitation, or more likely in the context of second-mover in family-
stage migration. Therefore, the same reasoning applies about the experience of
migration fostering isolation, dependency on the more settled partner, degraded
labour market participation, performance (González-Ferrer, 2011), and hence
limited bargaining power. There is no evidence here of such trajectories creating
windows of opportunities for less gender-specialisation in households, although
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there is no comparison with the couple’s arrangement prior to migration. Ad-
mittedly, however, even in Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994)’s account, these windows
were contingent on a number of other things, notably labour market participa-
tion. The big picture is that, when compared to single adult migrant, women
who migrate while already in a established relationship tend to end up in more
gender-specialised relationships.
In the case of established first partnerships, we do not observe the reverse effect
for migrant men in this sequence, as we did with the formation first partnership
sequence. If anything, the sequence seems more often associated with greater
gender-polarisation, even for migrant men. This is coherent if we consider that
though migration perhaps happens at the same time in the life course for migrant
men and migrant women in this sequence, they do not refer to the same dynamic,
because women in this sequence typically follow a partner, while men in this
sequence typically lead (González-Ferrer, 2006). Indeed, if we consider the
breakdown of sequences by legal admission category, as allowed by the French
data (figure 7.5), it is clear that most migrant men who follow this trajectory do
not actually migrate as family migrant and are rarely sponsored by their partner
(7.5). This case thus highlights that even when migration occurs at the same point
in women and men’s life course, it does not follow that they tread the same legal
pathways. Both migration trajectories and the life-course have to be considered
in distinctly gendered ways.
The numerical domination of work visa for migrant men in almost all
sequence clusters can help explain why union-migration sequences do not impact
on migrant men’s couple dynamics to the same extent that they do for women. If
we go by the French data, it is only in the sequence formation first partnership that
family-related visas are the most common mode of entry for adult migrant men
(putting aside child migration). It is no coincidence then that is also the sequence
that is most likely to be associated with reduced gender-polarisation.
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FIGURE 7.5: Percentages by legal admission category, by se-
quence cluster
Overall, the single adult sequence used as reference level was associated
with less gender-specialisation of labour for migrant women. The migration
of women can foster empowerment, even compared to native women, but it
appears to hold this possibility only for these very specific and selective forms of
autonomous migration which constitute a small minority of women’s migration.
I chose to use this particular sequence as a baseline in all models because it fits
best with what was long considered the default mode of migration (single, adult,
etc), and because this trajectory could be considered to be mostly consistent and
comparable for both men and women (whereas, as we have seen, family-related
trajectories are more likely to encompass very gendered realities).
It is clear however that single, adult migration is not an obvious baseline,
especially for women. It is likely that it involves a very specific profile of women,
who both have the resources and the autonomy to decide to migrate indepen-
dently. In this respect, it refers to a scenario of female migration that is more
extra-ordinary than ordinary. One thing that the descriptive analyses by se-
quences made clear was that couple formation, to a large extent, conditions the
migration of women. It is a small minority of migrant women who do not migrate
under the tutelage of a parent (as child migrants) or in the context of a forming
or pre-existing relationship. This does not imply that partnered women have no
agency. However, this agency should not be overplayed: modes of migration,
mode of conjugality and partner choice are heavily constrained by immigration
restrictions. In addition, agency is constrained by social relations (including but
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not limited to gender relations) in the society of emigration and in the society of
immigration.
Toma and Vause (2014)’s studies on Senegalese and Congolese migrations
showed that women’s migration - even when excluding marriage and partner
migration - tends to be organised around and to rely on close relatives and kin
networks. Men’s migration is overall less dependent on close kin and draws on
looser networks, but the sharpness of the contrast between men and women’s
migration and the types of networks that facilitate them is linked to gender
inequalities and regimes; in comparatively more patriarchal Senegal, women
are unlikely to migrate as single adults unless it is within the framework and
control of a close kin network; meanwhile, in Congo, Toma and Vause (2014)
found no evidence of significant differences between the networks drawn on by
men and women who migrate. This helps make two important points: firstly,
even single adult migration may reflect different migration experiences - e.g.
different networks - for men and women, and therefore the homogeneity of
the baseline category cannot be considered entirely foolproof. Secondly, single
adult migration does not necessarily denote autonomy or independence from
family or kin networks and their demands, though - if nothing else - it implies
independence from partner.
Considering trajectories: child migration, separation and remarriages
In the French analyses, migrant women in the Child migrants (1.5G) cluster
were significantly more likely to take on a greater share of the unpaid labour
(and a smaller share of the paid labour) than women who had migrated as single
adults. The same did not apply for migrant men and the link was more tenuous
in the British sample. There are some hints of a similar gender divergence, and of
child migrant women being in somewhat more patriarchal couple arrangements
(notably when using the labour-time share measures (index 2)), but child migrant
women never significantly differ from migrant women in the Single adult sequence
cluster with regards to the gender division of labour. This may have to do with
the baseline category which, as discussed, differs subtly between the French and
British models.
The observation that young migrant girls, compared to young migrant boys,
may grow up in to form relationships that are more gender-polarised is ground
for questions. It has been argued that there may be greater monitoring and
policing of girls by migrant families at least in some migrant groups including
Mexican and Asian families in the U.S. (Das Gupta, 1997; Suárez-Orozco, 2001;
Min Zhou & Bankston, 1999) and Turks in Europe (e.g. Idema and Phalet (2007));
if they are more tightly monitored than boys, migrant or second generation girls
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may also have less wiggle room to go against gender roles and less agency in
partner selection and the notion of their intermarrying may be less tolerated. This
cannot however be easily investigated and certainly cannot be generalised: in
cultures with preferences for sons (e.g. Chinese), families may be more involved
in the monitoring and controlling sons’ socialisation and selection of partner.
Either way, there is no automatic connection between the potential monitoring of
daughters, a greater control on partner selection and more polarised gender roles
in ensuing relationships. Greater monitoring does not mean that individuals
have no agency, though perhaps agency has to be exercised in more subtle ways.
Migrant women from the younger age groups and women from the ’second-
generation’ may be more attached than their parents to ideas of companionate
and egalitarian love, but these aspirations of love and conjugal equality may
be at odds with those of their partners, and indeed are often at odds with re-
alities of unequality (Twamley, 2012). More generally, even if migrant women
and their daughters may be more prone than migrant men and their sons to
declaring and/or adopting gender-egalitarian values (e.g. Roeder and Mühlau
(2014), Idema and Phalet (2007)), this does not necessarily translate directly and
practically into more egalitarian divisions of labour. For that matter, this is in
no way specific to migrants or ethnic minorities, and applies also to white, ed-
ucated and middle class Western natives (see, for example, the recent work by
Daminger (2020) on how couples use ’de-gendered’ narratives to justify gender-
specialisation).
Twaley’s account of Gujarati couples’ narrative of love, intimacy and gender
relations is illustrative here. Though the women in her study insisted on the
egalitarian nature of the couples’ dynamics and on the gender-egalitarian atti-
tudes of their husbands, the husbands in question were, in contrast, quite clear
on their position as head of household, their control over their wives’ degree of
engagement in paid work, and their wives’ paramount duties towards domestic
and care work (Twamley, 2012). Twaley’s diagnosis is that the narrative of ’love’
and ’companionate marriage’, in this context, was actually disempowering for
women, because recognising and questioning the couple’s unequal dynamics
would have appeared as cracks in the success story of love and intimacy, and the
attachment to this story meant that no such cracks could be acknowledged.1
Since migrant women - especially from South Asia, Turkey and North Africa
- who migrated as children are likely to be partnered with other migrants or
1This critique of narratives of love echoes central ideas of second-wave feminists (e.g. De
Beauvoir (1949)). Their argument was that ’love’ and intimacy is used to cajole women into
accepting unequal arrangements and subjugated situations. It collides with Gidden’s theory, which
suggest that the modern emphasis on the emotional bond between partners naturally fosters
empathy, respect, hence greater equality between partners.
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with direct descendants of migrants (while men who migrated as children are
comparatively more likely to form mixed unions with the native majority group),
it could be expected that these women’s partners will be less attached to gender-
egalitarianism than they are (also because migrant men and descendants of
migrant men tend to follow slower paths of gender-acculturation (Roeder &
Mühlau, 2014)). Based on Twaley’s work, individuals’ greater involvement in
their partner selection and greater attachment to love-based marriages among
the second and the ’1.5 generation’ may neither lead to nor help with negotiating
less-gender-specialised roles in their relationship.
When it comes to the connection between union-migration trajectories and
the gender-specialisation of labour, the British and French analyses differed
mainly with regards to the partnership reconfigurations trajectories. The effects
associated with this sequence cluster were not consistent for migrant women in
France and in the UK. While there was no difference of any sort in the French
case between single adult migrant women and women marrying after the end
of a relationship, the same sequence cluster was associated with a distinctly
gender-polarising effect for migrant women living in the UK. Interestingly, this
effect played out most strongly for the division of unpaid labour between mi-
grant women and their partner. There are no obvious differences here between
the French and British data: almost half of it is made of EU migrants in both
cases, with a further 20 to 25% consisting of migrants from ’other’ areas, and
the migrants in this cluster migrate at around the same age (33). One gender
difference that should be noted in the British case, is the higher incidence of
African migrants among men (23% of men, compared to 4% of women), and
more importantly perhaps, the higher incidence of Southeast Asian migrants
among women (13% of women, compared to 4% of men in the cluster). In the
French case, there is no such group of Southeast Asian migrants among women in
this sequence cluster: the distribution by migratory origin is gender-symmetrical
and follows roughly the same pattern as the men in the equivalent British cluster.
This leads me to conclude that it is this particular population of Southeast
Asian women (who migrate after the dissolution of a first union and often as a
new union is forming) that may explain this discrepancy. Biographical trajectories
that follow this line have been described by Suksomboon (2011) in her ethno-
graphic study of Thai marriage migrant women. Many of the women in question
(half, to be precise) had been previously married to a Thai partner. Their marital
past stigmatised them in the eyes of Thai’s gendered conceptions of sexuality,
which mostly overlooks men’s previous and extra-marital sexual experiences,
but holds that the same actions make women unfit (’impure’ 2011, p. 233) for
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marriage. This made it difficult for these women to re-partner within Thai soci-
ety, whereas, in contrast, women’s past sexual or conjugal experiences were not
perceived as a major hindrance by the Dutch men they ultimately partnered with.
Through marriage migration and partnering with a European husband, they
had sought ’new beginnings’, greater opportunities, and many had also hoped
for more equality (see also Riaño and Baghdadi (2007)). However, societies of
immigration and their status as dependent, combined with the patriarchal expec-
tations of their sponsor partner, had led to highly gender-specialised divisions
of labour - something which the women in Suksomboon’s study resented, and
which in some cases led to separation (Suksomboon, 2011, p. 224). As to why
these scenarios would be more likely to involve British (or Dutch) rather than
French men, perhaps the answer is as simple as the contrasting scale of British
and French tourist flows,2 and the language barrier. While English is mandatory
in Thai schools and widely spoken in Thailand (and in the Netherlands), French
is much less common, which may limit the possibility of developing intimacy
between French visitors and Thai natives.
This brings us back to the need to contextualise men and women’s migra-
tion, partner selection and gender relations, within ’gendered geographies of
power’ (Mahler & Pessar, 2009). That is, at the junction between the power
imbalance that links native/settled partner and migrant partner and often goes
hand-in-hand with trajectories of ’geographic hypergamy’; the globalisation of
the marriage market; the development of mass tourism in Southeast Asia; and
Western orientalist perceptions of Asian women as simultaneously attractive and
docile. It also highlights the need for more research connecting migration and
separation in the life-course, as migrant women’s social status and bargaining
power can be greatly altered by marital breakdown, and motivations to migrate
can be linked to re-partnering efforts. Trajectories of migration post-separation
(which are not limited to trajectories of re-partnering) appeared in this study
as singular but altogether not anecdotal cases for both mixing and gender re-
lations. There is however very little empirical research to draw from on these
particular migration and family processes (for an exception and a discussion of
this oversight in existing scholarship, see Mand’s work on migrant Sikh women
negotiating separation (2005)).
2According to statistics from the Thai department of tourism and sports (Visitor statistics,
1998-2016), in 2008 and prior there were over twice as many British visitors (over 800,000 in 2008)
than French visitors (just under 400,000 in 2008). Though French tourism has most caught up since.
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FIGURE 7.6: Gender-specialisation of labour (Index 1), migrant
women and migrant men in France (top) and in the UK (bottom)
Estimates from survey-weighted linear models. Not displayed but included in the models
are: age and age-squared, age gap, control for unemployed couples.
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FIGURE 7.7: Model estimates UK: gender-specialisation (index 2 -
distribution of labour time)
Estimates from survey-weighted linear models. Not displayed but included in the models
are: age and age-squared, age gap, control for unemployed couples.
7.1.3 Mixedness, migration and gender
This thesis thus established that, when it comes to migration and the gender
division of labour in couples, it matters both where people came from and how
they came. But what about who they partnered with? Here I come back to the
question of partner selection and specifically mixedness and whether and when
it can foster more gender-equality in couples.
Descriptively, I found that migrants who mixed with majority natives are
recruited disproportionately among EU-migrants (and Old Commonwealth coun-
tries for the UK), and tend to follow different migratory paths: mostly child mi-
gration, and in the case of migrant women, also couple-forming migration. This
already suggests that classic theories of family migration, notably of economic
inspiration (e.g. Mincer (1978)), cannot appropriately account for these couples’
migration and/or their gender-specialisation, because for an overwhelming ma-
jority of them, they do not make a decision to migrate as a couple. Either because
both of them already live in the country of immigration when they meet (when
child migrants are involved) or because only one of them (typically the woman)
migrates in order to join the other (when couple-forming migration is involved).
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These couples do not by any stretch represent rare or exceptional cases - they
are much more common than transnational unions involving second-generation
migrants, which are however much more discussed and researched. It is both
important and useful, therefore, to specifically study them and their gender
arrangements, in order to refine and nuance understandings of migration as
gendered and gendering, which have mostly been focused on migrant couples
and on couples formed by migrants and descendants of migrants.
The fact that migrants who partner with majority natives have different
union-migration trajectories and are recruited from specific (mostly white) groups
while entirely excluding groups that are most associated with gender-polarised
divisions of labour (notably Turks and Pakistanis/Bangladeshis) could be ex-
pected to already contain the explanation as to why these couples appeared
overall less gender-specialised than other relationships formed by migrants. Yet
as we saw, this was only true of couples formed by a migrant man and a majority
native woman.
The fact that couple-forming migration was an important feature for mi-
grant women/native majority men couples provided then a way to interpret the
observed difference between the two gender configuration of MIG-NAT couples
(migrant women/native majority men, or migrant men/native majority women).
Indeed, once accounting for area of origin and for union-migration sequence
(along with the other controls), the effect of partnering with a native majority
partner seemed of little relevance to explain the gender division of labour in
migrant women’s couples. This was not the case for migrant men. In the French
analyses, and in the British analyses based on time shares, migrant men in MIG-
NAT unions were found to have less gender-specialised arrangements with their
partner than other migrant men with migrant or second-generation partners.
This gender-equalising effect could be observed for both unpaid labour and paid
labour division, although in the British analyses, it only shows in the time-share
models. The French analyses also picked up a gender-equalizing effect associated
with mixedness for migrant women, but only for unpaid labour division. This
did not show in any of the British models.
How to interpret this? For migrant women, it appears that partnering with a
native majority French or British man does little to enhance gender equality in the
household as such. The way women migrate and the context in which they form
their relationship definitely matters for the gender roles they ultimately develop.
But the migratory background of their partner does not appear very decisive.
As the qualitative literature had suggested, partnering with a Western man is
not a ticket to gender-equality and definitely not when it involves moving to the
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man’s country (Dos Santos Silva, 2012; Heyse, 2010; Riaño & Baghdadi, 2007;
Suksomboon, 2011). It is possible that native majority French men contribute
somewhat more to housework and care work, compared to migrant or second-
generation men, but this does not permeate into paid labour division.
What of migrant men’s experiences of conjugal mixedness with a native
majority French or British woman? In their case, mixedness is associated with
reduced gender-specialisation, which could be interpreted in two ways: one, the
’native premium’ gives their native partner an advantage in the power relation,
which translates into less gender-specialisation. However, since the vast majority
of the migrant men in these unions were child migrants, it is unlikely that their
partner would have a great advantage over them. It is also possible that while
picking a native majority partner is an option that seems more open to men
who were child migrants than to their female counterparts, it comes at the cost
of a degree of alienation and distance from their own group and kin, which
subsequently weakens their position in the couple compared to other migrant
men. But this should also apply to migrant women, and the absence of a clear
gender-specialising effect of mixedness for migrant women undermines this
interpretation. It seems more credible, therefore, that the gender-equalising
effects associated with migrant men’s mixedness are linked to a combination of
self-selection, conjugal mixedness and what partnering with another migrant
comparatively entails.
Firstly, migrant men who partner with native majority French or British
women may be recruited among the migrants who are least attached to their
migrant/ethnic group and traditions. This greater independence and the will-
ingness to cross group lines by mixing may translate also into more openness
towards subversion of social norms in other areas: for instance, in gender roles
and representations. Secondly, the experience of mixedness as such may fur-
ther foster this (Collet, 2015). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we have
to consider the weight of the alternatives. The most common one by far is for
migrant men to partner with another migrant. In that case, it is highly likely that
the wives followed migration-union trajectories which we have identified as in-
creasing gender-specialisation. Even among child migrants (which, as discussed,
constitute most of the migrant men who partner with majority native women),
cases of former child migrants partnering with primary migrants are very likely
to involve couple-forming migration for the second migrant partner. Cases of
child migrants partnering with the native-born second-generation are rare, but
they are also likely to reflect active endogamous strategies and to entail a degree
of expectations and control by the community in the UK or France and by the kin
networks that assist in forming these unions. Part of these expectations revolves
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around cultural and gendered expectations, and these situations and mode of
union formation can in fact be feared and avoided by second-generation women
for this exact reason (Charsley et al., 2020; Lievens, 1999). The explanations I
offer are multilevel: to summarize, the fact that for migrant men, partnering
’out’ with a native majority partner is connected with comparatively greater
gender-equality is likely explained by the fact that, firstly, the migrant men who
intermarry tend to be selected among the most assimilated migrants and the
most egalitarian; secondly, partnering with majority native partner is unlikely to
be invested (by men and/or their family) with gender-conservative expectations
(rather the contrary); and thirdly, partnering with a majority native partner in the
country of immigration does not involve patrilocal relocation for the woman -
whereas it often does if the partner is a migrant man. Accordingly, female native
partners are comparatively more likely to be in work and less likely to be cut
from their social networks, etc.
This therefore suggests that there is something specific to mixedness, for mi-
grant men only, which in the case of migrant-native (MIG-NAT) couples involves
explanations linked to specific family formation and migration trajectories, and
to mixedness as such, in the sense of the crossing of social boundaries perceived
as structuring a given society. Here it is useful to finally take advantage of the
ethnic question in Understanding Society. If we replace the migrant group by the
ethnic group, and if we replace migrant-native mixing by inter-ethnic mixing,
what do we get? The models presented in figure 7.8 show a shape that is entirely
consistent with the other British models discussed previously. We observe the
same result, namely that for migrant men, inter-ethnic unions are associated
with more gender-egalitarianism in labour division, but that the same is not true
for migrant women. Once the models take migration trajectories and migrant
or ethnic groups into account, there is very little evidence that intermarriage
(however defined) enhances gender equality for migrant women. It derives that
endogamy as such is not necessarily a gender equality issue for migrant women,
but the modes of migration and couple formation are.
The ethnic and inter-ethnic lens, rather than the classification by area of birth
and couples’ migratory types as before changes little for the interpretation. The
distinction between Pakistani and Bangladeshi suggests that the effect observed
prior for the category Pakistani/Bangladeshi may have been more strongly driven
by Pakistan migrants. In the main, the analysis is consistent and the ethnic lens
brings little no new information. In fact, it confirms and slightly increases the
effects. Crucially, the importance of union-migration sequences for migrant
women was reaffirmed, as was the disconnect between the effect of sequences for
migrant men and for migrant women.
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FIGURE 7.8: Model estimates: (inter)ethnicity and the gender
specialisation of labour time for migrant women and migrant
men
Estimates from survey-weighted linear models. Not displayed but included in the models
are: age and age-squared, age gap, whether the couple has coresident children under the
age of 16, and a control for unemployed couples.
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7.2 Comparative insights, policy implications, and theo-
retical contribution
7.2.1 General comparison and measures of gender-specialisation
I have discussed the divergences and consistencies between French and
British analyses overall. The general consistency is highlighted by the visual
comparison enabled by the presentation of French and British models in figure
7.6. The models I picked for this were the most directly comparable. They use the
first index of gender-specialisation (as this was operationalised with both French
and British dataset) and only variables that were present in both data sets.
In terms of direction, the estimates for migration sequence are consis-
tent across the French and British models (see figure 7.6). When considering
the estimates for the dependent variables associated with Index 1 of gender-
specialisation (based on joint employment status and tasks), the reduced magni-
tude and significance of the British estimates are to be considered in the context
of the British modified male breadwinner model (Kan, Sullivan, & Gershuny,
2011). The variable on joint employment status does not consider asymmetrical
gender arrangements characterised by women working part-time work and men
working full-time, which is much more common in the UK than in France (Jan
Windebank, 2017). It is not surprising therefore that this variable would be less
discriminating in the British context and that this would subsequently also be
reflected in the estimates for gender-specialisation.
This is also why it is useful to consider the second index, based on time
use and, more precisely, time shares between men and women (see figure 7.7).
Here the parallel with the French models is even more marked. The comparison
between the labour-time approach and the tasks-distribution approach with the
British data demonstrated that the two measures did not capture quite the same
thing (although results were mostly consistent). It also underlined the greater
sensitivity of the labour-time approach. In the absence of finer data for France,
it is difficult to precisely compare estimates for the gender division of labour
between the two cases. Nevertheless, the French models, for unpaid labour
especially, can be expected to correctly suggest the direction of relations, if not
their significance or scale. In this regard they are indeed mostly in line with the
British analyses that model the second index of gender-specialisation.
It is clear from the comparison between French and British data that certain
demographic elements are critical for the gender-specialisation of labour, espe-
cially for women. For migrant women, having a university or other higher degree
is clearly associated, across data and models, with reduced gender-specialisation
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of labour. In the British analyses, this is especially true for the gender division of
paid labour. A high degree of educational achievement in migrant men is less
decisive for the gender division of labour. In the British analyses, it has no effect
whatsoever, while in the French analyses, it is a a very small, gender-equalizing
effect (but at any rate much smaller than for migrant women).
Conversely, living with children under the age of 16 is, unsurprisingly,
associated with more gender-specialisation of labour. The effect is larger for
migrant women than for migrant men. In the British models, the effect is also
larger than in the French model: for migrant women living in France, and all other
things being equal, women with coresident children under 16 are associated with
a 0.1 increase of gender-specialisation (Index 1, ranging from -1 to +1), whereas
the effect is over 0.2 for migrant women in the UK. The greater magnitude of
the children-related effects in the British models holds for paid and unpaid
distribution. Considering the difference in survey design and sample size, this is
to be taken with a pinch of salt. However, it is possible that this also reflects the
better and - crucially - more affordable childcare services and coverage in France.
The most interesting part of this comparison is in fact the gender divergence:
the French analyses find no effect of living with children for migrant men’s
gender-specialisation, when accounting for other factors. But in the British
analyses, the presence of underage children in the home in associated with a
stark increase of gender-specialisation, for migrant men and for migrant women.
This suggests that although there is always a motherhood penalty3 for migrant
women (regardless of who they are with, how they arrived, and where they came
from), this effect is less constant for migrant men. In France, it appears to be
dependent on other factors, which suggests that for migrant men’s relationship,
having children is not as decisive in gender-specialisation as partner selection,
perhaps because native French women are more likely to use public childcare
and to be able to work full-time during children-rearing years.
Throughout this thesis, I have complemented analysis that could be com-
pared between French and British data with one-sided analyses that used data
only available in one or the other dataset. Thus the use of the British ethnic
question in the previous section allowed us to confirm the relevance of boundary
crossing, to refine the analysis by group which underpins the notion of gen-
der culture and to further establish that the effect linked to union-migration
sequences could not be limited to or confounded with effects of ethnic groups
and aforementioned gender cultures. I also used the greater variety of measures
on housework and care work in the British data to refine the analysis.
3By motherhood penalty I mean more than a career delay or a increased wage gap, but a general
shift towards more gender-specialisation in the couple.
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In addition, I took advantage of the information on legal admission category
available in the French data and, building on the general comparability of the
French and British immigration regimes, I was able to push the reasoning further.
The French models identified the legal category of admission as a strong predictor
for the gender-specialisation of labour. To be more precise, they showed that
migrant women who entered the country as the dependent partner of a settled
migrant or a French citizen were more likely to end up in very gender-specialised
couple division of labour, though there was no gendering effect on migrant
men. This emphasizes the need to take into account immigration status and
legal trajectories, to understand the gendered and gendering features of migration
experience and partner selection on a global scale.
7.2.2 Policy implications and critical border theories
This research has several noteworthy policy implications: firstly, it strongly
undermines the notion that intermarrying with the majority British or French
group is a key vector of gender equality for migrant and minority women es-
pecially. Politically, this means that the ’feminist’ or ’pro-gender-equality’ argu-
ments targeted at migrant minorities and endogamous behaviours are wanting:
even if all migrant women intermarried with majority native French or British
people, this study suggests that these marriages would in all likelihood perform
poorly in terms of gender equality between partners. The problems have more
to do with women’s access to independent paths of migration and to opportuni-
ties on the labour market post-migration. From a gender equality perspective,
facilitating these should arguably be a much stronger point of policy focus than
ever-more restrictive policing of family migration, which is largely justified by
the targeting of endogamous behaviours (through e.g. policies against arranged
marriages and ’chain migration’).
The analyses presented in this thesis suggest that certain paths of migration,
notably marriage migration and couple reunification, may especially lock women
into rigid gender-specialised roles. Yet this should in no way be taken as an
argument to undermine family migration provisions. As Schrover and Moloney
(2013) recount, there have been initiatives in the past, driven by feminist critiques,
notably of the dependent status of reunified or marriage migrant women. But
these initiatives have often back-fired, when the critiques were co-opted into the
stigmatisation of migrant families, used to feed into anti-immigrant sentiment
and to undermine the right of migrants to live with their family. As many
have argued in opposition to stated objective of drastically cutting down family
migration in France and the UK - this type of migration is anchored to the human
right of migrants to have a family life (Héran, 2017). The last thing I would want
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is for this work to be used to undermine or suspend this right, which when it
comes to migrants is already much too often compromised.
The critique I have tried to articulate here, which emphasizes the impor-
tance of the life course and of migration trajectories, connects with a critical
approach to gender relations and inequalities and how they shape migration
opportunities and outcomes. It also speaks, albeit less directly, with a critique of
Western immigration regimes. The French and British states have, by practically
closing off any entry channel other than family migration for non-EU migrants,
condemned most prospective migrants to illegal or family migration, both of
which are especially prone to creating situations where women are vulnerable,
economically dependent, and confined to rigid interpretations of gender roles.
It seems clear that, again from a gender equality perspective, the period of time
before sponsored partners can apply for an independent visa should be reduced
rather than increased, which has been the current trend. Indeed, while it is crucial
that partners and family members be allowed to join or follow, it is disputable
whether that should warrant a different, more conditional and restrictive type of
visa.
Autonomous trajectories of migration, notably those of single, adult mi-
grants, may well be the most empowering for women (Sassen, 2005). But they
are precisely the paths that have been most reduced and where selection works
most against women. Gender inequalities at the world scale are such that overall,
women and girls are more likely to be illiterate, less likely to have access to school
or university, and hold less formal qualifications than men and boys (United
Nations, 2021). This puts them at a further disadvantage to fit into British or
French residual labour migration pathways tailored for highly-skilled migrants
(so-called ’chosen immmigration’).
Furthermore, by emphasising the role of couple trajectories in defining gen-
der roles and acknowledging how these trajectories are deeply constrained and
shaped by immigration regimes, this research engages with scholarship in critical
border studies. Western assumptions about what is a ’proper’ family, or an ’au-
thentic’ couple (especially when mixed), or a caring parent, in combination with
gendered and racialised stereotypes, underpin British and French (im)migration
policies and restrictions. This point is particularly compelling when it applies to
the management of intimacy (Stoler, 2010) via family migration visa requirements
and practices (Turner, 2015; Turner & Espinoza, 2019), and via the policing of
intermarriage. Historically, this was explicitly about managing (or preventing)
mixed-race unions (Heuer, 2009; MacMaster, 1997; Thompson, 2009), and it now
polices mainly mixed-nationality status couples (De Hart, 2015). Through the
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immigration requirements and the policing and monitoring that goes with them
(and especially with not meeting them), governments split migrants and families
between normal/abnormal, authentic/disingenuous, tolerable/intolerable. The
working of these biopolitics (Foucault, 1994) also participates in policing and re-
producing highly gendered roles. These often work against migrant women who
are confined to spouse visas and family reunification; but they also work against
men, whose emotional involvement as fathers and partners is often denied (Grif-
fiths & Morgan, 2017; Wray, 2011). Yet in the (rare) cases when men follow or
join their partner, gender roles and inequalities in the home may be profoundly
shaken and re-negotiated. With the typology I used, men’s migration trajectories
and how they fitted in the life course did not appear as a decisive factor for
gender (in)equality in labour division. But this also reflected the fact that the vast
majority of the migrant men follow the same union-migration trajectories. They
either migrate as children, or as single adults, or if need be as lead migrants.
7.2.3 Theoretical contribution
Rather than focusing only on push-pull factors (motives and context of
migration decision) or profiles of migrants (composition) to explain labour dis-
tribution post-migration, the thesis considered migration experience itself as
a potent parameter. In a broad sense, the thesis thus operationalised a theo-
retical framework drawn from feminist theories of migration. These theories
emphasize that gender relations inform and frame all aspects of migration: from
the context of departure (before) to the mode and timing of migration (during)
and its outcomes (after). The thesis further implemented feminist theories by
combining gendered analyses with an analysis of gender relations - that is, by
integrating gender both as an independent and as a dependent variable. Another
parameter, that was left little addressed in these pages, is how both gendered
migrations and gendered outcomes of migration can be affected by the structure
of the labour market in the country of immigration. Some migratory flows such
as those of nurses from the Philippines or the Caribbeans are mainly composed
of women; these flows are linked to a demand for particular skilled labour in the
country of immigration (in this example, the UK). These migrations which are
numerically dominated by women are logically associated with very high levels
of labour engagement among the migrant women involved, even though many
of them were already partnered and/or had children when they migrated (for
more examples see notably the literature on care chains Hochschild (2000), Lutz
and Palenga-Möllenbeck (2012), Palenga-Möllenbeck (2013), and Parreñas (2005,
2015)). Further investigation would pay closer attention to the structure of the
labour market in countries of destination, which would help refine the connection
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between couple formation, migration trajectories and gender dynamics of labour
division post-migration.
Nevertheless, this thesis developed a theoretical architecture that combined
and adjusted theories of gender and labour division in couples to the context of
migration. Indeed, specialisation theory, time availability and relative resources
approaches have seldom been discussed with regards to migrants and minority
groups. In the main, ethnic differences in the gender division of labour, when
they have been studied, have been explained with references to different gender
cultures, which can be boiled down in theoretical terms to variations around
’doing gender’ theories. This thesis laid out this theoretical articulation and made
room for associated culturalist explanations to ethnic differences in the gender
division of labour. These explanations proved to be particularly relevant to under-
standing migrant men’s relative contribution to paid and unpaid labour in their
relationships. However, I also expanded the theoretical framework by putting
emphasis on how migration experiences and trajectories can affect the resources
of migrants, hence also the power balance between migrants and their partner
post-migration. Drawing there mostly on relative resource theory, I argued that,
in the context of migration, other resources than purely economic resources need
to be considered relevant to couples’ internal bargaining. Specifically, native
and more settled partners can leverage a settled or native ’premium’. This ’pre-
mimum’ can take the form of legal sponsorship in cases of dependent partner
visas: the asymmetry induced by partner visa is thus one thing that can affect
the relative bargaining power of partners in the context of migration. Further
resources to consider include for instance better language skills and access to
local networks and opportunities. When these resources are unevenly distributed
between partners - typically when one partner is a recent migrant and the other a
native of the country of residence -, this creates situations of dependency towards
the native or more fluent and better integrated partner. These asymmetries and
dependencies can be missed by using a classic economic lens (e.g. income or asset
distribution) to assess the relative resources of each partner. Yet in the context
of migration, they are highly relevant to understanding the power dynamics
and bargaining context of couples, arguably especially those of migrant-native
couples. The focus on migration trajectories to explain the division of labour post-
migration draws directly on this theoretical construction. Namely, it posits that
certain migration trajectories (e.g. couple-forming or couple migration) can foster
multi-leveled forms of dependencies for marriage migrants or trailing migrant
partners, which in turn affects their bargaining power in the negotiations around
the distribution of labour in the couple. It is likely however that the strength of
the effect is different depending on whether the (more) dependent partner is a
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man or a woman, as couples tend to be more invested in re-establishing equal
footing between partners when men are dependent (e.g. unemployed) than when
women are dependent.4 This remains open to investigation, as do the relative
explanatory power of different types of asymmetries, e.g. legal, linguistic, social
capital, etc.
This thesis further contributes to nuancing theories of marital assimilation
as they relate to intermarriage. It built on and tested the idea that though theo-
ries of assimilation can explain part of why some migrants and some migrant
groups are more likely to intermarry with the majority native group, these the-
ories leave unaddressed a whole chunk of migrant intermarriage that occur
not through assimilation but through marriage migration. Furthermore, as the
thesis showed, such couple-forming trajectories are common among intermar-
ried migrant women but rare among intermarried migrant men, which lead to
conclude that theories of intermarriage as markers of marital assimilation need
to be amended to account for the gender diversity of paths to intermarriage.
Specifically, though theories of marital assimilation perform well in explaining
migrant men’s propensity to intermarry, they do poorly with regards to migrant
women’s intermarrying, because they do not account for marriage migration for
which status exchange theory provide a better theoretical framework. Theories
of assimilation imply that intermarriage rewards a high degree of assimilation:
it derives that assimilation has to happen before intermarriage. But in the case
of couple-forming migration, assimilation is more likely to occur after (if at all)
rather than before. Theoretically, this means that the link between intermarriage
and assimilation is gendered. Firstly, the link, especially the causal link, is weaker
for migrant women, who, though marriage migration, can intermarry without be-
ing already culturally assimilated; secondly, the temporality is different: migrant
men have to assimilate prior to intermarriage; but in the case of many migrant
women, assimilation happens mainly after intermarriage. The idea that classic
theories of marital assimilation may better account for minority men’s intermar-
rying, while other theories (including status exchange) are needed to make sense
of minority women’s intermarrying is not of relevance only to primary migrants -
it can also informs our approach to the second or third generation.
4See for instance Rao (2020)’s work on how married couples face unemployment, which
highlights the gender disparities in how much time and resources both dependent and bread-
winning partners dedicate to work search depending on whether the unemployed partner is a man
(work search is a couple priority) or a woman (women’s unemployment can much more easily
becomes a status quo).
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7.3 Limitations and avenues for further research
As the literature on internal couple relocation suggested, the gendering
effects of migratory experience are largely linked to the fact that trajectories
are themselves gendered. Certain migratory and conjugal paths are open and
acceptable for men, but not for women, and vice-versa. Gender-conforming
migratory paths (men as independent migrants or as lead movers, women as
marriage migrants or second-movers) also have gender-conforming effects. In the
context of migration, the subversion of gender inequalities, which in a feminist
materialist sense implies the end of gender-specialisation of labour in (as well
as out) of the household, likely comes about through the subversion of gender
norms and regimes around how and when in the life-course men and women
should migrate. This echoes the idea raised in the family relocation literature that
the ’gender display’ dimension may play out most heavily in framing migration
decisions and timing.
In this way, the notion of gendered and gendering paths of migration in-
volves a form of path dependency. Indeed there is evidence of path dependency
effects in gender-specialisation, which indicates that once a couple shifts to even
slightly gendered division of labour, this slows down the process of human
capital accumulation for the woman, which in turn makes it easier to push for
increased gender-specialisation (Kan & Gershuny, 2009). The literature often
mentions the birth of a first child as such a transition, but it seems plausible
that migration alsi works in this fashion, through the complex interplay of gen-
der norms, gender regimes, immigration restrictions and the globalisation of
the marriage market. For migrant women, the union-migration process may
kick-start gender-specialisation and then create career breaks and dependency
which further justify and embed it. In the absence of longitudinal data pre-
and post-migration I cannot investigate this claim as such, but taking advan-
tage of the available longitudinal data would make it possible to analyse the
evolution of the gender division of labour in migrants’ couples post-migration.
This would help better understand whether specialisation continue to increase
following gendering union-migration trajectories or, instead, diminishes over
time, as socio-economic and linguistic integration progresses and perhaps along-
side phenomena of gender-acculturation (Roeder & Mühlau, 2014). The French
analyses suggested that this might be the case for migrant women.
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7.3.1 Endogeneity of gender attitudes and union-migration trajecto-
ries
This also brings us back to an important limitation of this research, which is
the possibility of self-selection into certain union-migration trajectories and mixed
or non-mixed unions based on pre-existing gender-egalitarianism or gender-
conservatism. We know from the literature on intra-national relocations that
couples with gender-specialised arrangements are more likely to migrate (Mincer,
1978; Vidal, Perales, & Baxter, 2016), because they unambiguously prioritise the
man’s employment prospects over the woman’s. It is also highly likely that
gender attitudes orient who follows which paths of union-migration. Gender
ideologies likely influence how open women are to following their partner abroad
(whether as marriage migrants or as second or joint mover) or, conversely, how
open men are to following their partner. Thus gender attitudes could be a con-
founding factor for the gendering effects which I have associated with sequences
of union-migration and mixedness.
Again, having no information on gender attitude pre-migration in the British
data, and none at all (also post-migration) in the French data, it is difficult to
evaluate the merit of this possibility. Yet there is ample qualitative literature
documenting that migrant women, including marriage migrants, are often actu-
ally seeking gender-egalitarianism through migration to Europe, and are even
surprised and disappointed when it does not deliver. To quite a large extent,
women’s gender attitudes and taste for gender-egalitarianism is of limited conse-
quence on the actual division of labour, and gender attitudes are hardly affected
by relocations (Vidal & Lersch, 2019). I have treated union-migration sequences
as if their effects could be isolated from the groups who travel them, based on an
argument that gender trajectories could be distinguished from gender cultures -
that their effects are not only linear but also independent, thus implicitly separable
and cumulative (Sigle-Rushton, 2014; Spelman, 1990). In effect, however, there is
no question that the two interlock. This approach was a research design, aparti
pris, by which I stand, which allowed for an analysis that moved away from
essentialising narratives of gender relations in migrant and ethnic groups. But
it does rely on a assumption of linearity which is no doubt reductive and an
assumption of independence which is to some extent artificial. To improve the
multi-level comparison (between men and women, between mixed couples and
other couples, between trajectories, and between origins) and relax the hypoth-
esis of independence, it may be useful to look at more complex but potentially
better suited methods, such as e.g. exact matching (as fruitfully employed by e.g.
Ichou (2015)).
7.3. Limitations and avenues for further research 319
7.3.2 Limits of the operationalisation of the gender division of labour
Further limitations are linked to the way I operationalised the gender di-
vision of labour. On the one hand, with respect to unpaid labour, I chose to
focus on routine, physical housework (cooking, grocery shopping, and in the
British case, cleaning and tidying). Accordingly, I put aside other tasks such as
gardening and DIY jobs, which are less routine and whose distribution is not
clearly correlated with the other tasks. This was pertinent in order to aggregate
the undertaking of these tasks into a score variable that made sense and to focus
on the distribution of the most ’gendered’ (i.e. ’feminine) labour. But this might
exaggerate the gender-division of labour, since the increase in men’s contribution
to unpaid work has been overwhelmingly to non-routine work (Kan et al., 2011).
Conversely, I have only factored in the housework and care work done
by either partner and ignored (in fact, erased) the work done by other people,
including paid help but also relatives. This design choice is not without problems
for the matter at hand. Firstly, as I have mentioned before, it artificially constructs
migrants’ families as solely nuclear families, which is often a distorted if not
plainly inaccurate prism (Shaw, 2004). Communities and migrants around the
world live and develop extended households and varied family forms that go be-
yond or bypass the man-woman couple unit connected by marriage or a nuclear,
distinctly Western understanding of ’the couple’ (Pyke, 2008). This limitation
is apparent when looking at the Caribbean sample in this study. Though one
of the largest ethnic groups in the UK, the sample was small in this study. This
reflects the fact that this migratory flow is already quite old (many who identify
as ’Black Caribbean’ are grand-children of migrants (Ichou, 2015)), but also that
the narrow couple lens I have used to define couples and families (coresident
man-woman couples) misses many Caribbean families and households, who are
more likely than other groups to involve single mothers (Kulu, 2019) and several
generations of coresident women (Foner, 1979; Shaw, 2014). Most importantly,
in focusing exclusively on the work done by either the man or the woman in
man-woman co-resident couples, the design of the unpaid labour variable can-
not account for the fact that most outsourced labour is in fact done by women,
whether paid (paid domestic workers) or unpaid (grandmothers, sisters, etc.).
When considering the broader picture of who does the labour needed for social
reproduction (Bhattacharya, 2017), it is plain that the design of this variable very
likely under-estimates the actual gender division of labour, at the scale of the
family and household, but also at societal level.
Furthermore, with regards to paid labour distribution, although I tried to
make the best of the data I have, even the average time spent at work weekly
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cannot distinguish the variety of shift work schedule (Lesnard, 2008). This is an
important point, since it is arguable that, nowadays, shift schedules socially strat-
ifies paid work more than the distinction part-time/full time or hours spent in
paid work overall (Vagni, 2020). Migrant workers are more likely to be working
antisocial hours and jobs with poor working conditions and poor pay, especially
in care work, where migrant and racialised women are over-represented. We
could thus expect migrant women, as well as migrant men, to be over-represented
in the kind of time use patterns that denote nonstandard work schedules (shift
work, weekend work, etc). The gender division of labour plays out in different
ways when considering how couples organise and cope with nonstandard work
schedule. The information necessary for such analysis was, however, not avail-
able in the data (which brings us back to the discussion on the segregation of
data on migration and gender in part I). The analysis of migrants’ time use and
detailed patterns of paid and unpaid labour remains open for further, important
research.
7.3.3 Intersectionality: going back to the data
Throughout this work, I have attempted to follow an intra-categorical (Mc-
Call, 2005) approach to the question at hand, on the intersectional assumption
that experiences of migration and mixedness would likely have different conse-
quences and work in different ways for migrant men and for migrant women
and that both categories would hide a high degree of heterogeneity and social
stratification. This intra-categorical approach, characterised by systematically
segregated modelling did highlight different - gendered - dynamics, but it was
also clearly limited both by the sample size and construction, and by the informa-
tion contained in the datasets. Like Choi and Tienda (2018) I conducted separate
analyses to document variations in gender-specialisation separately according to
men’s characteristics and trajectories and women’s characteristics and trajectories.
Sample size and sample design permitting, future studies will expand on this by
combining the perspectives of both partners, so as to assess how husband and
wife’s journeys interact to shape, together, the gender outcomes of migration.
The difficulty in finding adequate points of comparison among white groups
for intersectional analysis is striking. It would have been very helpful, for in-
stance, to work with a large enough sample of North American or Old Common-
wealth migrants, who, contrary to EU migrants, have to submit to immigration
regulations. US-born individuals were the 6th largest migrant group in both the
2001 and the 2011 Census (ONS, 2001, 2011), ahead of Bangladeshis or Jamaicans.
But though there is a long history of immigration and emigration between the UK
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and the USA (and also a sizeable US-born population living in France5), the pres-
ence of these migrants has never been much questioned and consequently they
have never been specifically over-sampled in relevant surveys. White American
women living in the UK who followed or migrated with their partner, perhaps on
a partner visa, would provide a key point of intersectional comparison with e.g.
Caribbean, African or South Asian migrant women with the same trajectories
or pathway of migration. To no small extent, our ability to obtain adequate,
carefully thought-through samples of white migrants conditions our capacity
to offer quantitative investigation of intersectional inequalities in the context of
migration.
It has not been possible in this thesis to ’split’ the predominantly white
migrant groups, purely for reasons of sample size. Notably, this has meant that I
could not compare in the models EU (and in the case of the UK, Irish) migrants,
whose migration is (was) unrestricted, from other predominantly white but
controlled migratory flows (e.g. from the U.S., Australia, etc...). Yet it is of course
very plausible that the fact that EU migrant women are somewhat less likely
to be financially dependent on their partner, is linked to the fact that the entry
and participation in the labour market of the women in that group were greatly
facilitated by the absence of interference, restrictions or induced legal dependency
from the immigration regime. If, however, we had a large enough sample of
’immigration-controlled’ white migrants, it would be much more straightforward
to precisely identify the role of race and by extension of intersectionality in the
link between union-migration trajectories and the gender division of labour. This
is an important path for further work and it represents a crucial empirical need
to understand how race, together with gender, class and immigration regimes,
mediates how gender inequalities are (re)produced in and through international
migration. It is also an important theoretical pre-requisite to avoid reproducing
research frameworks that constitute gender and patriarchal relations as only
relevant to the international migration of non-Western groups - when everything
we know about intra-national relocations within Western countries indicate that
that is decidedly not the case.
It is clear that the emergence of data on gender relations in surveys on
migration and ethnicity was neither the product of chance nor simply a logical
development in a growing interest in gender. It necessitated that people in
positions of power in the survey design had made it their own research object. It
is also clear that as much as patriarchal gender relations are brandished against
migrant and ethnic communities and groups, political pressure at the national
5American women with French husbands formed the case study of some of the seminal French
qualitative studies on conjugal mixedness (Varro, 1984)
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level is not focused on expanding data on that front. The dynamics and actors
within the field of demographic research and on the academic side of survey
designs (as well as the EU agenda of promoting gender equality) were key drivers
here. It is in large part through their influence that topics of family formation,
migration and the gender division of labour co-exist in the data and accordingly
I expect that it is through more of the same that the scope for intersectional
research on gender relations and migration can be expanded.
Survey data, it should be noted, is not the only data available to analyse and
estimate migration flows. Although states and state-backed surveys long had
the monopoly of migration data production, the use of computational methods
has opened new avenues of quantitative data collection and analysis which
bypass survey data and associated politics. Leading in this is arguably Emilio
Zagheni and his team, who have used a variety of digital traces (emails, facebook
and twitter data among others) to calculate non-survey or state registry-based
estimates of international migrations (M. Alexander, Polimis, & Zagheni, 2020;
Zagheni, Weber, & Gummadi, 2017). While these methods hold much promise
- not least because they do not directly rely on states measures - they will help
develop research on gender relations in and throughout migration probably only
if they consciously set out to do so.
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Appendix: Understanding Society: design chronology
FIGURE 9: Appendix: Understanding Society - Extra five minute
questions and targeted samples (McFall et al., 2018, p. 21)
The controversy around the design of the French survey Trajectoires et Orig-
ines (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009)
In the first TeO project presented for approval to the CNIS6 in May 2006, the
questionnaire included questions on migration trajectories, nationality, country of
birth, parents’ country of birth, first visa obtained in France, as well as questions
on religion and respondents’ self-identified and socially perceived skin-colour.
These last two aspects in particular were innovative in the context of a national
survey. Although initially approved, approval is then questioned and delayed,
and the CNIS goes through a series of extraordinay and extraordinarily heated
meetings dedicated to the question of TeO (Héran, 2010, p. 18). The caution at
this point surrounds the questions on immigration status and visa types; religion;
6CNIS: National Council of Statistical Information, the official body that regulates the produc-
tion and use of public statistics in France.
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migratory origins; and skin colour. Ultimately, however, the CNIS approved
all questions, and only put restriction on the distribution of the data: access to
’sensitive’ questions will require a special licence, to be delivered by the CNIS
only. Consequently, the first version of the TeO survey, to be tested out in late
November 2007, included the following questions on skin colour.
“
• “When people meet you, how do you think they see you in terms of [skin]
colour(s)?” (open answer, no predefined categories)
• “And what colour would you personally say that you are?”
” (TeO questionnaire proposal, as approved by the CNIS in 2007)
In spite of the CNIS’ green light, the above ’ethnic questions’ as well as
the questions on religion soon become the topic of a national debate. Highly
unusual in the world of demography, which rarely lends itself (or is submit-
ted) to such political turmoil, the work of survey design and classifications are
discussed on a national, public scale, and the survey designers had to actively
engage in the debate to defend their survey as well as their own epistemologi-
cal and political stances (recounted by Patrick Simon (2015), one of the survey
leads). Opponents to the ethnic questions brought up the dark heritage of the
Vichy regime and its ’Jewish files’, and the shining colour-blindness of French
Universalism and Republicanism. The controversy tore through political lines.
Opposition to the survey linked to French ’Republican’ values was represented
amongst conservatives, yet many in the UMP ranks (including Nicolas Sarkozy)
were also in favour of introducing ethnic statistics, in which they saw a tool to
evaluate integration and to benchmark migrant groups so as to expose the more
’sectarian’ communities deemed ’unable and unwilling to integrate’. Meanwhile,
the Left and centre-Left found itself intensely divided - a recurring pattern when
it comes to the questions of racism and anti-racism in France (D. Fassin, 2012).
In November 2007, SOS Racisme, the biggest anti-racist organisation in France,
launched a petition against the survey’s ’ethnic filing’, which gathered over 100
000 signatories, including the entire front bench of the Socialist Party and the
future president François Hollande7. The part of the left who, along with the
survey team, supports the introduction of ethnic classifications, does it in the
name of anti-discrimination and with the aim of exposing the reality and scope
of racism and racial inequalities in France. Yet even within the INED, tensions
were rife. Hervé Le Bras, an INED researcher and specialist of immigration
7The petition was entitled Fiche pas mon pote!: ’Don’t file my pal’.
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violently attacks the survey and the survey team in the media (Le Bras, Blum, &
Guérin-Pace, 2007). Within the INSEE, the union (Inter-syndicale des salariés de
l’INSEE) also expresses its disagreement with parts of the questionnaire, those
on skin colour especially 8
The pressure rose to such levels that the questions on skin colour were
eventually revoked by a decision of the Constitutional Council, mid-November
2007. This decision stated that
The treatments necessary to the study of measures of people’s diversity of origins, of
discrimination and of integration [. . . ] may rely on objective measures but may not
rely on ethnic origin or race, without going against the principle of article 1 of the
Constitution.
The INED and the INSEE were thus forced to cut these questions out of the
questionnaire, replacing them with a broader question on origins: ’When you think
about your family history, what would you say your origin is?’ (Héran, 2010). The
questions on discrimination retained a skin colour category, so that it was possible
for respondents to state that they have been victims of discrimination because
of their skin colour, but not what their skin colour might be. The questions on
religion, which had also been criticised, were however maintained.
8Very active and very cautious on ’sensitive’ material, the union wanted for an ethics committee
to be set up and tasked with monitoring the production and the results of all studies which may
refer to ethnic or racial origins.
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Appendix: chapter 3
TABLE 1: Appendix: Areas of origin (finer grid) by gender of
migrants
Migrant women Migrant men Together
n %-w n %-w n %-w
Couple types
MIG-NAT 926 34 826 30 1752 32
MIG-2G 221 9 293 11 514 10
MIG-MIG 1720 57 1842 59 3562 58
Total: all couples 2867 100 2961 100 5828 100
Areas of birth
Southern EU 466 18 544 22 1010 20
EU-27: other 341 14 181 7 522 11
Turkey 316 7 366 7 682 7
North Africa 625 28 752 34 1377 31
Sahelian Africa 184 3 215 3 399 3
Africa: other 277 9 284 9 561 9
Mainland Southeast
Asia
264 3 297 4 561 3
Other 394 18 322 14 716 16
Total: all areas 2867 100 2961 100 5828 100
Note: all percentages and means are survey-weighted
Source: TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).
Universe: partnered migrants (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).
FIGURE 10: Appendix: Area of origin over time, among partnered
migrant women and men living in France in 2008-2009
The table above situates the union patterns of couples formed by primary mi-
grants, to compare them with couples formed by natives and second-generation
natives. It presents the weighted proportions of married unions in each couple
types, the proportion of couples living with dependent children (their own chil-
dren, under 16), and the proportion of exogamous couples. The table also adds
the weighted mean age at first marriage and at first child, for men and women
respectively.
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TABLE 2: Appendix: Distribution of areas of origin, educational
level, and family patterns and timing, by gendered couple types















Southern EU 20 17 16 18 29 23 18 22
EU-27: other 23 11 9 14 12 3 6 7
Turkey 1 6 10 7 2 9 10 7
North Africa 16 51 31 28 31 52 33 34
Sahelian Africa 3 1 4 3 2 2 4 3
Africa: other 10 3 10 9 9 5 10 9
Mainland Southeast Asia 3 2 4 3 2 1 5 4
Other 24 10 15 18 14 5 15 14
All areas 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Education
No educational attainment 14 27 32 25 19 32 30 27
High school/professional degree 42 40 47 45 47 50 46 47
Further education 44 33 21 30 34 18 24 27
All educational levels 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Unions and children
% married 77 87 89 85 71 85 90 84
% coresident children under 18 59 75 71 67 60 80 69 68
% parents 82 83 91 87 82 90 90 88
% more than 2 children 24 22 45 36 29 25 45 38
% exogamous 100 28 7 41 100 19 7 36
Ordering
% tied migrants 29 50 33 33 12 27 8 11
% couple before migration 38 49 57 50 16 35 33 28
% migration before couple 62 51 43 50 84 65 67 72
Timing (mean)
















































Note: all percentages and means are survey-weighted
Source: TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).
Universe: partnered migrants women or migrant men (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).
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Most co-resident couples overall are married (72%) , and about half of them
live with children age 17 or younger. These proportions vary however widely
by couple types (see appendix 3). Thus 90% of migrant couples (MIG-MIG) are
married, and they live with dependent children in two thirds of cases. When
primary migrants partner with second-generation natives, the proportion of
married couples drops slightly, but the proportion of couples with young children
in their care is higher still (3/4 of MIG-2G couples). This may also be due to the
fact that second-generation natives are on average younger, something reflected
in the TeO survey and sample (Beauchemin, Algava, & Lhommeau, 2015). Indeed,
this proportion of couples with young children is also higher among couples
formed by two descendants of migrants (2G-2G). On the whole, couples formed
between native majority individuals and native minority (i.e. with migrant
parent(s)) - 2G-NAT couples - behave very similarly to native majority couples
as regards both marriage and children, although they are somewhat less likely
to be married. The same resemblance with native majority couples applies to
those couples that involve a native majority partner and a primary migrant (MIG-
NAT couples). Yet this observation only stands at the level of the aggregate (all
MIG-NAT couples). Distinguishing MIG-NAT couples that involve a migrant
woman and a native majority man (MIGw-NATm), and comparing them with
MIG-NAT couples composed of a migrant man and a native majority woman
(MIGm-NATw), brings to light a clear contrast. WHile MIGm-NATw couples
are in all aspects almost perfectly aligned with NAT-NAT couples, the same
does not apply to MIGw-NATm couples. When a migrant woman is involved,
migrant-native couples are much more likely to be married, although they are
not more likely to be living with children.
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Note: all percentages and means are survey-weighted
Source: TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).
Universe: partnered migrants (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).
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Appendix: chapter 4
FIGURE 11: Appendix: Area of origin over time, among migrant
women and men (with or without co-resident partner) living in
the UK around 2009-2012
TABLE 4: Appendix: Areas of birth (finer grid) by gender of
migrants (partnered)
Migrant women Migrant men Together
n %-w n %-w n %-w
Ireland (Éire) 112 6 80 6 192 6
Southern EU 49 3 46 4 95 4
Other EU-27 324 23 252 18 576 21
USA, Canada, Australia, NZ 105 7 71 6 176 6
Caribbeans 102 3 117 3 219 3
India 332 12 350 14 682 13
Pakistan 259 6 294 7 553 7
Bangladesh 233 3 246 4 479 4
Southeast Asia 118 5 62 3 180 4
Sri Lanka 76 2 78 3 154 3
China 49 2 38 2 87 2
Maghreb + Turkey 32 1 45 2 77 1
Sahelian Africa 94 3 110 3 204 3
Other Africa 288 11 330 15 618 13
Other areas 202 11 172 10 374 10
total: all areas 2375 100 2291 100 4666 100
Note: all percentages and means are survey-weighted
Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).
Universe: partnered migrants (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).
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FIGURE 12: Appendix: Sequences cluster tree: union-migration
sequences (weighted)
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TABLE 5: Appendix: Quality measures for sequences partition












aSource: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012)
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migrant women 25 10 6 36 17 6 100
migrant men 27 14 20 24 11 4 100
MIGW-migm 21 12 5 34 25 4 100
MIGM-migw 19 17 22 23 15 3 100
MIGw-2Gm 30 10 7 42 9 3 100
MIGm-2Gw 32 11 13 36 6 2 100
MIGw-NATm 30 8 8 37 7 10 100
MIGm-NATw 42 11 19 19 4 5 100
couple before migra-
tion
0 2 0 55 35 8 100
migration before cou-
ple
42 19 22 14 1 3 100
tied migrants 1 5 4 63 22 6 100
work 13 20 22 27 13 5 100
studies 15 18 36 25 2 4 100
family 28 9 4 42 14 4 100
none needed 52 9 5 15 13 7 100
other 26 10 14 23 22 5 100
Southern EU 52 16 5 19 7 2 100
EU-27: other 13 8 10 33 21 16 100
Turkey 29 14 4 30 21 1 100
North Africa 25 13 16 33 10 2 100
Sahelian Africa 6 9 31 33 17 4 100
Africa: other 11 15 22 29 17 6 100
Mainland Southeast
Asia
37 19 16 16 11 1 100
Other 13 7 16 36 21 7 100
No qualifications 23 18 11 29 15 3 100
High school or pro-
fessional degree
33 12 11 28 13 4 100
Further education 20 8 20 33 13 7 100
Note: all percentages and means are survey-weighted
Source: TeO1 (INED-INSEE, 2008-2009).
Universe: partnered migrants (in coresident man-woman couples, both partners age 18-60).
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Appendix: chapter 6
TABLE 7: Appendix: Gender division of labour by couple types
(standardized coefficients)
Dependent variable:




2G-NAT (ref=NAT-NAT) −0.048∗∗∗ (0.023) −0.014∗∗∗ (0.014) −0.033∗∗∗ (0.015)
2G-2G 0.180 (0.060) 0.132 (0.038) 0.049 (0.040)
MIG-NAT −0.035∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.061 (0.018) −0.096∗∗∗ (0.019)
MIG-2G 0.153 (0.045) 0.164 (0.028) −0.011∗∗∗ (0.030)
MIG-MIG 0.161 (0.030) 0.171 (0.019) −0.010∗∗∗ (0.020)
Age (couple average) 0.003 (0.001) −0.004∗∗∗ (0.0005) 0.007 (0.001)
Coresident children under 18 (ref=no) 0.166 (0.015) 0.118 (0.010) 0.047 (0.010)
Further education (ref=no) −0.027∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.025 (0.010) −0.052∗∗∗ (0.011)
Constant 0.332 (0.037) 0.185 (0.023) 0.148 (0.024)
Observations 11,629 11,629 11,629
R2 0.017 0.039 0.022
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.038 0.021
Log Likelihood −20,078.720 −14,713.580 −15,356.690
Residual Std. Error (df = 11620) 0.785 0.495 0.523
F Statistic (df = 8; 11620) 24.613∗∗∗ 59.057∗∗∗ 32.172∗∗∗
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05.
Source: UKLHS (ISER-University of Essex), wave 2 (2009-2012).




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































HDI_Rank plbornc_all TeO_regionnaise2 Country_GII GII_pick2011 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
NA missing NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
NA inapplicable NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
NA proxy respondent NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
NA refusal NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
NA don’t know 9999 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
NA other areas NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
169 afghanistan    NA  afghanistan 0.743 NA NA 0.745 0.751 0.743 0.734 0.724 0.714 0.702 0.690 0.673 NA 0.655
69 albania NA  albania 0.249 NA 0.334 0.306 0.242 0.249 0.230 0.221 0.217 0.207 0.205 0.187 0.186 0.181
91 algeria 2101  Algeria 0.500 0.682 0.624 0.552 0.507 0.500 0.419 0.416 0.424 0.427 0.425 0.434 0.433 0.429
148 angola NA  Angola 0.537 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.537 0.534 0.531 0.539 0.537 0.536
46 argentina      NA  Argentina 0.354 0.427 0.417 0.372 0.358 0.354 0.351 0.348 0.345 NA 0.338 0.332 0.328 0.328
81 armenia NA  Armenia 0.337 0.479 0.473 0.392 0.342 0.337 0.320 0.307 0.308 0.309 0.303 0.266 0.264 0.245
8 Australia NA  Australia 0.132 0.180 0.160 0.139 0.138 0.132 0.127 0.119 0.116 0.110 0.108 0.104 0.103 0.097
18 austria 4402  Austria 0.106 0.186 0.150 0.118 0.111 0.106 0.102 0.093 0.090 0.089 0.087 0.079 0.076 0.069
88 azerbaijan     NA  Azerbaijan 0.314 NA NA 0.341 0.313 0.314 0.315 0.318 0.321 0.316 0.317 0.319 0.321 0.323
58 bahamas NA  Bahamas 0.378 NA 0.403 0.363 0.380 0.378 0.379 0.376 0.373 0.367 0.363 0.343 0.343 0.341
42 bahrain NA  Bahrain 0.221 NA NA 0.321 0.247 0.221 0.234 0.230 0.226 0.236 0.235 0.231 0.213 0.212
133 bangladesh     NA  Bangladesh 0.591 0.708 0.683 0.638 0.592 0.591 0.585 0.579 0.570 0.562 0.555 0.542 0.540 0.537
58 barbados       NA  Barbados 0.323 0.392 0.359 0.351 0.327 0.323 0.319 0.306 0.301 0.306 0.298 0.286 0.261 0.252
53 belarus NA  Belarus 0.149 NA NA NA 0.150 0.149 0.154 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.138 0.134 0.128 0.118
14 belgium NA  Belgium 0.086 0.162 0.122 0.104 0.091 0.086 0.081 0.074 0.063 0.057 0.054 0.052 0.048 0.043
110 belize NA  Belize 0.455 0.554 0.516 0.484 0.459 0.455 0.440 0.435 0.430 0.423 0.412 0.418 0.416 0.415
158 benin  2504  Benin 0.633 0.681 0.673 0.655 0.625 0.633 0.628 0.624 0.619 0.624 0.619 0.614 0.613 0.612
129 bhutan NA  Bhutan 0.507 NA NA NA NA NA 0.507 0.536 0.512 0.492 0.481 0.470 0.428 0.421
107 bolivia NA  Bolivia 0.487 NA 0.587 0.550 0.491 0.487 0.483 0.477 0.440 0.440 0.431 0.424 0.419 0.417
73 bosnia and herzegovina NA  Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.201 NA NA NA 0.228 0.201 0.193 0.183 NA 0.168 0.167 0.161 0.158 0.149
100 botswana       NA  Botswana 0.504 0.568 0.519 0.512 0.506 0.504 0.500 0.496 0.483 0.481 0.478 0.473 0.472 0.465
84 brazil NA  Brazil 0.452 0.532 0.510 0.474 0.456 0.452 0.448 0.448 0.442 0.439 0.436 0.428 0.410 0.408
47 brunei NA  Brunei 0.299 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.299 0.269 0.262 0.255
56 bulgaria       4501  Bulgaria 0.243 0.370 0.329 0.253 0.244 0.243 0.229 0.217 0.236 0.227 0.225 0.214 0.213 0.206
182 burkina faso   2407  Burkina Faso 0.610 NA NA 0.641 0.614 0.610 0.605 0.601 NA 0.619 0.616 0.605 0.605 0.594
185 burundi NA  Burundi 0.528 NA 0.624 0.567 0.532 0.528 0.523 0.519 0.515 0.509 0.508 0.505 0.504 0.504
126 cape verde     NA  Cape Verde 0.416 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.416 0.404 0.400 0.398 0.397
144 cambodia       3201  Cambodia 0.502 0.658 0.598 0.568 0.506 0.502 0.497 0.493 0.488 0.483 0.478 0.475 0.473 0.474
153 cameroon       2506  Cameroon 0.614 0.706 0.696 0.654 0.617 0.614 0.611 0.577 0.575 0.572 0.569 0.566 0.561 0.560
16 canada NA  Canada 0.124 0.184 NA 0.139 0.132 0.124 0.121 0.119 0.116 0.114 0.101 0.095 0.088 0.080
188 central african republic       2507  Central African Republic 0.680 0.743 0.711 0.693 0.693 0.680 0.678 NA NA NA 0.694 0.682 0.680 0.680
187 chad   2409  Chad 0.714 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.714 0.713 0.718 0.709 0.710
43 chile  NA  Chile 0.331 0.483 0.433 0.377 0.342 0.331 0.325 0.309 0.303 0.300 0.288 NA 0.253 0.247
85 china / hong kong      NA  China / Hong Kong 0.189 NA 0.269 0.227 0.194 0.189 0.186 0.178 0.175 0.172 0.169 0.168 0.167 0.168
83 colombia       NA  Colombia 0.466 0.524 0.501 0.494 0.468 0.466 0.463 0.461 0.436 0.433 0.431 0.431 0.432 0.428
175 democratic republic of congo   2510 Democratic republic of congo   0.661 NA NA 0.654 0.661 NA 0.655 0.626 0.637 0.641 0.638 0.636 0.635 0.617
62 costa rica     NA  Costa Rica 0.323 0.467 0.427 0.349 0.331 0.323 0.313 0.313 0.321 0.316 0.319 0.311 0.291 0.288
43 croatia NA  Croatia 0.144 0.285 0.205 0.157 0.146 0.144 0.139 0.133 0.127 0.151 0.160 0.131 0.126 0.116
70 cuba   NA  Cuba 0.313 0.422 0.383 0.340 0.320 0.313 0.317 0.316 0.316 0.315 0.312 0.310 0.305 0.304
33 cyprus 4502  Cyprus 0.139 0.331 0.253 0.140 0.132 0.139 0.137 0.134 0.118 0.114 0.091 0.089 0.088 0.086
27 czech republic 4509 czech republic 0.133 0.252 NA 0.153 0.135 0.133 0.133 0.138 0.139 0.134 0.135 0.132 0.135 0.136
162 ivory coast    2501 Ivory Coast 0.667 0.707 NA 0.688 0.678 0.667 0.667 0.664 0.665 0.664 0.660 0.650 0.648 0.638
10 denmark 4405  Denmark 0.052 0.096 0.076 0.064 0.056 0.052 0.049 0.046 0.044 0.044 0.042 0.041 0.040 0.038
88 dominican republic     NA  Dominican Republic 0.483 0.550 0.494 0.494 0.488 0.483 0.480 0.478 0.477 0.472 0.458 0.457 0.456 0.455
86 ecuador NA  Ecuador 0.424 0.592 0.502 0.475 0.425 0.424 0.417 0.403 0.399 0.391 0.383 0.385 0.385 0.384
116 egypt  NA  Egypt 0.579 0.668 0.637 0.579 NA NA 0.574 NA NA NA 0.452 0.451 0.450 0.449
124 el salvador    NA  El Salvador 0.433 0.508 0.511 0.482 0.435 0.433 0.412 0.405 0.400 0.388 0.386 0.384 0.384 0.383
29 estonia NA  Estonia 0.192 0.392 0.291 0.227 0.176 0.192 0.180 0.162 0.171 0.144 0.142 0.118 0.105 0.086
138 NA NA  Eswatini (Kingdom of) 0.555 0.621 0.633 0.592 0.559 0.555 0.551 0.566 0.564 0.562 0.560 0.559 0.567 0.567
173 ethiopia       NA  Ethiopia 0.583 NA NA 0.622 0.587 0.583 0.579 0.570 0.561 0.534 0.528 0.522 0.519 0.517
93 fiji   NA  Fiji 0.435 0.506 NA 0.435 NA NA NA NA 0.377 0.371 0.374 0.380 0.369 0.370
11 finland 4407  Finland 0.073 0.101 0.085 0.088 0.077 0.073 0.070 0.067 0.064 0.063 0.060 0.057 0.054 0.047
26 france 1101  France 0.105 0.185 0.162 0.138 0.107 0.105 0.091 0.089 0.087 0.085 0.081 0.061 0.055 0.049
119 gabon  2508  Gabon 0.551 0.622 0.603 0.581 0.553 0.551 0.545 0.541 0.541 0.537 0.536 0.530 NA 0.525
172 gambia 2403  Gambia 0.654 0.757 0.750 0.654 0.658 0.654 0.651 0.647 0.634 0.631 0.627 0.618 0.614 0.612
61 georgia republic       NA  Georgia Republic 0.406 0.431 0.409 0.391 0.406 0.406 0.364 0.366 0.362 0.359 0.335 0.329 0.327 0.331
6 germany 4403  Germany 0.093 0.156 0.130 0.117 0.097 0.093 0.091 0.083 0.081 0.076 0.076 0.084 0.084 0.084
138 ghana  2502  Ghana 0.576 0.632 NA 0.574 0.577 0.576 NA 0.559 0.557 0.556 0.553 0.542 0.540 0.538
32 greece 4401  Greece 0.148 0.284 0.221 0.179 0.157 0.148 0.135 0.132 0.127 0.124 0.126 0.129 0.125 0.116
127 guatemala      NA  Guatemala 0.539 0.590 0.590 0.585 0.549 0.539 0.528 0.528 0.511 0.509 0.500 0.505 0.503 0.479
122 guyana NA  Guyana 0.492 NA 0.550 0.525 0.498 0.492 0.491 0.483 0.479 0.477 0.472 0.466 0.463 0.462
170 haiti  NA  Haiti 0.632 NA NA 0.593 NA 0.632 0.637 0.635 0.633 0.632 0.776 0.639 0.638 0.636
132 honduras       NA  Honduras 0.469 NA 0.521 0.464 0.470 0.469 0.466 NA 0.434 0.427 0.424 NA 0.425 0.423
40 hungary 4504  Hungary 0.247 0.322 0.293 0.265 0.244 0.247 0.241 0.243 0.235 0.235 0.239 0.243 0.230 0.233
4 iceland NA  Iceland 0.098 0.184 0.148 0.125 0.099 0.098 0.093 0.088 0.083 0.075 0.066 0.069 0.063 0.058
131 india  NA  India 0.585 0.696 NA 0.624 0.590 0.585 0.581 0.573 0.561 0.550 0.541 0.525 0.512 0.488
107 indonesia      NA  Indonesia 0.504 0.574 0.563 0.550 0.508 0.504 0.500 0.498 0.500 0.494 0.491 0.478 0.474 0.480
70 iran   NA  Iran 0.516 0.657 0.593 0.511 0.519 0.516 0.511 0.512 0.516 0.507 0.455 0.451 0.455 0.459
123 iraq   NA  Iraq 0.572 0.707 0.664 NA 0.575 0.572 0.571 0.572 0.578 0.566 0.556 0.584 0.581 0.577
2 ireland (nec)  4409  Ireland (nec) 0.153 0.203 0.198 0.191 0.170 0.153 0.148 0.139 0.135 0.128 0.111 0.105 0.099 0.093
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